Tikkun

A BIMONTHLY JEWISH CRITIQUE OF POLITICS, CULTURE & SOCIETY

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Current Debate: The Pope & the Jews
Reviews: Barry Schwartz, Barry Holtz & Robert Ross

Special Feature:


Michael Lerner
Todd Gitlin
Michael Kazin
Julius Lester

Interview
Betty Friedan

Food, Sex & Money
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Women & Jewish History
Paula Hyman

South African Jews
Steven Mufson

Law & Ideology
Robert Gordon

Israel's Nukes
David Twersky

PLUS

Fiction by Joanne Greenberg, Poetry by Yehuda Amichai
Report from the Gay March in Washington by Jyl Felman
THE YIDDISH MUSES

I—unnecessary, a poet among Jews—
Growing, like wild grass, from a soil not ours
In an alien world I sing of the cares
Of men in a desert beneath alien stars.
Mani Leib (1883–1953)

They arrive, always, unexpected,
Silent as the glide of angels
On six wings. Only the idea of sound,
Wind that for a moment might be ocean.
I want to catch them, to make something
For them, a city or at least a psalm,
But I have nothing to build it with.
Yiddish is no language for poetry, so homely
On the page, vowels instead of silences.

Unnecessary, a poet among Jews,
I end up wandering the streets
With unknown visitors, who speak
In a language round and thick
As pillows squashed against my head.
They are telling dreams, so old,
So corny, dreamed by now in almost
Every language and a few elements:
Wood, stone, even gold, preserved
In cloth with needles and silk thread.

They have left a little dreaming
Everywhere: watery cities, towered cities,
Even in Cordoba, blank with sun, so white
And so unlikely, they left a whole room
Engraved with psalms. Judah Halevi
Left a palace and a family. Tired
Of poetry and dreams, he headed East.
After that, no one is certain.
They say he was trampled by a Turkish horse
As he kissed the earth, arriving in Jerusalem.

You will tell me this is not a pleasant story,
But you know nothing about dreams.
What would have happened if the sun
Had bowed to Joseph? I know for a fact
It would have killed him and any unsuspecting
Bystanders. I suppose we must be patient
Here, at the stony end of the ladder.
Only angels can go up and come back down.

I stay awake nights, though I’d give
Anything to see the curved backs
Of stars, and wonder who needs ladders
With three sets of wings. I watch shadows,
Cast by my Venetian blinds, stretch
Across the ceiling like the tracks
For unknown trains. Can you blame me
If I ride and ride, unnecessary as I am
And dangerous, a dreamer among Jews?

The muses burst out laughing, “Some dream.”
All morning, in synagogue, they chuckle
As they praise The Name, “Some prize to be a traveller
Among Jews.” Still, they manage silence
For the eighteen prayers, establishing that routine
Miracle, reordering of heavens, Jerusalem
Rising like the sun above their heads,
Above, even, the women’s section, higher
Than any memory its walls and domes.

JACQUELINE Osherow

Jacqueline Osherow, whose work appears in The New Yorker and the
Times’ Literary Supplement, lives in New Jersey.
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A catalyst for long-term social change, we empower people and communities to heal the world by embracing revolutionary love, compassion, and empathy. We support ethical, spiritual, economic, and political ideas that seek to replace the ethos of selfishness, materialism, nationalism, and capitalism with an ethos of generosity, caring for everyone on the planet (including animals), and every attempt to build local and global solidarity while enhancing love.

Tikkun magazine grew out of the empirical research of the Institute for Labor and Mental Health chaired by Rabbi Michael Lerner, which focused on the stress that people often experience in the world of work and which is often brought home into personal life. We discovered that the capitalist ethos is held together by a series of beliefs that must be dismantled in order to build a society that strengthens the love and caring relationships in both families and friendship circles. Among those toxic beliefs:

1. The fantasy that we live in a meritocracy, create our own world, and hence have only ourselves to blame if things are not turning out in the way that we might have wished. While we encourage people to do what they can to make their lives more fulfilling, we also want people to understand what we are all up against: the vast inequalities of wealth and power by the top 10 percent of wealth holders (in the US and globally), and thru that their ability to exercise the control over the media and much of the educational systems and large corporations.

2. This self-blaming is reinforced by a political system that makes it very difficult for ordinary citizens to believe that they can have any substantial impact on changing the system. Whether in politics or in personal life, people tell each other that seeking major changes is unrealistic and that they themselves are unrealistic if they think they can achieve major changes.

3. Many people have religious or spiritual beliefs that incline them to want to live in a society where people care for each other and for the planet. Yet most of the movements for societal change ignore or even ridicule those beliefs, driving many to embrace the Right Wing movements that welcome them. Tikkun brings to public expression those very hopes and yearnings that have been denied so long and suppressed so deeply that we no longer know they are there. Thus we advocate for far-reaching approaches that include pushing Israel to help Palestinians establish their own independent state living in peace with Israel, a Global Marshall Plan, and the ESRA Environmental and Social Responsibility Amendment to the US Constitution.

We created Tikkun magazine to bring these ideas to a large constituency. We strived to provide a wide, open, and welcoming tent - a space for rich intellectual, spiritual, and political exploration. For that reason, we published many articles from a wide variety of belief systems and religions, not all of which we agreed. We believe that people learn and grow by reading perspectives different from their own.

We are no longer in print. We struggled to raise enough money because of the controversial positions we take. On one hand, some progressives dismiss spiritual discourse as inherently flakey or reactionary, see our position on Israel as too soft, and are unhappy with our refusal to engage in demeaning discourse, such as labeling all whites as racists or all men as sexist, even as we called for reparations for victims of every form of historical oppressions. Many liberals, on the other hand, found our criticisms of Israel too upsetting and our advocacy for the human rights and dignity of Palestinians too challenging.

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CONVERTS

To the Editor:

Nan Fink’s conclusion in her review of Mixed Blessings (Sept./Oct. 1987) is right on the mark. It is vital that the Jewish community reach out to the intermarried and welcome those who wish to convert to Judaism.

The major arguments for welcoming such conversions suggested in the review are family stability and demographic self-defense. There are also many supplemental reasons for Jews to welcome converts.

First, Judaism can provide a spiritual home for many people searching for such a home, whether or not a marriage to a Jew is involved. Second, welcoming converts would be a return to Judaism’s roots. It was only after the loss of national sovereignty in 70 C. E. that Jews took the prudent route of discouraging conversions so as to avoid confrontation with the vastly more powerful non-Jewish communities that had outlawed conversion. Third, an increase in converts will familiarize the converts’ families with Judaism and thereby reduce anti-Semitism.

Clearly it is time that we Jews make conversion available for those who wish it, make it spiritually enriching, eradicate any humiliation or rejection attached to it by some benighted members of the Jewish community, and provide support in integrating these Jews by choice.

Lawrence J. Epstein
Stony Brook, New York

THE POPE

To the Editor:

The Rabbinical Council of America and the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America were the only constituent organizations of the Synagogue Council of America that opposed participation in the ceremonial meeting with the pope at Miami. The Rabbinical Council of America was cool to participating in the Miami meeting from the time the invitation was first tendered and adopted a negative view as soon as the Vatican’s invitation to Waldheim was announced. We were unimpressed with the meetings in Rome and consequently did not permit Rabbi Gilbert Klaperman, a past president of our organization and the current president of the Synagogue Council of America, to head the Jewish delegation at Miami.

You may also be interested to know that the Central Conference of American Rabbis and the Rabbinical Assembly initially abstained in the Synagogue Council of America vote to go to Miami. Only the Rabbinical Council of America of all the rabbinical organizations, however, had the courage of its convictions to oppose participation in the Miami event.

Also, as you may know, the initial reaction to the decision of the Orthodox groups not to go to Miami was quite negative. However, as time goes on, more and more influential voices, such as yours, are being heard in favor of the position that we have taken.

There will be issues on which we undoubtedly disagree from time to time, but I am glad that we are on the same side on this one.

Rabbi Milton H. Polin
President
Rabbinical Council of America
New York, New York

To the Editor:

Your articles on the subject of the pope and the Jews should be commended for their timeliness as well as frankness on a burning subject that through the demeaning behavior of our so-called “leaders,” has brought us much disgrace in recent weeks.

The question as to whether demonstrations could bring about more anti-Semitism reminds me of a real-life incident that was related to me by the late Orthodox Rabbi of Copenhagen, Rabbi Wolf S. Jacobson. When the Danish Jews were rescued by Danish fishermen from Nazi deportation in October 1943, the rabbi found himself in the boat heading for the Danish coast, in which also the head of the Reform Congregation was huddling. As they reached haven in Swedish waters, the rabbi rose and loudly pronounced the age-old benediction “Sheheeyo ve’kiyaman ve’hiyiyano laz’m man hazzeh.” Promptly, the Reform leader excitedly tried to hush down the rabbi, saying “Herr Rabbinder—you are creating anti-Semitism!” Some of the Jews just never learn....

The attitude of the Vatican has not changed. Not so long ago, in 1904 Pope Pius IX told Theodor Herzl, who had come to explore the Vatican’s view of a Jewish State, that “the Jews have not recognized our savior, we will therefore never recognize the Jewish people.” And even in our own day, “The good Pope,” John XXIII, when he was still Papal Nuncio in Istanbul during World War II, said “It would be ungrateful of the Jews to find a Jewish State in view of all that the Vatican has done for them.”

There can be no doubt that the Vatican’s refusal to recognize Israel is strictly based on theological embarrassment at the reemergence of a Jewish State. If they say that it has political reasons they simply do not speak the truth.

But realizing the theological hang-ups that make any meaningful “approachment” impossible, I think we should instead concentrate on achievable goals. These include the demand for the return to the Jewish people of the many magnificent Hebrew manuscripts that have accumulated in the Vatican library. These manuscripts were plundered and stolen from ravished and massacred Jewish communities throughout the centuries, and should now, as a matter of honor and justice, be returned to us. It is shameful that the organizers of the current exhibition traveling to various American cities, have suppressed the fact that the treasures are part and parcel of our proud patrimony. Not one Hebrew manuscript was ever voluntarily “donated” to the Vatican. The church carried out a spiritual genocide against the Jewish people by confiscating, and often burning, large masses of sacred Jewish books. They had various purposes in mind: 1. They wanted to deprive Jews of the tools of their education so that the myth that Judaism remained arid and unproductive after the destruction of the Temple could be maintained. 2. They needed material to fabricate accusations against Judaism and the Talmud, often used in riggedquisitions carried out by renegade Jewish converts against rabbinic authorities. 3. They used—and this is little known—the parchment of these manuscripts for retail sales as bookbinding material, a thriving business in past centuries. (In my manuscript library I own hundreds of fragments of Hebrew books that had been used as book covers for non-Jewish works, including tax accounts of small businesses.)

The time has come to redress this injustice and testimony of cruel harass-
ment and persecution of Jews and Judaism by the Catholic church. When the pope visited the exhibition in
Miami, I placed a full page ad in the local newspaper calling on him to return these Hebrew manuscripts to
the Jewish people so that they again may be used for Jewish scholarship and Jewish devotion.

If Jews in all cities visited by the exhibition join in this appeal and demonstrate for it in front of the
exhibition, the Vatican will have to take note of our rightful demand. Such a campaign bears promise of success—
perhaps the only success that we can expect from any contact with the Vatican.

Dr. Manfred R. Lehmann
Manfred and Anne Lehmann
Foundation
New York, New York

POLAND AND THE JEWS

To the Editor:

Mr. Abraham Brumberg missed the
main objection an average Pole has
to the article of Jan Blonski in Tygodnik
Powszechny. It concerns misrepresen-
tation of facts: Blonski’s acceptance of
Celia Heller’s assertion (in her “On
the Edge of Destruction”) that the Poles
were about to murder Jews but the
outbreak of World War II prevented them
from doing this, and Blonski’s allega-
tion that current Polish publications
are rife with anti-Semitic pronuncia-
tions. Both statements are not
true. The first one was defined as false by
the editor of Tygodnik Powszechny,
Jerzy Turowicz, a fact not mentioned
by Mr. Brumberg.

W. Twierdochlebow
Menlo Park, California

To the Editor:

In his article “Poland and the Jews,”
Abraham Brumberg uses the “stick and
carrot” approach. The Poles are good,
cultured, and anti-Semitic collaborators;
some are pogrom-oriented.

Mr. Brumberg, in his youth, belonged
to the Bund movement, which was
strong in some cities but not part and
parcel of Polish Jewry. Luckily for him,
Mr. Brumberg was not caught in the
Nazi occupation in Poland, and he
bases his nostalgia on pre-War Poland.
In his article there are leanings to the
“Galut Mentality” by some individuals.

During World War II, throughout
Poland, there were collaborators, agents,
and pre-War Polish police—all of them
hunting Jews.

There were strong underground Pol-
ish fighters, the Armia Krajowa (Na-
tional Army) and WIN, NSZ (Narodowe Siły
Zbrojne—The National Armed Forces),
who, among others, specialized in find-
ing Jews and killing them on the spot.
The NSZ, headquartered in the Świeto-
krzyz Mountains and supported by
the Polish citizenry, issued leaflets to
Poles in 1942 stating their intention to
fight until they could achieve full victory
over the three enemies: the Germans,
Communists, and Jews. Since the NSZ
also engaged in killing Jews, they had
a “gentlemen’s agreement” with the
Germans not to attack each other.

In 1941–43 the Germans were
engaged in bloody battles and could not
afford a large contingent of Germans
to liquidate Jews. This was done with
the help of Ukrainian murderers, Polish
collaborators, and the Polish police.
The Polish police served the Nazis and
took an active part in delivering Jews
to the Germans and killing Jews on the
spot.

In towns and villages across Poland,
the Nazi collaborator became a person
feared by the community and by fellow
Poles.

As Mr. Brumberg rightly stated, the
Jews could escape from the Germans
but could not escape from the Poles,
tragic as it sounds.

The ones who did help were a small
minority in a “sea of hate.” Many, many
Poles, now over sixty-five years old,
helped the Germans in liquidating Jews
denouncing, by informing, or by
killing them themselves.

The pogrom by Poles of Jews in 1946
in the city of Kielce, in which forty-two
Jews were slaughtered, was one more
tragic reminder of Polish hate toward
Jews.

In Rumania, where the population
did not collaborate with the Nazis in
the killing of Jews (except the murder-
ous and unpopular Iron Guard—mostly
criminal elements not supported by
the population), of the over 800,000
pre-War Rumanian Jews, over 400,000
survived—over 50 percent. In Poland,
however, less than 3 percent of the
pre-War 3,500,000 Jews survived.

Regrettfully, Mr. Brumberg proposes
an “understanding” or “dialogue” be-
tween Poles and Jews.

Such a dialogue would mean a dia-
logue between the collaborators and
killers of Jews with the survivors, who
for four long years witnessed Polish
hate. It is doubtful if any survivor
would agree to such a dialogue. Any-
body else attending such a dialogue
would not be representative and would
render it meaningless.

The martyrs, kedoshim, brutally mur-
dermed while the world kept silent, did
not authorize anybody to dialogue with
their murderers (Germans, Poles,
Ukrainians, and others). The survivors’
obligation is to tell it like it was,
regardless of whether others like it.
There is only one reality, one truth,
not subject to manipulations, distortions,
and “personal feelings” or personal

Anatol Palisner
New York, New York

To the Editor:

I am afraid Abraham Brumberg was
much too considerate to Czeslaw Milosz.
Even the world-famous poet seems not
to be immune to the ugly infection of
racial prejudice. He tries to justify the
“legitimate resentments” of the Poles
against the Jews by reference to Jewish
sympathies toward the Soviet Union
and the Red Army at the partition of
Poland. The generalization is not only
incorrect, as Brumberg pointed out,
but rather anti-Semitic—the “resent-
ment” is extremely illegitimate. In ret-
pect, the Jews were right to be more
hopeful about the Soviets than about
the Nazis. Of three-million pre-War
Polish Jews, barely 50,000 survived
under Nazi rule, while the overwhelm-
ing majority of Jews who took refuge
in the Soviet Union (an estimated
one-half million) suffered a bitter ordeal
but survived.

Miloś’s assertion that Jewish Com-
munists “occupied all the top positions
in Poland and also in the very cruel
security police” is again a distinctly
anti-Semitic generalization. By far not
all the leading communists were Jews.
Gomulka, Bejrut, and Ochab at the very
top were “natives,” and while the civilian
security police, Bezpieka, stood under
mostly Jewish leadership, Informacja
(the military security service and or-
ganizer of the murderous political trials
against resistance forces, Home Army
officers, former civil servants, bourgeois
party leaders, and “unreliable” Com-
munists) was practically “Judenrein,”

LETTERS
The flavor of anti-Semitism can also be detected in the other "legitimate resentment" stressed by Milosz: Jews are internationalists. This charge sounds like a polite version of the Nazi-German *vaterlandlose Gesellen* (rascals without a country), later modified by Stalin to "cosmopolitans" as a code word for Jews. Yes, Jewish-Polish Communists served their Soviet masters, as did their "native" colleagues, but at the same time they tried to carve out for their country—and it was their country—as much autonomy as possible. It was the Jew Jakub Berman, top security chief in the Politburo, who saved Gomulka from a show trial and execution ordered by Stalin, and who ignored Soviet pressure to execute General Tatar and the Home Army officers.

Anti-Semitic "native" Communists, in happy collusion with the anti-Communist masses, didn't wait long to make the Jews scapegoats again. In 1956, Polish and Russian anti-Semitism blamed Jews, solely, for the Stalinist terror and in the coming years threw them all to the wolves to appease the population for the broken promises of the Polish October. Fifty thousand left voluntarily, while the remainder were driven out of their positions, and ultimately out of their country. When, after the Six Day War, Gomulka made his famous threat against the fifth column, it was not Cardinal Wyszyński or the Catholic church that raised their voices for the persecuted Jews but the Communist head of the state council, Ochab, who resigned in protest against the anti-Semitic witchhunt.

Czeslaw Milosz should know better when he speaks of legitimate resentments against Jewish internationalists or dismisses the exodus and expulsion of the remnant Jews as an "internal purge within the apparatus."

George Hermann Hodos
Sherman Oaks, California

To the Editor:
Mr. Brumberg's article accurately and fairly reported the current state of the debate about Polish-Jewish relations in Poland, especially the reactions to Professor Jan Blonki's article, which deplored the existence of Polish anti-Semitism. Those reactions are, I would argue, significant but in many ways ambiguous. Since a lot of them were hostile or at least cool to Blonki's thesis, one must admit that anti-Semitic sentiments are still strong, though definitely and understandably less aggressive than before. They persist mostly among older people, also in the Catholic church hierarchy. One can also find them in the Communist Party, which long ago abandoned the universalist legitimization of its political claims and turned to far more effective nationalistic symbols. At the same time, younger generations become more and more aware—that not all of them and not to the degree that one might wish—of the moral necessity to face the unhappy heritage of anti-Semitism and to seek Polish-Jewish reconciliation. A recent example of it may be a letter sent to the Primate of Poland by a group of young intellectuals from Cracow, raising the question of the record of Polish anti-Semitism and requesting the Episcopate to address the issue in moral terms. This is not an isolated case and I hope it marks a *signum temporis.* The time is short, however, as there are fewer and fewer Jews whose memory of their life in Poland, bitter but not devoid of affection, could make them interested in the Polish-Jewish dialogue. When they are gone, the relations between the two communities will cease to be a living problem and become one of many arid questions for historians, without a meaningful impact on the lives of Poles and Jews.

Ryszard Lechutko
Cracow, Poland

To the Editor:
I read with great interest Abraham Brumberg's article "Poland and the Jews" (Vol. 2 No. 3) written with much verve and a vast knowledge of the problem. Mr. Brumberg explains and comments on the new wave of opinions and polemics that have appeared in Polish publications during the last few years. Of course, it is a good thing that these problems are again being discussed in Poland. Simultaneously, however, it is characteristic that the Jewish question is raised most often in a polemical context. Polemics attempt to prove a point of view and to overcome the opponent, rather than going into the merits of the problem.

Mr. Brumberg aptly shows that various authors try to shut their eyes to facts that are uncomfortable for them, that in the fervor of polemics they are inclined toward hasty generalizations and claims. But Brumberg also does not avoid this pitfall. For example, he attempts to prove that the pro-Bolshevik attitude among the Jewish population on those terrains joined to the USSR in 1939 were not—counter to the opinion prevalent among the Poles—so great, since shortly thereafter the Russians deported over 300,000 Jews to the Soviet Far East. "Because of their pro-Soviet sympathy?" he asks ironically. This argument is typical for propagandistic methods of thinking, confusing with one another matters of a different nature. Were only anticommunists repressed in Stalin's Russia? Can Mr. Brumberg prove that during the Great Terror, loyalty shielded anyone at all against repression?

In the discussions mentioned by Mr. Brumberg, some opinions are more and some less successful; those that shed more light on the problem and those that repeat oft-used stereotypes. There are also very prominent comments, such as those of Jan Blonki's article—thus, as a whole, I would be very reluctant to negate this journalistic current. Personally, I tend to agree with the opinion of Timothy Garton Ash (New York Review of Books, Dec. 19, 1985), who appeals for an intensification of scientific research. Without it, further Polish-Jewish discourses are threatened with intellectual barrenness.

Facts should not be discussed; they should be known. A constant inquiry as to whether anti-Semitism existed in Poland only treads in the same place. Yes, it is true that anti-Semitic positions appeared very strongly during the interwar period, that help given to the Jews during World War II was miniscule, that after that war anti-Semitism met with social approval (vide the events of 1968) by a government politically steered by Communists. But no historian can limit himself to just declaring these facts. He must at least attempt to persevere in finding the reasons. . . .

Polish historiography also has many shortcomings in this field. For years it avoided the uncomfortable problem. But silence does not settle anything. Therefore it must, finally, conduct a thorough analysis of the circumstances of the birth, development, and rationale of Polish nationalism. Perhaps, for this
"Broch is the greatest novelist European literature has produced since Joyce." George Steiner

THE GUILTLESS
A NOVEL IN ELEVEN STORIES
BY HERMANN BROCH
TRANSLATED BY RALPH MANHEIM

The Guiltless portrays an apathetic and ethically debased European society—the "guilty guiltless" who unknowingly nurtured the growth of fascism.

From the reviews of The Sleepwalkers:

"The excitement of discovery on first reading Austrian novelist Hermann Broch’s masterpiece is comparable only to one’s first encounter with such writers as Dostoevski, Joyce and Faulkner." The San Francisco Chronicle

"A classic that enlarged the scope of twentieth-century fiction by focusing with unparalleled precision on the profound transformation of values that produced the modern consciousness."
New York Times Book Review

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The Sleepwalkers. Paper, $15.50

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Berkeley, California 94706

(Continued on p. 81)
We are often bemused by the things people say about Tikkan. For example, while handling our booth at the recent two-day Jewish Heritage Book Festival in New York, I heard diametrically opposite descriptions of the magazine. Some people came by and said “I know Tikkan—it’s the magazine that was liberal at first but it became conservative.” Others described it as “that magazine that is moving more and more to the left.” A few people muttered that “it is anti-Jewish,” although others claimed that “it is obviously pro-Jewish.”

Part of the confusion about the nature of the magazine seems to have come from press reports about Tikkan’s recent interview with Jesse Jackson and the six responses to the interview (Nov./Dec. 1987 issue). The interview created a flurry of press attention nationally, because it was a statement of Jackson’s position in relationship to the Jewish community. Some press reports made it sound as though Tikkan gleefully gave Jackson a hard time, while others created the impression that we were protective of Jackson and were thereby promoting him. Both accounts were wrong—but how could non-readers know that. We asked Jackson important questions about issues of Jewish concern and printed his answers because we thought that it was crucial, given his history with the Jewish community, that people know his current thinking.

Another reason for the confusion about where to locate Tikkan politically and Jewishly is that our articles include a surprising mix of views about current concerns. We refuse to be a one-view magazine—as others on the right and on the left often are. Because we think it is extremely important to be familiar with positions other than our own, we sometimes print articles with which we strongly disagree.

Anyone who reads Tikkan over a period of time knows that we take strong editorial positions about many issues. But that doesn’t preclude printing other opinions about those issues. Sometimes we print controversial articles on which we take no editorial stand. A case in point is Eliezer Jaffe’s recent article on Jewish philanthropy (Sept./Oct. 1987), which suggests that it would be best for the American Jewish community to not send money to Israel but, instead, to use it for the development of Jewish life in the U.S. We do not intend this article to be the definitive one in Tikkan on this subject; rather, we think it is an interesting way to begin the conversation about Jewish philanthropy. In the future there will be other articles about this issue in the magazine.

We think our combination of a strong editorial voice and an openness to other points of view is a good way to engage large numbers of people in the important discussions of our time. Our overwhelming experience with Tikkan is that people are hungry to read about what concerns them—but they don’t want to be lectured about following “the right line.” They want to be stimulated by different and sometimes outrageous ideas to think new thoughts and figure out new strategies for dealing with the problems that plague us.

More than anything, people seem to want to talk with each other about these issues—witness the large number of Tikkan discussion groups that are being organized around the country (see p. 13 for a list of some of these groups). Everywhere we go, we meet people who express this desire to discuss issues. For example, at the Book Festival mentioned above, person after person came up to me wanting to have a long conversation about the Jackson interview, the state of politics in the U.S., the relationship of American Jews to Israel, and so forth.

Why is there now this outpouring of desire to talk about issues? My hypothesis is that many people are tired of being self-absorbed and isolated and they are looking for more satisfying ways to connect with each other.

Besides, people are worried—about the threat of nuclear war, about the grave social problems of our day, about who they are and what they are doing in this world. The “it will all work out” of the flower generation is long gone; even the New Age people are sober about the shape of our world. At the same time, however, there is a sense of possibility in the air, coming at least partly from the Reagan era now unceremoniously drawing to a close. People are talking more now about acting together to get things done.

Are we in for a repeat of the 1960s, when everything seemed to come alive after years of grimness? There are stirrings today that are somewhat reminiscent of the early 1960s. All the more reason, then, to pay attention to the lessons that can be learned from that earlier historical time. In our special section in this issue, “Transcending the Sixties,” some of the problematic dynamics of the antiwar movement of the 1960s are discussed in order that they can hopefully be avoided in the years to come.
Editorials

1988: A Window of Opportunity

The crash of the stock market in October; the continuing erosion of Reagan’s moral credibility over Iran/contra; Reagan’s need to negotiate nuclear arms reductions as a way of restoring political credibility; steps toward openness and liberalization in the Soviet Union and the goodwill generated by the Washington summit; the growing popular awareness that America is spending too much on defense and not enough on education, housing, and other domestic programs—all this creates a remarkable opportunity for liberal and progressive forces (“the left”) to reshape the American political landscape in 1988.

But never underestimate the ability of the left to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

To be sure, the progressive forces have scored some impressive victories in the past two years. Grass roots organizing campaigns like that sponsored by the million and one-half member-strong Citizen’s Action played an important role in electing progressives to the U.S. Senate. Anti-interventionist sentiment was mobilized to prevent new aid to the contras. An impressive array of organizations orchestrated a massive demonstration of political muscle to prevent confirmation of Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court. And the legacy of years of antinuclear organizing created the conditions in which Reagan would find that making a deal with the Russians was his best available alternative for restoring the credibility of a badly shaken presidency. These are important accomplishments, and a coherent liberal/progressive movement could celebrate them, and develop plans to build on them for 1988.

But how, exactly, would one go about doing that? There is no national organization, no widely read national newspaper, no mechanism for choosing national leadership, no framework for working out a shared strategy, no way that the diverse elements who constitute the liberal and progressive forces have to assess their mistakes, celebrate their victories, and together agree on a joint strategy. In many respects the liberal and progressive forces function like a loose assemblage of feudal fiefdoms more invested in protecting their own terrain than in joining together to create a common strategy.

The Bork nomination was a rare moment when individual boundaries were temporarily transcended to fight a common fight. Such defensive battles are important, but limited. The most that can be achieved at such moments is to restrain the worst offenses of the right, rather than to chart a path that might fundamentally alter the public agenda. Indeed, even this description suggests more coherency than actually exists within each of the separate political movements that constitute the left. If you think in any detail about the antinuclear movement, the anti-apartheid movement, or the anti-intervention movement, you quickly realize that most of these movements remain crippled by the anti-leadership and anti-national organization ideologies that were popularized in the 1960s. Few of these movements are able to develop a strategy that is accepted as authoritative by their own activists, much less able to commit themselves to an effective plan for coordinating with other movements that might entail setting priorities amongst the different possible foci for left energy, attention, and strategic focus in 1988.

Consider the antinuclear movement. If the millions of people who feel deeply involved in that movement’s goals hoped to hear any specific ideas emerging from the Sane/Freeze merger convention in November of 1987 about how to use the Washington summit in December or the 1988 elections as opportunities to shape a pro-disarmament politics, they would have been sorely disappointed. Adopting a list of over fifty “priorities”—something for everyone so that no one goes away thinking that the big, bad, national organization has stifled local initiative or autonomy—is the same as having no priorities at all.

What kind of strategy would be possible? The antinukes might have set up town meetings and teach-ins the weekend before or after the Gorbachev summit, focusing on two issues: “Is it time for the U.S. to end the cold war?” and “How do we move from the limited treaty being signed now to a comprehensive nuclear disarmament agreement?” Thousands of such town meetings could have created a climate that would have forced the press to concentrate less on the personality of Gorbachev and his wife, more on the political possibilities for peace. If they so chose, the anti-nukes could make the continuation of the cold war the central political question of 1988. A massive television and newspaper ad campaign comparable to that focused on blocking Bork could accompany town meetings and focus on the way decades of military spending have distorted the American economy, what new social programs would be possible if military spending were dramatically reduced, and why this is possible without risking America’s freedoms. Though it’s not too late to
refocus the debate about INF in this way, the Gorbachev summit would have been the logical time for the antinukes to begin to mobilize the rest of us for a national campaign on the cold war.

Or imagine if, facing the 1988 elections, the antinukes had organized a national convention with elected delegates from every congressional district whose task was to either select presidential candidates for the movement to endorse, or to develop a list of minimum standards which any candidate would have to meet—or face our active opposition in the general election (for example, a clear commitment to nuclear disarmament and to a series of precisely defined steps whose purpose is to make clear that the U.S. is ready to end the cold war if the Soviets will take similar steps).

Part of the problem here is that the opportunities in 1988 are not static; they do not remain as a permanent possibility. If the left does not step in, the right will. So, for example, the antinuclear forces that did not use the summit effectively will now find themselves fighting a rearguard battle, trying to defend the INF agreement signed by Reagan from a right-wing assault that hopes to put “reservations” on the treaty thereby limiting its impact and creating a more conservative climate that might then prevent Reagan from signing a more comprehensive agreement in 1988.

But just as important a problem is this: Most of us, strong supporters of anti-nuclear causes, are disempowered by the absence of a coherent organization, strategy, and leadership. We are forced to watch the summit spectacle in a passive way, wishing that our voices could have been heard, wondering if anything was really accomplished by all our activities in the past, watching in frustration as the issues get misdefined and the main points lost. No wonder it’s hard to sustain political commitment when this happens over and over again. What’s the point of endless grass roots activism, many will wonder, if at the point of actual national decision making that activism finds itself without the organizational mechanisms or leadership to actually participate in shaping the outcomes? A similar frustration is inevitable during the 1988 elections, as pro-disarmament candidates split the votes amongst themselves, and a “realistic” media voice warns everyone that they must move towards the center in order to show that they are “responsible” and hence electable.

Absent a coherent strategy, organization, and leadership that unifies the various movements of the left, there is little possibility of convincing our own liberal flank that it is realistic to push for a more principled stand on any given issue. Unfortunately, many in the liberal wing of the left have not learned from the right that there is a lot to be gained by fighting for their full political vision even if in the short run they may take some losses. For example, if the liberal camp were to spend the same energy it may have to spend defending INF by instead strongly critiquing it for not going far enough, for being too timid and only valuable if it is a first step toward a comprehensive disarmament agreement, we might have more of a chance both of defeating the right’s “reservations” on INF and, simultaneously, in preparing the groundwork for the next stage of the anti-nuclear struggle.

You can see this kind of mistake in the recent history of the left in the Nuclear Freeze and the anti-Bork struggles. The first was an attempt to circumvent the deeper issues about the cold war and the need for full disarmament by calling for “a nuclear freeze.” Millions of people, wishing to create a nuclear-free world and to oppose Reagan’s militarism, were convinced to adopt a demand whose simplicity could win it a sure and quick political victory. But the opportunism backfired: legislators jumped on the Freeze bandwagon, happy to placate their anti-nuclear constituency and still feel free to vote for vastly expanded military forces that escalated the nuclear danger. The Freeze movement’s repudiation of deterrence and the theory of “mutually assured destruction” could even be embraced by Ronald Reagan who offered his Star Wars defense as an alternative. A movement so narrowly focused was unable to use its rapid success as a vehicle for serious political change because it had not committed itself to a politics that was adequately deep and radical.

A similar error was made in the struggle against Bork. Instead of defining the issue as “Reagan court packing” and insisting that any conservative candidate for the court would be politically unacceptable, far too much attention was given to the details of one individual candidate. By picking a far-right ideologue, Reagan was able to swing the entire political dialogue so far to the right that subsequent right-wing nominees would look like moderates in comparison—thus ensuring the eventual success of a nominee like Judge Kennedy who appears far to the right of the national consensus. If instead of falling for the bait, the liberal forces had agreed with Reagan’s charge that their opposition was “political,” and built a campaign on the principle that it was perfectly appropriate for them to struggle for a Supreme Court reflecting politics more moderate than those which would be imposed on the country by a Reaganite majority; had they asserted that their opposition would certainly go beyond Bork to include any conservative who threatened to enshrine in perpetuity Reagan’s right-wing politics, they would not have painted themselves into the corner they face in 1988 when they are likely to accede to a Judge Kennedy so as to not appear too “unreasonable.” Right-wingers in the Senate have no qualms about threatening to filibuster against nominees.
or programs that they don’t like—and as a result political discourse moves right to try to compromise with them. Unfortunately, rarely do we see among Democratic Party liberals this kind of willingness to stand alone. The centrist know that after liberals have “gone on the record” with a vote for ideals they will quickly compromise toward their right—thus undermining any incentive for the centrists to move left.

A national organization or coalition of the progressive social change movements could create a pressure from the left that would give Congressional Democrats support to stand firm on their principles. But perhaps even more importantly, if it were to provide a framework through which all of us who are committed to social change could democratically participate in choosing specific strategic priorities for the period ahead, it would immeasurably increase our collective political impact. The Preconditions for the possibility of such a national organization could be built by everyone of us today—by insisting within our own individual social change movements that they stop laundry-listing priorities and make some of the hard choices required to have a unified strategy for 1988, and that they end the back-biting and give power to leaders to really lead (and be held accountable for what they have done or failed to do).

More than its value in coordinating strategy and providing a national voice for our shared perspective, a national organization or coalition would be important to the extent that it attempted to provide a unifying vision for the wide array of social change movements. The proliferation of causes and demands sometimes makes the left look to outsiders like a continuation of the marketplace of interest groups that dominated American politics for the past fifty years. People sense today that the problems are deeper and more systemic. Ironically, when they look at the left part of the political spectrum what they hear is a cacophony of voices seeming to say, “give me this and give me that.” If 1988 offers a unique moment in which the American population is open to hearing ideas from a left, it would be more likely to respond if what it heard was something deeper and more appealing than what it heard the last time it paid attention.

A vision for our times would, of course, necessarily incorporate our demands for peace and justice, for a nuclear-free world and worldwide disarmament, for an end to racism and patriarchy, for a rectifying of economic injustice and a rational planning of the world’s resources and productive capacities. Yet the liberal and progressive forces would be taken much more seriously if they were to move beyond their traditional definitions of politics—by projecting a vision that incorporated all of these concerns within a larger framework that showed a new sensitivity to the psychological, ecological, spiritual, and ethical concerns of the American people. Much of the on-going debate within Tikkun is aimed at helping to define that vision.

The moment we begin to talk about ethical and spiritual concerns, or if we begin to talk about the psychological needs that underlie the popularity of the right’s profamily perspective and the need for a left to constitute itself as the profamily force, many people on the left become terrified. They got to the left in part by rejecting the manipulations of religion and “traditional values” that have been used by the right to impose a rigidity of thought and behavior on many Americans. They became liberals because they rejected the falsehoods and stifling deceptions that many experienced growing up in families that were attempting to be “proper.” The last thing they want is to be told that the left is now going to compromise on these issues!

We have no such compromise in mind. If, for example, we think it useful to talk about a left profamily perspective, not only do we emphasize that we mean single-parent and gay families as well, and that we believe that patriarchal relationships play a major distorting role in families, but also we insist upon talking openly about the ways that the family ideal has been used as a club to induce conformity, emotional numbing, and suffocating dishonesty.

Yet at the same time we believe that a left should publicly identify with what people are seeking in family life—long-term, committed, loving relationships—and should insist that the failure to make possible those kinds of relationships is the deepest indictment of any society. A progressive approach not only gives an opportunity to reorganize our normal list of demands for childcare, support for the aged, full employment, housing, and health care as specific planks of a profamily perspective, it also provides an opportunity to educate Americans about how the dynamics of the competitive marketplace and the kinds of tensions generated by the stress at work foster human beings with diminished capacities for loving relationships. And if the desperation for loving relationships leads too many people to settle for a family life that is disappointing, deadening and oppressive, a liberal/left profamily movement might help people reject the crippling self-blaming that so often accompanies our disappointments in personal life and instead help people begin to explore the full range of economic/structural, psychological and cultural factors that undermine friendships and families. Similarly, it is not hard to show that the individualism, materialism and me-firstism of the capitalist marketplace are major factors in generating the social dynamics that undermine ethical and spiritual sensitivity.
Imagine the collective sigh of relief if a left profamily movement made it permissible for people to talk publicly about their frustrations in family life, and yet simultaneously validated the desires that keep people hoping for more. A left that seemed to truly care about these issues, that reframed its program in terms of creating a society that was safe for love, intimacy, and lasting friendships, and that showed spiritual, ethical, and ecological sensitivity, would immediately jump over existing political categories and have a much wider and more sympathetic audience for its absolutely vital struggles against apartheid, racism, sexism, nuclear war, economic irrationality, and ecological disaster. Yet this is only one possible approach to what a unifying vision might be.

The right has had its turn at bat. It has struck out. This creates a unique opportunity in 1988. It remains to be seen if the liberal and progressive forces can muster the political wisdom to make intelligent use of this opportunity.

Try Shabbas

You don’t have to be Jewish to learn from Judaism’s most spectacularly wise observance: the sabbath, Shabbat, the day of rest.

Yet most Jews have no idea of the psychological and spiritual sophistication built into this observance—mostly because they’ve never tried it. Some Reform and Conservative Jews have an image of Shabbat as a Friday night service in a synagogue, with rabbi, choir, and prayer book—possibly associated with lighting candles and doing a blessing over the wine at a family dinner. The services were often boring, the ritual pleasant but uneventful on a spiritual level. To others, looking at Shabbat as an Orthodox custom, the association is to a seemingly pointless set of “thou shalt nots” that include not riding in one’s car, not using electricity, and not cooking.

Yet if Jews were to discover Shabbat in someone else’s spiritual or religious practices, the chances are we would find it deeply intriguing and persuasive.

The idea underlying much of the ritual observance is this: For six days a week human beings are involved in the act of making, shaping, and transforming the world. So, we take one solid period of time, twenty-four hours, to change our relationship to the world—to refrain from acting upon it and, instead, to stand back and celebrate the grandeur and mystery of creation.

Shabbat ritual is designed to disconnect us from our normal attitude of making, doing, changing material existence, and to connect us to the realm of time. To experience the world free from the need to interfere with it is a transformative and liberating experience. But it can’t be achieved in the midst of a day filled with getting, spending, speeding, and making. That is where the rituals come in. Like the guides to any deep meditation process, the rituals are the accumulated wisdom of many generations on how to most effectively “get into” the experience.

The rituals have two parts: what you shouldn’t do, and what you should. What you shouldn’t do is basically this: Don’t do anything which requires changing the material world. So, we start at sunset on Friday night and until sunset on Saturday night we don’t light fires, turn on electricity, cook, iron, wash clothes, garden or pick at things in nature, ride in automobiles, go shopping, write, use money in any way, do anything connected to our world of work (including talking or thinking about it), or watch television or movies.

To understand what we should do, we need to focus on the other element of Shabbat. The particular genius of Judaism is to combine our celebrations of nature—an aspect we share with other religious traditions—with a simultaneous affirmation of the need to transform the human world by freeing it of oppression. The symbolic framework in which that message is conveyed is the ritual retelling of the story of liberation from slavery, as detailed in the Torah. So, each week we read a portion of that Torah—completing the reading in the course of a year. The Shabbat morning prayers are built around that. The idea of a day of rest on which no one is allowed to work was the first victory of the working masses over existing systems of domination. Its recreation each week is not purely symbolic—it is the living out of that victory by prohibiting the masters of the world from having any dominion on this one day. It is the weekly celebration of the working class, developed by those who first asserted the dignity and rights of workers and who have played a leading role in articulating demands for freedom ever since. Perhaps this explains why Jews have been so vigorous in not allowing encroachments; like the vigorous shop foreman from a militant union, we have been aware that unless we draw firm boundaries the powers that still rule the rest of the world will slowly erode what we have won.

To make this work, Jews are enjoined to enjoy themselves. No wonder that Shabbat is the least understood of the ritual observances in the Jewish world—in the modern period, particularly in the past century, the physical threats to our existence have created a sadness and heaviness among Jews. Fleeing the oppression of pogroms or, later, of the Holocaust, Jews have associated their Jewishness with pain and suffering. Many have become “once a year Jews” whose only appearance in the Jewish religious world is at Yom Kippur—the one day where heaviness and breast-beating really are on
the agenda. No wonder that they are startled to learn that the central Jewish religious celebration, Shabbat, is meant to be joyous. Frankly, in most synagogues it’s still hard to get this sense. There are prayers that say what a joy Shabbat is—but they are often read with a flatness of spirit that makes many people think that these are just empty words.

Yet in religiously committed communities the Shabbat really does have a joyful feeling. Big celebratory meals in which people sit around the table singing, studying portions of the Torah, arguing fine points, sharing wine and good food, contribute to this. So does the injunction that married people should have sex on Shabbat. Nor is this celebration confined to the Orthodox: In communities around America refugees from the social change movements of the sixties and seventies have created havurot—small groups that meet together on a Friday night or Saturday to create informal prayer sessions, eat a festive meal, sing and study together. Incorporating a contemporary consciousness into ancient celebrations, these havurot have pioneered new ways to make Shabbat deeply joyous and not simply a set of tired old traditions.

Social change movements might well consider adopting the idea of Shabbat for themselves. The combination of celebration of the grandeur of the natural world with a reaffirmation of the struggle for freedom would give a depth to political activity and would regenerate energy for the rest of the week. But it would only work if the old formula were rigidly observed: a complete twenty-four-hour period of separation from the demands of the world. It is the immersion in this experience that provides the refreshment of soul that is so sadly absent from most political communities. But unlike various spiritual paths that have been imported from the East, Shabbat is celebrated in community and not by isolated individuals, and its focus is political, leading one out of the Sabbath and back into the struggle to remake the world.

The Tikkun Community

Tikkun Discussion Groups

As Tikkun becomes one of the most widely read intellectual/political magazines in America, groups of people meeting regularly to discuss specific articles or editorials have begun to form throughout the country. New groups are still in formation. If you’d like to be in one, the following people have volunteered to be contact people who will play the role of helping to set up a first such gathering. Contact them if you want to be in a group or, if there is no one in your area and you would like to be a contact person, contact us at 5100 Leona Street, Oakland, CA 94619.

Arizona
Barbie Engelman, 607 E. Wesleyan, Tempe, AZ 85282 (602-968-1501)

California
Barb Hrabovsek, 3556 Barnard Way #301, Santa Monica, CA 90405 (213-392-2615)
Dennis Ann Denton, 1280 Bluebird Canyon Dr., Laguna Beach, CA 92651 (714-497-2145)
Ellis Atkins, 17506 Cumana Terrace, San Diego, CA 92128 (619-451-3071)

Northern California Readers
Tikkun’s next Salon/Discussion group is Monday, Jan. 25th at 7:30 p.m. with Todd Gitlin and Michael Lerner discussing the legacy of the sixties. A monthly Torah Study group meets next on Saturday, January 23rd at 11 a.m. More info: 482-0805.

call Tikkun offices at: (415) 482-0805

District of Columbia
Tasha A. Tenenbaum, 1880 Columbia Road NW 506, Washington, D.C. 20009 (202-483-8907)

Florida
Herb Altman, 720 E. Ocean Avenue, Boynton Beach, FL 33435 (305-734-1805)

Illinois
Amy Feldman, 6924 N. Greenview, apt. 1-E, Chicago, IL 60626 (312-508-9807)

Iowa
Al and Mary Razor, Route One, Collins, IA 50055 (515-385-2374)

Kansas
Ray Anderson, P.O. Box 20341, Wichita, KS (316-868-7100)
Rabbi Daniel Horwitz, Congregation Ohev Shalom, 5311 West 75th St., Prairie Village, Kansas 66208 (913-642-6460)

Kentucky
Vicki M. Pettus, 309 Steele Street, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 (502-227-9986)

Maryland
Michael Snow, 3500 W. Strathmore, Baltimore, MD 21215 (301-358-7668)

Massachusetts
Brian Rice McCarthy, 113 Coburn Ave., Worcester, MA 01604 (617-791-8434)

Michigan
Ann Parker, Jewish Community Center Librarian, 6600 West Maple Road, West Bloomfield, MI 48033 (313-661-1000)

New York
Phyllis Goldberg, P.O. Box 377, New York, NY 10014
Sue Ellen Dodell, 5901 Delafield Ave., Bronx, NY 10471 (212-549-6886)
Dr. Solomon Levine, 874 Cherry Lane, N. Woodmere, New York 11581 (516) 374-7900

New Jersey
Robert Wechsler, Catbird Press, 44 North Sixth Avenue, Highland Park, NJ 08904 (201-572-0816)

Texas
Evelyn Erickson, 2002 Arthur Lane, Austin, TX 78704 (512-442-8849)

Washington
David Tatelman, 3601 N.W. 67th St., Seattle, WA 98117 (206-783-3763)

Wisconsin
Sandee Stone, 2809 Center Ave., Madison, WI 53704 (608-244-6233)
Law and Ideology

Robert W. Gordon

In April 1987 Assistant Professor Clare Dalton was up for tenure at Harvard Law School. Uninformed outsiders would have rated her chances high. She had written a book on nineteenth-century tort law, accepted by Oxford Press and praised by all but one of the thirteen eminent outside reviewers asked to read it. Colleagues with weaker files than hers had received tenure earlier in the year. Her case, however, provoked passionate and bitter debate. After several meetings, she fell short of the two-thirds faculty vote she needed for tenure.

At the same time, David Trubek, a professor visiting Harvard Law School for the year from Wisconsin, was voted an offer of a tenured appointment by comfortably more than two-thirds. But in his case Harvard's President Derek Bok overruled the faculty vote and vetoed the appointment. It was the first time he had ever intervened in a Law School appointments matter.

Insiders were shocked but not really surprised. It was just another episode in the factional warfare that has polarized the law school for ten years. A small handful of the faculty, about seven or eight out of sixty-five, is associated with the left-wing Conference for Critical Legal Studies, or C. L. S. Another handful of about equal size makes up their hard-core conservative opposition. The intensity of the factions had regularly turned faculty appointments into prolonged battles for the votes of the shifting center. The C. L. S. faction (sometimes called "Critics" or "Crits") had seemed to be making gradual headway, but in 1986 the faculty denied tenure (the first time it had denied tenure to an internal candidate in seventeen years) to a Crit, Daniel Tarullo. After a brief period of truce, the conservative faction this year picked off two more: Dalton and Trubek. (In mid-July, responding to a storm of public protest over these decisions, President Bok agreed to review Dalton's case.)

While the episode has attracted a lot of press coverage, little is remarkable about it except that it happened at Harvard and so involved Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous. The story is depressingly familiar, although unpublicized elsewhere. Job troubles for C. L. S.-affiliated teachers are common. One was denied tenure at Rutgers-Camden last year, for instance, four others were fired from New England Law School last fall, and refusals to hire Crits, however qualified, may now be more the custom than the exception. The dean of the Duke University Law School published a speech asserting that C. L. S. adherents were "nihilists" who had no place in professional schools. The retiring dean of Case Western Law School suggested they were a menace comparable in gravity only to declining applications. As the president of the law teachers' association observed last fall, "[F]aculty members at self-proclaimed prestigious schools and more modest ones alike express determination that no Critical Legal Studies adherent will find a place on their faculty." (Susan Westerberg Prager, "President's Message: Collegial Diversity," Association of American Law Schools Newsletter, September 1986.)

But again, this is an old story. People with identified left-wing associations have always had trouble finding and holding on to jobs. In universities these days leftists can count on some protection from liberals who remember or have heard about the appalling costs of cowardice and silence in the 1950s and know that next time the bell may toll for them. (See Ellen W. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the University, Oxford, 1986.) But the number of professors with impeccable liberal credentials who will vote against leftists because they are "ideologues" or "disruptive" or "bad colleagues" remains large, and the number who regularly finds that work outside the mainstream fails to meet scholarly "standards" is legion.

Still there's something fascinating about the C. L. S. phenomenon. C. L. S. has made headway in some law schools, despite many setbacks. And it has provoked enormous controversy—in the newspapers, the New Yorker and the New Republic, the lawyers' press and bar journals, in law school alumni meetings, and in academic law reviews. It has reduced its opponents to spluttering rages, generally incoherent ones. (Very few discussions of C. L. S. outside its circle of members and sympathizers are aimed at understanding, much less engaging with, the substance of its ideas.) So it's worth asking: What are Critical Legal Studies and why do they make people so angry?

Critical Legal Studies began as a meeting in Madison, Wisconsin in 1977—a ragtag collection of friends and friends of friends in their thirties, who had been active in radical or left-liberal
(civil rights and antiwar) politics in the 1960s and had
gone on to law school and later into law teaching. This
group wrote a number of books and law review articles
that together made up an initial set of critiques of main-
stream legal ideas—what they thought was wrong with
their own legal education. They also organized a series of
annual conferences and summer camps. Over the next
ten years the movement spread well beyond the originat-
ing group. It has outposts of at least two or three
adherents or sympathizers at several law schools—apart
from Harvard, at American, SUNY/Buffalo, Cardozo,
Miami, New England, Rutgers-Camden, Stanford, UCLA
and Wisconsin—and perhaps a hundred more mem-
bers, typically individuals isolated in a hostile sea of
colleagues on law faculties across the U.S., Canada,
and Australia. A group of English law teachers has
formed a British Conference on Critical Legal Studies,
and last summer there was a meeting at Bremen
of German and American scholars interested in critical
legal ideas.

Legal discourses are saturated with
categories and images that for the
most part rationalize and justify in
myriad subtle ways the existing
social order as natural, necessary,
and just.

If the original C. L. S. membership was hard to
generalize about, the expanded new one is so exotically
varied and internally divided as to defy characterization
almost entirely. Some aspects of C. L. S. work, however,
generally distinguish it from the more traditional left-
wing critiques of the legal system, such as those of the
National Lawyers Guild, with whom the Critics have
formed occasional if rather contentious alliances. Marx-
ist lawyers usually take law to be an infernal machine
for the projects of the ruling class, albeit one full of
tricks and devices that can sometimes be turned back
upon its makers. More liberal lawyers think law con-
tains many good rules and expresses noble purposes,
but that its rules and procedures are constantly bent
out of shape by the powerful. Oppositional lawyers can
bend it back and use it to advance progressive causes
or to soften oppression of the weak and dissident.

For the Critics, law is inherently neither a ruling-class
game plan nor a repository of noble if perverted prin-
ciples. It is a plastic medium of discourse that subtly
conditions how we experience social life. Critics there-
fore tend to take the rhetoric of law very seriously and
to examine its content carefully.

To get a picture of the way Critics think, consider all
the habitual daily invocations of law in official and
unofficial life—from the rhetoric of judicial opinions
through advice lawyers give to clients, down to all the
assertions and arguments about legal rights and wrongs
in ordinary interactions between police and suspects,
employers and workers, creditors and debtors, hus-
band, wives, and neighbors, or television characters
portraying such people. Sometimes these ways of
speaking about law (legal discourses, let's call them)
appear as fancy technical arguments, sometimes as sim-
ple common sense. ("An employer has the right to
take over what happens on his own property, doesn't
he?") In whatever form, they are among the discourses
that help us to make sense of the world, that fabricate
what we interpret as its reality. They construct roles for
us like "Owner" and "Employee," and tell us how to
behave in the roles. (The person cast as "Employee" is
subordinate. Why? It just is that way, part of the role.)
They wall us off from one another by constituting us
as separate individuals given rights to protect our iso-
lation, but then prescribe formal channels (such as con-
tracts, partnerships, corporations) through which we
can reconnect. They split up the world into categories
that filter our experience—sorting out the harms we
must accept as the hand of fate, or as our own fault,
from the outrageous injustices we may resist as wrong-
fully forced upon us. Until recently, for instance, an
employer's sexual advances didn't occupy any legal
category. They were a kind of indignity that a woman
had to interpret as something her own dress and man-
ner had invited, or as an inevitable occupational risk,
given natural male aggression (and the statistical fre-
quency of creeps), one that could get her fired unless
she gave in or had incredible tact. Now such advances
have the legal name of "sexual harassment." This doesn't
always improve the practical situation of the victims—
since vindicating legal rights costs money, emotion,
smooth working relations, the chance of promotion,
and maybe even one's career—but for many men and
women the feminist politics that forced the change in
legal categories has completely changed how they inter-
pret and feel about the behavior.

Some of the basic points the Critics want to make
about legal discourses are as follows:

These are discourses of power. Law is not, of
course, uniquely the tool of the powerful. Everyone
invokes the authority of law in everyday interactions,
and the content of laws registers many concessions to
groups struggling for change from below, as well as to
the wishes of the politically and economically domi-
nant. But to be able to wield legal discourses with
facility and authority or to pay others (lawyers, legis-
lators, lobbyists, etc.) to wield them on your behalf is a large part of what it means to possess power in society. Legal discourses therefore tend to reflect the interests and the perspectives of the powerful people who make most use of them.

Whether actually being used by the powerful or the powerless, legal discourses are saturated with categories and images that for the most part rationalize and justify in myriad subtle ways the existing social order as natural, necessary, and just. A complaint about a legal wrong—let's say the claim that one is a "victim of discrimination"—must be framed as a complaint that there has been a momentary disturbance in a basically sound world, for which a quick fix is available within the conventional working of existing institutions. A black applicant to professional school, whose test scores are lower than those of a competing white applicant, asks for admission on grounds of "affirmative action." Everybody in that interaction (including the applicant) momentarily submits to the spell of the worldview promoted in that discourse, that the scores measure an "objective" merit (though nobody really has the foggiest idea what they measure besides standardized test-taking ability) that would have to be set aside to let him in. A middle-aged widow buys a cheap promotional package of lessons at a dance studio. The studio hooks her on flattery and attention, then gets her to sign a contract for 4,000 hours of dance instruction. To break her contract, she will have to struggle to make a case that her situation is grotesquely exceptional—the result of serious fraud; and, even if she wins, she and her lawyers will have participated in and reinforced the law's endorsement of "normal" marketplace relations as unproblematically voluntary, informed, noncoercive, and efficient.

Thus legal discourses—in conjunction with dozens of other nonlegal discourses—routinely help to create and maintain the ordinary inequities of everyday social life: the coercions, dominations, and dependencies of daily relations in the marketplace, the workplace, and the family; the ordering of access to privilege, authority, wealth, and power by hierarchies of class, race, gender, and "merit."

Yet legal discourses have the legitimating power they do because they sketch pictures of widely shared, wistful, inchoate visions of an ideal—a society of dealings between genuinely free and independent equals, one so ordered that we could cooperate with others without having to worry that they would hurt or enslave us, so structured as continually to open to question the legitimacy of its hierarchies. Thus law is always a source of images and ideals that challenge and urge us to revise current arrangements as well as justifying them. The problem is that, in the ordinary uses of law, the revisionary images are realized in scattered fragments and otherwise muted and repressed.

So the big premise of the C. L. S. method, the raison d'être of its scholarship and local political tactics, is that the deployment of ordinary legal discourse is a form of political practice, and one with unnecessarily conservative consequences. If we experience a sense of stasis and paralysis about the possibilities for social change, we owe our passivity in part to the character of these pervasive discourses. C. L. S. people believe that when you take legal discourse apart and see how it works, you can start to reinterpret it and to gain the energy and motivation to engage in local political action that in turn can help to change the social context that the discourse has hardened. Since most of the Crits were academics in law schools, they first picked on the targets that were closest to them, the standard ways that other law teachers wrote, taught, and talked about, the first-year legal subjects, such as Torts, Contracts, and Property.

Their first problem was to figure out how legal training produces its mind-numbing paralysis—how even left-liberal students trained by left-liberal teachers end up drained of energy and hope for social change. One big reason, of course, is that graduates of the elite schools are lavishly rewarded in money and social status for going into large-firm corporate law practice and tend over time to adjust their ideals to their situations. Graduates of less elite schools think themselves lucky to get any legal job on any terms that are offered. But both types of lawyers tend to excuse their passivity with the gloomy thought that nothing can change anyway, and that conclusion—so the Crits speculate—they owe in part to the conservative elements in academic-legal discourse.

Those elements take a number of different forms. There is a traditional kind of law teaching, perfected around the 1950s and still probably the dominant one, that is very elusive because it never makes any of its premises or assumptions explicit. The teacher creates confusion by slashing up the reasoning of the judges who decide the cases assigned for classroom reading and also the reasoning of the students, but ends up suggesting that there's a delicate, complex balance-point, a moderate centrist position, that a smart, sensible, professional lawyer can settle on. Such a teacher presents a centrist politics as if it were a craft. There is now a fresh set of discourses urging the natural necessity of conservative or mildly reformed social arrangements; this is the economic analysis of law by scholars such as Guido Calabresi of Yale and Richard Posner of Chicago—far more intellectually formidable than the old style of legal theory and increasingly influential.
among policymakers and scholars. Legal economists assert that disputes about particular legal arrangements (e.g., decisions about whether polluters should have to pay homeowners to pollute the air, or homeowners pay polluters not to pollute) may be resolved through value-neutral comparisons of alternative solutions as more or less "efficient."

Fighting, as they saw it, fire with fire, the Critics responded to long articles in elite law journals with longer articles in elite law journals. Streetwise radical lawyers have always mocked the Critics for "footnote activism," using up political energy in pedantic swiping at mandarin doctrines, but from the C. L. S. point of view, the strategy made sense: they were matching a local discourse of power and constraint—one that had some discernible impact on their own and their students' lives—with a discourse of resistance. It is a modest form of political action simply to try to reduce the authority of those people who control the local situation and thus to create a little extra space for your own projects, your counterinterpretations of the same discourses. Through this work, the Critics hoped to develop a set of critical insights and demolition rhetorics that they and others could pick up and use on all sorts of legal discourses, not just those of other scholars. (The success of the project has been mixed. Some of their students picked up and improved on this early work, and went on to teach it to others. Most radical or left-liberal lawyers probably found it too arcane, abstract, and not obviously enough connected to the goals of practice to be of immediate use. Some teaching has been done through conferences, summer camps, and more popular books, but not yet enough to make the ideas widely accessible.)

Here are some of the methods the Critics have deployed against mainstream legal discourses:

**Trashing:** This sixties-evoking phrase covers a big miscellaneous grab bag of techniques designed to denounce the complacent message embedded in legal discourse, that the system has figured out the arrangements that are going to make social life about as free, just, and efficient as it ever can be. The trasher tries to show how discourse has turned contingency into necessity and to reveal the repressed alternative interpretations that are perfectly consistent with the discourse's stated premises. Trashing techniques are used sometimes simply to attack the discourses on their own terms—to show their premises to be contradictory or incoherent and their conclusions to be arbitrary or based on dubious assumptions or hidden rhetorical tricks. The C. L. S. critiques of legal economics, for instance, have borrowed from and added to the multidisciplinary critiques of the neoclassical economic model of human beings as rational self-interested maximizers of their satisfactions: critiques that the model is vacuous (it tells you that people "want" everything they get); that when the model is given concrete content, it is obviously wrong (people are often irrational or altruistic) and too narrow (people want self-worth and the esteem of others as well); that there are fatal ambiguities in the notion of choosing selves (personalities are divided in their desires, desires change over time, short-term desires are often destructive to long-term selves); that the individualism of the model is a culturally and historically specific image of human conduct (a product of certain modern market cultures) that the model falsely claims is universal; and so forth. Critics by no means reject economic analysis as valueless: they teach it and make regular use of it in their work (although the economists do not reciprocate). But by showing that the agile interpreter can justify as economically efficient virtually any imaginable scheme of social arrangements, the critique helps to deprive technocracy of its mystery; its pretense that science, magically substituting for agonizing political and ethical choices, dictates that if we want to remain prosperous we must endure all the miscellaneous injustices now in place and even invent new ones. The Critics' message is that the economic-efficiency analysis of legal practices isn't a science, it's just a very manipulable rhetoric, often a useful rhetoric which highlights problems and possible consequences that one wouldn't otherwise notice, but a myopic rhetoric, too, which systematically obscures from view—has no way even to talk about—the violence, coercion, irrationality, cultural variety, solidarity, and self-sacrifice of lived experience.

**Deconstruction:** The Critics do not believe, however, that their trashing reveals a random chaos or that what lies behind the seeming order of legal decisions is just pure power (or personal whim). There is a patterned chaos, and the aim of Critical scholarship is in part to uncover the patterns. Some of their best work is a familiar kind of left-wing scholarship, unmasking the often unconscious ideological bias behind legal structures and procedures, which regularly makes it easy for business groups to organize collectively to pursue their economic and political interests but which makes it much more difficult for labor, poor people, or civil rights groups to pursue theirs. Other work aims at laying bare "structures of contradiction" that underlie fields of law. Contract law in the Critics' view, for example, draws regularly for its inspiring assumptions upon two diametrically opposed visions of social life. One is a stark neo-Hobbesian world of lonely individuals, predatory and paranoid, who don't dare associate with each other except through formal contracts that strictly limit their obligations. The other is a world in which trustful cooperation is the norm and people assume indefinite open-ended responsibilities to others with
whom they deal regularly and who have come to rely on them. Both sets of images, and the regimes of legal obligation they recommend, are potentially available in every legal decision about a contract. Yet the legal system persistsently gives one of the regimes (the rule-bound, formal, individualistic one in this case) an arbitrarily privileged position and partially suppresses the other or reserves it for the deviant or exceptional case.

**Genealogy:** Still another way to heighten awareness of the transitory, problematic, and manipulable ways legal discourses divide the world is to write their history. The Crits have turned out a lot of history of legal categories. They have focused their attention, for instance, on the mid-nineteenth century moment, when the business corporation, once an entity created only to serve the “public” ends of the commonwealth, was reclassified as “private” and thus free as any individual to do what its managers pleased in the market, while the city corporation was reclassified as the “public” agent of the legislature and its managers’ legal powers from then on were strictly confined. Crits also write social history revealing that even the most basic legal concepts, such as “private property,” have never had any definite, agreed-upon content but have, on the contrary, always been fiercely struggled over, so that any conventional stability the concepts may now seem to possess represents nothing more than a temporary truce that could be unsettled at any moment.

Such techniques owe much to standard liberal and radical analyses. But in the hands of Critics they add up to a style and method of critique that is quite distinctive. Consider the case of picketers who want to demonstrate in a shopping mall and are kicked off the mall by the owner. Lawyers usually approach this situation as one involving a conflict between two opposing “rights,” the property right of the owner to exclude unwanted visitors or behavior and the demonstrators’ right to free speech. Judicial decisions suggest that the way to resolve the conflict is to ask whether the mall is “public” or “private” in character (the more “private” it is, the greater the right to exclude). The Crit begins by asking why labeling the mall as “property” should give the right to exclude picketers in the first place and goes through the standard justifications for property rights. The efficiency rationale says that owner control will yield the highest valued uses of the property. But it is not at all clear that the shoppers do not value diverse viewpoints at the mall, that they are only there to buy and not to converse and socialize, or that their decisions to shop at this mall or go elsewhere are likely to any important extent to depend on being free from picketers.

Anyway, the “taste” of owner and shoppers, if real, to be free from exposure to political speech may be one (like the “taste” for not serving or sitting next to blacks at lunch counters) that should not be entitled to recognition, rendering the whole “efficiency” calculus irrelevant. The privacy rationale for exclusion has much less appeal when the owner is a bodiless corporation that lets hordes of strangers swarm over “its” property daily. Critics examine the private versus public distinction, what it means, and why any of those meanings should be dispositive. How “private,” for instance, is the owner’s decision to exclude picketers, once he asks the cops and courts for injunctions, fines, and jails to back it up? History lends a hand here, pointing out that common law traditionally prescribed social obligations to propertyholders (such as public access to inns and common carriers) in return for the protections of public force and the privileges of corporate status. Some argue that the picketers’ right of access ought to turn on how “public” the property is in the sense of how many links it has to state agencies—zoning privileges, tax exemptions, police services—a bundle of attributes only arbitrarily related to the crucial issue of the appropriate sites of political debate.

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**The economic-efficiency analysis of legal practices isn’t a science, it’s just a very manipulable rhetoric which systematically obscures from view the violence, coercion, irrationality, cultural variety, solidarity, and self-sacrifice of lived experience.**

This brief sketch of one Critical approach certainly does not demand the conclusion that the correct legal solution is to allow pickets, although all Crits probably would favor that result. One can examine just as skeptically the scope of “free speech” rights, which as currently interpreted would allow demonstrators no access at all even to platforms intended for public political discussion, such as newspapers, unless they first purchase a controlling shareholders’ interest. All the approach is meant to do is to show that when legal discourse identifies the shopping mall as “private property,” it sets up a powerful mystifying charm that sends the pickets scrambling to find a stronger countercharm—“free speech.” When you pick the discourse apart, you may find that calling the mall “private property”—even if you completely accept all the standard justifications for private property—tells you virtually nothing

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Down-to-Earth Judaism: Food, Sex, and Money

Arthur Waskow

For most liberal and progressive American Jews, Judaism has little to do with the warp and woof of everyday life—little to do with what food we eat, to whom and how we make love, where we spend or invest our money.

We may avoid eating some foods—but the foods we avoid are as likely to be non-union grapes, Chilean apples, or fast-food hamburgers from the slashed rain forests of the Amazon—as they are to be lobster or ham. We make ethical decisions about what to eat, but few of us consult Jewish sources for ethical advice.

We may be finicky about how to have sex—but that will probably have to do with condoms, herpes, and AIDS—not with avoiding the menstrual period as the Torah decrees. And few of us will consult Jewish sources for counsel on sex, or on health.

We may be choosing “socially responsible” money market funds—but we are not likely to connect that choice with the Torah’s command to let the poor glean from the corners of the field or to redistribute all land equally in the Jubilee year.

Many of us might say that our social concerns are ultimately rooted in our sense that Judaism cares about the poor and the oppressed. We may even connect our social values with our Jewishness by marching for the freedom of Soviet Jews ... by working to restore black-Jewish dialogue ... by voting for our synagogue to become a sanctuary for Salvadoran refugees ... by sending money to the New Israel Fund for a battered women’s shelter in Tel Aviv ... by taking part in a Shalom Seder-in-the-Desert at the Nevada nuclear testing site. But even then, these will seem like Jewish acts to take precisely in the times we have set aside for “being Jewish”—the time we reserve for “politics” or “religion.” And they have to do with “policy” and the “big world”—what presidents and congresses do, not with the small and intimate details of our everyday lives. In the “small world” of our own lives—really the great bulk of our time—most of us live not as Jews but as Americans, or lawyers, or women. The time in which we work, spend money, eat, sleep—most of our lifetime, in fact—has little that is especially related to being Jewish. That we save for a wedding, a funeral, a holy day, perhaps a Shabbat.

It is true that in the last twenty years, some liberal and progressive American Jews have taken the first steps to experiment with walking a more holistic Jewish life-path. But only a few, and only the first few steps. Precisely as liberals and progressives, but rarely as Jews, we have said that “politics” and “culture” and “religion” are not in fact isolated parts of our lives, but the fabric of our whole lives; that what we do about sex, money, and food is indeed more fully and really our “politics,” our “religion,” and our “culture” than what we do in these isolated moments when we deal with “policy.”

I want to propose that we now explore in our imaginations what it would mean to extend this wisdom in a Jewish context, to take the next step in Jewish renewal, the next step on a more holistic Jewish life-path.

Let us begin by saying out loud that, for many of us, this exercise may call up nightmares and demons. Demons perhaps from earlier generations of our families—making distinctions concerning kosher food that to us seemed insanely obsessive or disgustingly hypocritical. Nightmares, perhaps, of what it cost us or our parents to break free from the conventional Jewish roles set aside for women, the whispered Jewish taboo on menstruation; to break free from the conventional Jewish horror and contempt for homosexuals; to break free from the habit that the little blue pushke for the Jewish National Fund was the only way of showing that we cared for others who were trying to make a better world.

Perhaps more basic is the nightmare of Jewish claustrophobia—our own grandparents’ (or great-grandparents’) ghetto—the nightmare that convinced us that even if we are willing to be Jews in the “special” time in which we read Tikkun or go to Seder, we are not willing to define our everyday lives in a way that cuts us off from American society and culture.

Perhaps most basic of all is the nightmare of being “commanded” by these commands, constricted by these restrictions—and sensing these commands as coming not from some ultimately benign and wise Reality, from the necessities of communal life and the discoveries of countless generations, but instead from our immediate forebears—parents and grandparents from a narrow world who were unhelpful guides to the world we
sought to live in, unhelpful when they tried to guide us and infuriating when they tried to command us. So for many of us, the only “down-to-earth Judaism” we knew was restrictive, divisive, irrational, and oppressive.

For many of us, these nightmares and demons carry real weight. They do and should affect what we choose to make out of being Jewish in our own lives. Yet perhaps we have let them have too much weight—assuming that the rigid form we inherited was the only form in which down-to-earth Judaism could exist.

And perhaps the time has come for us to look at the experience and the experiments of those among us who for the past twenty years have been inventing new versions of a fuller Jewish life-path, to see what might be possible. We might do this for the sake of that hypothesis we more than half believe: that the personal is political, and religious, and cultural—and Jewish.

So let us nod to the nightmares and demons, set them aside for the moment, and undertake a thought-experiment in creating our own down-to-earth Judaism—despite them. And then let us come back to reexamine them after we have explored what our own down-to-earth Judaism might be like.

In each of three areas of life, we will look at three questions: how Jewish tradition might mesh with our contemporary concerns, how we might develop the tradition in new paths, and how we might actually initiate and organize those new paths—ground them in continuing reality.

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Let us first take up questions of food. It is not by accident that I propose to start here. Perhaps the way in which biblical Israel focused on food and taught all future generations of Jews to do the same was a distinctive element of Israeliite thought.

According to “biblical Israel’s” understanding of itself, as expressed in the Bible, and according to some (not all) of those who have studied the ancient cultures of the land of Canaan, the very divergence between “Canaanites” and “Israelites” may have emerged in part from the divergence between two ways of addressing the Life-Force of the Universe. One path was through sexuality, which obviously transmitted and celebrated life through the generations. In this view, sacred sexual intercourse with sacred sexual priests and priestesses (what the Bible called kadesha and kadesh—from the root for “holy”) was, in ancient Canaan, a way of invoking and celebrating that ultimate Intercourse that gave rise to all life.

The other path was through the celebration of food. In this view, biblical Israel created a form of prayer and celebration that rejected the path of temple sexuality and focused entirely on bringing the food that sprang from the land—goats and sheep, barley and wheat, olive oil and wine, even water—to the central place of worship. Some was set aside for God the Lifegiver, who was the real owner of all land; some for the landless priests; and some for the poor who had little to eat.

In this culture, even the first independent act of human history was described as an act of eating—not as an act of sexuality or parenting or murder. That act of eating from the Tree of Knowledge sprouted into the burden of endless toil that all human beings faced to wring food from the earth. And when the same culture joyfully welcomed Shabbat into the world—the first step of releasing that burden of endless toil—it was also in the context of food, the manna in the wilderness, that Shabbat came.

In this culture, even the first independent act of human history was described as an act of eating—not as an act of sexuality or parenting or murder.

So it is hardly surprising that this culture generated an elaborate system of kashrut. When the destruction of the Temple and the dispersion of the Jewish community necessitated some new approach to hallowing food that did not depend upon the Temple sacrifices, the Talmud described each family’s dinner-table as a holy Altar, and kashrut was elaborated far beyond its biblical simplicity. Without a separate food-producing land to make them distinctive, the Jews made their Diaspora dinner-tables so distinctive that at every meal their separate peoplehood was reaffirmed.

The content of kashrut has puzzled many analysts. Some have claimed that the prohibition of certain meats protected health; others, that it was the compromise a deeply vegetarian ethic made reluctantly with inveterate eaters of meat. Some have argued that the method of ritual slaughter minimized the animals’ pain; others, that the separation of milk from meat was intended to strengthen an ethic of distinguishing death from life.

Perhaps the most interesting analysis—because it went to the heart of what the entire halakhic system was about—was the one that argued that the entire system of distinctions concerning food was an integral part of a culture that focused on distinctions.

In our own generation, the strongest defenses of kashrut are simply that it is what we have inherited from the Jewish past, and what therefore defined us as
Jews in everyday life. As even the far-flung ghettos and Jewish neighborhoods dissolved into an even more dispersed Diaspora, kashrut might be practically the only distinctive element in everyday Jewish life. From this standpoint, too, kashrut is about distinctions: distinguishing ourselves from others.

For many Jews in our generation, therefore, the question of kashrut is especially problematic. Most of us want to assert our Jewishness without letting it separate us from others with whom we share basic political, cultural, and spiritual values. Many of us act as if “we are what we eat” when it comes to decisions about vegetarianism, macrobiotic diets, boycotts of food grown by oppressed workers in Chile, South Africa, or the United States. Yet many of us also resist the imposition of absolute, black-and-white distinctions in our lives: this you must and this you must not.

Is there any way to reshape this ungodly bundle of our partly contradictory values so that it makes a coherent whole, affirming and strengthening our lives as Jews?

Most of our strongest social values have their roots (or at least their analogues) in values expressed by Jewish tradition:*  

**Oshek.** The prohibition of oppressing workers—and a similar prohibition of exploiting customers. Its principles could be extended to prohibit eating the fruit of such oppression or exploitation.

**Tza‘ar ba‘alei hayyim.** Respect for animals. It could be extended to prohibit eating any meat, or to prohibit eating meat from animals that have been grown under super-productive “factory farm” conditions. It could also be extended to respect for the identity of plants—for example, by prohibiting the misuse of pesticides and of genetic recombination, or the eating of foods that were grown by such misuses.

**Leshev ba‘aretz.** Living with, and not ruining, the earth. It could be extended to require the use of “natural” or “organic” foods—foods not grown with chemical pesticides.

**Shemirat haguf.** The protection of one’s own body. It could be understood to prohibit eating food that contains carcinogens and/or hormones, and quasi-food items like tobacco and overdoses of alcohol. This principle would also mandate attention to the problems of anorexia or overeating that cause us deep physical and psychological pain and make food into a weapon that we use against ourselves.

Tzedakah. The sharing of food with the poor. It could be extended to prohibit the eating of any meal, or any communal festive meal, unless a proportion of its cost goes to buying food for the hungry.† An extended version of this approach suggests that, in a world where protein is already distributed inequitably, it is unjust to channel large amounts of cheap grain into feeding animals to grow expensive meat protein—and that it is therefore unjust to eat meat at all.

**Rodef tzedek and Rodef shalom.** The obligation to pursue peace and justice. It might be understood to require the avoidance of food produced by companies that egregiously violate these values—for example, by investing in South Africa or by manufacturing first-strike nuclear weapons.

**Berakah and Kedushah.** The traditional sense that eating consciously must affirm a sense of holiness and blessing. This might be understood to require that at the table we use old or new forms for heightening the attention we give to the unity from which all food comes—whether we call it God or not. This would help us maintain an awareness of the sad fact that we must kill plants and/or animals to live.

It is important to note here that we have given only the barest sketch of these ethical principles that are embedded in Jewish tradition—no more, in fact, than a list. To draw on them in any serious way would mean to look more deeply at how the tradition shapes their content—not only at the specific rulings, but at how one arrives at them. Not necessarily to follow the same paths of thought or decision, but to wrestle with a Judaism that draws on the wisdom of all the Jewish generations—not our own alone. Once we have done this, then indeed our generation must decide for itself.

The very decision to apply these ethical principles to the choice of what to eat would represent this process of consulting the tradition without being imprisoned by it. If we undertook such a study, we would first find that every one of these principles stands as an ethical norm in Jewish tradition—not only in the aggadic sense of symbol, metaphor, and philosophy, but also in the law code: halakha. Then we would find that there are hints in the tradition that one is obligated not only to avoid doing these misdeeds, but also to avoid benefiting from them if they have been done by others. But we would also find that there is no clear legal requirement to bring together the Jewish sense of the importance of food with these principles by forbidding the eating of the fruits of these misdeeds. We would also find that

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*For the remainder of this discussion of food and the possibility of an “ethical kashrut,” I have drawn a great deal on work that Rabbi Rebecca Albert, Dean of Students at the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College, and I have done together in the context of the Reconstructionist movement. This approach owes much of its origins to Reconstructionist ways of thinking, but also seems to “work” in other approaches to Judaism and Jewish peoplehood held by a wide range of Jews.

†In line with the recent establishment of Mazon, a Jewish anti-hunger organization that collects a voluntary self-tax on communal celebration meals.
there is little in the tradition that would stand in the way of adding new ethical restrictions to what we allow ourselves to eat.

Does it make sense for us now to draw on these basic principles to set new standards for what we actually eat—standards for an “ethical kashrut”? If we did, do we run the danger of obsessiveness, or even the danger that applying strict standards might result in drastically reducing the kinds of foods we could eat at all? Perhaps we can learn a lesson from the way different types of Jews practice traditional kashrut today.

Different Jews do maintain different answers to the question, “Is this food kosher?” For example, some will accept only certain types of certification on packaged goods, while others are satisfied with reading labels to verify ingredients as kosher. Some people will drink only kosher wine, while others believe this category is no longer relevant. Some keep “biblical kashrut,” only abstaining from biblically forbidden foods. Some are willing to eat nonkosher foods in restaurants and in other people’s homes, while others do not eat any cooked foods away from home.

Could we call into being a broader commission for eco-kashrut that could reach out far beyond the Jewish community to define what products are so damaging to the earth that they ought not to be bought or consumed?

A new kashrut that is rooted in ethical strands of Torah will also demand that people make choices about how to observe. For example, some will treat the principle of osbek (not oppressing workers) as paramount, and will choose only to eat foods that are grown without any oppression of food workers (from one’s own backyard or neighborhood garden, or from a kibbutz where all workers are also owners and participants). Others may make the principle of leshev ba’aretz (protection of the environment) paramount, and put osbek in a secondary place—perhaps applying it only when specifically asked to do so by workers who are protesting their plights.

But there will also be some important differences in the way choices will work in an ethical kashrut from the way choices work in traditional kashrut. According to the new approach, there will be so many ethical values to weigh that it may be rare to face a black-and-white choice with a particular food. This one is grown by union workers, that one with special care for the earth and water, another… So choices will depend more on balancing and synthesizing of the underlying values than on an absolute sense of Good and Bad. More on a sense of Both/And than of Either/Or.

What impact might adherence to this new approach to “ethical kashrut” have upon adherence to the traditional code of kosher food? Jews who find traditional kashrut an important link with Torah and Jewish peoplehood could continue to observe it while observing ethical kashrut as well; Jews who cannot relate to the traditional code could continue to leave it to one side while following the new path with its new way of connecting with Torah and Jewish peoplehood.

Some who are newly observant of ethical kashrut may find that it leads them to find unexpected value in the traditional form. Others who have observed kashrut in traditional ways may find that the new one fulfills their Jewish sense more richly, and give up the ancient form.

In any case, this new approach to kashrut would be trying to deal with the issue of “distinctions” in a new way: not by separating only, but by consciously connecting. Connecting what is uniquely Jewish with what is shared and universal. Connecting Jewish categories with universal concerns. Consciously asserting Jewish reasons to avoid a food that others are also avoiding for similar but not identical reasons. Choosing not Either/Or but Both/And.

If we were to draw further on the analogy with traditional kashrut, what we would need is a kind of “living Talmud”—a group of people who are Jewishly knowledgeable, ethically sensitive, and willing to become reasonably expert on questions regarding food so that their advice would be taken seriously by large parts of the Jewish community. Such a commission on ethical kashrut might periodically issue reports and suggestions on specific matters and specific foods, listing specific foods and brands that it regarded as “highly recommended,” and others it though should be “avoided if at all possible.”

How should such a commission come into being? We will take up this question after dealing with two other areas of “down-to-earth” Judaism.

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In the ancient world, food and sex were the two most powerful emblems of the Lifegiver in the visible world, and the production of food was the strongest link between human life and the rest of the created world. On the earth-to-human side, this link was governed by kashrut; on the human-to-earth side, it was governed by rules of land use, including provisions
for the poor and for periodic equalizations of landholding, and by intense human prayers for rain. Indeed, the provision and protection of water is one of the main concerns of Jewish liturgy.

There were other links between earth and humanity, but none required as much care and regulation as did food. Clothing was one of these other links, and the Torah notes a kind of kashrut of clothes—not mixing linen and wool. But the rabbinic tradition did not greatly elaborate upon the rule. Breathing was another link. God's most intimate name may have been based on a breathing sound, and breath/wind became the metaphor for life, soul, and spirit. Even in the biblical and rabbinic periods, air pollution was occasionally a problem—downwind of a tannery, for example—but this was rare, and few rules were developed for the correct use of air.

In our own world, food is no longer the only problematic link between human beings and their environment. Our water and air are often polluted, and although food represents the most crucial link to the earth, producing it takes up a much smaller proportion of our work than it did before the modern age. Today there are many products that we make from the world around us that are crucial to our lives and health. Does it make sense to apply to them some rules of “kashrut,” and if so how would we develop such rules? And how would we enforce them?

In this new society, the human-to-earth link comes not so much through the use of land as through the use of money. Rules about preserving the gleanings and the produce of the corners of a field for the poor, redistributing land once a generation, letting the land rest from its work every seventh year—all these need to be translated into the use of money and of “technological capital” if we are to preserve the same functional relationship of holiness between human beings and their environment.

In a sense, in our world the kashrut of food is holiness at retail; the kashrut of money would be holiness at wholesale.*

There are some religious and cultural traditions that view money itself, or the effort to amass it, as intrinsically evil. There are others that see the possession of money—or large amounts of it—as intrinsic evidence of holiness and blessedness. Most of Jewish thought sees money as a powerful tool for evil or for good—depending on how it is used. There is deep Jewish experience with the mitzvah of tzedakah—sharing the just and righteous use of money not only to alleviate poverty, but to help end it and create shared wealth—and with the use of money to protect Jewish rights, assist Jewish refugees, and help create the Jewish community in Israel. All this experience suggests that as the Jewish community stirs itself to protect its own survival and that of the planet, the wise use of money is an important tool. Knowing where not to spend money, as well as where it should be spent, is important both morally and politically.

Let us look at the different areas of possibility:

**Work.** How do we choose what companies to work for and what work to do? Should engineers, secretaries, scientists, public-relations experts, and nurses be asking whether their work contributes to or reduces the danger of a nuclear holocaust? Does Jewish tradition and the Jewish community offer any help in making such judgments? What help is most needed?

In the Summer 1984 issue of *Reform Judaism*, Rabbi Laurence K. Milder wondered what would happen “If the Scientists said No” to nuclear expansion. He described a Boston conference on “The Faith Community and the Defense Industry Employee,” in which engineers and scientists examined how their various religious and ethical systems might deal with work on nuclear questions. Said Milder:

Can Jews afford to be disinterested regarding nuclear weapons research? Until now, the Reform movement has been outspoken in its opposition to the arms race. Yet the question remains to be addressed whether the same religious convictions ought to prohibit one from working on the construction of those weapons whose deployment we oppose. Being disproportionately represented in the sciences and high-tech industries, we can be sure that the question would have far-reaching impact. A decision to refrain from such work would be a serious blow to the nuclear weapons’ industry. Any decision at all would be better than silence, which suggests that Judaism stops at the doors of one’s workplace. Congregations can provide a forum for this kind of dialogue, in which Jewish scientists and engineers can talk about their concerns, to one another, and to fellow Jews.

How could the Jewish community, or parts of it, decide whether specific jobs were “kosher”? Suppose a community decided a specific job was not kosher; should and could the community provide financial help—temporary grants, low-interest loans, etc.—to Jews who decide to leave such jobs for reasons of Torah and conscience? Should organizing toward such a fund be a goal of the Jewish community?

**Investments.** How do we judge where to invest money—in which money market funds, IRAs, etc.? What about institutional funds in which we may have a voice or could make for ourselves a voice—college endowments,

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In much of the rest of this discussion about money, and in my comments about a “connective” rather than “separative” ethics, I have drawn on conversations with Jeffrey Dekro, Associate Director of the Shalom Center.
pension funds, city bonds, etc? In the last ten years, there has arisen in the United States a network of people and groups concerned with “socially responsible investment”—that is, working out how to apply ethical standards to investment decisions. Demands for divestment of investments in businesses that operate in South Africa are one—but by no means the only—example of this approach. Labor relations, degree of involvement in the arms race, and health and safety concerns have been others. The network has now brought into being socially responsible “screened” investment funds, which avoid investing money in what each considers the most socially irresponsible firms, and affirmative socially responsible investment funds that seek to invest in new or small but financially viable businesses that in their eyes have major positive factors for social responsibility.

In the Jewish community, investment funds that might become “socially responsible” include community-worker and rabbinical association pension funds, synagogue endowments, building campaign accounts, pulpit flower funds, seminary endowments, etc. How would the community decide which investments are “kosher”?  

**Purchases.** Should we as individuals, when we choose which companies to buy consumer goods from, use as one factor in our choice the facts of what else a specific company is producing? Are operations in South Africa, the USSR, Chile—or in making nuclear weapons, dangerous petrochemicals—relevant? Should we ask our synagogues, our pension funds, our city and state governments, our PTA’s, to choose vendors on the same basis? Rabbi Zalman Schachter-Shalomi has suggested that since in our era we consume many items other than food, the notion of kashrut should be expanded beyond food to many other products that we use. Is electric power generated by a nuclear plant “kosher,” he asks? And, even more to the point, could we call into being a broader commission for eco-kashrut that could reach out far beyond the Jewish community to define what products are so damaging to the earth that they ought not be bought or consumed?

**Taxes.** Is it legitimate to challenge, protest, or prevent the use of our tax money to carry on activities that profoundly contradict Torah? If so, how do we define “profoundly contradict”? What weight do we give to the fact that our taxes and government expenditures are defined by elected representatives?

**Tzedakah.** How do we decide how much money we should give to “charity” and to which enterprises to give it?

In the last twenty years, there have grown up among Jewish liberals and progressives not only new channels for *tzedakah*, such as Mazon (intended to feed the hungry) and the Jewish Fund for Justice (intended to help groups of the poor or powerless organize to win their own footing in the world), but also a relatively new (and old) form for *tzedakah*—the “*tzedakah collective*.” These groups meet together, face to face, to discuss possible recipients of *tzedakah*; the participants agree in advance on what proportion of their incomes they will give, and on a more or less collective process for deciding how to give it. The ambience produced is very different from what happens when individuals write checks to a national *tzedakah* organization, whether it is the United Jewish Appeal or the Jewish Fund for Justice; and usually the involvement of the participants is much deeper in learning about *tzedakah* and the Jewish tradition’s teachings on *tzedakah*, as well as in learning about projects that might be *tzedakah* recipients.

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**Most of Jewish thought sees money as a powerful tool for evil or for good—depending on how it is used.**

Participants in these *tzedakah* collectives report that their involvement feels inspiring and their field results seem good; yet the number of such collectives seems still to be much lower than the number of havurot for study and prayer. What would be ways of encouraging this process?

It would take two steps to encourage such direct involvement in *tzedakah*. One would be face-to-face organizing by rabbis, Jewish teachers, and similar local Jewish community workers to get groups of families to meet together to do *tzedakah*. The other would be providing such groups with information not only on *tzedakah* decisions that groups like them are making, but also on Jewish aspects of the everyday use of money in their non-*tzedakah* lives: the “kashrut of money” for investment, purchasing, tax, and workplace choices. If a packet of newsletters with such information were made available every month or two first to rabbis to pass on to “*tzedakah activists*” and then to *tzedakah* collectives as they appeared, the chances would be much greater that Jewish values would be consciously applied to the use of money in many aspects of life.

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The second section of *Down-to Earth Judaism: Food, Sex, and Money* will appear in the next issue of Tikkun. The second section will address questions of sexuality.
This is the first in a series of interviews with people who have been important in shaping the political, cultural, and spiritual movements of our day. In these interviews Tikkun seeks to learn about the role of Judaism in their lives.

Tikkun: What role did Jewishness play in forming your identity?

Friedan: I didn’t have a very Jewish growing up since I was raised in Peoria, Illinois, where there were relatively few Jews. There was one other girl my age who was Jewish, and one boy—his mother told him he had to dance with me at dancing school, so naturally we hated each other. And yet I see it was a very strong factor in my growing up in the sense that it made life a little miserable, because there was covert anti-Semitism. It was the uncomfortable kind of anti-Semitism. It made me an outsider.

I remember very distinctly that it was first oppressive to me when I was in high school. Sororities and fraternities dominated social life in this Midwestern town. All my friends got into sororities and fraternities and I didn’t because I was Jewish. So I was isolated then, and I spent much more time reading poetry alone on gravestones in the cemetery than I would have liked to do.

I would have much rather hung out in the hamburger joint, in somebody’s jalopy, or with the gang. So being Jewish made me an observer, a marginal person and, I made one of those unconscious vows to myself: “They may not like me but they’re going to look up to me.” Although it was many years before I identified in any way with feminism, I think my passion against injustice came from my experience of being a Jew in Peoria.

I wouldn’t be the first of our people to have taken the experience of injustice, the passion against injustice, which, if it’s not in our genes, is certainly a product of centuries of experience, and applied it to the largest human category of which one is a part. Jews have been very, very present in centuries of revolutions against one form of injustice or another, one form of oppression or another.

My father was of the immigrant generation, and my mother was born and grew up in Peoria. Her father, my grandfather, studied to be a rabbi, but eventually went to the first medical school class of Washington University in St. Louis, was in the Medical Corps in World War I, and then became Public Health director in Peoria.

My mother was an anti-Semitic Jew, which was very easy to be, growing up in Peoria, Illinois at that time. So I was not even allowed to have the comfort of knowing that I didn’t get into the sorority because I was Jewish.

My father was a different matter. He had also come to Peoria from Russia by way of St. Louis. At the age of 13, he had a collar button stand. He sent his youngest brother—he was the oldest of thirteen—to Harvard Law School, and by the time I was born he was a prominent businessman. He would say, non-Jews will do business with you during the day—when you are a friend—but afterwards they don’t want to socialize with you. When I was thirteen years old I announced to the rabbi a month before my confirmation (in Reform Judaism the Bar/Bat Mitzvah is called confirmation and includes girls) that I no longer believed in God. And he said, keep it to yourself until the confirmation is over. So, actress that am, I gave the flower offering, raising my eyes to the heavens.

But my intellectual tradition growing up was the agnostic, atheistic, scientific, and humanist tradition, and it is only in my later life, and really as almost an offshoot of my feminism, that I have begun to embrace my own Jewish roots and develop an increasing interest in the mystery of being Jewish. But I was always involved in the struggles against injustice.

Tikkun: You were involved in antifascist struggles...

Friedan: Living in Peoria, I think I first learned about the Spanish Civil War reading Hemingway. I became involved in the antifascist left in my youth in the forties. I was with the labor unions, working people, poor people, the oppressed—those generally on the left—and then the civil rights struggles, and I was not at all a feminist. By the time I got to college the first century of struggle for women’s rights had been blotted out of the national memory and the national consciousness.

I can look back now and say, probably if I had been a boy I’d have gone to law school. My cousins all went to Harvard Law School, and I would have, being sort of disputatious. But, of course, Harvard Law School
didn’t take women, and it never occurred to me to go law school.

But I didn’t have any conscious feminism. My first experience of injustice applied to women was when I was fired from a newspaper job for being pregnant with my second child. I took it to the union, the newspaper guild. I was the best writer on the staff and there had never been any complaint about my work. I had taken nearly a year with my first child of mostly unpaid pregnancy leave (that you were supposed to be able to take on the union contract). And obviously they were getting rid of me because they didn’t want me to do it again. And I said, “this is not fair,” and they said, “Well, it’s your fault for getting pregnant.” The union wouldn’t even take the case. That was my first conscious awareness of something unfair about the way women are treated.

I certainly learned lessons from class warfare, from the racial struggles, the civil rights struggle; but our revolution is and was unique, and it was based on confronting our own experience. We took the values of equality and freedom and applied them to our own condition as women. We paid concrete attention to our daily life experience as women.

If you ask why me, I would have to say that it was the same reason that it was not surprising that the modern women’s movement exploded in the U.S. first—because in the U.S. there were the greatest numbers of women with education, who grew up with some degree of independence, and yet were expected to focus all their energies in the narrow scope of the home. The conflict was the most acute, then, for American women.

All the more so for Jewish-American women, because traditionally Jewish women received their self-definition solely in terms of the family. And yet, the little girls, like the little boys, are brought up to respect the culture of the book and get all A’s. So the conflicts are stronger there. But once we broke through to authenticity as women, which our generation began to do, we said we would not buy someone else’s definition of what being a woman is. I am a person, and what I am as a woman is all of me, not just part of me that will give birth, but my brain and my mind, and I need to be able to move into society as the person, myself, and not just as my children’s mother, my husband’s wife. And then we began to write our own names as people to define ourselves, and to know the strength that authenticity gives you.

We didn’t have that sense of authenticity from our Jewish experience if we grew up as I did in an assimilated, almost anti-Jewish community. There was the fixing of noses, the changing of names.

I remember becoming very strongly aware of this at Smith. There were four wealthy Jewish girls from Cincinnati in the house where I lived in 1939. There was a petition to the president of the U.S. to open immigration, to relax the quotas that were keeping persecuted people out. The president of Smith College indicated that he would open the doors of the college to women escaping Nazi persecution.

It was my freshman year at Smith, and at the discussion in the house meeting about whether to support the petition—a few obviously liberal young women spoke up for this, and the Jewish girls, the upper class, were silent. I was new, but I spoke up for it, of course. It didn’t pass. But the petition was left on the hall table, so anyone could sign it individually, and it was on the hall table for four days. I signed it, and these two or three WASP girls signed it. Every day I’d come in from the library or wherever, and I’d look at that petition to see if the girls from Cincinnati had signed it, and they hadn’t.

I was studying with Kurt Lewin and from his teaching, I began to understand the dynamics of the anti-Semitic Jew. So I was very strong about Jewish identity; in my years of agnosticism and atheism, we always had Passover.

**Tikkun:** I wonder if recognizing the anti-Semitism in your mother and the kind of internalized anti-Semitism in college gave you a hook on being able to understand the internalized sexism of women.

**Friedan:** Yes. I think that in a certain sense, my experience as a Jew informed, though unconsciously, a lot of the insights that I applied to women, and the passion that I applied to the situation of women. But then, conversely, the sense of breaking through to your authentic self as a woman prepared me when I began to experience the new form of anti-Semitism in the international women’s conferences: the “Zionism as racism” form. And I was outraged and appalled. I realized that many of the communist nations, the third-world despotisms, and the neo-fascist nations didn’t want their women messing around with women’s rights. They had to give lip service to this meeting of the U.N., but they certainly didn’t want anything to really happen there. So having a resolution of Zionism as racism did manage to disrupt and preempt the airwaves and prevent the women of the world from getting together on their own rights; and that kind of red herring outraged me both as a Jew and a feminist.

After the eruption of anti-Semitism at the U.N. I began to speak out as a Jew. Also, within the women’s movement I began to make the links with my Jewish experience and my own identity, and I began to get more interested even in theology. For those of us who grew up in an intellectual, secular environment, our intellectual map simply did not include theology. It was a desert when it came to spiritual values. Our spiritual
values were political values.

However, my feminism has led me to an unabashed sense of the unity of spirit and political values. Now, four months of the year I'm a visiting distinguished professor at the University of Southern California. And when I'm there, I'm part of a Jewish study group. I have a sense of wanting to know more about the mystery of being Jewish and about a theology that is not pie-in-the-sky and heaven after you're dead.

In my generation of feminists a lot of feminist leadership came from people who happened to be Jewish, though we weren't religious Jews. But the next generation took this taste for authenticity and embraced their Jewish identity. They then immersed themselves—some became rabbis because our new authenticity made us embrace our Judaism rather than deny it or evade it or weaken it. But then, if you are a woman, that brings you right into confrontation with the feminine mystique and the put-down of women in the Jewish world.

I love what the new young women rabbis are imparting to Judaism and bringing into this field—definitions based on female experience, not just male experience.

Tikkun: What do you say to women who argue that, since historically Judaism was patriarchal, it's a mistake to give any legitimation to the Jewish tradition because you only legitimate a tradition that had been fundamentally shaped by a patriarchal consciousness.

Friedan: Well, everything was patriarchal. But, you don't throw away the baby with the bath water. You can't really find in Jewish history or in the Bible the images to justify the full personhood of woman that we're dealing with now. In those centuries, there wasn't a feminine mystique. Woman's main role was as child-bearer and child rearer, and that defined her life. To see woman as a full person was not possible then, and now it is. This is a part of human evolution, and Judaism has got to evolve and allow room for Jewish women who want to retain the values of their spiritual tradition and integrate them with the equally strong values of their feminism. There's got to be some changes. And some have been made. You take the very best values of your spiritual tradition and you apply them to women as if they were souls, too. The next step is that the very values themselves will change as values of nurturing life that have been specialized to women become articulated as a part of the religious tradition. So we will move beyond the male dominant, angry, patriarchal god, which articulated something that was from male experience. You add to that some dimension of nurture, of not either-or, win-lose, but a dimension which embraces the complexity that comes from female experience. This is an interesting theological enrichment of the whole tradition that is coming from women's voice. There will be a transformation of Judaism when women's voice begins to define the religion also.

Tikkun: Have you heard the claim that Judaism played a major role in creating patriarchy?

Friedan: Yes, and I don't like it. It's dangerous. I don't like feminism to be used in any way to justify anti-Semitism. I understand that in some left circles it is now chic to say that. Anti-Semitism of the left appalls me and outrages me even more than anti-Semitism of the right. It makes the left beyond the pale for me. Suddenly we have the Jews blamed not only for killing Christ, but for supposedly killing the Goddess. I'm very quizzical about this Goddess stuff; I don't believe that there was a wonderful world where women were worshiped and that the Jews killed them off. Monotheism is what the Jews did. If God is seen as a male God, then that is a limitation. But you do not replace it by a female God. There is one God. And I, as a Jew, have no use for this Goddess stuff. I have great use for how women theologians and rabbis are enriching the Jewish tradition by bringing rubrics that come from female experience, but the Goddess . . . "The Lord is One" is the basic truth here.

Tikkun: One of the arguments that is made is that part of what makes the Jewish God a male God is that the Jewish God, as One, is seen as transcendent from nature, whereas women are more in touch with nature. So the Goddess, or the goddesses, were connected with nature. But of course that raises another issue in feminist theory, at least a debate between those women who think that reclaiming nature is a good thing for women. To reclaim their identity as natural versus those that . . .

Friedan: Watch it. I just hate all that polarization, all that either-or stuff. If female experience is to inform in a new way and enrich our values generally in any discipline, it should move us away from the either-or, polarized, win-lose, zero sum definitions that, to me at least, come from more linear male experience, and embrace the complexity of not either-or, but both. So, to say, "you had your God, that was a male God. Now we're going to have our Goddess"—that's ridiculous. That's not liberation. If there was too much of a masculine definition, then you enlarge it by including the complexities of women's experience. You don't simply repeat the masculine polarization in the other direction. It seems to me such a weird perversion of feminism. And watch this business of designating women to handle nature, freeing men so they can dominate and make war. The games of the men are bringing the United States to ruin: Wall Street
is divorced from the realities of life. The nuclear weapons that the men have developed can destroy the whole planet. It is not safe to try to define women in ways that bar them from the abstractions of mastery and specialize them to focus on the concreteness of daily life, and let men have the dominance of the realm of abstractions and politics. We’ve seen that men can bring the nation to economic ruin and the world to Holocaust. Both men and women have got to be more in tune with the realities of life, but also with the realities of our human capacity to abstract and master our environment and control it. I’ve watched this business of trying to reduce woman to the earth mother again. There’s a new feminine mystique building here that will be exacerbated and exaggerated as a result of the economic trials that are ahead, as these leveraged buy-outs, these latest games of the men increasingly bring us to ruin.

The answer is not for women to flee back home again, because their paychecks, even from low-paying miserable service jobs, are going to be necessary to keep themselves and their children alive. But there’s going to emerge a new feminine mystique, and I would watch it. I certainly wouldn’t play into it by one of these ridiculous reversals.

Tikkun: Could you say more about how your feminism sees the issue of family?

Friedan: Even my original formulation in the Feminine Mystique was not antifamily. I was opposed to the definition of women solely in terms of the family, and in that sense it had become a mystique that denied the reality of women in the world they had to move in. But even then I saw that one of the reasons for that had been the either-or polarization. After a hundred-year battle for women’s rights, we won the right to vote, have jobs and careers. But those first feminists had had to fight so hard to prove that they were equal to men, in male terms, that many of them didn’t want to confront the difference between the sexes and the strong reality about women giving birth to children. And so, as a result, even after women won the vote, the image of the feminist was of a woman who didn’t marry, didn’t have kids. So a few women went on to a career, and they didn’t marry, and they didn’t have kids. Other women worked for a few years before marriage, or in time of national or domestic crisis. And then the feminist dreams got too painful because they couldn’t be lived, and we had a new feminine mystique making a religion of women in the home just at the point where their own life-span and the evolution of the society absolutely required that they also move beyond the home. Faced with an either-or—either family or career—the majority of women continued to marry and have children. And so that was the death of the first wave of feminism, or the abortion of it.

Now, in my book The Second Stage I’ve very clearly articulated the need of the women’s movement to continue evolving and insist that feminism does not require the denial of the difference between women and men. Women are the people that give birth to babies. That is a fact of life. It is extremely important. It shouldn’t define women’s lives completely because it is not the defining principle for an eighty-year life span, but it is a very basic element of a woman’s life. Having children is not a mystique. Children are real. We do not need to repudiate the family. We can’t, if family is our human core. It defines our humanness. Of course, the family must evolve so that women are full people in it, and not just the people that give birth to children and that serve them. Families must recognize that women in an eighty-year life span must spend a good part of their time moving in the larger society beyond the home.

So, therefore, you must restructure professions, jobs and professional training that up to now were based on men that had wives to take care of the details of life. Well, the women that are going to use these rights that we have fought for won’t have such wives and can’t be such wives. The men won’t have such wives either, though part of that restructuring is to have adequate community childcare. It’s outrageous that the United States is the only industrial nation besides South Africa that doesn’t have a national policy of parental leave and childcare.

I deplore the pseudo-radical extremism of the kind of feminism which leads to an antifamily position. But now, as some of these feminists begin to hit up against the biological clock in their late thirties or early forties, they are finding that they want to have kids, and they haven’t got such good choices about having children. You postpone it too long, it’s going to be in-vitro fertilization.

Tikkun: My impression is that the National Organization of Women may be stuck in a time warp. What do you think?

Friedan: I agree with that to some degree. To some extent the leaders of what had previously been the front-edge feminist organizations are caught in a time warp of first-stage feminism, and they haven’t moved to the second stage. What I think will happen in the next couple of years is either they will move, as they must, to the second stage, or there will be new feminist organizations. This next stage cannot be women against men. Women and men and the whole family are going to be concerned about basic economic survival issues. I’ve always felt that you can’t divorce women’s rights,
the battle for women's rights, from what's going on in the larger society.

Tikkun: So perhaps a profamily movement could be one that was led by women, rather than just for women.

Friedan: Right, exactly, because for the preservation of families today, you need the paycheck of women as well as men; and you also need to be able to choose to have kids before you're forty.

Tikkun: So building some kind of progressive profamily movement might be useful in the period ahead for the liberal forces?

Friedan: I've felt we've got to take those values back. When I debate the prolife people, I say I am for life. You know, for the life of the woman as well as the child, which implies access to legal abortion. You don't throw away the family because you want to throw away certain aspects of the role of women as it had been defined in past generations. You don't throw away the American flag because it has been waved by reactionaries in recent years. We should value democracy.

We could have no women's movement without the Constitution, without the freedoms of speech and organization. Women under authoritarian and communist regimes do not enjoy our freedom. We should embrace the real values of family, of our American tradition, of our Jewish tradition, and of our religious tradition. And, as women, we should also transform them. Now, as feminists we've got to concern ourselves with the larger economic and political problems, as well as the saving of our own rights. This is essential not only for our own survival, but for that of our families, at a time of economic chaos, when there will be new waves of political reaction.

There is going to be some new attempt at using women as scapegoats—attempts certainly to send the women home again, and maybe an attempt to use the Jews as scapegoats, as often happens in times of great economic trouble. But there is a hunger on the part of people in this country for serious purpose again, for values beyond themselves and their immediate material gratification, and a hunger for real family and real community. And I think that as feminists and women, as Jews, we have to understand this, and certainly not let ourselves be diverted into narrow and polarizing expressions of our predominant themes. Second-stage feminism will bring the needs and the problems of women and men together. It doesn't mean that there can be a retreat from women's rights. That would be bad for the family, and that won't solve any economic problems. But, on the other hand, with the whole nation now facing economic crisis as well as political crisis, the narrow first-stage definition of feminism no longer suffices, even for the defense of women's rights.

Tikkun: If you could imagine people reading this thirty or forty years from now, do you have some kind of message about the kinds of ideals that you would like to be remembered for, and what you want to say, what you think is important to be changed in the world?

Friedan: Well, I think that the modern women's movement was the most life-opening movement of social change of the last 20 years, no question about it. And what we did we had to do. We had to move beyond the definition of women solely in terms of family, we had to fight for women's access to employment and professional training and the control of our bodies. But we also had to, and have to now, transcend the polarization of women and men, and the specialization of women only to life, that has allowed men to dominate the economy and use the technology for the development of weapons that will destroy life itself. The next stage for everyone's survival has got to be the articulation of the values of family and life and community that reembrace the seriousness of purpose in terms of life itself. Women's rights are a part of that, and women's experience must be a part of that, and women must take a leadership role in that, but it can't any longer be seen in terms of a polarized war of women against men. The second stage is beyond that, and so what we have to do now is to reembrace in a positive, life-opening, life-affirming way new values of family and of community and new values of larger purpose that integrate masculine and feminine experience. ☐
Johannesburg, South Africa—Shlomo Peer, a husky sixty-year-old South African businessman, ushers me into his study. The room has all the trappings of the “quality of life” that Peer says lured him to South Africa—beige leather chairs, a sleek wooden conference table, and a sliding door that allows the cool air of a South African summer downpour to blow in from the lush garden. Four large photographs decorate the wall—the late Moshe Dayan, an Israeli general on a visit to South Africa, the provincial leader of South Africa’s ruling National Party, and South African President Pieter W. Botha.

The photos reflect Peer’s own peculiar odyssey. Born in the East Carpathians of Bukovina, Peer fled to Palestine in 1940 and joined the Royal Air Force. He remained in Israel after the war and served in the Israeli army. An admirer of Dayan, he keeps an old Hebrew campaign poster and a personal letter from Dayan framed next to the late defense minister’s photo. In 1966, however, Peer left the Promised Land, moved to South Africa, and worked for the Anglo American Corporation’s insurance affiliate. He later joined the ruling National Party and became the first Jewish member of its Transvaal provincial executive committee.

It was at the time an odd marriage, a Jew and the National party. Many party leaders had belonged to the Ossewabrandwag, a group of Afrikaner nationalists and Nazi sympathizers who had sabotaged British installations while Peer was flying in the British Air Force against the Nazis. When boatloads of Jewish refugees washed up on South African shores from Nazi Germany, South African National Party leaders demonstrated at the docks to have them shipped back. The party, which has pursued a policy of apartheid since it came to power in white elections in 1948, had been dominated by Afrikaans-speaking whites. Though Jewish, Peer was given the standard party membership card, which on the reverse side said he pledged to “seek the development of South Africa’s national life along Christian National lines” and “with undivided loyalty … to uphold the declared principles of the National Party as the national political front of Afrikanerdom and the White Nation in South Africa.”

Unruffled, Peer found himself at home in the party. The idea of protecting white Afrikaner identity in a predominantly black country didn’t seem that much different from guarding Jewish identity in a vast, gentle sea of humanity. And if that meant the domination of other people, Peer had no problem with that. “You see, I’m a little like Hitler,” he explains in his accented English. “I’m a racist. I think Jews are superior. They form .02 percent of the world population yet win 25 percent of the Nobel awards. I believe in the superiority of one people over others.”

In a grotesque fashion, Shlomo Peer poses a disconcerting question for South African Jews: Where does ethnic identity end and racism begin? And what moral price will people pay to protect their own interests? The history of Jews should encourage South Africa’s white Afrikaner minority. The survival of Judaism through the centuries should show that legal strictures enforcing racial separation aren’t necessary for people who want to preserve their own language and culture.

But instead of illuminating the way to guard ethnic identity in a modern democratic society, South African Jews themselves are losing sight of the distinction between ethnicity and racism. Here at the southern tip of Africa two self-declared chosen peoples are finding much in common. South Africa’s white Afrikaner minority invokes themes that resonate for Jews—survival and “culture” and minority protection—and Jews increasing support the white regime’s fight against an angry black majority. Lured also by a standard of living without parallel anywhere else in the world, Jewish soldiers patrol the black townships side by side with their Afrikaner colleagues.

Many Jews are abandoning the liberal white opposition parties and swelling the ranks of South Africa’s ruling National Party. When the government proposed a new constitution in 1983 with a segregated three-chamber parliament that excluded blacks entirely, more than a dozen leading Jewish businessmen took out ads backing the government plan. In the recent white elections, Jewish defections helped cut liberal parliamentarian Helen Suzman’s whopping majority to half its previous level, and a Jewish National Party candidate won a previously Progressive Federalist Party seat.

Steven Mufson, former Johannesburg correspondent for the Wall Street Journal and Business Week, is writing a book on black South African politics at the Council on Foreign Relations.
This trend contrasts sharply with past political participation. South African Jews have been the stalwarts of the liberal opposition, pledging money and votes, and sizable numbers of Jews have played active roles in the Communist Party and labor movement. “Traditionally, South African Jews were to the left of the political spectrum. But today Jews have come out of the closet and openly identify with the ruling party,” says Issy Pinshaw with evident pride. Pinshaw is the only Jewish member of the sixty-man President’s Council, a high-level legislative and advisory body.

Paradoxically, the drawing of Jews into the mainstream of National Party politics marks the end of the party’s own sense of cultural and ethnic exclusivity. In an effort to buttress the party against right-wing Afrikaners, the party has tried to broaden its constituency among English-speaking white South Africans. Playing to this new constituency, the party dropped its loyalty pledge three years ago.

What moral price will people pay to protect their own interests?

The reason for the shift is fear. In the past, Jews perceived their greatest threat to be the Afrikaner anti-Semitism that greeted them in the beloved country as they arrived, mostly from Lithuania. They faced prejudice in the army and antagonism from the Afrikaner working class. “Jews owned all the cafes and businesses, and poor white Afrikaners saw the Jewish community as a barrier to what they wanted,” says Wim Booyse, an Afrikaans political analyst. A pamphlet in the 1930s depicted a bald-headed, large-nosed head on the body of an octopus. The body was labeled “Juda” and each tentacle clutched a different business: gold, hotels, diamonds, radio and television, industry, grain and meat markets, and commerce. At a 1939 rally, Hendrik Verwoerd (later prime minister) launched an attack on Jews as a menace to Afrikanerdom because of their prominence in the professions.

In the beginning, many Jews refrained from openly attacking the ruling National Party for fear of arousing Afrikaner hatred toward them. To protect their own interests, they even went so far as to plead with Israeli leaders to widen Israeli-South African links. But the conspiracy of silence about the flaws of the National Party has given way to open enthusiasm for it. The face of the Jews’ perceived enemy has undergone a metamorphosis: it is now a black face. As the racial crisis in South Africa has deepened, Jews have grown more fearful of what is commonly known here in Afrikaans as die swart gevaar or the black peril. According to these Jews, the black peril, like some sort of plague, would sweep across the country with majority rule, leaving misery in its wake. “One man, one vote would spell chaos and destruction for the whole of South Africa,” says President’s Council member Pinshaw. He equates Jewish interests with white interests, which he believes are best protected by the National Party. “We are a minority group within a minority. The future of South African Jews is inextricably linked to the future of the white community in South Africa. Any threat facing the white community faces the Jewish community as well.”

Jews would suffer first under majority rule, these people believe, because Jews are seen by blacks as the richest whites in a country where whites earn ten times as much per capita as blacks do. This fear is fanned by the Moslem influence among members of the apartheid coalition, the United Democratic Front. Students from a group called the Call of Islam have clashed with Jewish students, and at a recent law conference, a black lawyer attributed racism to the Talmud. (He apologized and retracted the remark after comments by Jewish students.)

Even Nobel Peace Prize-winning Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu has incurred the wrath of South African Jews. Tutu’s transgression was to wonder why Jews who had suffered so much discrimination and oppression didn’t identify with South African blacks. He suggested that Jews, like all whites, should treat their domestic servants more fairly and that Israel should reexamine its military ties to South Africa. Later, when a Jewish charity invited the archbishop’s wife Leah to speak, scores of contributors refused to donate money.

The lip service paid by the exiled African National Congress to the Palestinian cause also alarms Jews. Pinshaw says, “I find the aims and objects of the ANC and South African Jewry to be irreconcilable.” That view is reinforced by American Jewish groups, who care little for what is best for South Africa. A group called the International Freedom Foundation has provided funds to conservative students. The foundation’s chairman, Jack Abramoff, has visited prominent Jews sympathetic to the government. The Anti-Defamation League bulletin, in an article by Nathan Perlmuter and David Evanier, focused exclusively on the ANC’s antagonism towards Israel and its relations with the Eastern bloc. In the issue of the bulletin published a month before the 1986 state of emergency was imposed to snuff out dissent, these two authors approvingly quoted an analyst who said that “there is overwhelming evidence that South Africa has been moving away from apartheid.”

The South African Jewish religious establishment
plays a unique role in smothering Jewish criticism of the
government and in rallying Jews to the National Party
barricades at a time when church and Moslem groups
have become outspoken opponents of the government.

In June 1986, when the South African government
declared a state of emergency and rounded up nearly
20,000 people without charges, a Johannesburg rabbi
told his rabbinical students that they mustn't criticize
the government because the government had been good
to the Jews. On Yom Kippur, the head of a yeshiva
interpreted the prayer for the government to mean that
Jews should support the government.

When Rabbi Israel Selwyn Franklin, head of South
Africa's largest Jewish congregation, went to Israel in
1986, he said in an interview that Israel should reconsider
its extensive trade and military ties with the South
African government. The Jewish Board of Deputies,
the governing body of South African Jewry, immediately
telephoned Rabbi Franklin and ordered him to return
to South Africa. The board pressured him to quit and
his synagogue board told him to resign if he chooses to
speak on public platforms.

While hammering Franklin, the Board of Deputies
has remained silent when other rabbis make political
pronouncements. In a newspaper interview three months
after Franklin was reprimanded, Johannesburg Rabbi
Aron Pfeiffer called sanctions "unlawful" and equated
helping blacks to achieve political power with giving
guns to kindergarten students. The Jewish Board of
Deputies said nothing. Michael Katz, a commercial
lawyer who headed the Jewish Board of Deputies in
Johannesburg, says the board shouldn't be involved in
politics. He says that its role is to serve as the voice of
the Jewish community, as a protector of Jewish civil
rights, and as an umbrella body for Jewish groups. "The
board has a right to intercede in matters with humani-
tarian connotations, but it isn't involved in party politics."

In its entire history, the board has issued only a handful
of statements on current affairs. In the early 1960s when
then-Foreign Minister Golda Meir cast Israel's United
Nations vote against South Africa, the Jewish Board of
Deputies in South Africa condemned Israel.

In May 1985, the Jewish Board of Deputies issued
another missive on current events. It was bold by the
board's standards. After ignoring the 1948 National
Party platform of white domination, the massive black
defiance campaign against apartheid legislation in the
1950s, the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, and the 1976
Soweto uprising, the Jewish Board of Deputies finally
condemned apartheid. "It was too little, too late," says
Rabbi Franklin. Indeed, the board's posture was a safe
one by that time. It had even become fashionable for
the architects and protectors of apartheid, the South
African government, to criticize apartheid. President
Botha himself condemned apartheid as an "outdated"
concept. The board nevertheless hastened to say its
resolution was humanitarian, not political.

The storm over what is a political issue and what is
a religious one has spilled over into the pulpits of
synagogues. Is there a Jewish position on current affairs?

One tumultuous congregation has been Har El, where
Johannesburg Rabbi Ben Isaacson relishes his reputation
as the rebel rabbi. He keeps a photograph of himself
and long-banned leftist Helen Joseph on his desk and
brandishes a testimonial letter from Archbishop Tutu
as though it were his identity document. Isaacson runs
a Conservative service, conducted largely by the congre-
gation, men and women alike. Isaacson's breakaway
synagogue initially attracted many young Jews and
membership rapidly grew from ten to 180 families.

By late 1986, however, Isaacson's congregation
had been torn apart by political fights. Nearly
every week, Isaacson delivered a sermon heavily
critical of the government. After a congregant stormed
out midway through one sermon, he barely eked out a
vote of confidence from his synagogue board. More
than a third of the congregation quit in protest, and
Isaacson has become obsessed with his own isolation.
"They say they only want the teaching of God, as
though the shooting of black children in the streets has
nothing to do with the teaching of God," Isaacson says.
"Was Auschwitz politics? I'd rather break the tablets
than worship the golden calf of apartheid." In late 1987,
financial supporters withdrew backing from Har El,
and the congregation folded. Isaacson will become the
Orthodox Rabbi of Harare in Zimbabwe.

The image of the golden calf emerges over and over
for Jews who live in South Africa's manicured white
suburbs. Johannesburg's Rabbi Asabi says South African
Jews are living in a "fool's paradise," thinking that they
can enjoy the good life no matter what happens politi-
cally. "As it played a major role for German Jews in
the 1930s, the golden calf plays a major role for South
African Jews in the 1980s." Asabi, who plans to return
to his native Israel, says Maimonides taught that a Jew
living in a country with an evil government must leave
the country lest that ideology rub off on him. Alter-
natively, the Jew mustn't sit on the fence but must
oppose that government.

Some members of Asabi's Reform congregation
haven't taken kindly to his views. The rabbi has received
threatening phone calls saying that if the government
doesn't expel him from the country, the Jewish commu-
nity will.

Some Jews outside the pulpit have spoken against the
government. Dennis Davis, thirty-four-year-old law
lecturer at the University of Cape Town, helped launch
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A group called Jews for Justice in August 1985. It has forged links with black and Moslem groups, held public roundtable discussions, and criticized Israel's ties with the South African government. A leader of the Johannesburg affiliate of Jews for Justice spent about a year in detention without trial.

The group drew a surge of interest from alienated Jews who felt that the Jewish establishment was out-of-step with Jewish opinion. It appealed to Jews who saw a gap between what Judaism espouses and what the Jewish business and religious establishments practice in South Africa. Hundreds of Jews showed up for the first public meetings, reflecting a segment of Jewish opinion that wanted to buck the right-wing trend in Jewish politics. Some of those who joined had never openly identified with Jewish organizations before. One member had even worked with the Catholic Human Rights Commission (there is no comparable Jewish group).

The new Jewish establishment takes a dim view of the group. Synagogues refuse to grant the group space to hold meetings. Twice the group has received bomb threats. Davis, who answered one of the calls, thought from the accent that the caller was Jewish.

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The survival of Judaism through the centuries should show that legal strictures enforcing racial separation aren't necessary for people who want to preserve their own language and culture.

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The group has founndered because of the pervasive feeling of impotence among whites opposed to the government. The white parliament seems irrelevant. The rise of the Conservative Party to the position of official opposition makes parliament seem only more anachronistic and removed from the crisis within the country. But because of the physical gap between white and black residential areas, and because of black hostility toward whites, many Jews feel there isn't any place for them in extra-parliamentary politics.

Fatalism about South Africa and misapprehensions about military service requirements are driving the natural constituents of Jews for Justice—young Jews—out of the country in large numbers. One young Jewish computer programmer who had done his national service in the Navy packed and left the country one week after he was called up for reserve duty patrolling the sprawling black township of Soweto.

The Israeli government urges Jews to leave South Africa and move to Israel. South African Jews feel, however, that there isn't enough milk and honey in the Promised Land. Only one-fifth of young emigrating Jews move to Israel, even though until recently South African Jews donated more money per capita to Israel than any other group in the Diaspora. Instead, South African Jews go where the standard of living measures up. They migrate to Australia, England, Canada, and the U.S. "South African Jews have led too comfortable a life to clean chickens on a kibbutz or to pick oranges. Here you call your maid to do that," says Russell Crystal, a conservative Jew who runs the local branch of the International Freedom Foundation.

Emigration accentuates the profound sadness that pervades the Jewish community of South Africa. Almost every Jewish family has "lost" a child to another country. Only one or two generations after many Jews sought refuge in South Africa, the Jews face the prospect of leaving "homes" again. Everywhere there are signs of slow departure. I lived in what was once a heavily Jewish neighborhood of Johannesburg, but the dull patina of the mezuzah on my apartment door testified to years of neglect by Christian tenants. Hundreds of miles away in the arid Karoo town of Oudtshoorn, a rich Jewish community once flourished in the heyday of the ostrich feather trade in the early twentieth century. Today, the ornate feather palaces are run-down. The tiny synagogue is a museum, rarely visited. Further west, in the Afrikaans university town of Stellenbosch, the depleted Jewish community imported a Lubavitcher Yeshiva student from Philadelphia to conduct High Holiday services. His presence was a bizarre touch in the aging congregation; he was brimming with enthusiasm about the future of South African Jewry. He assured me that no less an authority on South African politics than the Lubavitcher Rebbe said that Jews must stay in South Africa. (The Lubavitchers have built a new school on the grounds of a converted convent in Johannesburg and have run up a fifty-million dollar debt that they cannot service following the collapse of the rand, South Africa's currency.) While the Yeshiva student bubbled, the Stellenbosch congregation had to wait on Yom Kippur just to make a Minyan.

Though the average South African Jew and the Jewish establishment have been cautious in politics, individual South African Jews have played leading roles in the country's tradition of activism.

Jewish labor leaders have ranged from Solly Sachs, who led a militant nonracial garment workers' union for twenty years until he was banned in the 1950s, to Bernie Fanaroff, who now works with the black Metal and Allied Workers Union. The farm used as the headquarters of the African National Congress sabotage
campaign in the early 1960s was owned by a Jew, as was the farm Mohandas Gandhi used as the center for his South African followers in the early twentieth century. The only white member of the first Transvaal executive committee of the anti-apartheid United Democratic Front was Jewish.

Jewish women have also been active in organizations such as Black Sash, a group of white women who advise blacks about coping with apartheid laws and bureaucracy. Ina Perlman has built Operation Hunger into South Africa's leading relief organization, feeding hundreds of thousands of malnourished blacks (as well as 8,000 whites). The group refuses to take money from the government in order to distance itself from apartheid. Instead, it raises nine-million dollars a year in private contributions that it funnels through black community groups.

Several leading political lawyers in the opposition camp are Jewish, as are several members of the white opposition party in parliament. And the business leader in the country who has been most outspoken on the need for the government to deal with the outlawed African National Congress, is Anthony Bloom, head of the Premier Group.

Most infamous of all government foes is the Lithuanian-born Jewish lawyer Joe Slovo. Slovo, who spoke nothing but Yiddish until he was ten years old, is the head of the South African Communist Party, the only white on the ANC executive committee, and former chief of staff of the ANC's military wing. Slovo's name is chanted by black children at political funerals and in the streets as one of the messiahs of black liberation. In the townships, school and street names have been crossed out and renamed after Slovo.

Yet these Jewish activists remain exceptions. Moreover, most don't identify themselves as Jewish. Jews for Justice is the first activist group to assert its Jewishness. By late 1987 the group had won modest support from some members of the Jewish establishment, including current and past chairmen of the Capetown Board of Deputies. Nevertheless, most Jewish activists prefer to downplay their ethnic identity and view themselves as part of the wider South African community's reaction to a government that encourages and enforces ethnic and racial divisions.

Although more and more Jews support the government, most still boast of a liberal Jewish tradition. They universally cite Progressive Federalist Party member Helen Suzman's unflagging opposition in parliament. She has served in parliament longer than anyone else except President Botha, and the two openly disdain each other. For years, she was the lone legislative voice against apartheid, and today she is swept up in flurry of political funerals, speaking engagements, and appeals from detainees and constituents.

"I'm Exhibit 'A' for Jewish democracy," Suzman says wryly. "It makes me smile. It doesn't exonerate Jews prepared to stand by and do nothing about the injustices around them." Suzman knows that even she, as a liberal, is in an increasingly tenuous position in South Africa. The black opposition grows more radical and views her as conservative because of her approach to sanctions and because of her continued participation in what they view as an "illegitimate parliament." At the same time, conservative whites view her as part of the radical camp. She plans to retire come the next election. The daughter of a Lithuanian immigrant, Suzman is loath to generalize about the Jewish community. She herself isn't observant. She says a disproportionate number of Jews still back the Progressive Federalist Party, but says she sees no reason to expect Jews to be different from other whites.

U

ncomfortable parallels lie beneath Jewish relations with the Afrikaner government. The first is drawn between Israel and South Africa. Both are surrounded by hostile neighbors, engaged in what they consider to be struggles for survival. "Both view themselves as people of the book fighting to defeat the Machiavellian forces of darkness," says Jews for Justice leader Davis. The deep empathy the two countries feel is underscored by the fact that, ironically, South Africa's National Party was the second government (after the Soviet Union) to recognize the State of Israel. Prime Minister D. F. Malan, who had introduced a bill during World War II to restrict Jewish immigration, was the first head of state to visit Israel, and he felt instant affinity with the Jewish farmer-settlers.

In recent years, the two countries have been pushed still closer by their common strategic interests: diamonds, guns, and sanctions-busting. Although those areas of trade are considered state secrets in South Africa, industry sources estimate that Israel cuts several hundred million dollars worth of diamonds distributed by the South African-based De Beers diamond cartel. Israel also has helped South Africa with military technology, especially for aircraft and automatic weapons. Israeli generals specializing in antiterrorist tactics have visited South Africa to advise police and military about how to combat ANC guerrillas. Israeli nuclear technicians have worked with South African nuclear plants, and when a U.S. satellite detected a flash in 1979 that many believed to be a nuclear test, speculation centered on the possibility of a joint South African and Israeli test. Israel has denied any connection to the flash, and evidence about its source remains inconclusive.

Israel helps South Africa break sanctions as well. By
Gender and Jewish History

Paula Hyman

Until very recently, to study history was to study the action of the powerful—i.e., the exploits of “great men.” Although Jews scarcely figured among the conventionally powerful, they too had a hierarchy of power, measured in wealth and rabbinic learning, if not in military prowess and political might. In Jewish society, as in all others, power was distributed primarily among men. Not surprisingly, then, Jewish historians, in investigating the activity of communal leaders and successful entrepreneurs and in analyzing the development of rabbinic culture, have recounted the history of Jewish men, indeed of the elite among Jewish men.

What happened to women in these traditional versions of Jewish culture? In many cases, they were ignored entirely, except for those few who made their mark in the world of men or so deviated from traditional female behavior as to become curiosities. The daughters of the medieval commentator Rashi, who were educated by their father and reportedly prayed in the traditional male garb of prayer shawl and phylacteries, come to mind as an example. Most women, however, were treated as passive appendages of male actors. Historians would write, for example, that “Jewish immigrants brought their wives and children along with them,” as though women were part of the baggage. Most frequently, women were subsumed in a cultural experience whose patterns were defined by the life histories of men. Presuming that the experiences of women and men were essentially identical, historians spoke explicitly of men but implied that women were included in the category of man.

By introducing the analytic tool of gender, feminist theory and women’s history have challenged the paradigm of ordering human experience according to male norms and then asserting that such a paradigm is universal. Once the category of gender—the cultural construction of the biological division of the sexes—is acknowledged, our understanding of the past becomes different. Sensitivity to gender suggests that women do not simply replicate the social experience of their brothers and husbands. Their experience of work and home, of public and private spaces, of power and powerlessness is different.

Armed with the question of how gender—along with other variables such as ethnicity and class—has shaped the social and cultural experience of human beings throughout history, historians have begun to recover the experience of women, including Jewish women. At its best, however, women’s history is more than a demand for equal time or compensatory history. In challenging the “scholarly objectivity” of histories that ignored women, it joins social history in redefining which aspects of human experience are deemed historically significant. As historian Gerda Lerner has noted, the use of gender analysis enables us to reexamine assumptions about historical development that are derived from the experience of one-half of the population. This process can lead to a major recasting of key turning-points and epochs in history.*

Although Jewish women’s history is a new enterprise, it has already begun to serve as a prism to refract traditional conceptions of Jewish history and culture. Drawing upon recent research, I will discuss three areas women’s history is reshaping: the nature of Jewish religious expression, the evaluation of assimilation, and the definition of community.

* * *

With its bias towards the high culture of the rabbinic elite, Jewish historiography has depicted Judaism as though it were a religious system consisting of rabbinic commentaries, halakhic decisions, and philosophical treatises alone. Since the gender division within traditional Judaism excluded women from the learning that produced this literature, those interested in Jewish women have had to look elsewhere for clues to the ways in which women defined and expressed their off-noted piety. In treating seriously the sources that reveal women’s spirituality, these women have also expanded our definition of Judaism and probed the connections between elite and popular religion.

The spirituality of the Central and East European Jewish women of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is the focal point of this scholarly investigation. From this period we have many sources in Yiddish, ranging from the extraordinary Memoirs of Gluckel of Hamelin* to ethical literature, the midrashic “women’s Bible,” the Tsena ur’enab, and, most important, the collections of tikkines—prayers written for, and sometimes by, women for their use in personal devotions. With their focus on the women’s commandments of hallab (the ritual separation and burning of a portion of dough), menstrual regulations, and candle-lighting, on pregnancy and childbirth, on the women’s half-holiday of the New Moon, and on domestic concerns, these tikkines—which went through many editions—illustrate both the occasion and contents of female prayer as well as the way traditional Ashkenazi culture shaped women’s religious roles. They reveal how women could use traditional imagery to empower themselves.

Modern Jewish historians have focused upon the process of assimilation that accompanied the civic emancipation of Jews and their entry into the societies in which they now live. Most scholars have described that process as one of radical discontinuity in Jewish belief and practice, even as they recognize that the majority of Jews sought to retain a Jewish identity and to accommodate Judaism to the conditions of the modern world.

In their descriptions of the acculturation and embourgeoisement of European Jews in the nineteenth century, scholars have focused on an articulate urban male elite—the upwardly mobile Jewish businessmen, professionals, and intellectuals who preferred the stock exchange and the university to the synagogue and the bet-midrash. Concerning women’s responses, we usually hear only about the Jewish women of the salon in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Germany. A small number of women who were alienated socially, culturally, and often religiously from the Jewish community, they present a model of women as extreme assimilationists in response to the restriction of female roles within the traditional Jewish community.‡

New research on a broad range of middle-class Jewish women living in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century—the sisters and wives of the men who epitomize the extent of Jewish assimilation within Germany—challenges the “salon Jewess” model of female assimilation. Suggesting that women’s patterns of assimilation were much more moderate than men’s, recent studies by Marion Kaplan should compel historians to modify the picture of radical discontinuity that typically characterizes the historical accounts of Jewish entry into modern western societies.†

German-Jewish women of the middle class retained a greater measure of Jewish tradition than their male peers because they faced very different experiences in daily life. Since German universities were closed to women until the beginning of the twentieth century, Jewish women were spared the corrosive effects of higher education upon traditional patterns of religious behavior. While their husbands interacted with gentiles in the business world and adopted the mores appropriate

*The Memoirs of Gluckel of Hamelin (trans. Marvin Lowenthal) are readily available in a Schocken paperback edition. Written in Yiddish at the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, they are an unparalleled source for exploring a traditional, wealthy Ashkenazi woman’s life and self-perception.


†Moses Althshuler, introduction to his Brantshtigl (1936), as cited by Chava Weissler, “For Women and For Men Who Are Like Women,” unpublished article.


to that world, bourgeois Jewish women were “home-centered,” and their social networks were largely Jewish. As a result, they were shielded in large part from the assimilatory pressures of the marketplace. Finally, Jewish women experienced less disruption in their religious practice because much of their religious observance had traditionally been domestic, and remained so. When men abandoned the model of regular synagogue attendance for other pursuits, they had no alternate model of Jewish behavior.

Diaries and memoirs of German Jews, both men and women, reveal that women were a conservative force in the bourgeois German-Jewish home. In families that historians have characterized as thoroughly assimilated on the basis of the public behavior of adult males, women remained attuned to domestic religious observance (including prayer) and to the Jewish calendar. These women were as thoroughly German in culture as their husbands and brothers, but bourgeois German culture itself encouraged women to link religious and family concerns. Like their gentle contemporaries, Jewish women in Germany associated religion with family life and considered it their task to preserve family networks and to maintain some aspects of religious tradition.

This portrait of the survival of a somewhat secularized domestic Judaism among Jewish people who generally were considered extremely assimilated suggests that measuring assimilation primarily through the public behavior of men can distort the complexity of social experience. German-Jewish men who rarely attended synagogue very likely lived in homes where their wives preserved more Jewish practice than is commonly recognized. Sigmund Freud’s persistent quarrel with his fiancée over the issue of her lighting Sabbath candles (which he opposed) is a paradigmatic example of a “gender gap” in Jewish observance and attitude. Certainly, the question of when Jewish women have served a preservative function and when they have served a transformative function deserves further study.

***

When historians and sociologists speak of the Jewish community, they usually mean the institutions of the organized Jewish community. In early twentieth-century America that community included the synagogue, the *landsmanshaft* society, philanthropic societies, major national Jewish organizations, and perhaps the Jewish labor unions. Since women have been less active than men in these institutions, their noninstitutional political and communal activity has escaped notice. My own work on immigrant Jewish women in New York City suggests that women often had a different focus for community and politics than did men, and that our definition of community, therefore, should be expanded to include female experience.

In the immigrant period, married Jewish women disappeared from history because the vast majority retired from the workshop and from union activity as well. Yet such women were not completely apolitical, even though they were immersed in domestic concerns. Rather, they organized sporadically and spontaneously, not through unions or political parties, but within the neighborhood, which they defined as their community.

*If for women the locus of Jewish communal identity and political activism was the neighborhood and public spaces of markets, shops, and stoops, then we would do well to investigate further what the female experience of community has been and what the female vision of community has contributed to Jewish organizations, both religious and secular.*

The three-week-long kosher meat boycott organized by women on the Lower East Side in the spring of 1902 provides a good example of how women linked politics and local community. Reacting to a rapid rise in the price of kosher meat—from 12 cents to 16 cents a pound—a group of middle-aged married women, with an average of five children each, spearheaded a boycott of kosher butchers in an effort to drive down the price of meat. They saw themselves as natural leaders in the neighborhood, which was their turf, their center of activity. Using the neighborhood network and the moral suasion that a face-to-face informal community permits, they enforced discipline in the boycott (including inspecting cholent pots on the way to the bakery to make sure that they were vegetarian) and raised money to bail out those boycott leaders who had been arrested.*

Married immigrant Jewish women can be seen as pioneers in what we would today call “neighborhood organizing.” The 1902 boycott, while colorful, was not unique. In the first two decades of this century immigrant

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Jewish women organized to combat the influence of Jewish gangsters, to conduct rent strikes, and to canvas their neighborhoods on behalf of women's suffrage. They were able to draw upon, and expand, a long tradition of acceptance of Ashkenazi women in secular public activity. While domestic issues such as food and the management of the family budget generally sparked the political activity of these women, their statements and strategy reveal a measure of political sophistication and an assertion of their right to become involved in public issues. As Rebecca Ablowitz, one of the leaders of the 1902 boycott, said during her court hearing: "We see how thin our children are, our husbands have no more strength to work harder. If we stay home and cry, what good will that do us?"

The nature of the informal female community within the immigrant neighborhood suggests that defining community in institutional terms, and then pigeonholing individuals in their appropriate institutional box, is hardly an accurate way to portray the dynamics of communal life. The female activists of the kosher meat boycott transcended institutional boundaries as well as the divisions of secular and religious life. They made use of socialist rhetoric, but cared about kosher meat; they demonstrated in the streets, but also appeared in local synagogues on the Sabbath to mobilize support. If for women the locus of Jewish communal identity and political activism was the neighborhood and the public spaces of markets, shops, and stoops, then we would do well to investigate further what the female experience of community has been and what the female vision of community has contributed to Jewish organizations, both religious and secular.

As we introduce gender into Judaic Studies and into the consciousness of the contemporary Jewish community, we have an opportunity to see Jewish history and culture with a wholeness not previously attained. We are just beginning to understand how Jewish culture differentiated the experience of Jewish women from that of other women (a subject I have not touched upon here) and how it developed, and modified, gender roles for both women and men. We are also just beginning to frame the questions that will enrich our understanding of the diversity of Jewish history and culture.

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**Nubia**

**Gabriel Levin**

It happens this way. Eyes peeled on the Ibis scribbling its own hieratic script in water. Elephantine Island—
of the Fish Eaters who journeyed into Ethiopia with myrrh in their satchels to spy out the land for Cambyses.

Dust clouds swirl above the granite boulders jutting out of the wide river. A boatman offers to take me down

the Nile to the stone face of the Angry Man. I use the little words I have to explain how I am fine here

in the shade of feluccas shored up for caulking or a fresh coat of paint; turning over in my mind the silent

stone processions: cupbearers and demonheads crowding the high walls, funerary barques laden with offerings.

While all around me the crickets continue their Song of Intervals—well on into the morning, in the scorched grass.

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*Gabriel Levin is a poet and translator living in Jerusalem.*
Is Silence Golden? Vanunu and Nuclear Israel

David Twersky

“What is the theory of military strategy? Everyone knows that it is based on three components: distance, terrain, and weapons. Missiles and atoms have changed all this.”

Shimon Peres

On October 5, 1986, London’s Sunday Times wrote about an exclusive interview given to them by Mordechai Vanunu. Vanunu, who had worked in Israel’s Dimona nuclear plant, said, in the words of the Times, that “far from being a nuclear pygmy, the evidence is that Israel must now be regarded as a major nuclear power, ranking sixth in the atomic league table with a stockpile of at least one hundred nuclear weapons and with the components and ability to build atomic, neutron, or hydrogen bombs.”

Until Vanunu’s testimony was published, the official story was that “Israel would not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East,” which apparently meant that no matter what it did, it would never speak of the bomb.

If it was silent, Israel was still giving mixed messages. Jerusalem’s conspicuous refusal to sign the 1974 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and its ongoing opposition to international inspection of its reactor facilities in Dimona, had undercut the repeated proposals made by Israeli leaders for a regional treaty to keep the Middle East “nuclear-free.”

Now, ironically, Israel’s capture and trial of Vanunu tend to confirm the long-standing rumors that the Jewish state possesses not only weapons-grade plutonium and a sophisticated system for developing nuclear weapons, but a stockpile large enough to make Israel the sixth largest nuclear power in the world. Strategic experts, such as Aharon Yariv—head of the Tel Aviv University Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies and formerly in charge of military intelligence—now openly admit to Israel’s nuclear capacity. The center’s 1987 Middle East Military Balance Report says that “The Arab chemical warfare threat against Israel is a fact... It constitutes one form of Arab reply and counter-deterrent to Israel’s nuclear advantage...” [emphasis added].

What is most significant is that the new revelations come at a time of deficit-induced doubt about the viability and durability of American military and financial assistance. Reliance on U.S. aid has allowed Israel to run the expensive course of the conventional arms race, a contest that some Israelis think cannot ultimately be won. It is interesting, then, that the Vanunu story has surfaced at a time when Israeli strategic planners have been forced by budgetary constraints to rethink their position on the decades-old nuclear-against-conventional debate.

Economic, geopolitical, and military realities dictate a change in the course of Israeli strategic thinking. Currently, there are three alternatives under review. The “pure offensive” approach is based on a policy of a “massive initiated first-strike blow against the enemy.” The “purely defensive” alternative is based on projections of the enormous casualties that a policy of breaking through enemy lines would entail, and it argues for alternative methods to defeat enemy forces “through the use of extremely accurate weapons.” (The development of the Israeli-designed Lavi warplane stemmed in part from the army’s desire to redirect limited resources to “accurate weapons” research and development.) The third security doctrine alternative can be called the “consolidated nuclear approach.” This approach argues for “incorporating a nuclear option together with much reduced conventional forces, [as] a much more effective deterrent.” [All quotes are from Ze’ev Schiff, Ha’aretz, August 7, 9, 10, and 11, 1987.]

As we shall see, there are nuclear doves and conventional hawks, and conventional doves and nuclear hawks.

What are the facts about Israel’s nuclear force? According to the October 5th Sunday Times story, Israel ranks sixth behind the U.S., the U.S. S. R., Great Britain, France, and China. Vanunu asserted that Israel has stockpiled at least one hundred nuclear weapons, and that it has the “components and ability to build atomic, neutron-type, and the “city-busting” thermonuclear type. This contradicts previous reports that Israel had worked solely on breakthroughs in tactical nuclear artillery and naval shells. Israel has little need for high-yield hydrogen bombs, which could not be used without placing major Israeli population centers at significant risk. The logic of the situation was thought to dictate a need for tactical, low-yield, “clean” bombs, which could be used to blast through a concentration of enemy forces with little danger of radioactive fallout spreading throughout the region. According to the

David Twersky, a member of the Tikkun editorial board, writes frequently on Jewish and Israeli themes.
Vanunu report, however, Israel’s nuclear force has progressed beyond the tactical weapons level.

There is little doubt that the report is fundamentally correct. Sunday Times editor, Andrew Neil, who regards himself as “pro-Israeli,” told me that his paper’s special investigation team meticulously checked out Vanunu’s story before publishing it, and was satisfied that it stood up to the most vigorous cross-examination. Neil asked Dr. Frank Barnaby, retired director of the Swedish Institute of Peace Research, about the reliability of Vanunu’s testimony. “As a nuclear physicist,” Barnaby said, “it was clear to me that details he gave were scientifically accurate and clearly show that he had not only worked on these processes, but knew the details of the techniques. His testimony is totally convincing.”

Barnaby cross-checked his conclusions with three other experts, including a nuclear physicist and a nuclear chemist. Furthermore, just as the story was about to break, a participant in the meeting who asked not to be identified, confirmed that then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres told Israel’s newspaper editors, meeting in closed-session, that “one of us [i.e., Vanunu] has betrayed us”—hardly the language of a disclaimer.

Finally, the seduction/abduction of Vanunu—lured from London by an American-Israeli woman and kidnapped in Rome—and the subsequent legal proceedings against him, testify to the seriousness of the “leak” in the opinion of the Israeli elite.

The real story underlying the Vanunu trial concerns not only whether and to what degree Israeli leaders should rely on a nuclear deterrent, but also on whether or not they should publicly “go nuclear.” This debate centers on the belief that going public would signal a strategic shift, with nuclear weapons becoming part of the ordinary “order of battle” rather than remaining circumscribed within doomsday scenarios as a “weapon of last resort.” By going public, Vanunu may have preempted strategic planners, but he has misunderstood the important issues at hand. Vanunu thought he was blowing the whistle on Israel as a nuclear state, and that is why the left embraced him. But what makes Vanunu important is that he brought to the fore the question of to what extent Israel should admit being nuclearly capable.

The division caused by this debate cuts across other lines, such as Labor-Likud and dove-hawk. Both doves and hawks are further divided along pro-nuclear and pro-conventional lines. Professor Yuval Ne’eman, an internationally recognized expert on nuclear physics who heads the far-right Tehiya party, is pro-nuclear, while Ariel Sharon, no less a committed annexationist than Ne’eman, believes that Israel must plan for its future wars in conventional, non-nuclear terms. Raful Eitan, the former chief of staff and current Tehiya Knesset member, is “pro-conventional” and opposes a “nuclear balance of terror” since he regards the Arabs as unstable and irresponsible enough to launch a first-strike. (One of the arguments against a nuclear defense for Israel is that if an Arab state succeeds in going nuclear, the temptation to launch a first-strike might prove irresistible. Israel is too small—and poor—to develop a second-strike capability in the near future.)

The nuclear/conventional strategic debate also divides the moderates. There are doves such as Ezer Weizman and Lova Eliav, who see a nuclear umbrella as a substitute for strategic depth and the increasingly impossible-to-finance conventional arms buildup. Other moderates such as Yitzhak Rabin doubt that Israel could live safely within the old 1967 borders, and see nuclear weapons in the Middle East as inherently destabilizing.

This debate was an important, though not explicitly admitted, issue of concern to supporters of Shimon Peres (the country’s foremost champion of nuclear thinking) and those of Yitzhak Rabin in the years when the two struggled bitterly for control of the Labor party. It also explains why Rabin briefly appointed Sharon as an adviser, while Peres appointed Ne’eman, during the tenure of the last Labor government in the mid-seventies.

What makes this debate even more confusing is that today many of the leading pro-nuclear advocates are also leading moderates on the peace question. Peres told the Labor party convention in April 1985 that modern technology had decreased the significance of borders. Earlier, in November 1983, he told a special session of the party bureau: “What is the theory of military strategy? Everyone knows that it is based on three components: distance, terrain, and weapons. Missiles and atoms have changed all this” [emphasis added]. Translation: We can afford to return significant amounts of the occupied territories for peace because we have a nuclear umbrella. Those who see the next war in purely conventional terms tend to give greater weight to control of strategic territorial assets, such as hills and mountain passes, and are less inclined to be forthcoming on withdrawing Israeli troops from “the mountain range” running through the West Bank like a spinal column.

The debate, long restricted to the often interchangeable political and military elites, goes back thirty years. In the fifties, Moshe Dayan and Peres, with the backing of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, concluded that a small nuclear deterrent could offset Arab military superiority in a moment of extreme emergency. The assumption was that nuclear weapons would never become a regular instrument for conducting routine
foreign policy.
But not everyone agreed even with the last-resort nuclear scenario. A group of influential Labor party leaders, including Golda Meir and Yigal Allon, believed that a nuclear Israel would increase the probability of an Arab first-strike. Unlike the superpowers, the Middle East "enjoys" a low provocation threshold and few control systems to prevent the use of nuclear weapons; and if some people doubt the predictability of an Ariel Sharon, fewer trust the decision-making processes in some Arab regimes. These considerations, among others, led Allon after 1963 to support Israel's first anti-nuclear group, the Public Committee for the Denuclearization of the Middle East.

In 1967, the Allon group carried the day, so that when the Johnson administration pressured Israel to slow down its nuclear program—promising to supply the warplanes and other means for a conventional buildup—Prime Minister Eshkol agreed. For so doing, Eshkol was bitterly attacked by Ben-Gurion for basing Israeli defense on an ultimately unrealistic calculation—that U.S. support would always enable Israel to win the conventional arms race.

Israel's nuclear facility was secretly built with the help of the French between 1954 and 1964. It was one expression of the ties forged by Peres with the French military complex. De Gaulle's order to end the special relationship just before the 1967 War drove Israel toward the U.S., but Peres retains his Parisian orientation. (Between 1982 and 1985, he dispatched a close confidante—a Labor party dove and kibbutz member born in France and a friend of François Mitterand—on more than half a dozen occasions to serve as his go-between with the French president. Peres' still-unfulfilled goal: to secure French funding and approval for two new Israeli reactors.)

In an article in the left-leaning journal *Politika* (associated with the Ratz party) Dr. Shai Feldman, the chief proponent of the "consolidated nuclear approach," analyzed the nuclear "silence is golden" arguments—described elsewhere as "calculated ambiguity"—and explains why he is in favor of going public.

According to Feldman, official policies of silence notwithstanding, Arab states probably take Israel's nuclear capability into account. Moreover, Feldman admits, by not speaking publicly about Israel's nuclear capacity, Arab leaders are free of internal demands to match the Israeli accomplishment. Silence allows the great powers to avoid confronting Israel on the issue and helps the Soviet Union to continue rejecting Syrian requests for "strategic [i.e. nuclear] parity" with Israel.

Nevertheless, the "silence is golden" policy prevents the development of a security doctrine governing the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence. Going public, Feldman argues, would allow Israel to engage Arab states in a strategic dialogue about the consequences of these weapons, thereby helping them to prevent the outbreak of war through misunderstanding. On the conventional level, Israel and Syria already have arrangements to prevent such misunderstandings. Thus, according to Feldman, there is reason to hope that such arrangements can be made with respect to nuclear weapons as well.

Most interestingly, Feldman argues that going public would necessitate the adoption of a dovish foreign policy. Publicly acknowledging that Israel is nuclear capable while maintaining annexationist politics would invite a harsh response from the great powers. And tying Israeli deterrence to a nuclear umbrella would move the consensus on the territories toward the left. After all, Israel would not risk nuclear confrontation over non-consensus areas such as the West Bank, but would limit its rattle of the nuclear sword to the defense of the compact pre-1967 state.

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*Many of the leading pro-nuclear advocates are also leading moderates on the peace question.*

Properly wedded to a comprehensive peace policy, going public would not trigger an American aid cut-off because, even though the Symington-Glenn amendment calls for cut-offs to aid-receiving states going nuclear, Congress probably would not cut aid to Israel if Israel were to pursue dovish policies. Moreover, the Soviets would be unlikely to react in a hostile manner if Israel were willing to return to the 1967 borders. After all, the Russians are very hesitant to place a Syrian finger on the Soviet nuclear trigger. Therefore, as long as Israel were pursuing dovish policies, the Russians would be able to resist helping Syria go nuclear.

Avner Yaniv, who teaches at Haifa University, disagrees with the go-public nuclear policy. He believes that an open nuclear defense would spur Arab states to acquire the bomb. Most analysts agree that economic considerations dictate the need to abandon the concept that Israel can defeat enemy forces attacking on several fronts through purely conventional means. But while cutting the defense budget, Yaniv argues, Israel should make clear only that it *might* go nuclear: "Israel should gradually switch to an order of battle facilitating effective responses to sub-war and medium-size war threats.... This does not mean going public with the bomb. But it does mean a significant lowering of the invisible threshold for doing so."

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Like Feldman, Yaniv is in favor of a dovish foreign policy. If Israel is willing to withdraw from most of the territories in return for peace, the U.S. would be prepared to sign a joint security pact that, combined with the “low nuclear threshold,” a powerful conventional force, and a demilitarized West Bank, would provide more than adequate deterrence. Yaniv calls his plan “conditional nuclearization.”

While some people may fail to see substantial differences between Yaniv’s “conditional nuclearization” and Feldman’s “nuclearized deterrence,” Yaniv is passionate in making a case against Feldman:

A deliberate emphasis on ... first strike, massive retaliation and counter-city targeting strengthens conventional deterrence... In nuclear settings, a reliance on this awesome triad of preferences is a prescription for untold disasters or for a kind of self-deterrence. Bluntly put, a declared doctrine of nuclear first-strike could well be a prelude to a global holocaust... A doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation can easily lead to an abyss where the only choice is between submission and mutual annihilation.

Feldman, however, points out that before the Vanunu report or any other decisions to go public, there was a widespread conviction that Israel was nuclear capable. Arab leaders, along with everyone else, have taken this assumption into account.

The Vanunu revelations were only “the frosting on the cake,” according to William Quandt, Brookings Institute Middle East expert. “Moshe Dayan admitted publicly to Israel’s nuclear capability years ago. In 1973, the Egyptians and the Syrians acted on the assumption that Israel had nuclear weapons [and therefore limited their objectives]. Sadat knew that beyond a certain point his forces would be targeted,” and therefore he ordered his army not to press its relative advantage following its successful crossing of the Suez Canal and storming of the Bar-Lev line.

Moreover, rumors persist that, following the failure of the October 8, 1973, counterattack against the Syrians on the Golan Heights—the Syrians, it should be kept in mind, were at one point close to cutting off the upper Galilee from the rest of Israel—Golda Meir ordered a nuclear device assembled. Some observers have speculated that the generous levels of U.S. assistance to Israel in the last dark hours of the first weeks of the Yom Kippur War—aid that proved critical in helping Israel reverse its early defeat—was linked to Washington’s concern about what a desperate Israel might do. The increased levels of American support, in turn, bolstered the anti-nuclear line of Allen, Rabin, and Bar-Lev, and weakened the pro-nuclear policy advocated by Dayan and Shimon Peres. (With American aid, Israel could afford to outspend the Arabs and maintain a qualitative edge in a conventional arms buildup.)

If Israel trades territory for peace, it will open a new chapter in its defense policy. In the new text, nuclear weapons will have a major role to play. Arguing against a nuclear Israel and for major territorial concessions at the same time represents wishful thinking.

Quandt believes that Arab governments, for at least a decade, have operated under the belief that Israel is nuclear capable. Long ago they came to “the realization that there is no way to overwhelm Israel.”

It should therefore come as no surprise that there was little reaction from Arab governments to the Sunday Times story. Syrian president Hafaz Assad accepts Israel’s nuclear potential as a matter of fact—although according to U.S. ambassador to Damascus William Eagleton, he will not refer—that is admit—to it in conversation with Western diplomats. “The Israeli “bomb” lurks in the background every time Syrian leaders reiterate their goal of reaching “strategic parity” with the I.D.F. The gap between Syria and Israel in purely conventional terms has narrowed, although Syria is still far from achieving one-to-one parity, despite a costly and burdensome militarization of its economy. With the nuclear factor brought into the equation, Israel remains unrivaled as the regional superpower even when Syria’s advanced chemical warfare program is taken into account. The hints dropped by Syrian defense minister Mustafa Tlass that the Soviets have provided Damascus with a nuclear guarantee are dismissed as posturing by both Eagleton and Quandt. In fact, the Soviets have historically demonstrated prudence, refusing to share nuclear know-how with their client states. This Soviet policy led Iraq to turn to the West to acquire the technology to build a plutonium-producing bomb factory. This allowed the Israeli elite to demonstrate one consensus on nuclear issues—their refusal to allow an Arab state to go nuclear. As a result, Israeli jets eliminated the Iraqi reactor in June 1981, several months before it went hot.

In Egypt, after Camp David, the Israeli nuclear deterrent strengthened the peace camp, helping to dispel the illusion of Arab armies rolling over the I.D.F. to “liberate” Tel Aviv. But what came first, the Israeli
nuclear development or the Arab military “response”? Some people see the overall impact of the Israeli bomb—whether it exists or not—not simply as a severe psychological/military deterrent to Arab adventurism, but as a prod to the development of an Arab bomb.

Recently, a former Egyptian chief of staff now living in exile called on the Arabs to develop nuclear weapons to deter Israel from using its nuclear weapons in the next war. Otherwise, he argued, the new Arab surface-to-surface missile threat to the Israeli heartland will tempt Israel to play its nuclear option.

Notwithstanding Iraqi attempts to link their bomb-project to Israeli nuclear capability, Iraq, Pakistan, and Libya would undoubtedly be trying to acquire nuclear bomb-making technology whether or not Israel had a bomb of its own. Iraq, now bogged down in a no-win war with Iran, has ambitions to be the leading state in the Arab world and the regional power in the Arab (Persian) Gulf. The Israeli bomb is not the only enticement to Iraqi nuclear development.

Despite Feldman’s elegantly argued proposal, the idea of Israel “going nuclear” leaves many serious questions unanswered. What are the geographical and situational—not to mention the ethical—limitations on the use of Israel’s nuclear weapons? What governs the “when” and the “where” of their use?

Presumably nuclear weapons would be used only in a “Samson”-type scenario, with Arab armies breaking through I.D.F. lines and threatening the heartland. How could Israel justify their use in a limited conflict, like a conventional Syrian offensive aimed at recapturing parts of the Golan Heights, or in an anti-PLO (or Shi’ite) foray into Lebanon? Would Israel defend the West Bank with nuclear weapons? Or only Tel Aviv? Isn’t the I.D.F., in effect, without recourse to its alleged nuclear arsenal in the overwhelming majority of possible military confrontations? Moreover, just where could Israeli use a thermonuclear “city-buster”? Or even the smaller “suburb-buster” type? Or Damascus? On the Aswan Dam? Even if one discounts for the moment Moscow’s response to an Israeli first use of nuclear weapons against the Soviets’ regional ally, Damascus is so close to Israel as to give Israelis pause. With a sudden gust of wind, the radioactive cloud could boomerang back over Israel. According to Vanunu, Israel can produce neutron weapons that do not pose a boomerang threat. Still, these severe restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons underscore the arguments of the anti-nuclear strategists whose thinking remains, in most cases, dominated by traditional conventional categories, especially territorial depth.

Despite the unpopularity of nuclear weapons among Western liberals, Peres—always sensitive to his image among “enlightened circles” in the West—has made no compromises on nuclear affairs. Paradoxically, his pro-nuclear stance is precisely what underlies his territorial moderation.

Israeli planners must also imagine the possibility of conflict with a reunited Arab/Islamic world. In such a scenario, Arab numbers and weapons systems’ weight would be so great that the traditional Israeli military doctrine, which balances the Arab advantage in soldiers and weapons systems with Israel’s superior quality and ingenuity, no longer would apply. With the American commitment to a conventional arms race under review, the nuclear advocates are—willy nilly—enjoying a certain vogue.

The growing Arab conventional advantage and the introduction into Arab arsenals of longer range surface-to-surface missiles capable of targeting Israeli army bases and mobilization centers raises another possibility, which is that the smartest Israeli strategic maneuver would be to work for reductions of tension and peace. In this light, it is possible to understand the tendency of many Israeli military generals to be on the political left. So, for example, the General Staff has expressed strong opinions about the Lavi decision despite Prime Minister Shamir’s attempts to remove the army from the debate so that it would not play a role in support of Peres’s peace policies.

Given the complexity of the issues involved, the trial of Mordechai Vanunu and the question of a nuclear Israel to which it is necessarily linked, should not evoke the one-dimensional and often simplistic arguments of the anti-nuclear movement. Vanunu’s lawyer maintains that since nuclear weapons should be illegal, his clients’ actions were within the law. But the situation is far too serious for such simplistic arguments.

Doves in the United States, often anti-nuclear by instinct, cannot substitute an ethical calculus for strategic thinking. If Israel trades territory for peace, it will open a new chapter in its defense policy. In the new text, nuclear weapons—conditionally or openly—will have a major role to play. Arguing against a nuclear Israel and for major territorial concessions at the same time represents wishful thinking and a retreat behind ideological platitudes.

If the Vanunu affair helps us understand this point, Vanunu may yet deserve the heroic status so many on the left have awarded him for the wrong reasons.
TRANSCENDING THE SIXTIES

Nineteen eighty-eight is a year of many anniversaries of events that shaped our contemporary American political reality. The twenty-fifth anniversaries of the March on Washington and the assassination of President Kennedy. The twentieth anniversaries of the Tet Offensive, the resignation of President Johnson in response to the antiwar movement’s growing successes, the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy, and the police riot against the antiwar demonstrators at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. We will undoubtedly be subjected this year to endless three-minute television “thought pieces” on the nightly news, interviews with people who have become more respectable and renounced their radical past, and full-scale specials attempting to convince us that whatever was legitimate in the concerns of the movements of the sixties has already been fully incorporated into the reality of the American eighties.

The sixties released a level of creativity and political energy that fundamentally challenged the sacred cows of American society. The fundamental questions raised have not yet been fully answered, and the radical visions that people dared to formulate have never been fully explored, much less assimilated. Yet before we could even begin to understand what was being created, the spirit of the sixties vanished almost as quickly as it had emerged. A whole generation was deeply affected by the experience, but rarely has it had the chance to think through those experiences, to learn from them, and to make sense of them.

In this special section, Tikkun begins that process of rethinking the legacy of the sixties. We believe that many of the political battles of the eighties have had the experiences of the sixties as an unconscious subtext. By bringing the issues to consciousness we hope to transcend the sixties, learn from the strengths as well as from the weaknesses of the social movements of that period, and thus be better prepared to shape a liberatory and healing politics for the nineties.

The Legacy of the Sixties for the Politics of the Nineties

Michael Lerner

The specific way that the movements of the 1960s defeated themselves has much to teach us about the politics of the 1990s and beyond. These movements, particularly those dominated by the New Left, ate themselves alive! New Leftists were unable to accept their own or anyone else’s limitations, and ultimately rejected their own accomplishments as useless or even destructive. In a frenzy of self-doubt and self-denigration they were unable to see the value of what they already had accomplished. Instead, New Leftists immersed themselves in reckless attacks on each other for not being adequate manifestations of the ideals that they professed to share, thereby undermining the kind of trust and mutual confidence that is the cornerstone of any social movement.

Analyzing the collapse of the sixties has great contemporary political importance—it is not an exercise in historical nostalgia. Liberal Democrats, 1988 Presidential candidates, and social change movements of all stripes often face unconscious resistance by many Americans who, though they agree with specific political or economic programs of the left, have a lingering distrust for those whom they associate with the movements of the sixties. To overcome this resistance, we must understand more fully how a social movement dedicated to “power to the people” could be seen as such a threat. Similarly, the hundreds of thousands of people who quit the social change movements in the period 1970–1974, often made that choice for good reasons, not because of narrow self-interest or lack of idealism, but because of their unsatisfying experiences within those movements. Though their current lives may be focused on securing career and family (and are therefore unfairly demeaned as “yuppies”), many of those “baby boomers” remain committed to the same values that inspired them in the sixties. Potentially, they remain a force that could play a major role in liberal and progressive politics in the 1990s.

Michael Lerner, the editor of Tikkun, was a member of the executive committee of the Free Speech Movement, chairman of Berkeley SDS, a defendant in the Seattle Seven Conspiracy trial, and a contributing editor at Ramparts magazine. His book Surplus Powerlessness is based on ten years of work as a psychologist for the labor movement and as director of the Institute for Labor and Mental Health.
Though many maintain their own personal idealism, only political movements and leaders who understand the dynamics that turned them off to politics could ever succeed in mobilizing them.

Any analysis of the failures of left-wing activists of the 1960s must be pursued with great caution. It is true that the left was unable to fulfill its dream of radically transforming humanity. Nevertheless, the movement played a tremendous role in ending the war in Vietnam and combating the racism and sexism that pervade American society. The constraints on President Reagan’s abilities to make war in Central America, the pressures that have pushed him to agree to a partial nuclear disarmament agreement, and the adoption by Congress of anti-apartheid legislation have all been the products of political movements whose current power derives from the changes in political awareness that the New Left generated in the sixties. It is fair to say that, despite the difficulties that still plague America, we live in a much better world thanks to the political activism of the New Left. It is all the more important, therefore, to understand how the New Left self-destructed as a major force in American political life.

_With deep contempt, Bay Area hippies would revile people driving home from work with shouts of “Work addicts! Shame on you!”_  
_Those who sought to build monogamous relationships were seen as possessive and sexually dead. Not only were people who lived traditional lifestyles attacked as “unhip,” they were also accused of being the cause of all that was wrong in the world._

Yet an honest discussion of the way that the New Left self-destructed has been blocked by many who have a vested interest in obscuring the ways that New Leftists contributed to their own defeat. The tens of thousands who never quite find it difficult to acknowledge that they created a movement that turned off hundreds of thousands of others who were equally committed to social change. Far easier to denigrate the commitment of those who quit, to suggest that they were in the movement only because it was popular or fun, or because of some narrow self-interest like avoiding the draft or finding support for their desire to experiment with alternatives to the dominant sexual and cultural mores of the society. Then there are the former-activist academics who may still be feeling some guilt at having put their primary energy into pursuing their careers at the point in the 1970s when their own intelligence and creativity might have been used to create organizational and intellectual alternatives. Conveniently, they hold on to various inevitability theories that purport to find some set of “objective conditions” that necessarily led to the collapse of the sixties—and all that any rational person could do, then, was to passively look on and observe as these objective conditions worked themselves out on the historical stage. Finally, there are many activists in today’s movements, particularly the anti-interventionists, the anti-nuke, and the anti-apartheid movements, who show surprisingly little interest in learning from the experience of those who have gone before them—perhaps anticipating that they will experience a shock of recognition in the stories that they would likely hear about the debilitating impact on the New Left of the very “anti-leadership” and “anti-national organization” tendencies that are the hallmark of many left movements of the late 1980s. Ironically, the newer generations of activists purport to have “learned the lessons of the sixties” when they are actually completely copying the most self-destructive aspects of the New Left!

Of course, it would be unfair to think that the problems of the New Left were somehow unique to it. On the contrary, the most destructive elements in its thinking were direct products of the larger society in which leftists grew up—the New Left imaginatively appropriated and reshaped to its own historical circumstances individualist currents in American ideology that have played a decisive role in containing and subverting most of the important social change movements of this century. So let us start our enquiry by reminding ourselves of a myth that is taught over and over again by every institution in American life: that we live in a society in which anyone can become anything s/he wants if s/he really tries hard enough and has enough dedication and wholeness of heart. It is this “fact” that is supposed to make our society “fair.” If anyone can be anything that they want, given enough good intention and hard work, then what we actually do end up with is a product of our own actions. We have no one but ourselves to blame for what we have achieved in our lives. It is up to us as individuals to make our world in any way that we choose. This is thought to be the basic ground rule for America, its central self-justificatory fantasy. To some degree, virtually everyone growing up in this society comes to believe some version of this idea—and to blame themselves, usually quite unfairly, for not having “made for themselves” a more fulfilling world.

New Leftists knew that there was something funda-
mentally unfair about the way rewards were allocated in American society. As successors to the liberal Democrats who had fashioned the New Deal, they understood that many people had been "left out" of the general prosperity, and that this was unfair. They went on to develop theories to explain the role of ruling elites of wealth and power. Yet it never occurred to them to question the deeper individualistic assumptions that pervaded American thought, particularly the notion that human beings could, by acts of will, make themselves into whoever they wanted to be. Having little or no appreciation of the ways that their own psychological and social conditioning might constrain the amount of change or transcendence that could reasonably be expected of any individual, the movement bought the assumption that it could shape a brand new human being in one generation through conscious acts of will. And when New Leftists failed to become the living embodiment of their own ideals, the movement became paralyzed with self-doubt and self-blame.

The possibility of radically reshaping themselves and the world through conscious acts of moral commitment was the central energizing fantasy of the New Left. New Leftists inherited a world that seemed populated by a wide variety of failed social transformers: Soviet Communists and their American supporters, who had seen the moral vision of socialist egalitarianism transformed into the Stalinist nightmare of political oppression and intellectual rigidity; American liberals, who had bought the benefits of a welfare state at the cost of an unprincipled alliance with militarists whose ultimate expression was the war in Vietnam; labor union activists, who had secured economic benefits for their membership by depoliticizing their members and emphasizing cooperation with multinational corporations that were systematically destroying the planet's environment; and university professors who had been radical in their youth but now taught that fundamental social change was either unnecessary or impossible. New Leftists were forced to confront the possibility of being corrupted in the same way that these earlier activists had been.

It was obvious to New Leftists that they could not rely on the Old Left's strategy of "We will change the society, and then the new society will create a new kind of human being." The failures of the Old Left made it all too clear that such a plan would fail because people who are flawed in the old ways will never create a new society. So the New Left took the opposite tack: "We will change ourselves, and then we ourselves will be the guarantors of the future society." But, having disregarded the ways a social order and past psychological conditioning restrain the level of change, New Leftists believed that the process of change would simply be a matter of will and moral seriousness. They insisted that their movement be, at that present moment, the living embodiment of the ideals they sought to bring into existence in the future. The guarantor of the future must be the present: the movement shall be now, in the daily lives and activities of its participants, the actualization of the society that eventually would be built. And if it must be now, there is no time to go through the process, no time for people to be supported as they gradually move through stages along the way. Rather, if it is all a question of will and commitment, then the defects will be remedied instantly—or not at all. Almost immediately, movement people began to judge themselves and each other in terms of how much they lived up to the ideals of the future, how worthy they really were. It was only a short step to an intense self-blaming, as they failed to live up to their own highest values.

It is true that the demands that New Leftists imposed on themselves produced moments of great heroism and remarkable personal transformation. Many people reached heights of courage and self-understanding that they had never dreamt possible. But all too quickly they began to burn out. Unlike previous generations of political organizers, many of whom had been involved in political movements for decades, New Leftists were unable to sustain the level of intensity that they demanded of themselves, and as a result, people began to drop out of active participation after a few years. They, in turn, were replaced with ever-expanding numbers of new recruits in the mid- and late sixties, who joined the fray by finding new and imaginative ways to raise the ante of acceptable demands on themselves and each other.

Little thought was given to how people with families or jobs might be able to participate in the movement. To ensure, for example, that the antidemocratic tendencies of the Old Left were avoided, New Leftists frequently insisted on achieving consensus on its decisions—a process that often lasted late into the night. Only those with neither job nor family could stick it through. The plausible alternative—having tightly structured agendas that restricted the number of speakers and granted time for deliberation on issues, deciding issues of principle and then empowering a democratically elected leadership to make important implementing decisions—seemed less democratic than having endless meetings at which everything could be decided by some kind of consensus. So, in the name of being democratic, New Leftists effectively excluded from the movement those whose lives were filled with other real-world commitments, such as raising children or making livings. Is it any wonder that some people wondered exactly
who the New Left had in mind when they talked about “Power to the People”? And if this was living the values of the future in the present, those who imagined that life as a nonstop political meeting might not be so much fun began to question whether they really wanted to buy into a New Left future.

The attempt to attribute the problems of the New Left to “wrong ideas” without understanding the social and psychological dynamics that might lead people to adopt those ideas is to miss the boat.

Living the values of the future in the present led to another distortion—a crude leveling that manifested itself in anti-intellectualism and antileadership. Intellectual activity was often seen as a form of elitism—after all, if everyone is to be treated equally, everyone’s insights must be equally valid. As a result, New Leftists embraced the assumption that the only ideas worthy of serious consideration were those based on feelings. Since everyone’s feelings were equally deserving of respect, and since truly vital ideas were based on deep feelings and passion, all ideas were equally worthy of attention. In such a climate, sustained intellectual activity was seen, at best, as an inauthentic way to spend time, and, at worst, dangerous. It followed, then, that anyone could become a leader, and that the main problem was to control the egos of some who thought that their previous experiences entitled them to a greater say in the current plan. A cult of antileadership emerged that effectively prevented New Leftists from learning from their own accumulated experiences. In the mid-1960s the main New Left organization, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), adopted the policy of allowing its top leadership to remain in that position for only one year. By the late 1960s, in New Left organizations it was not unusual to hear people who had been in positions of local leadership for six months maligned as “the old leadership.”

This very cult of antileadership forced those who wished to lead to seek other ways of achieving influence. Though some were undoubtedly driven by self-serving egotism, many were concerned that the movement needed someone to refute the lies being articulated by prowar government spokesmen that were then broadcast as “truth” by the media. Hoping to influence events and seeing no alternative leadership that was officially sanctioned by the movement, some activists sought media attention to make their perspectives known. Yet most New Leftists interpreted their activities as motivated solely by a desire for ego-gratification and power.

The New Left assumed that ego needs are fundamentally illegitimate. By failing to acknowledge that ego motives are inevitable, and particularly acute in capitalist societies, the New Left wasted the opportunity to harness those needs to the goals of the movement (an insight it might have learned from the Jewish tradition of insistence that one serve God with all one’s inclinations, including the yetzer ha-ra or “evil inclination”). Needless to say, it didn’t take long for most New Leftists to discover that they themselves were “impure” (surprise of surprises: they too had ego motives). But instead of accepting this as inevitable and making room for the reality, New Leftists felt terrible about themselves and were determined to purge themselves of these imperfections.

Given these dynamics, New Leftists were easy targets for the crudest forms of manipulation. Whoever was willing to be the most militant in any situation seemed to be indicating that s/he was making a more serious commitment than others. The holier-than-thou dynamics that plague almost every political, religious, or moral movement were even more out of control in a movement that had no sense of external constraint. Considerable evidence now shows that the F. B. I. and state agencies manipulated this dynamic by sending undercover agents into New Left groups to encourage extreme actions designed to discredit the movement. The climate of mutual recrimination facilitated the success not only of agents provocateurs, but of baiting by members of “oppressed groups”—the supposition being that because they were more oppressed, they were wiser, or that since the dominant group had never allowed itself to be led by the oppressed, it was necessary to grant leadership to members of oppressed groups regardless of their wisdom. After all, any judgment of the abilities of the oppressed was subject to prejudice. Here self-blame took one more decisive step forward: Not only were people to blame for not having changed themselves enough, they were to blame for being white or male or born into middle-class families. If their very essence was deserving of blame, nothing would ever be enough.

These destructive dynamics were held at bay as long as movement activists believed that their actions were effective in building public opposition to the Vietnam War. The decisive change came after the election of Nixon in 1968. Starting with a small group in SDS (the Weathermen) and extending to larger and larger groups of New Left activists, a new perception began to spread: Nothing had been accomplished through years of peaceful protest—the movement had been a failure. Though the Weathermen pushed
this idea with the hope of generating a higher level of militancy and commitment, the U.S. government pursed the same idea with the hope of discouraging further radical activity. Nixon and his entourage firmly believed that the war had to be ended, but they were deeply committed to ending the war on terms that would give neither credit to the antiwar movement nor encouragement to political activists. The Nixon White House consciously set about a double-pronged strategy: on the one hand, massive disruptions of left organizations and overt repression of the leadership, and, on the other hand, a carefully crafted public denial that any attention was being given to the antiwar movement or its demands. Since the war seemed to be continuing and the level of repression increasing, many New Leftists began to doubt that their activity was accomplishing very much. Once that perception became widespread, there no longer existed an external constraint on the tendency towards self-doubt and self-blame.

In the absence of a belief that their activity was stopping the war, claiming adequacy as a movement would have required claiming that New Leftists were making essential and dramatic changes in their own lives, changes that could achieve the goal of actualizing the future in the present; and such claims required more chutzpah than anyone had. And, if the very legitimacy of the movement depended on its ability to embody a different kind of consciousness and spirit than mainstream culture, how could one justify continuing that movement—if it could be shown to be riddled with racism, elitism, sexism, and so forth?

The emerging women’s movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s was decisive in this process. The analysis of sexism was so transparently correct and important that it raised serious doubts about the legitimacy of many of the then current political struggles. If the New Left itself was infused with sexist practices and sexist men, how could it possibly hope to be an embodiment of the future society? And if the movement was sexist, why should one risk going to jail on its behalf?

A rational response would have been to acknowledge the women’s movement’s critique of sexism in the New Left and to understand that people in any political movement, socialized in the larger sexist society, would inevitably have deep sexist distortions. Such an approach would have encouraged women to articulate their anger about sexism and would have recognized that the small group discussions by which women were coming to link the pain in their personal lives with the larger social reality were a prototype for a new and far more revolutionary politics. It also might have encouraged men to engage in a profound reevaluation of their sexism without making them feel so defensive and worthless that they would run for cover (at times using the intensity of women’s attacks as an excuse to avoid really confronting the truths of the feminist perspective).

Instead, there was a new frenzy of people trashing each other and themselves. Many people simply quit New Left politics altogether in the early 1970s, using the critique of their own sexism as an excuse to “work on their own heads.” And, although many women moved into feminist activity and carried on the social activism of the New Left, a great number of others retreated from politics, overwhelmed with disappointment when they saw their male comrades as sexist and untrustworthy.

There have been some attempts by neo-conservatives and former lefties having “second thoughts” to blame New Left failures on its alleged softness on communism. There were, to be sure, thousands of activists at the end of the sixties who became born-again worshippers of third-world revolutionaries. They tended to be the people who were most adept at grabbing publicity (it was “good TV” for the evening news to show demonstrators carrying NLF flags), and those who were best at intimidating others about their “lack of commitment.” Yet these antics were just one of the many ways that New Leftists flailed about trying to find identities that would heal the pain of their growing conviction that they had failed to live up to their own ideals. That there was a propensity to overlook the faults of third-worlders, and, hence, to glorify some of America’s “enemies” was more a product of guilt about the U.S. murdering hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese than a statement of attraction to Vietnamese communism, more a statement of shame about the U.S. role in the third world than a political ideology for America. The fact is that most New Leftists, to the extent that they allowed themselves to think about ideological issues at all, were largely anti-Marxist, overwhelmingly anti-Soviet, and hostile to the legacy of the Communist Party. Their early refusal to go along with demands to exclude communists was partly a healthy sign of the very kind of openness that eventually allowed police agents to infiltrate, and partly a refusal to let the debates of the thirties and fifties set the agenda for the sixties. In fact, the resolute anticommunism of the New Left was consistently attacked by leftist sectarians, who were always scandalized by it. The picture changed only in the late sixties when, overwhelmed by their perception of their own failure, some New Leftists were drawn to the notion that they must learn from the lessons of more successful revolutionaries elsewhere—Ho Chi Minh, Mao, and Fidel. But the strong democratic commitment of the vast majority of New Leftists led them to view those who joined communist sect groups with a mixture of suspicion and derision.

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Two Thoughts Forward, One Thought Back: The Rise and Rapid Decline of the New Ex-Left

Todd Gitlin and Michael Kazin

The prerequisites of apostasy are a church and a doctrine. It was curious, therefore, that about thirty veterans (not a hundred leaders, as the Wall Street Journal's reporter seemed to have gathered in Washington's glittering Grand Hyatt Hotel on a weekend in October) bashed the Church that Failed at a conference called "Second Thoughts."

On the face of it, a gathering by this name was peculiar. What, after all, had been the nature of those "First Thoughts" that now had to be lived down? What had been their texture? For all its latter-day sins—Third World romance, anti-intellectualism, revolutionary fantasy, violent posturing, sectarian viciousness—the bygone New Left spawned a minimum of orthodoxy. Unlike the Old Left, a system of cults each embodying true belief, the New Left was a ragged, messy hodgepodge of movements, stronger on impulse than programmatic clarity, and in constant flux—civil rights, student, anti-war, countercultural, feminist, gay, and none of the above. It was precisely disorder that frustrated both the FBI and the ideologues. The movement flux was not only a herky-jerky response to events—though it was that—but a matter of principle, a way of learning, a style of thought, even an epistemology: Don't follow leaders, don't parrot texts, put your body on the line. No master Party reigned over the Sixties Left to secure a shaky line. Most of the ideological manacles of the Sixties were mind-forg'd—cramping enough, at times, God knows, but scarcely as brutal as what a Party makes out when it has the power to excommunicate. As the Sixties hardened into the Seventies, therefore, most of the people who left radical politics—or felt it was leaving them—melted away from politics altogether: into psychological ("human potential") or spiritual disciplines, or the everyday habits exacted by work and family. And the myriad Sixties veterans who gravitated into local, ecological, consumer, union, or other grass-rooted politics in the Seventies and Eighties went on thinking second, third, fourth...n more thoughts about the politics and style of the Left.

Heterodoxy, in short, became normal. How could it not have been? For the early and middle New Left, it had been routine to start with; you were "in the movement" not so much because you had the right line but because you asked the right questions (who rules? who is qualified?) in the right style (casual, inductive, halting, tentative). Then the extravagances of the late Sixties collided with the nasty, disheartening facts of the Seventies and Eighties. The postwar boom went bust, the boat people fled Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge slaughtered millions, street crime couldn't be explained away, the Symbionese and other demented ragtag "soldiers" discredited the romance which decreed that those longest imprisoned were the most heroic, cults turned murderous...and the old catechisms, loose as they were, looked less compelling by the year. Accordingly, a host of positions got rethought and rethought again. Few veterans of the Sixties, therefore, have felt the need to atone, recant, declare themselves apostates. These days, the unconstructed are hard to find; virtually everyone we know from New Left days is one sort of revisionist or another.

So why devote fanfare to the fact that some veterans of the Sixties think "Second Thoughts"? The organizers, David Horowitz and Peter Collier, ex- of Ramparts, were evidently pulled in two directions. On the face of it, they meant a very particular set of "Second Thoughts," tracking their own rightward trajectory. But by the sound of their publicity, they meant not so much second but final. "Twenty years ago they condemned America's democracy as a sham and dismissed its enemies as figments of cold war paranoia," proclaimed the "Second Thoughts" ad in The New Republic. "Today they recognize that America's enemies are real and that America's democracy must be defended...They meet to reexamine the assumptions of the New Left and to consider..."
how those assumptions have been inserted, with destructive results, into the national dialogue, and particularly in regard to the struggle against totalitarian forces in Central America." They did not mean the death squads of El Salvador.

But interestingly, Horowitz and Collier included panelists whom they knew would demur publicly from their own line. Call it protecting their left flank, or insurance against imprisonment in what Horowitz recognizes as the "antiquated," "culturally backward" precincts of the aggressive Right, or recovering a bit of the New Left's ecumenical spirit: in any event, they extended themselves to include old-fashioned liberals and social democrats alongside Reagonites rampant. The result was unexpected political theater. Liberals balked, crusaders bridled, honorable precursors bitched. What did it all mean? In one sense, the two dozen "second thought" panelists represented little more than themselves, twenty-four characters in search of a position. In another sense, their search for political ground reveals something more, for they brushed up against the zeitgeist at one of its turning points. At the very moment of its hypothetical foundling, today's Church Penitent cracked into fragments. Like the very New Left whose ghost it was trying to bash back into the grave, the conference was built on negation; without a vision, it perished. As a born-again rally, the sanctimonious "Second Thoughts" failed abysmally, if flamboyantly. That failure was titilating, but more: It pointed, all at once, to the Right's weakness, the Left's defaults and liberalism's befuddlement—all this at a political moment pregnant with possibilities. For after seven years of "Reagan Revolution" (as much a "Counterrevolution" as anything else), American politics are up for grabs. Thanks to the Iran/Contra scandal, the Arias plan (and Jim Wright's maneuvers in its behalf), the stock market crash, the reinvention of arms control in the INF treaty, and the doomed nominations of Judges Bork and Ginsburg, the mandate of heaven is passing from the Right. The unsettled and unsettling question is, Whither, after Reagan, does it pass?

II

Horowitz himself sprinkled "Second Thoughts" with a succession of cartoon one-liners: "The Left supports murderers, the Left supports gulags," "Liberation theology is a satanic creed." Benjamin Linder, the young American engineer killed at point blank range by Nicaraguan contras last spring, was a "dedicated Communist" fighting for a "police state." "The beginning of political morality is anti-Communism." "The effect of pulling the plug [on South Vietnam in 1973] was the death of three million people in Southeast Asia and one million in Afghanistan. I'm never going to pull the plug on an anti-Communist struggle again." That moving target called The Left hadn't been accorded so much power since Joseph McCarthy brandished lists and the Right declaimed against "twenty years of treason."

You were "in the movement" not so much because you had the right line as because you asked the right questions (who rules? who is qualified?) in the right style (casual, inductive, halting, tentative).

Some in attendance were embarrassed at Horowitz's extremity ("battery-acid rhetoric," a writer for the Unification Church's Insight magazine calls it). But most of the audience—right-wing writers and cadres and foundation professionals, Nicaraguan contras and their supporters, assorted Congressional assistants—lapped it up for Horowitz is a, or the, prize apostate. In 1962, when the New Left was scarcely a mote in the American eye, he published a book of intelligent praise about the student rumblings in Berkeley. He went on to write one of the early, influential volumes of cold war revisionism—The Free World Colossus—and directed the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation in London. In 1967, Horowitz returned to California as an editor of the slick New Left monthly Ramparts, specializing in exposés of "the power structure." Came 1969, as the New Left tore itself apart in sectarian splendor, he skewed what he called "hand-me-down Marxism." But in the spirit of the time he fell for the siren screech of the Black Panthers. Obscurity wasn't enough; in 1974—at a time when most white radicals had long since abandoned illusions about the Panthers—he procured for them a bookkeeper who, upon discovering that they were cooking the books and diverting funds under cover of providing free breakfasts for children, was found floating in San Francisco Bay. The onetime acolyte of Isaac Deutscher hunted for an honorable Left position but skidded into ideological freefall. In 1981, a moving Horowitz-Collier piece on the Bay Area lawyer Fay Stender demolished the naive prisoner-support movement; soon afterward, they were writing

*One of us (Gitlin) read then that Horowitz was editing a collection of revisionist essays on the cold war, and sent him a piece on the Greek wartime resistance and civil war, arguing that the Greek Left, for all its crimes, was no Stalinist plot, that the Truman Doctrine had helped sabotage democracy and drive the Greek Communists beyond the pale. Horowitz accepted the piece, then tried persuading Gitlin to play up America's economic motives for imperialism.
sex-and-drug tales of the Weathermen for *Rolling Stone*, diminishing the tragedy of those good-time would-be revolutionaries by denuding them of their dreadful politics. For the enraged son of an unreconstructed Stalinist, the red-diaper baby who never exercised the spirit of the Old Left, a New anti-Left became a substitute ideological home.

Today the old passion for total politics has resurfaced with a vengeance. It is jihad time. Horowitz and Collier shocked their old comrades when, in a 1985 *Washington Post* screeed, they declared for Reagan. Today they are as utopian as ever, with white-hats and black-hats reversed—America cast as the promised land, socialism as a chain of gulags, Washington as holy Jerusalem. If the New Left “hated America,” as Horowitz proclaims, now is the time for all good men (there is barely a woman in the fold) to come to the aid of their embattled country. When Horowitz speaks of the movement against the Vietnam War, the word “treason” rises easily to his lips. Tourist of the counterrevolution, he writes for *Soldier of Fortune*; he and Collier pass through Managua for the USA. It is time, Horowitz says, to name the names of the heathen within the gates: “Divided Loyalties,” he and Collier entitle their attack on campus “Sandalistas” practicing solidarity with Central American Lefts. The habit of apocalypse dies hard: he is sure that some day Communist terrorists—Salvadorans, he mentions—are going to wreak havoc in the United States; his shrill alarms will be proved right, and the prophet shall be repaid with honor.

Needless to say, theology of this sort sells in Reagan’s Washington. The *Post* piece caught the eye of James S. Denton, son of the ultraright Alabama ex-Senator who once said he was ready to die in the cause of getting sexual dalliances off TV. It was the Dentons’ foundation that funneled $450,000 from the Smith-Richardson, Coors, Olin, J. M. Murdoch Trust, Scaife, and Bradley foundations to subsidize the October 16–18 confessional and its spin-offs. Horowitz is talking now about projected publications and teach-ins. “Second Thoughts” did well in the media spotlight, but whether the Dentons got their money’s worth, at an otherwise bad time for the Right, is questionable.

III

For all the hoopla, only some two dozen “second thoughts” (Horowitz’s term) actually materialized, some to confess, some simply to describe and deplore, their thought-crimes; in the audience they were severely outnumbered by journalists and by prospectors from right-wing foundations hunting for fool’s gold. Few of the confessors could follow Horowitz all the way to Reagan. Hardly any had been actual New Leftists in the Sixties; in fact, more were homeless liberals edging leftward, and they remain homeless liberals now. Their intellectual roots are in the warfare-welfare consensus shattered by Vietnam, assassinations, and race upheavals in the Sixties; their heroes were the three H’s—Harry Truman, Hubert Humphrey, and Henry (Scoop) Jackson—all of them dead. More than one “second thought” was quesy about appearing under Horowitz-Denton auspices in the first place (one panelist speaks privately of Horowitz’s “Genghis Khan conservatism”). Several demurred publicly from conference blurbs hitching them to American crusades south of the Rio Grande; they would feel more comfortable with a vital, thoughtful center-liberalism if it existed. They spoke feelingly for the victims of Lefts in power, but were willing to rally for neither Judge Bork nor the contras.

What had to be lived down? “Illusions and misplaced hopes” about Third World socialism, said David Hawk, once an organizer of the 1969 Vietnam Moratorium, later head of Amnesty International, now leading an effort to get the Khmer Rouge condemned before the World Court under the Genocide Convention. Hawk blamed a “reflexive anti-anti-Communism that grew out of revulsion against McCarthyism and a revolt against the Old Left origins of the New Left.” Doan Van Toai, once president of the Vietnamese Student Union, jailed by both the Saigon and Hanoi regimes, warned onetime antiwar activists not to be silent about human rights violations in Vietnam today. Jeffrey Herf, a late SDSer turned sociologist and military strategist, said correctly that the New Left had been largely “neutralist,” declaring “plague on both your houses.” In 1979 he was ostracized by left-wing friends for supporting the NATO two-track strategy, which he thinks vindicated today by glasnost and the INF treaty. Herf wants to reconstitute a “Democratic anti-Communist center,” and made the interesting point (which in the overheated Grand Hyatt atmosphere no one took up) that participatory democracy and supply-side economics are two versions of “innocent Americanism.” “Today,” he concluded, “when I hear the word ‘Movement,’ I reach for my books and my word processor.” When a questioner arose to insist that the antiwar movement was “very carefully manipulated” by North Vietnam, Herf, who teaches at the Naval War Institute, said, “I kiss the ground” that the military has avoided stab-in-the-back thinking.

Personal testimony carries its own ring of authority, but it is not political argument. Both liberals and neocons knew that, and it took their sharp questions from the floor, about political implications, to produce moments of truth. One came from Bruce Cameron, a onetime Indochina Peace Campaigner who, with Tom Hayden

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and Jane Fonda, helped lobby Congress to cut off aid to the Thieu regime. He was still haunted by that time, Cameron said, and he wanted to know whether, after the Paris Peace Accords, there was another way the war could have ended. Probably not, said Herf, who agreed with Henry Kissinger that it was Watergate which kept Nixon from sending the Air Force back into action. The Saigon generals were pocketing American aid, said Doan Van Toai; after 1963 there was simply no good solution. Whereupon the Committee for the Free World's Midge Decter arose to ask just which anti-Communist insurgencies the panelists would support. Toai disappointed her: He cautioned against futility, didn't want intervention unless the population already opposes a regime, and as for Nicaragua—the conference touchstone—he said he didn't know enough. Experienced political hands, in other words, rejected political theology in favor of the difficult business of politics, which entails hard choices among practical possibilities. Cold secular water on the jihad!

IV

Among the ex-New Left testifiers, the common Kronstadt was the exodus of Vietnamese boat people and the Cambodian atrocities. Fair enough. New Leftists did hasten with unbecoming ease toward revolutionary utopias thought to be aborning in torrid lands. Communist crimes were casually explained away. Much of the American Left did go dreadfully silent about Southeast Asian abominations after 1975, and has still failed to work out a principled and practical position on Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and the other revolutionary omelets that litter the ground with broken eggs and stink to high heaven. In its silences, the Left has ceded a good deal of the moral high ground to the Right and the gathering center.

But it is one thing to come clean about stupidities and quite another to hasten after a new theology of Third World Revolution led, this time, by the anti-Communists. The weekend's big standing ovation went to the Nicaraguan ex-Trotskyite Antonio Ybarra Rojas, now of the University of Dubuque, who denounced the Arias plan as a "new Yalta" and whose voice rose to rousing pitch as he asked, "Is this a new Bay of Pigs? Speak out ... so there do not have to be 'Second Thoughts' about your complicity... We have 15,000 Nicaraguans armed ... set up to be massacred. Are you going to stand silent?" Tumult in the hall! "I wish we were worthy of you," said New Republic Editor-in-Chief Martin Peretz to the contras that night, in unconscious echo of the deplorable Third World hero-worship of the Sixties. Political theologians of all persuasions, eyes cast resolutely upward, are forever tripping over the actual bumpy ground. None of the "second thinkers" were heard to observe that the anti-Vietnam coalition which includes the Khmer Rouge finds its defenders not in the ragtag Left but among the Reagonite ultras. Nor was much heard about that embarrassingly clandestine junta of CIA director William Casey, Lt. Col. Oliver North, and friends. If democracy has to be destroyed to preserve democracy, well, this possibility might be disconcerting enough to occasion a third thought or two.

The Left lost initiative after the sixties partly because its language failed to address the new anxieties and demands of a society which the movement had helped to change.

Third thoughts there were, here and there, and they provided the conference shocker: apostasy's own apostasy. You could hear a leaflet drop as Bruce Cameron (ex-ADA lobbyist turned pro-contra in 1985, and widely credited with helping win contra aid by persuading centrist Democrats) declare that he had been "fundamentally in error both in my support of the contras and my understanding of the Reagan administration." The third world (counter)revolution kindled in his breast turned out to be yet another fraud. He decried conservatives' "error of voluntarism, that is, the belief that by sheer force of political will, one can surpass and overcome the stubborn and recalcitrant social realities. The right believes that if you call a movement of people 'freedom fighters' often enough, not only are they, but they can win.... By denouncing the sins of the Sandinistas, which are legion, and by evoking the suffering of the Nicaraguan people including those who have joined the contras, one nonetheless cannot change the stubborn reality that the contras cannot win in the foreseeable future." Another case in point: Mozambique, where massacre-making Renamo, beloved by the hard American right, was founded by unreconciled Portuguese settlers working for Ian Smith and later fronting for South Africa. Having denounced the "fantasy" of the democratic counter-revolution, Cameron administered the coup de grace, announcing that he had just signed on as lobbyist for the People's Republic of Mozambique. Hisses and gasps in the hall! "I have great doubts," he added matter-of-factly, "that there can be democratic counterrevolutions," for they backfire: thus, "America's quick embrace of Lon Nol," in 1970, "led to the rise of Pol Pot." ("Bullshit!") rang out from Reed Irvine of the egregiously misnamed Accuracy in
TRANSCENDING THE SIXTIES

Beyond Ideology

Julius Lester

This article was originally delivered as a speech at The Second Thoughts Conference in Washington, D.C. in the fall of 1987.

THE MOVEMENT. It was a special time, a time when idealism was as palpable and delicious as a gentle rain, a time when freedom and love and justice seemed as immediate as ripe oranges shining seductively from a tree in one’s backyard. It was a time when we believed that the ideals of democracy would, at long last, gleam like endless amber waving fields of grain from the hearts and souls of every American. It was a time when we believed that love was too wonderful and too important to be confined to our small circles of family and friends because love was a mighty stream that could purify the soul of the nation, and once purified, the nation would study war no more, and everyone would sing “No more auction block” because we all were slaves of one kind of another. We had a vision of a new world about to be born and that vision burned us with a burning heat.

In its beginnings, in the latter half of the fifties, The Movement challenged us to sing the Lord’s song in a strange land, a land in which we all sat by the rivers of Babylon and wept, though only a few of us knew we were weeping. In Montgomery, Alabama, Martin Luther King, Jr. was saying that yes, segregation was wrong, but that one was not justified in destroying it by any means necessary. “All life is interrelated,” he said. “All humanity is involved in a single process, and to the degree that I harm my brother, to that extent I am harming myself.” We must be careful, he admonished, not to do those things that will “intensify the existence of evil in the universe.”

From a monastery in Kentucky, a monk named Thomas Merton was writing essays and books imbued with a clarity and authenticity unlike anything many of us had ever read:

.... our job is to love others without stopping to

inquire whether or not they are worthy. That is not our business and, in fact, it is nobody’s business. What we are asked to do is to love; and this love itself will render both ourselves and our neighbors worthy if anything can.

And on the West Coast, in a place with the romantic name of North Beach, there came the voices of Allen Ginsberg, Jack Kerouac, Alan Watts, and Gary Snyder stripping the Eisenhower and McCarthy years of their gray-flannelled fear, and through their words we were invited to live life in all its fullness and blinding complexity. Henry Miller, the elder statesman of the Beat Generation, put it this way:

I am not interested in the potential man. I am interested in what a man actualizes—or realizes—of his potential being. And what is the potential man, after all? Is he not the sum of all that is human? Divine, in other words? You think I am searching for God. I am not. God is. The world is. Man is. We are. The full reality, that’s God—and man, and the world, and all that is, including the unnameable.

The Movement was not born from the desire to change the system. We wanted to move far beyond systems; we wanted to create community, and in the words of one of the earliest white members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Jane Stembridge, that community was to be “the beloved community.”

What made The Movement such a compelling force in its early years was that political action was merely the vehicle for spiritual expression. The values by which we lived were what really mattered—the quality of who we were and the subsequent quality of our relationships. Ending segregation was not sufficient as a goal. (Anybody who really thinks that the aim of the early Civil Rights Movement was to sit down at a lunch counter next to a white person and eat a hamburger and drink a cup of coffee insults not only the intelligence of black people but also our tastebuds. We had always known that the food was better on our side of the tracks.) We wanted to create a new society based on feelings of community, and to do that, The Movement itself had to be the paradigm of that New Community.
SPRING, 1960. I stood in the Student Union Building at Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee, staring at the bulletin board. The sit-in movement had begun in February of that year in Greensboro, North Carolina, and it had spread quickly to Nashville and other cities in the South and become national news. That spring afternoon of my senior year, I stared at the bulletin board reading the telegrams tacked upon it. They were telegrams from schools all over the country expressing support for the sit-in movement: Harvard, Yale, Stanford, the University of Chicago, Oberlin, and on and on and on.

I was bewildered. I didn’t understand their what or their why. I had lived my then twenty-one years shuddering within the lingering shadow of slavery—segregation. I had learned to walk great distances rather than sit in the back of segregated buses, to control my bodily functions so that I would not have to use segregated bathrooms, to go for many hours without water in the southern heat rather than drink from the Colored Fountains, and to choose hunger rather than buy food from a segregated eating place. I was fourteen before I ever spoke to a white person. Although I had encountered whites during a semester at San Diego State College the previous year, and although there were white instructors and a few white students at Fisk, white people had no reality as persons. They were an implacable force as massive and undifferentiated as an iceberg, and somehow I would have to find the way to steer the fragile craft of my life around it or be thrown into the icy waters, another victim of that hard and blinding whiteness.

What made the Movement such a compelling force in its early years was that political action was merely the vehicle for spiritual expression.

But as I stood there reading those telegrams, I recognized for the first time in my life that white people were not an undifferentiated mass, an unfeeling negative Other. There were whites who cared, who did not think of segregation as a Negro problem, but who knew it for what it was—an American problem. For the first time in my life I felt that I was not alone in America.

That is why the New Community that the early Movement tried to be had to be Black and White together. The Old America had been one of Black and White forcibly kept apart by segregation, economics, and prejudice. In 1960, most states had laws forbidding interracial marriages, and the southern states had additional laws forbidding social relationships between blacks and whites.

“Black and White together,” we would sing in one of the choruses of “We Shall Overcome.” What a revolutionary statement it was! Black and White together on such a scale was unprecedented in American history because Black and White together was not how the nation had ever perceived itself. It was not surprising, then, that during demonstrations, it was the whites who were singled out for the most vicious beatings. They were traitors to America’s conception of itself as a white nation. William Moore, Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, Jonathan Daniels, Rev. James Reeb, and Mrs. Viola Liuzzo were made to pay the ultimate price: they were murdered. Others, like James Peck, suffered for the rest of their lives from the beatings they received. Some committed suicide. Others paid and continue to pay psychologically.

We did not know that America would extract such a price to maintain the status quo. We did not know that the Justice Department of Robert Kennedy would not be eager to use the power of the federal government to protect civil rights workers. We did not know that seeking the end of segregation and disenfranchisement would lead the liberal press to accuse us of wanting too much too soon. Above all, perhaps, we did not know that the values we sought to embody—the values of nonviolence and the beloved community—were not values that America wanted for itself.

One can live in the valley of the shadow of death only so long before asking, why am I doing this? I lost fifteen pounds in two weeks that summer of 1964 in Mississippi. The body is an organism with an intense awareness of itself. It knows when its existence is being threatened, even when the mind claims there is nothing to worry about. My mind thought the long and desolate highways of Mississippi beautiful; my body knew that southern trees bear a strange fruit. At night my mind would tell me that the house I was sleeping in might be bombed while I slept, but, it would add blithely, “Everybody has to die sometime.” My body, trembling with incredulity, would say: “Sometime ain’t this time,” and refuse to fall asleep.

Faint whispers of second thoughts in voices like those of the witches in “Macbeth” disturbed a lot of us that summer of 1964. Trying to register blacks to vote was not worth risking one’s life for, especially when one walked into the voting booth and had to choose between Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater. And as Navy men searched the swamps and countryside of Mississippi for the bodies of Chaney, Goodman and Schwerner, our own mortality stared at us with its hollow eyes and we wondered if America really cared.

In August 1964, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic
party went to the Democratic party’s convention in Atlantic City and challenged the Democrats to seat it as the legitimate representative of the party in Mississippi instead of the all-white delegation led by arch-white supremacist, Senator James Eastland. The convention offered the MFD party two token seats.

Those foreboding second thoughts acquired full-bodied voices because of our feeling of having been betrayed by our country. We had offered America love; it played politics. We wanted the constitutional ideals of equality, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, to stroll through the streets of cities and along country backroads with the glowing wonder of lovers discovering themselves in each other. America told us that we were young and did not understand. We understood that America’s only interest was business as usual. We could not accept business as usual.

Second thoughts confront us when reality does not correspond to our expectations, when new information leads us to modify or change wholly what we had believed to be true. Second thoughts are important because they are the threshold of self-examination.

I do not remember the first time I heard of Malcolm X but I remember clearly the first time I took him seriously. During the winter of 1962 I worked for the Welfare Department in Harlem. For reasons beyond my comprehension, the month of February at the Welfare Department was devoted to raising money for the NAACP. The department was organized into units of six caseworkers, each with its own supervisor. One morning, my supervisor, who was white, informed me that our unit was to raise money for the NAACP the following day and that I was scheduled to sit at the table in the lobby from twelve to two and sell cookies, muffins or whatever it was. I told him I didn’t support the N-double-A and had no intention of raising money for it. He looked at me coldly and said, “What are you? One of those followers of Malcolm X?” The way he said it told me all I needed to know about Malcolm, and I returned his cold stare and said, “Yes.” Significantly, he treated me with a cool but proper respect after that, something that had been absent before. Such was the power of Malcolm X.

There were a few blacks at the Welfare Department who went to hear Malcolm at the mosque in Harlem, and on Mondays they would give me a summary of his speech. What Malcolm said was fearful to hear, even secondhand. He derided integration and mocked non-violence. He scorned love and extolled power. He had contempt for everything white and a startling love for everything black. What he preached was hard to embrace. It was even harder to deny.

We did not follow Malcolm, but what he said followed us like some nagging super-ego, especially after four little girls were murdered in the bombing of a church on a Birmingham, Alabama Sunday morning, and we began to ask ourselves whether Malcolm was right. Was violence the only appropriate response to violence?

One day in the mid-sixties—about 1965, I think—I was in New York’s Forty-second Street Library and ran into a friend whose first words were an excited, “Have you read this yet?” He thrust into my hands a book called The Wretched of the Earth. The author was someone named Frantz Fanon.

If I had learned nothing else, I had learned that one does not turn another human being into an abstraction without becoming an abstraction oneself, and to turn another into an abstraction is murder.

The Wretched of the Earth was a sophisticated reiteration of much that Malcolm had said, and reading it made our second thoughts become new convictions. Fanon gave us words through which to know ourselves anew. In his writings we found the term, Third World, and no longer would we identify ourselves as American. He told us that we were a colonized people, and that we had a political identity that aligned us with all the people of the twentieth century who had struggled against colonialism. Most important, Fanon told us that violence was redemptive, that it was the only means by which the colonized could cleanse themselves of the violence of the colonizers.

We did not have to wonder about the violence of the colonizers because every night on the news we watched the films of U. S. soldiers carrying out a war in a country we had never heard of, a country that none of us thought threatened America’s security. The nation was at war and something happened that was perhaps unprecedented in American history: A significant number of young Americans sided openly with the enemy. Young men fled to Canada and Sweden rather than be drafted to fight an unjust war. Draft cards and American flags were burned at antiwar rallies and Phil Ochs sang “I Ain’t A-Marching Anymore.”

At the same historical moment, the predominantly black Civil Rights Movement and the predominantly white anti-Vietnam War Movement became anti-American. Suddenly, America was the enemy. If ever there was a
moment in history for second thoughts, that was one. Common sense should have told us that it is impossible
to transform a nation if you hate it.

But that is one of the dangers of idealism. When it
is let loose in the public arena, it is like an animal in
heat and in desperate need of a sexual joining. All too
quickly, unrequited idealism can become surly and
aggressive. All too quickly, it becomes rage, bares the
teeth that have been lurking behind the smile as pretty
as a morning glory, and enraged, bites itself and never
feels the pain, never knows that the blood staining its
teeth is its own.

But the signs had been there almost from the begin-
inning. I remember being at a civil rights rally in the early
sixties and hearing the chant, “Freedom Now! Freedom
Now!” I muttered “Freedom any ol’ time” because I
was afraid of what would happen if we didn’t get
“Freedom Now.” Later in the sixties, Jim Morrison of
the Doors shouted, “We want the world and we want
it now!” We should have been frightened, and we
weren’t.

Freedom did not come now. We may have wanted the
world, but we didn’t get it, at least not warm from the
oven, as light and flaky as a croissant. Because freedom
did not come now, because we did not get the world,
we turned against the nation we had wanted to love, a
nation that did not want our love. Or so it seemed. And
we turned against each other.

IT IS SPRING, 1968. I am sitting in my apartment
in New York with one of my closest Movement friends.
I am a very private person, and there are not many
people with whom I share my home and family. This
friend was one of the few who had eaten my wife’s
cooking and mine and had played with our children.
We are alone in the apartment that afternoon chatting
with an ease that is possible only with those to whom
we have entrusted our souls. He and I had trusted our
very lives to each other on the backroads of Alabama.
Suddenly, he says, “I probably shouldn’t say this, man,
but I don’t think you should be married to a white
woman. You probably think it’s none of my business.”
Quietly, I say, “You’re right.” He nods, and there is
nothing more to be said—about that or anything else.
After a moment of silence as long as winter, he gets up.
“Take care of yourself,” he says. “Yeah, you too,” I
respond and I close the door gently behind him. I
never saw him again and a few years later he was dead,
killed in a bombing.

By 1968 the Movement that had begun with the singing
“We Shall Overcome” was shouting “Black Power.” I
wrote a book called Look Out, Whitey! Black Power’s
Gon’ Get Your Mama. It was the first book that sought
to explicate Black Power, an angry book, expressing
not so much personal anger as racial anger. It was also
a very funny and outrageous book, which I thought
would be evident from the title. Everyone took the title
seriously. I will never forget the headline in a Fort
Wayne, Indiana newspaper: “White Mamas In Danger,
Says Black Militant Lester.” I knew, however, that “white
mamas” had the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines
to protect them. I was the one in danger and in ways I
had not anticipated.

I was invited to speak on college campuses and I saw
the disappointment in the eyes of black students when
I got off the plane and I did not have a ten-foot high
Afro and was not wearing a dashiki made by Jomo
Kenyatta’s grandmama. I found myself being asked,
angrily, to explain how I could consider myself a black
activist and have a white wife. For a while, I wondered,
too. But I kept remembering one close friend who had
dissolved a relationship with the love of his life for no
other reason than that she was white, and I remembered,
too, his unhappiness and shame. Having grown up in
the South where whites decreed whom I could and
could not marry, I was not going to turn around and
give blacks that power. My eventual divorce had nothing
to do with my wife’s race or mine but with us and who
we were as persons.

Second thoughts abounded now like wildflowers. Both
the Black and White movements attacked individuals
within their ranks more viciously than they attacked the
administration in Washington. The personal had become
political, and the gray-flanneled conformity of the fifties
was replaced by a blue-jean and Afroed totalitarianism.
A mysterious and mystical entity called The People
became the standard against which everyone was mea-
sured and judged. One’s actions, thoughts and lifestyle
had to serve the needs of The People. At one meeting,
I asked a simple question: “Which people? Do you
mean junkies, winos, and prostitutes? Do you mean the
church-going people, the manual laborers, the unwed
mothers, or the strivers?” When the meeting continued
as if I had not spoken, I knew that I had committed a
revolutionary faux pas. I also knew I had asked a good
question.

Wasn’t the role of the intellectual simply that—to
have second thoughts and to ask good questions? But
an intellectual could not do that if he or she felt guilty
about being an intellectual, if she or he found virtue only
in something called the “working class” or something
even more amorphous called “The People.” The intel-
lectual had to realize that to think and feel what had
not yet been thought or felt was also work, though the
hands remained uncalledous and the armpits were devoid
of perspiration.

In his very fine novel, An Admirable Woman, the late
(Continued on p. 93)
GOLD FLUME, A NEW SUCCESS STORY

Once a booming silver camp, Gold Flume died in the 1890s when the price of silver dropped. There was another boom-bust—the uranium fever of the fifties, and after it the Ute Valley looked empty as the moon. Now, it is enjoying a third life as a fashionable ski resort. Pickaxe on the north and the towns of Granite, Bluebank, Callan, and Aureole to the south provide housing for service personnel who work in Gold Flume and for businesses and some industry necessary to the town. Mary Rember, who was born in Gold Flume in 1926, is delighted. "We have a library now," she said, "and the groceries carry foods we only heard about. Time was when the only doc around was a vet. Now they’ve got specialists and a good hospital." Marvin Stopes of Callan is less enthusiastic. "Sure the towns downriver have improved financially, but they are crowded now and the crime rate is soaring, and there are social class differences we never had back when everyone wasn’t getting so rich." There have been characterizations of Gold Flume as a gilded ghetto. Inflated land values have forced many of the Flume’s young people to move away. Jacqueline Brown was born in Gold Flume but now lives in Callan and says she can’t afford to get a place near her aging parents who homesteaded Whiskey Gulch. She is bitter. "I feel like I’ve been forced off my own place," she says. Her schoolmate, Lucy Tyrone, is happy with the changes. "The Ute used to be full of tailings. Now there are fish. Life has come back to the river. Let's face it, the new people are very careful with the environment, better than we ever were, and when Jackie's folks do pass on, she'll have a piece of land worth millions."

Entered in Evidence at the Hearing,
Ute County Courthouse, Aureole,
November 15, 1986.

VALLEY'S MYSTERY PLAGUE

A meeting including Epidemiologist Michael Mariani, Psychiatrist Richard Scale, Pastor John Embry, Dr. Paul Bissel, and Mayors Thompson and Pratt was held at the courthouse in Aureole on Tuesday. The purpose of the meeting was to coordinate forces in an attempt to deal with the so-called mystery plague affecting 200 victims and their families in the Ute Valley since mid-September. The results of the meeting, though not definitive, should bring a guarded optimism to the valley which has experienced panic and sorrow as friends and loved ones were struck with the illness which still defies diagnosis. No new victims have come down with the malady since September 21st, and Dr. Bissel says that the 200 sufferers officially counted are in stable condition. The participants of the meeting addressed the panic of loved ones, and what Mayor Pratt called "unbecoming and wrongheaded accusations" at the citizens of Gold Flume which, with Pickaxe, was almost unscathed. Information from studies and interviews may be summarized as follows:

1. The effects of the "plague" were sudden and severe and began on the 14th or 15th of September. Symptoms were profound depression, sleeplessness, weeping, and severe lethargy.
2. The condition affected entire families, or only one or two members. All ages and both sexes were afflicted, but more men and more older people were victims. Onset was sudden and frightening.
3. The course of the "plague" seemed to tend to go town by town, downriver. It was first evident in Granite, then Bluebank, then Callan, and finally in Aureole, hardest hit with 120 cases. Two cases were reported afterwards in Gold Flume; one in Pickaxe.
4. Current health and social services are inadequate to the challenge posed by the illness. Contingency plans are going to be studied and the implications for civil defense are profound.
5. No new cases have been reported. The most recent victims were the two members of the Alderson family of Gold Flume and Elmer Diez of Pickaxe.
6. Water tests of wells and the Aureole water supply continue negative; tests of air and of the water and ground around the Ute River, and of ground seepage, continue negative. All other findings have so far been negative. The Federal Government says there has been no testing of any kind for war or chemical products, past or present, in the mountains around the Ute or near its drainage system.

Ute Valley Prospector,
November 18, 1986

Mariani had left the meeting with a familiar sense of frustration which he hoped he had not shown. The picture was all too familiar: a sudden wave of illness, all alike, and no clues. There were many possibilities, but nothing exceptional was showing up in any of the samples he had taken. The
area was full of old mine tailings but there was no sign of their leaching any new substance into the river or the water supply. It was negative for abnormal biota, or particulates of any of the heavy metals. Yet 200 people had been affected. John Embry, the pastor, had taken him into their homes; some he had found standing staring unseeing out of windows; some were sitting in chairs, mute and motionless; some were in bed; but all of them were sunk in unbelievable, black depression. In cases where a whole family had been afflicted, neighbors or relatives had had to come in and care for all of them. Many of the older people had had to go to hospitals. There had been forty-seven suicide attempts among the 200 victims. No one could or would speak of what had happened. They sat and stared, their eyes holding despair like frozen mercury. He left the courthouse, took a turn around the block to clear his head, and went back to his temporary office in the Health Department to sit down to reports he had already seen.

"Atlanta's on the line for you," the secretary said. It was Doris Eppling of the Center for Disease Control. "It's about time," she said. "You're finally sending us valid water samples."

"What do you mean?" He didn't get on well with Doris. Her confrontational style made communication difficult for him. "Was there something wrong with what I sent you?"

Her voice was accusatory. "Your latest ones have just come in and they are normal Colorado river water."

"I don't understand."

"Your first eight groups—"

"Negative, you said so."

"Yes, negative, but I was surprised by the lack of sediment suspension. I went back and tested for purity. Ute River, my ass. Those samples were taken from an artesian system someplace, or the river that ran through Eden. The water was absolutely clear. No pollutants; none."

"Impossible."

"True."

"Give me the band and numbers." She did. "I'll check and get back to you."

The samples were his, his band and numbers, taken by him personally or in his presence, and they were taken at sites above and below the four towns and definitely from the Ute River. She had said the present samples were normal. It must have been a foul-up on the other end. He sent his validations to Doris in Atlanta and told her to look for a mix-up in her own lab. Was someone testing his neighbor's Perrier?

That evening in Gold Flume, he lay soaking in Bernard Krollick's hot tub. He had been there several times before. Krollick was an orthopedic surgeon who, at sixty, had left a high pressure practice in Boston to come to Gold Flume, where he now handled ski and summer injuries.

"I'm fascinated by this plague thing," Krollick said, "and by the work you guys do, tracing clues back. Is it a virus nourished in a snake's eye and vectored in a rat?"

Mariani chuckled. "Those wonderful insights come once in a lifetime. The usual job has no thrilling denouements like that."

"Want a drink?"

"No, I'm just right as I am. My mind has stopped circling on itself. Embry the minister, Seale, Bissel—we've gone over and over the possibilities until I'm tired of death of thinking about your plague."

"Bissel is O.K.,” Krollick said, "but I don't like Seale much. A cold fish. The pastor, John Embry, is a good man—generous, too; our congregation uses his church."

"Congregation?"

"Har Shalom. It's a small Jewish group, people from all the towns."

"I didn't think there were any Jewish people here."

"There are about twenty families from Pickaxe to Aureole but most of us are singles like me, divorced or starting over, and some young people."

"Interesting," Mariani said.

Krollick laughed. "Telling about the congregation is new for me. I'm sixty-five, of a generation that didn't talk about its Jewish life to outsiders. It was all very separate, very secret. To Endure Be Obscure was our motto. Things are different now, and I'm trying to change. Now they announce Jewish holidays on TV."

"How does it feel?"

"Still a little uncomfortable for me. I'm still self-conscious. Anyway, Embry is very good to us. He makes us feel like a part of the town."

"I like him, too. His Sunday School class helped me with some of the sampling."

"I know. I've been pumping him for information about the sampling and your methods. He called me an epidemiological groupie.”

Mariani laughed and lay back in the tub. The word took him. Krollick was a large man, muscular and commanding, with iron-gray hair. The word groupie suggested another person entirely, one pierced ear, green hair, shades, a necklace. “Groupie,” he said, and they laughed. But the word....

The next morning he was on the phone to Doris Eppling. “Could this be a chemical like LSD? Think of fugitive signs, nothing in the body after six hours, nothing in the water. It might even explain the cleaner sample you found. Covering their tracks, couldn't they have flooded the river with ordinary water hoping to wash out our test?”

Doris sighed on the other end of the line. “You don’t
really believe that, do you?"

"I guess not. I was brainstorming, letting go a little. Sometimes that helps."

"Whatever you do think, too much argues against that. First, look at the uniformity of response. With those drugs, you'd get a variety of responses, hallucinations, mania, depression, delusions... As for the clean samples, do you know how much water it would take in a river to produce samples like the ones you turned in? At least 10,000 gallons added no more than a hundred feet from where your samples were taken and the water would have to be added all at once. I don't think there's a pump or system in Ute County that could do that."

"The samples were mine, band and number."

"Well, we didn't screw up on this end; I checked. I guess you have two mysteries to solve."

The next day Mariani went to Embry's church where there was yet another meeting of concerned citizens. The people here were old-timers, ranch people who had lived along the Ute before Gold Flume and Pickaxe had had their recent transformations. Many of the sufferers were family or friends.

"You've got to stay till this is solved." Ev Rember said. He had been at many of the public meetings.

"We're scared you'll leave before we know," Mariani had to explain that there were government regs about the length of his stay when a case wasn't moving. There were other jobs to get to.

An older woman got up, one he hadn't seen before.

"I've been nursing these folks. It was in the fish."

"We thought that at first," Mariani said, "and it may be so, but all our tests have been negative."

"It was the fish," she persisted, "and there was something else. People say the fishing that day—those two days when this thing began, that the fishing was—special—specially good. I've talked to people who said that the fish had jumped into their boats, that they had flung themselves in or jumped, yes jumped onto their lines. They took those fish home and ate them and the next day got up like they are now, desperate and miserable and wanting to die."

Here and there in the audience, heads nodded in assent.

Mariani had heard the stories about the fishing. It was true that most of the victims had eaten river fish, but there had been nothing indicative in any of the fish taken later, or in freezer samples of fish caught at the time of the problem that pointed to their having been the cause. The woman went on.

"I talked to the Stopeses and they said the same thing. The Collettes, also. Maybe the fish were desperate themselves in some way; sick, too. Maybe how they acted was their suicide try. There was a chuckle from somewhere. "I know this sounds crazy—it's why I didn't go to the other meetings, but when you've heard the theories going around—communists, hippies, drug addicts—sick fish starts sounding pretty sane."

Mariani asked her name.

"I'm the public health nurse, Jean Heath." He had looked for her at the county meeting; perhaps some new information was coming from the patients; it might justify his staying another week or two. "The doctors have done blood tests, CAT scans, ultrasonor," Jean said, "and they've tried people on all kinds of tranquilizers, mood elevators, vitamins—"

"Has anything worked?" Mariani asked.

She looked at him steadily. "We're all friends here," she said. "I've been nursing in this county for thirty years, and I take a refresher certification every two years."

He shook his head slowly. "I won't laugh."

"O.K.," she said. "Cocoa works. Hot cocoa in a thick mug with marshmallows. The William Tell Over-ture works and so does the sound of a rocking chair. Hallowe'en worked very well. Many people were helped by eating Hallowe'en candy and seeing jack-o-lanterns in neighbors' windows. They were able to get up afterward and move around. Some of them recognized family and friends. They're not mentally ill. The mentally ill people I've nursed hated holidays. I think Thanksgiving and Christmas will do these people a lot of good. I think . . . ."

"What?"

"Snow. The first snowfall; the falling snow will work and the snow on the ground, and the sound of sleigh bells will work, too."

"It sounds a little . . . ."

"I know," she said, "but I don't mean that Cocoa in a thick mug cures anyone; it does make most of them talk for a while. Woodsmoke works. Woodsmoke makes all of them better for a while."

As he listened to Jean Heath, Mariani realized that she had purposely avoided the big meeting in Aureole. Seale, the psychiatrist, would have torn her apart. "Have you a clue as to what this is?"

"I know what it isn't. It isn't anything that attacks the brain or the central nervous system. This is acute depression, despair, but it isn't the same as the psychiatric kind."

"Then there's good and bad news," Mariani said. "The good news is that this was a single occurrence that may never be repeated. People are improving and will probably continue to improve. The bad news is that like most such occurrences, we may never know the causes and so we will have to live with uncertainty."

He said the same thing to Kroliek when he was back in the hot tub that evening. "I'll finish up the week and
then go. You know, don't you, that most of what I investigate is just like this, fugitive effects, idiopathic and unrepeatable. Think of that when you're wishing your work had more mystery in it. Bones don't disappear. Hand me that glass. I want to drink to September 14 and be done with it."

"Was that the day?"

"Yes, didn't you know?"

Krollick was silent for a long time. Then he said quietly, "It was a beautiful day. I remember it well."

"How come?"

"It was a Jewish holiday. I took off."

"One hour—"

"Jewish services go on and on," Krollick said. "We finished the morning service around one and then went down to the river."

Mariani felt the quickening of surprise and interest.

"Where?"

"Near here, the first bend past Gold Flume." Krollick was looking at him steadily.

"Why were you there?"

"It's a … it was a thing we did … do, an old custom, very old."

Mariani sensed Krollick's hesitation. "Tell me," he said.

"How good a man are you?" Krollick asked. "How decent are you? How lacking in hate?"

"What are you talking about?"

"I'm talking about a nightmare, about where we were and what people will think."

"What the hell is it?"

"We were at the river, all of us, this time, for Tashlich. We stood on the river bank with bread bits, day-old bread, and we did Tashlich."

"What's that?"

"It's a ceremony, a rite of casting away sins, and we said the two or three prayers and threw the bread into the water. It was a lovely day, mellow-warm. We were all conscious of the sweetness of the weather and there was a little breeze and I felt happy to take those wonderful timeworn prayers outside and offer them up in the turning trees and the noontime sky. We're modern Jews, pragmatic people, and we were shy about the ceremony, the primitive … casting away of sin. Some of us laughed a little and were self-conscious and that's why we didn't go to the bridge but to the bend in the river—private, we said, but not secret."

"You say this was the first time you did this—"

"It was the second time I did it. Some people have done it for two or three years now, but most of us weren't there before—this was the first time there was anything like the full congregation."

"What holiday was it?"

"Rosh Hashanah, the new year. Tashlich is a custom, though, not a law. And why we were doing it, why we had not done it before, is bound up in what I was telling you last time—about how it was and is—" "You mean about how you are freer, more open now?" Mariani knew a few Jewish people but little about their ceremonies.

"Yes. It suddenly seemed all right, almost natural to stand on a river bank wearing a shawl and do—without fear of accusation—"

"What accusation?"

"You don't know, do you?"

"No."

"I forget there are people who are not part of our nightmare. The accusation was that we poisoned the water."

Mariani began to laugh. "I've heard of Jewish guilt; by now it's a comic turn, but you don't seriously think your bread poisoned the river—"

"We have an old religion and a long history. Prayers are powerful. My medical mind says no, but with this happening—"

"And now you're not sure, that the accusations weren't true, that your people don't have the power, to affect nature with your guilt … "

"Sin. Nature is affected by other sins—by greed, by sloth … "

"The word is inaccurate and that's what's causing the confusion. The sins had already been committed. What you were riddling yourself of was the guilt, the shame for the sins."

"I'm so afraid someone will connect what he saw or half-saw, passing by, a bunch of us in prayer shawls throwing something in the water … "

"When did you start thinking about this?"

"When you told me about the fish—I'm afraid someone will start the nightmare again."

"Well, I won't blab. No one has so far. Why are you worried?"

"Maybe our souls affect nature. If not, why pray? If so, is there something other than electrochemical bonding and molecular reality at work in the world?"

"Let me put the question to you that the guilt of—how many?"

"About forty."

"That the guilt of forty people went into day-old bread and was thrown into a river whence it was eaten by fish which were caught downstream and eaten and sickened the eaters with the guilt's immense despair. At the same time, the aforesaid guilt in the aforesaid bread in the aforesaid river bonded with alluvial run-off, particulates, sediments, minerals, and effluents in suspension and created a compound dense enough to
clear the river for a time, to render it pure. I don't know what was in the river or in the fish. I don't know what happened high in the mountains, what chemistry caused this. I do know, and this is my, pardon the expression, cross to bear, that fugitive effects, sudden, unexplained changes in a very complex biochemistry and electrochemical matrix happen—. I told you before that people want answers they can't always have, chemical answers, which most of the time cannot be proved."

"We've been accused so often of so much. Growing up when I did and where I did, there were lies I heard—perhaps I came to believe, or half-believe some of them. I see now that it's why this lovely ceremony, standing together outside in the blue air and warm sunlight at the bend of the river—why we were uncomfortable. Would someone see us and remember, accuse... or do we really, with our well-known comedy-turn guilt, have the power our detractors say we have..."

"Did it happen in the Middle Ages?"

"No."

"Why not last year, or before this?"

Krolick had been sitting up, hunched forward in the tub. His posture looked strange to Mariani until Mariani realized he had never seen anyone in a hot tub tense and distracted. Krolick caught his look and made a conscious effort to lie back. The effect was disconcerting.

"Why not?" Mariani asked again. "Surely you've thought about it."

"The guilt was different. The people who originally did this ceremony knew much more than we do. They were completely familiar with all the words, and the proper formulae. They had only so much pain as their sins gave them. We have the additional weight of our ignorance, that we have to copy the words, learn the prayers, be unsure and blundering. Has something been left out? Was there some other prayer to say before or after, some part of the ceremony? The Jewish exile is a double exile that way, not only because we left Jerusalem in 37 A.D. but because we left ourselves somewhere, all those words, all that knowledge."

"I'm not a theologian," Mariani said. "I study what's catching. You'd be surprised how little is catching, how little gets through the body's nets and goalies. We all have TB bacilli in our blood and lungs. We get contaminants in food. Water carries 1,000 viruses; why not Despair and Remorse, too? Is it in a virus so small that not even the electron microscope sees it?"

Krolick laughed. "Algavirus Hebraicus."

"Name it for its density; remember, it also cleared your very dirty water."

"Gravovirus Hebraicus."

"If there ever is a microscope that can find it, what will you want to do with such a virus?"

"Get rid of it."

Mariani stretched and got up out of the tub, lifting himself with his arms. "That's what you were trying to do at the river, and if what I saw in 200 cases is what you people carry around inside you, I can only wonder how you function at all."

"It's bad enough sometimes, but the fish must have concentrated it." Krolick came out of the tub and they dried themselves. Mariani said, "Viruses are named after lots of things but the diseases they cause are named after the doctor. This is going to be Mariani's Malaise."

"What about Krolick's Complaint. Do you want a sandwich? I have some good cheese and there's beer—"
me a boot-top fracture any time. You people have
too many phantoms to fight. Now the talk is that the
same bunch who mutilated cattle on the range last
year were involved in this. Extraterrestrials. The
government—that’s you, buddy—is hushing it up.

Mariani smiled.

I figured no one was smart enough to tell you how
it all came out, so I will. Jean was right. Christmas
did it. Trees in the houses. It was amazing; people
got up just like that and walked into town to see the
lights. The church choir is full again and sounds no
better, but they’re all back, even the older ones who
had to be hospitalized. Jean was right about it not
being ordinary mental illness—there seem to be no
sequelae—not even convalescence.

But are they back to normal? Not quite. Embry
told me that Luke Brown (you remember, that
whole family was down) comes to church and prays
but refuses to speak God’s name at all. Ev Rember
stands up all during the service swaying back and
forth, witnessing, he calls it. The people who had
whatever it was are touchier, angrier, Embry says,
and more intense. They’re more quarrelsome but
also more aware. I told him it was probably the

pain they’ve all been through—He said the oddest
part of it was how vocal they all are about it. These
are folks whose families seldom heard a personal
feeling expressed by them from one year to the
next; now, you can’t shut them up. Their talking
about their experience has spread to other parts of
their lives, too. Last week there was a soapbox set
up in Bluebank and three of them made political
speeches extempore that went on for as long as forty-
five minutes. Ray Stopes has begun writing a bill of
particulars against God. He says, “The Lord has a
lot to answer for.” People are writing books—at
least ten of them are doing that. Four are writing
songs. So far there have been 166 lawsuits begun,
120 against the government—city, state, and federal;
32 against doctors; 14 against the local ministers as
spokesmen for the Almighty, would you believe that?

I’m urging you to keep silent about what I told
you. Everything that moves is getting sued. I won’t
leave Gold Flume, but neither will I tell another
soul that I recognize what those people are doing.
Embry says there was one other odd thing. Many of
them come to church now in cowboy clothes. He
has no idea. I do. The fringes; it’s the fringes.
1924

I was born in 1924: if I were a violin of the same age,
I wouldn't be one of the best. As a wine I'd be first-rate
or completely sour. As a dog I'd be dead. As a book
I'd be just getting valuable or already out-of-date.
As a forest I'd be young; as a machine, ridiculous.
But as a human being, I'm very tired.

I was born in 1924. When I think about mankind
I think only of those who were born the same year as I,
whose mothers lay in labor with mine,
in hospitals, unlit rooms, wherever.

Today, on my birthday, I'd like to say
a blessing over you,
you whose lives are weighed down by hopes and disappointments,
whose deeds grow less, and whose gods
more numerous—
you are all brothers of my hope, friends of my despair.

May you find lasting peace,
the living in their lives, the dead
in being dead.

And whoever remembers his childhood best,
he's the winner,

if there are any winners.

My Mother Comes from the Days

My mother comes from the days when they painted
fruit in a silver bowl and didn't ask for more.
People moved through their lives
like ships, with the wind or against it, and held
to their course.

I ask myself which is better:
a person who dies old or one who dies young?
As if I'd asked which is better,
a pound of feathers or a pound of iron.

I want feathers, feathers, feathers.

REPORT FROM THE GAY MOVEMENT

For Love And For Life, We’re Not Going Back

Jyl Lynn Felman

This is the first in a series of reports from various movements.

In reading about the October 11, 1987 National March on Washington for Lesbian and Gay Rights, you may have noticed that coverage of the march is predominantly AIDS coverage. It appeared that we came to Washington motivated “only” by the loss of colleagues. In death, then, our movement is finally accessible to straight people and ultimately newsworthy. Any celebration of gay culture and the diversity within the movement is absent from the papers. Our platform was never made public but our grief is reported everywhere as the grief of a movement dying a slow death. So even though we are made visible in our dying, our deaths are trivialized and depoliticized. Our lives remain hidden, unreported, and our culture denied. For gay men and lesbians this is the call to action from Washington: to defy a definition based on death.

In taking our platform to the nation’s capital, we challenged the heterosexual community to make our cause their cause. We asked for passage of a congressional lesbian and gay rights bill, including a presidential order banning anti-gay discrimination by the federal government. We demanded an end to discrimination against people with all forms of AIDS, massive funding to support education, research, and patient care, and the repeal of all laws that make sodomy between consenting adults a crime (laws that invade the privacy of both heterosexual and homosexual households). Our relationships must be legally recognized. We demanded the right to control our own bodies and reproductive freedom, and we called for an end to sexism, racism, and South African apartheid.

Our issues begin in the particular but end in the universal. Our demands are inclusive rather than exclusive. We put forth not only a gay liberation platform, but a liberating platform. We do not fear that coalition politics will discredit our movement as others fear that we will discredit them. On the contrary, central to gay liberation is the liberation of all people, everywhere, from any form of discrimination prohibiting each of us from being fully alive. In Washington, we not only challenged compulsory heterosexuality, we challenged the effects of rigidly defining and limiting human potential. The call to action to the straight community is not to join us in death, but to join us in life.

The National Park Services gave 200,000 as the final count, while march organizers said the total was over 650,000. What is significant about under-reporting large numbers of gay people marching in Washington, D. C.? The fact is that even when we’re out, (marching over half a million on the nation’s capital) we’re not out. And being made invisible, nationally, even when we are visible is politically significant and profoundly homophobic.

Cesar Chavez and the Farm Workers of America, Jesse Jackson with the Rainbow Coalition, Eleanor Smeal and NOW, Disability Rights and Central American Peace activists, Labor Solidarity, and New Jewish Agenda were among those who marched in Washington for the right to choose a loving partner free from governmental interference. We need to ask what makes their presence at a national gay rights march important? In the past, most civil rights groups felt that supporting gay rights was supporting a liability. The “real” issues would become diluted, less politically sound, and even more suspect if gay rights were included in the agenda.

For instance, NOW spent a good ten years overcoming the fear in the minds of their supporters, liberals and conservatives alike, that women’s rights also meant rights for lesbians. Rather than build coalitions around common concerns, NOW worked hard to separate itself from gay liberation. So the presence of thousands of NOW supporters, including Eleanor Smeal addressing the crowd, signals an end to the old, homophobic fears that the support of gays and lesbians will lose votes, dilute issues, and offend NOW members.

The Disability Rights movement was also long afraid to associate itself with gay causes, fearing that homosexuality was just the kind of disability that would discredit it and keep federal funds at a distance. It was far too risky to add gay rights to its platforms, especially when refuting the erroneous assumption among able-bodied supporters that being disabled and being asexual were synonymous. Large numbers of the disabled community at a national gay rights march signal a dramatic change in our definition of civil rights. And the fact that union organizers went home from the march to fight for an end to discrimination based on sexual orientation in the workplace and protection for employees with AIDS implies a radical shift in our understanding of workers’ rights.

The same analysis can be made for each of the various special interest groups at the March: finally, the left is waking up and revising its own homophobic understanding of sexual politics. From the Washington March we learn that the right to private control over our lives is both a heterosexual and a homosexual right, and being gay is not just about who we sleep with. So the presence of other groups is a major turning point in our acceptance of what is politically sound and safe to fight for. After Washington it is clear
that the exclusion of gay rights from any civil rights platform ultimately invalidates the platform itself.

The March was not just another parade filled with balloons and pastel colored streamers. Every state in the union was represented, including Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico. The state of Tennessee alone had twelve bus loads of supporters. Out of rigid, academic closets, from institutions known for perpetuating conservative views and censoring dissent, students and faculty—many for the first time—stood together from the likes of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. And PFLAG—Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays—marched in a group ten blocks long. Groups usually not associated with gay rights marched: Presbyterian Friends, Lutherans Concerned, Veterans from Korea, World War II, Lebanon and Vietnam, and elected officials. This was the largest, most broad-based coalition to come to Washington in twenty years. It was grass roots strategy on a grand scale and the mechanism for social change working at its best. We came to Washington for six days of political strategizing, lobbying, mourning, and celebration of gay culture. Beginning Thursday, over eighty-three senators and one hundred congresspeople were visited. A mass wedding was held at the steps of the IRS building to protest unequal tax treatment of gay couples. Six-hundred affirming couples participated in this publicly defiant ceremony.

Meeting for the first time nationally, the People of Color Caucus held all day workshops to discuss racism in the gay community, and homophobia and AIDS in the black community. The fact that people of color were part of the whole and were still able to meet with each other, separate from the whole, is politically significant and a model for the left.

A Sunday morning kick-off rally with black poet Pat Parker, singing by the Lavender Lights Gospel Choir, and an opening Native American ceremony clearing the air and ground, was yet another example of gay coalition politics at work. Our movement is not monocultural—this doesn’t mean the kind of tokenism in which a white stage is shared with one or two black performers, but the opening of our stages to total diversity.

Throughout Shabbat, various services were held, including a public Torah reading by Bet Mishpachah, a gay D.C. shul. New Jewish Agenda hosted a Havdalah service with six hundred gay Jews and friends crowded into one small room to welcome in the new week. While individual Agenda chapters support local gay rights groups, this was the first time, that a national heterosexual Jewish organization sponsored a national event for gay Jews. The fact that Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, secular, atheist, cultural, leftist, Zionist, and anti-Zionist Jews celebrated together is an example worth emulating by the Jewish left and the Jewish community as a whole.

Saturday night, in front of a standing room only crowd, three hundred musicians of the Lesbian and Gay Bands of America performed at Constitution Hall. On Monday the first meeting of a national Gay Congress occurred. Finally, on Tuesday six hundred non-violent demonstrators, protesting the 1986 Hardwick decision that allowed for the criminalization of sodomy between consenting adults, were arrested at the Supreme Court by police wearing plastic gloves. Five thousand supporters stood in solidarity. No, this was not just another Mardi Gras with beautiful floats and firecrackers. Out and outraged, fighting for our lives, we came to Washington.

Sunday morning—before the absolute high of the afternoon march and after three days of lobbying, strategizing, and networking—we rise at dawn to remember our brothers, fathers, lovers, uncles; our mothers, sisters, aunts; and all the children. We bury our dead and we are not afraid. Standing next to each other we do not wear plastic gloves or face masks. But we hold hands, holding each other the way the world refuses to hold us. We mourn those who refuse to mourn. We are not ashamed.

In the nation’s capital we sit shiva standing at the foot of each side of the quilt. As 2,000 names are read, one after the other into the complete silence of thousands, I know I stand before the most beautiful talis, the most sacred prayer shawl that I will ever be privileged to see. There is nothing casual about our grief; the quilt heals the living and honors the dead. The quilt is the nation’s largest community arts project—a name on each panel, and sewn, individually designed—and the only national monument honoring, calling by name, remembering the men, women, and children who have died of AIDS. Yes, absolutely, we mourn our dead; and in public. We will not be ashamed.

In leaving the nation’s capital we bring the movement home to the local level, to the schools, the doctors’ offices, the neighborhoods, our families. Our leadership is strengthened and new networks set up. But our strategy remains grass roots and coalition oriented. For every time a gay man or lesbian takes the risk, opens the closet door and embraces a lover in public the world begins to heal. And every time a straight person becomes an ally, the sacred task of repairing and transforming the world is set in motion.

The title for this piece is taken from the National March on Washington's theme, printed on all march publications.
BOOK REVIEW

Capitalism and Democracy

Barry Schwartz


I

What is the relation between capitalism and democracy?

As questions go, this one may seem like a nonstarter. Capitalism just is democracy, applied to the economic sphere of life rather than the political. We hold this truth to be self-evident. Milton Friedman does. Ronald Reagan does. And so do all of Ronald Reagan's political opponents who are even remotely electable to public office. We say, "It's a free country" to justify our decisions about voting. We also say it to justify what we wear, what we eat, where we live, what work we do, what stocks we buy, who we buy from and sell to. Democracy, to most of us, means freedom of choice, and no institution better embodies our freedom of choice than the capitalist marketplace. When we contrast our society with those of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it is the colorlessness of their clothes, cars, and food, as much as their politics, that we find so appalling.

Like so many of the things we think we're sure of, this apparent relation between capitalism and democracy is not what it seems. It is certainly logically possible to have one without the other. On the one hand, democratic socialism remains the utopian dream of many an intellectual. On the other, authoritarian or totalitarian capitalism has been the very real nightmare of millions of peasants living throughout the third world. So the relation between capitalism and democracy should not be taken for granted.

The Capitalist Revolution by the sociologist Peter Berger and Democracy and Capitalism by economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis are both attempts to analyze the relation between capitalism and democracy. Although both books are concerned with the same issues and presumably are examining the same social, economic, and political phenomena, they come to radically different conclusions. Berger concludes that a capitalist economy is necessary for a political democracy, and that capitalism plays a crucial causal role in fostering and preserving democratic political institutions. Bowles and Gintis conclude that capitalism and democracy are in conflict, and that the price for preserving capitalism as we know it may well be extracted in the currency of democratic participation. These different conclusions are partly the result of powerful effects of distortions that occur when a dynamic historical process is frozen into a pristine but static image. A stopped watch tells the right time twice a day. If you check the watch at just the right moment, it seems to be working fine. Berger caught the old watch at just the right moment, then looked away. Bowles and Gintis kept looking when the moment passed.

II

Berger argues that ordinary, prosaic capitalism has been transformative and revolutionary. Even understood narrowly, as an economic system in which enterprising individuals or groups produce for a market with the purpose of making a profit, capitalism has played the decisive role in transforming modes of production, notions of private property, and individual preferences and motives. It is to capitalism that the "rational calculation of self-interest" owes its current exalted status as the most central and most natural of all human activities. Understood more broadly, as a culture within which an economic system is embedded, the significance of capitalism is still more profound: It has exerted its influence on our social, political, and cultural life, as well as on our economic life.

The Capitalist Revolution offers a set of fifty propositions about the relation between prosperity, equality, and liberty, along with a discussion of the empirical evidence that supports the propositions. The bottom line of the book is that most of what we find good about modern American society owes itself in no small measure to capitalism, while much of what we find unfortunate is not peculiar to capitalism and may even be to some extent ameliorated by it. This book, in a word, constitutes something like "two and a half cheers for capitalism."

The first cheer for capitalism comes from an assessment of its contribution to material life. Berger's proposition here is simple and, I think, incontrovertible: "Industrial capitalism has generated the greatest productive power in human history. To date, no other socioeconomic system has been able to generate comparable productive power." Although its beginnings extracted considerable human costs—probably material and certainly cultural—it has ended up generating the highest standard of living for the masses of people in human history. And it is capitalism itself, not the peculiar agglomeration of religious and cultural elements that characterized Western Europe when capitalism began, that is responsible for this great material success. Production for profitable market exchange provides the best possible conditions for ongoing technological development, continued increases in efficiency, and sustained growth in productivity. This proposition is confirmed by the development of industrial capitalism in East Asia over the last century. Although they had none of the cultural baggage of the
more effective is political action that is mediated by nongovernmental institutions that have and sustain a life of their own. Families, tribes, villages, labor unions, chambers of commerce, religious groups, universities, and the like provide the needed mediating structures or mediating institutions between individuals and the state. Berger has done seminal work on the character and importance of mediating institutions in the past (to wit, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy with Richard Neuhaus, 1977). His suggestion in the present book is that the market and the firms that participate in it are essential mediating institutions. Indeed, in the modern world, the market and the firm may be the most powerful mediating institutions we have. Hence Berger’s claim that capitalism is necessary for democracy, his second rousing cheer.

The final cheer for capitalism comes from an assessment of its effect on social and cultural life and institutions. This cheer is not unequivocal. Berger’s discussion focuses on social mobility and stratification on the one hand and individualism on the other. The record on social mobility is a good one for capitalism. Berger tells us that no known society exists or has existed that has not ranked its members in some way. Furthermore, rank has always conferred privilege or power. The critical question one might ask about systems for ranking people concerns how rigid and all-encompassing the rankings are. According to Berger, under capitalism there has been an unprecedented potential for social mobility—for movement between ranks. Berger carefully points out that increased social mobility is characteristic of all forms of industrialization, not just capitalism. Nevertheless, capitalism is first among equals, “most likely to maintain openness in the stratification system of a society.”

This brings us to the down side of capitalism and culture, its relation to individualism, or what Berger calls “individual autonomy.” The United States is the pinnacle of individualist culture. Our individual autonomy, protected by a host of legal and political institutions, extends to almost all domains of life. As Berger points out, whether individualism is a good thing is itself controversial. “Today the proponents of capitalism almost always refer to its alleged linkage with individual liberty ... precisely in the sense of allowing and fostering the free unfolding of the individual person. On the other side, critics of capitalism routinely blame it for the alleged excesses of ‘rampant individualism,’ for selfishness and personal greed, and for the disintegration of community.” And the critics are by no means all wild-eyed leftists. Concern about the disintegration of community and social responsibility is at least as much a cry of the right, including the religious right, as it is of the left. So is individualism a triumph or a disaster?

Berger’s answer is that individualism is both. It is a triumph because it is liberating. It frees the individual from having to walk the narrow, rutted path of his or her ancestors. It opens the way for innovation—social, cultural, and technological. It is destructive of tradition, but not mindlessly so. It destroys the old by creating something new to replace it. But individualism can go too far. There is no guarantee that the mediating structures and institutions that are so important to the preservation of democracy will continue to sustain themselves if no one takes the time and trouble to look after them. And individualism seems to make people less and less inclined to take the time and trouble. In part, the problem is that each of us decides to let someone else do the communal work while we continue to derive the personal benefits. But the problem is also that as individuals exercise their freedom in ever more diverse ways, they find themselves less and less able to fit into any existing communal group.

It is possible to pin some of the responsibility for individualism on modernity in general rather than on capitalism in particular, and Berger tries to do this. Yet capitalism seems to bear a special, intimate relation to individualism. As pointed out by sociologist Georg Simmel, the money economy “frees the individual from the bondage of concrete allegiances.” Capitalism allows individuals to purchase not just commodities, but status, power, and social position. “Money, with its great power of abstraction, makes it possible to convert all socially relevant phenomena ... into units of specific monetary worth.” There can be no more fluid ticket of admission to one or another social group than money,
so that the more money allows one to buy, the more one can be a free agent, with only short-term allegiance, at best, to particular social institutions. If all assets—even social ones—are convertible into cash, people can flit from group to group without leaving anything of value behind.

What may be a decisive test of the relation between capitalism and corrosive individualism is now slowly unfolding. It concerns the phenomenon of East Asian capitalism, especially in Japan. Japan has less of the West’s general individualist ideological baggage, and even its capitalism has been remarkably collectivist. Can it avoid individualism? Berger thinks not. “The societies of East Asia have succeeded for a considerable time in modernizing under capitalist conditions without undergoing indviduation along Western lines. [However,] the values of individual autonomy are undermining East Asian communalism and are likely to continue doing so.”

By Berger’s account, we now face a capitalism-nourished individualism that threatens to destroy our sense of community. Relations between people are becoming increasingly contractual, and the contract “spells our rights and obligations in a precise and exclusive manner. This stands out in sharp distinction from the imprecise, diffuse networks of rights and obligations that characterize most if not all pre-modern societies. The capitalist market, of course, could not exist without a mature development of contract law. But there is a carry-over from the market to all other human relations.” This contractualism, breeding as it does a cold, calculating, purely instrumental view of other people, does not bode well for the family, the church, local clubs and groups, and other mediating institutions that give some warmth to life. And as we have seen, threats to these mediating institutions are also threats to democracy. Indeed, in the long run, they are even threats to capitalism. Berger himself puts it this way: “Progressive anarchism, with each individual out ‘on the make’ by and for himself, undermines capitalism, because it deprives it of the fabric of trust and value without which it cannot function effectively.” Berger is exactly right here, but he underestimates how much the negative effect of capitalism is slowly but inexorably undermining the positive ones.

Somewhat, he fails to see that capitalism is now a stopped watch, and that two and a half cheers are just not enough.

The failure of Berger’s vision may derive from his seriously misplaced confidence in the ability of the firm and the market to replace the mediating institutions which capitalist individualism destroys. To serve the end of promoting democratic participation, not just any institution will do. This point is clearly made by Harry Boyte and Sara Evans in their discussion of the importance of voluntary associations as sources of democratic change (see their articles in Tikkun, Vol. I, No. 1, and Vol. II, No. 3, and the book Free Spaces, Harper & Row, 1986). The critical features of such institutions are their rootedness in the community, their independent, voluntary nature, and “their public or quasi-public character as participatory environments which nurture values associated with citizenship and a broader vision of the common good.” It doesn’t take a cynic to understand that the firm and the market are the last places to look for a vision of and concern for the common good. Individuals in the market don’t care a whit for the common good, nor are they “supposed” to. The whole point of the market is that it allegedly makes concern for the common good unnecessary. As economist Charles Schultze put it, “market-like arrangements reduce the need for compassion, patriotism, brotherly love, and cultural solidarity.” And leaving aside so noble an idea as the common good, nowadays, individuals don’t even care about the welfare of the firm that employs them. They will, and do, sell the long-term interests of their company down the river in exchange for short-term benefits to themselves. How does this behavior promote true democratic participation?

In voluntary associations of the sort that really do promote democracy, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. As Boyte and Evans see it, “The strength of such groups, from a democratic perspective, is that they have an independent existence and reality different from personal relations on the one hand, or large and impersonal relations on the other. The stuff of authentic ‘politics’ involves conflict, argument and debate.... Indeed, it is often through a clash of opinion in the context of certain shared and overarching aims, that a generalized and authentically democratic appreciation of the common good emerges.” The Black churches of the American South and the Catholic based communities throughout Latin America have served perfectly the role of mediating institutions by providing spaces for open discourse and by being responsive to local concerns. In contrast, the official Catholic church hierarchy, closed to debate except among the elite, has not played this role and has become so large and impersonal that it has lost touch with the concerns of its members.

By regarding the market and the firm as potential mediating institutions, Berger implicitly takes the view that mediating institutions in general are really nothing but interest groups, single-issue lobbies out for themselves without concern for the common good. In other words, he makes the narrow, self-interested, profit-seeking character of the firm the model for all social institutions, in practice if not in theory. While it is true that interest groups restrain the power of government, they do so by introducing conflict and competition for pieces of the economic pie controlled by government. Not every such interest group can get everything it wants, but the lesson of the market is that no self-respecting interest group should ever stop angling for all it can get. Self-restraint is a game for suckers. The result is that government is pulled simultaneously in dozens of incompatible directions; interest-group politics substitutes government ineffectuality for government autocracy. With mediating institutions like these, we are all Robinson Crusoes.

III

Economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis see what Peter Berger does not. Their book Democracy and Capitalism is a persuasive argument that the actual relation between democracy and capitalism is one of constant tension and conflict rather than compatibility and support. This conflict is opaque to most observers because several centuries of social and political philosophy have seduced us into viewing the world through lenses that make the obvious almost impossible to see. And yet, the conflict grows so acute that the future may require us to choose between democracy and capitalism.
A mericans have grown up steeped in a liberal individualism that distinguishes between the public and the private spheres of life. The focus of the public sphere is the state, and the matters of political power, right, and responsibility that go with it. Essentially, everything else is private. Importantly, within the liberal tradition, democratic principles only apply in domains that are public. That is, rational adults elect state leaders. In other domains of life, like the family, the church, or the workplace—domains that are private—principles of democracy are irrelevant. Thus, there is no conflict between capitalism and democracy because their principles apply in different and nonoverlapping domains. In effect, conflicts between capitalism and democracy are eliminated by definition.

If you don’t rule out conflicts by definition, you get them. Consider property. Private property is the sine qua non of capitalism. People have the right, within broad limits, to do what they want with their property. So why is it that I am not allowed to exclude you from my restaurant because you’re Black, or a woman? Why can’t I refuse to hire you, or refuse to pay you as much as I pay others doing similar work, because of your race, sex, or religion? The answer is that much, if not all, private property has a public aspect. Society decides to what extent principles of democracy should apply to the domain of private property. Much of the civil rights movement in this country, as well as the women’s movement, can be seen in fact as a struggle to extend principles of democracy from the domain of the state to the domain of private property.

Instead of liberalism’s artificial dichotomy of public and private, Bowles and Gintis offer a vision of social life as divided into spheres—the economic, the political, the cultural. The novelty is that each sphere of life has its own economic, political, and cultural aspects. Seen in this light, all spheres of life become contested terrain, battles between principles of democracy and principles of ownership. While this has always existed, due to the simultaneous expansion both of rights and of markets, the conflict between democracy and ownership has grown especially acute during the last few decades. The language of liberal democracy has increasingly invaded the firm, the school, and even the family, slowly changing the norms of appropriate conduct in these domains. At the same time, “the capitalist firm’s ongoing search for profits progressively encroaches upon all spheres of social activity, leaving few realms of life untouched by the imperatives of accumulation and the market.”

That liberal has effectively walled off considerations of democratic rights from considerations of ownership and that the wall is now crumbling is the heart of the Bowles and Gintis book. They discuss at length how economists and social theorists from both the left and the right have lacked this insight and, as a result, have misdiagnosed the problems society faces and have misprescribed solutions. Neoclassical economists have traditionally viewed economics as divorced from politics and questions of power. The myth of the market is that it is anonymous, impersonal, and apolitical. You sell to anyone for the right price and you buy from anyone for the right price. People who misuse the market by excluding segments of the population from the workforce or the customer pool or by withholding sound investments for nonbusiness reasons will be driven out of business by competitors who will hire anyone qualified, sell to anyone who can pay, and invest in anything that seems profitable. The only “power” that is displayed in the market is the power of economic rationality: efficient production, comparative advantage, and inventive opportunism. The language of rights and control has no place.

So goes the traditional view of the market economy. It is false, and not just because actual markets are only approximations of the perfectly competitive abstractions that economists talk about. Bowles and Gintis show that this view of the market is false for deep reasons that “perfect competition” won’t change. The heart of the problem is that while economists view the labor-wage exchange between worker and boss as they would any other commodity exchange, it is not. Labor cannot be alienated from the laborer. You don’t hire work, you hire workers. And to extract work from the worker, the boss must be able to exert control. When you buy a stereo, you know what you’re getting. When you “buy” a worker, what you get is very much up in the air.

What this means is that in addition to the cost of the wage itself, the boss must absorb the cost of enforcing the wage bargain. This may mean paying overseers or supervisors. It may mean offering incentives for productivity. It may mean being able to threaten serious sanctions for slacking off. What is clear, however, is that the more power the boss has over the worker, the more he/she will be able to get his or her money’s worth on the job.

The costs of enforcing the wage bargain are substantial. The way that cost can be reduced is found in how the state enforces its laws. The costs of enforcement go down as the perceived legitimacy of the state and its laws goes up. In a participatory democracy, most citizens perceive themselves as having some responsibility for the rules that are promulgated and some stake in the success of the government. After all, the people who pass and enforce the laws are ultimately responsible to the citizens who elect them and pay their salaries. As a result, most laws are largely self-enforcing. In an autocratic state, the costs of enforcement are enormous. Rules have no perceived legitimacy, and anyone will do whatever he/she thinks s/he can get away with.

The lesson is clear. The capitalist can reduce enforcement costs by making his or her operation less autocratic and more participatory. S/he can give workers a voice in decision-making, make their work interesting and fulfilling so that they can identify proudly with the company, and perhaps even give them a financial stake in the operation. And the evidence is that democratization of the workplace does increase efficiency as well as worker satisfaction. The lower enforcement costs and higher efficiency that come with democratized and meaningful work would lead an economist to expect that, over time, democratized firms would drive autocratic ones out of existence. If one company makes things cheaper and better than its competitors, the competition either changes or goes under.

This hasn’t happened. Indeed, there is little evidence that worker participation projects are anything but a mild perturbation on an otherwise smooth sea of autocracy. Why aren’t worker-controlled firms taking over the market? Bowles and Gintis discuss several reasons why workplace democratization is not yet having the impact that,
on grounds of economic efficiency, it should. The one I focus on here can be traced to the difference between hiring work and hiring workers. Suppose you are about to set up a plant and establish jobs that are engaging, require substantial training and skill, and pay well. You hire workers and spend several months, and many thousands of dollars, training them. In effect, you use your capital to invest in education and training instead of in the plant and high-tech equipment. Who now owns that investment? Not you. If you fire the workers that you trained, or if they quit, they take the investment with them. The more time you spend training people, the greater your stake in keeping them and the greater their leverage in situations of conflict. While your firm may become more productive and efficient than the competition, you will not be in a position to insure that you, and not your workers, will enjoy the proceeds of that increased productivity. Furthermore, it is always possible that your skilled workers will blackmail you into paying them wages that are so high that any potential efficiency advantage is lost. Because you don’t own workers and thus can’t completely control their behavior, it seems prudent to invest in machines and keep jobs as menial as possible.

The “deskilling” phenomenon occurring within the American labor force has become an issue of widespread concern as America becomes increasingly a third-world-style economic nation, exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods. It’s a phenomenon that no one wants but about which nothing can be done as long as the liberal split is maintained between the public and the private, with matters of property firmly located in the private domain. Understandably, Bowles and Gintis would bring at least some aspects of property into the public domain. They argue that any exercise of power that has significant social consequences should be seen as public, whether that power is exercised by the state, by the economy, or even by the church or the household. And if it is seen as public, then principles of democratic decision making apply. There is no question that economic developments have significant social consequences. What follows from this is that the behavior of private firms should be the product of public decision making.

IV

In the portrait of human nature painted by liberalism, people are “choosers,” acting in private (the market, the bedroom) or in public (the voting booth) to satisfy their preferences. What this portrait leaves out, Bowles and Gintis tell us, is any account of where preferences originate. Liberalism (and neoclassical economics) treats preferences as “exogenous,” outside the system, given. There is no accounting for tastes; liberalism merely supplies the rules for the exercise of free choice in satisfying whatever those tastes are. People are what they are, human nature is what it is, and liberalism simply sees to it that people are as free as possible to exercise their natures.

Bowles and Gintis argue that the notion of exogenous preferences just won’t do. “Liberalism claims that the marketplace and the ballot box allow people to get what they want. But liberalism is silent on how people might get to be what they want to be, and how they might get to want what they want to want.” Preferences come from somewhere; tastes are formed by something. People are what they are in part as a result of the conditions they encounter in their lives. The critical insight here is that economies do not just make things; they also make people. The cauldron of liberalism and capitalism permits not just the exercise but the formation of the will.

The reason this is so important is that the character of both an economy and a state will depend in part upon the character of its participants. An economy that encourages the pursuit of self-interest as a matter of right or even of obligation is prevented from becoming a bazaar of deceitful, backstabbing monsters only by the moral commitments that people bring with them to the marketplace. A democracy that offers individuals little opportunity for genuine participation is prevented from becoming a collection of automatons marching periodically to the polls to record their affection for “communicators” only by the commitment people have to behaving as responsible citizens. If we could count on moral commitment and political responsibility, democracy and capitalism might coexist in the way that Berger suggests. But the very features of the human character on which liberal democracy depends cannot be taken for granted. On the contrary, the political and economic system extolled by Berger actively erodes that character.

In the modern, liberal, capitalist state, the expression of will is restricted to the choice of a preestablished slate of candidates, either in the market or in the voting booth. The alternative to choosing from a given selection of candidates or of goods is taking an active part in the shaping of that selection. Such participatory activity is what Albert Hirschman calls “voice” (see his Exit, Voice and Loyalty). Giving voice in a large and complex society typically requires some form of group membership, some form of gemeinschaft, the “mediating institutions” previously mentioned, which market capitalism destroys. It is a great irony that those for whom mediating institutions like the family, the church, and the small-town community are most important are capitalism’s most ardent defenders.

The mistake made by those who, like Berger, defend capitalism in part by crediting it with extending social interaction across previously impregnable barriers, increasing social mobility, and destroying autocratic, parochial domination, is their failure to appreciate that the effects of their capitalism are dynamic. Capitalism grinds away at social structures that are rigid, unjust, and oppressive, but when it gets to social structures that are flexible, fair, and liberating, it doesn’t stop grinding, it just keeps on going and presumably will continue until social structures are simply gone. By photographing capitalism at one moment in its history, and staring at the photograph, one misses the important point that capitalism is not a still life, it’s a movie.

The reason that the social decay we are experiencing has not been more noticeable to us is that markets reduce the costs to individuals of not participating actively in politics. As long as we have the cash, we can buy the ends we desire as individuals instead of campaigning, organizing, and arguing for them as groups. We can spend money on private schools and safe neighborhoods. It is this very lack of the need for group organization and coordination that champions of the market applaud. And as public commitment
as loneliness than as freedom."

In *Spheres of Justice*, Michael Walzer argues that different principles of justice apply within different spheres of life. Serious problems of injustice and inequity arise when the differentiation of spheres starts to break down, and success in one sphere is necessary for success in all the others. In such a situation, one good becomes dominant, and the people who control it control everything. Pascal described such a situation as tyranny.

Our society is fast becoming tyrannical, with money (property) as the dominant good. Money buys social position, housing, education, health care, good looks, and political power. When we see this in its extreme form, we recoil. Walzer describes the example of Pullman, Illinois, a company town literally owned —lock, stock, and barrel—by the Pullman Company. Mr. Pullman assumed that property rights applied in his town, just as they did in his factory. So just as he told its residents, all company employees, what to do in his factory, he also told them how to live in his town. They weren’t required to live there, and he was a reasonably benevolent fellow, but, nevertheless, it seemed and was later judged in court to be wrong for anyone to "own" a town. The town we all live in is becoming increasingly similar to Pullman.

V

How then do we go about preserving and protecting democracy from its corrosive contact with capitalism? Must we engage in the wholesale destruction of the state and the market as we know them? Bowles and Gintis think not. What is required is not one big struggle, but lots of small ones. Personal rights are to be preserved; they are not the mere bourgeois ideology perceived by Marxism. Property rights in some form are also to be preserved. For many years the mutual existence of personal and property rights seemed harmonious—even synergistic, as long as their discrete domains of application were preserved. But pressure to enlarge the sphere of personal rights has created conflicts. The way to resolve the conflicts, according to Bowles and Gintis, is to increase the scope of personal rights still further. If we increase the range of permissible participation by workers in the workplace, by children in the school, by women and children in the family, we will foster the kind of human nature that will make for active participation in the state. Neither the corporation nor the state will be allowed to become autocratic.

There is nothing especially revolutionary in this proposal. As Bowles and Gintis point out, it is in many ways business as usual. Determining the scope of application of a set of principles is what social life is all about. The market is the place for exchanges of private property. But there are plenty of constraints on what can be exchanged, under what conditions. People can’t sell themselves into slavery, nor can they sell their children. Car salesmen can’t sell unsafe cars at a discount. Doctors and lawyers can’t give bad service at bargain prices. Workers can be fired from their jobs, but they can’t be beaten or imprisoned. What Bowles and Gintis are urging is that the different spheres of social life as we know them be preserved, but that principles of democracy and participation nudge principles of hierarchy and ownership wherever possible.

How does this extension of principles of democracy work to preserve mediating institutions and broader participation? First, since people’s attitudes toward their work and their willingness to do it with care and energy depend on how work is organized, how rewards are distributed, and how authority is distributed, and how people are treated by their colleagues and supervisors, being treated as a responsible, participating agent on the job can be expected to contribute to the formation of character. Second, breaking down hierarchy, either in access to decisions or in access to goods, is a way of strengthening communal ties. As Walzer notes, "communal provision is important because it teaches us the value of membership. If we did not provide for one another, if we recognized no distinctions between members and strangers, we would have no reason to form and maintain political communities."

In the short run, the recommendations of Bowles and Gintis can be effective. The extension of personal rights can invigorate mediating institutions and strengthen democracy or at least protect it from being further weakened by corrosive market capital-

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ism. But in the long run, the emphasis on personal rights feeds directly into the liberal individualism that Bowles and Gintis see as the philosophical core of our current social difficulties. In viewing the strategy of redressing the imbalance of rights as a general solution to the problem of conflict between democracy and capitalism, Bowles and Gintis are guilty of the same kind of shortsightedness as Berger. If we imagine the sort of extension of personal rights they propose and look a few years into the future, what we will see is a collection of individuals, all guarding their personal rights as they deal with the market and the state. Mediating institutions will have vanished. They will have vanished because while they play a critical role in helping to protect personal rights, the pursuit of personal rights does nothing in itself to protect them. What is missing is a notion of obligation or responsibility to the group that counterbalances or restrains the pursuit of personal rights.

In the short term, while individuals are grateful to their local institutions for helping them win difficult battles for autonomy and respect, the individuals will stay loyal to the institutions. But in the long term, as autonomy becomes commonplace, the importance of the institutions will be forgotten. So as the dynamic process of securing personal rights proceeds, the solution will become part of the problem.

Emphasis on individual rights has its times and places. It was critical in Western Europe and the colonies when people were trying to break the rigid social bonds of feudalism. But for us, those times are now past, and the appeal to individual rights must be balanced by an appeal to communal obligation and responsibility. Progressives have typically been suspicious of such appeals, regarding them as veiled attempts to keep power in the hands of established minority groups and out of the hands of the masses. And it should be said that such suspicions are not unwarranted. However, what is most sorely needed now is an appeal to communal obligation that will keep mediating institutions strong enough to survive. Otherwise, isolated individuals will be pitted against states and markets that grow ever larger and less responsive to human concerns. The problem we all face is how to keep mediating institutions strong without making them completely inflexible.

There is reason to believe—and to hope—that Americans who have always regarded themselves as progressive now understand how important it is to preserve the mediating institutions that have played a formative role in their own lives. People to whom tradition, and especially traditional institutions, were always anathema have come to see how empty it is to try and go it alone, and how difficult it is to create "instant institutions" whenever a need for organized action arises.

BOOK REVIEW

Jewish Education and the Challenge of Modernity

Barry W. Holtz


Jewish education suffers from many ills—inadequate funding, untrained personnel, spiritual ennui, to name the most obvious—but it is rare that we consider a profound difficulty that underlies all the rest: Jewish education is a field devoid of almost any serious theoretical or philosophical reflection about the basic issues of the enterprise. It has produced almost no writing or thinking about the basic issues. One can find virtually no journals of stature devoted to such discussions; one can count on one's fingers the number of university scholars in this country whose sole responsibility is the academic discipline of Jewish education. And one finds a rather small library, indeed, of full-length books devoted to the subject.

Thus, to say that Michael Rosenak's Commandments and Concerns is the finest book about Jewish education of at least the last decade (as it certainly is), or that it indeed may be the finest book ever published in the English language about the theory and philosophy of Jewish education in the modern age, is both to recognize the magnificent contribution of this work and to acknowledge the state of the field as it stands today.

I do not mean to give a backhanded compliment to Rosenak for his accomplishment. This book would be a major work no matter what the library of Jewish education looked like. The question the book addresses is monumental: How has modernity changed the nature of the way we must pass on the Jewish tradition to future generations? Rosenak shows quite convincingly that for all but the most insulated Orthodox communities there is no escaping the effects of modernity on the task of education. The various coping strategies by which some people retreat into the fantasy of an intact premodern world (even though it no longer exists) and others bend tradition to the whim of a false "relevance" all fail to address the central problem at the core—we live in the world of modernity and that fact lies at the heart of our educational dilemma.

Rosenak believes that exploring this
dilemma means beginning, interestingly enough, with theology. In order to uncover our real educational goals, we must examine what we are about religiously. It is only then that we can begin to invent theories of education to realize these goals.

At the center of the book is a lengthy exploration of various theological tendencies within Judaism. Rosenak sees two powerful religious trends, two dimensions of religiosity, that permeate our history—the "implicit" and the "explicit." Implicit religious consciousness, best exemplified in the modern age by Martin Buber, sees the heart of religion to be the internal, experiential, personal nature of religious experience. It is the confrontation with the divine, the sense of being addressed directly by God. Explicit religiosity, exemplified by thinkers such as Isaiah Leibowitz, is the view that we are commanded by God to obey a set of norms and to follow a discipline that is beyond our own personal existential situation and not subject to mere human valuation. Torah, according to this view, is greater than our personal perception of Torah, since we are bound by a greater Will than our own. Rosenak describes the two impuluses:

Explicit religion concerns itself with what we believe and practice as loyal adherents of a specific faith, as members of a believing community; it sets down norms that prevail in our fellowship, norms that are incumbent upon those whom "we" will recognize as "religious." Implicit religion deals with existential encounters, occasioned by looking within and up in an attitude of encounter; it connotes reverence, openness, and search for meaning. Implicit religion begins not with God's demand, but with human hopes and fears, with perception rather than tradition... In explicit religion we come into contact with God when we do His will; in implicit religion, it is when we become conscious of a unique significance that is in us...

Each of these religious perspectives has its own implications for education. Each, in fact, even suggests certain pedagogic methodologies. Can one, for example, use an open classroom to teach explicit Judaism? Can one teach an implicit kind of faith by rote learning exercises? Without being aware of the underlying theological messages upon which our educational practice rests, we cannot make intelligent choices about the texts we teach, the discussions we run, the educational environments we create, and the ways we train our teachers. It is that kind of agenda that Commandments and Concerns tries to flesh out.

Rosenak, however, goes beyond mapping out the theological underpinnings of Jewish education. His discussion of the implicit and the explicit culminates in a detailed theological position that argues for the essential interrelation of both dimensions throughout Jewish religious history and describes the price we pay if we choose to educate from only one of the perspectives. "Religion," he points out, "must articulate and illuminate all that is true about one's human situation. Inherent in that situation is that the individual must be initiated into community and normative expectations and that he or she must choose." Thus, Jewish community requires norms and structure; but for Jews to choose to remain part of that community, particularly given the world of modernity and the political freedoms Jews enjoy in the West, the inner dimension of Judaism must also not be ignored.

Education requires more than theology, however. Theology must become theory—the translation of theology into the practical world of students and teachers. In other words, once we determine the particular Judaic theology we wish to transmit, we must tailor it to a particular set of students, teachers, educational materials, and cultural settings. The last section of Commandments and Concerns is an attempt to do that task of translation or, at least, to delineate the boundaries for such a discussion.

Thus, Rosenak wonders, "how does one really educate a young person, really help a young person to become loyal, disciplined by the regime of revealed norms and, at the same time, curious, open, endowed with an expansive spirituality?" Although he has some interesting answers to the question, these answers assume a basic willingness by Jews to be engaged by the challenge. And it is here that we come face to face with the deep problem that looms behind Rosenak's entire book, "the problem," as he puts it, "of the Jews, not simply of Jewish education":

Many Jews have ceased to see in Judaism a source of norms and of significance; it is not an option of meaning for them. Judaism, however interpreted, does not integrate their lives, shape them culturally, or provide them with an image of humanity against which they measure themselves.

For these Jews, beginning even with implicit education—and hoping to reach the explicit—will not work. They have already cast their lots elsewhere.

One could argue, in fact, that based on this recognition of the diminished role of Judaism in the lives of many contemporary Jews, Rosenak has doomed himself to a losing battle by making his definition of Jewish education identical with religious education. Perhaps Jewish education could meet with success if its goals were not tied to theology, but to ethnicity, or Zionism, or the so-called "civil religion" of the Jews. Moreover, by grounding his theological definition of Judaism on both the implicit and the explicit, Rosenak has ruled out some of the more liberal movements within the American Jewish religious spectrum who view the explicit in ways that are far different from his own.

But this book is arguing a theological case, and Rosenak argues it well. One could, he says, base educational theory on many theological positions. The view that he articulates is the one that seems to him most consistent with the religious consciousness of the Jewish tradition. Others are welcome to spell out their own visions and, hence, one of the great accomplishments of Commandments and Concerns is its challenge to the educational theorist of any Jewish theology or perspective. It is a book that cannot be ignored if we claim to take seriously the enterprise of Jewish education. Michael Rosenak has provided us with a stunning model of the kind of wise and articulate theoretical investigation that our work requires and deserves.
Book Review

Lennon and Lenin: The Politics of the New Left

Robert J.S. Ross


Launched twenty-five years ago, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was the largest and most prominent of the New Left student organizations of the sixties. Former SDS President Todd Gitlin reflects on the decade that put SDS and its doctrine of "participatory democracy" on the historical stage.

The author of a fine study of SDS, the ant-war movement, and the mass media (The Whole World is Watching, University of California Press, 1980), Gitlin has now written the definitive account of the culture of the New Left. From within that culture a distinctive political pattern emerged:

- a preference for "direct action" over electoral campaigns of mass organization;
- democracy as an intrinsic value, including in many versions, a vaguely etched socialist vision;
- hyperdemocratic views of organization—rejecting formal leadership, internal discipline, and strict definitions of membership;
- a rejection of cold war antimperialism, and sympathy for revolutionaries in the third world; and
- a culture of politics that believed in personal authenticity and the importance of communalistic solidarity (good politics ought to be a satisfying human experience), and which also asserted that the personal is political.

Each element contributed to SDS's rise and fall.

II

Gitlin's chronological narrative is strongest—even brilliant—when he analyzes the origins of the counterculture of the sixties and the ways the New Left blended with it. The common ground between the New Left and the counterculture was an emphasis on the personal side of politics: it was attractive to a cohort of young adults who lived in vast multiversities and who were destined to live as organizational functionaries. But within this set of attitudes lay fatal flaws. First, as Gitlin emphasizes, it encouraged action on the basis of personal feeling rather than calculated efficacy. Second, it provoked a cannibalistic mentality: Leaders were trashed; and, eventually, so were white males and married couples with mortgages and cars. Even ties and suits became symbols of sellout. If the personal was political, then the closest enemy sat across the dinner table or at the front of the small meeting.

Devising strategies to advance the cause of long-term structural change became a devalued activity. Hippies considered political debate boring. Many of the early feminists, coming to consciousness within and against the New Left, contended that arguments about theories and strategies of change served only to prop up male dominance, for theory was "male" while feeling was "female." By 1968, only those who endorsed weirdly distorted versions of Marxism contended for organizational control of SDS.

Gitlin believes that the sixties proceeded in ever-maddening leaps, a history that, in a phrase from Czeslaw Milosz, "came off its leash." At the same time, paradoxically, Gitlin's work brilliantly demonstrates the continuity of cultural disobedience from the fifties to the sixties. His discussion of the beats, particularly Kerouac and Ginsberg, is especially revealing. Their refusal to participate in what C. Wright Mills called "the American celebration," and their rejection of politics, prefigured the counterculture of the sixties.

Gitlin sees the mass-culture heriocics of Brando (cf., The Wild One) and James Dean as the popular version of Camus' despairing call to commitment even when there is no hope (cf., The Myth of Sisyphus). The "rebel without a cause" is an historical actor who has neither history nor future. Dean and Camus go to fiery deaths in fast cars as premature death pervades the "underside" of the fifties. Moreover, the bomb loomed ever-present as future New Leftists knelt beneath their school desks, practicing air raid drills.

So, although the "counterculture" of the sixties developed a rhetoric of "life" and "love," lurking images of death and the bomb made its optimism a kind of whistling in the dark. The more bizarre expressions of this contrapuntal Life-or-Death culture took on pseudo-political form: the radical, "free-food," street-tough Diggers; the Lower East Side politcal gang called the "Motherfuckers"; and the antics of Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, and their media-genius yippie stunts.

Gitlin's argument about the connection between the counterculture and the New Left after 1967 is most poignant in his account of activities in the Bay Area, particularly in his sections about drugs. The political project of making long-term, large-scale change led activists to try to live in the present as if the harmonious community of the future had already arrived. The saga of the construction and destruction of People's Park is Gitlin's archetype.

One can see that the New Left and the counterculture carried a powerful political message that is now accepted by virtually everyone who yearns for a more just social order: A movement should be in its internal life and structure like the society it wants to make—that is, "good politics ought to be a good experience" and "only appropriate means justify ends."

Yet it is doubtful if the fulfillment of
such a vision is possible, and it is equally questionable if it is desirable. We are all affected by our particular social experiences; we cannot live as if the future has come because we are products of the past. Therefore, we cannot "trash monogamy," which some did at the turn of the decade, without incurring disabling burdens of guilt and personal disruption. That we are gentle or loving is of no concern to our adversaries—who are centralized, brutally calculating, and willing to kill. We cannot disable rifles by stuffing their barrels with flowers. And we cannot grapple with global aggression or corporate power through purely local projects with ten comrades.

III

The political culture of the New Left and SDS began with an emphasis on direct action, learned from the southern civil rights movement—an impulse that arose from the stalemate of the fifties when the left was decimated and popular movements weak. Breaking "out of apathy," as the British New Left put it, required dramaturgy. Gitlin contrasts the dynamism he found in SDS in 1963 to the tepid and frustrating world of Harvard's disarmament advocates who were learning at a tender age to channel their views along the Cambridge-White House axis.

The direct action ethos demanded and inspired risk of imprisonment, injury, death, career-loss, and calumny. But mass movements must also have room for those who are neither saints nor professional revolutionaries. What started as a challenge to get people off their duffs too often failed to recognize that a movement of social transformation must eventually have meaningful roles for people with jobs, families, and homes. Those who were not full-time organizers felt defensive and devalued, while burn-out and exhaustion were frequent among those too committed to rest or eat properly.

The New Left's democratic impulse was not only fundamentally healthy, but also a brilliant way of reviving socialism within a cold-war culture that had made socialism "the forbidden word." When taken as a doctrine of local action, however, "participatory democracy" was strategically limited. Since the founding cohorts of SDS had never fleshed out the full import of their radical democratic vision, later sectarians of SDS viewed participatory democracy as a wimpy vision.

Neither of these problems—the rigors of direct action or the ambiguities of participatory democracy—were insurmountable, but hyperdemocratic organizational practices were. Rotation of leadership, decentralized policy-making, a do-your-own-thing experimentalism—these policies were attractive to young people who faced the prospect of careers in large bureaucratic organizations. But the harsh realities of political combat, of the size of the country, and of the need for experience, leadership, and accountability, all made the hyper-democratic mode highly inefficient and precluded the possibility of long-term organizational survival.

IV

By contrast, in historical terms, the rejection of anticommunism and the tenets of the cold war was a great accomplishment for the New Left. Without it, there could have been no antiv war movement, no departure from the internecine combat of the sects and grouplets of the old left, and no portal through which revolutionary inspiration could pass. Gitlin recounts how SDS emerged from the anticommunist social democratic organization, the League for Industrial Democracy. When SDS's 1962 manifesto, "The Port Huron Statement," placed major blame for the arms race on the United States and criticized the liberal establishment for its antidemocratic, anticommunist foreign policies, the LID attempted to censor and to red-bait the young organization. Eventually, SDS cut its ties with the LID in 1965.

Gitlin's account differs from those of other current critics of the New Left (See Paul Berman, "Don't Follow Leaders," The New Republic, August 10 and 17, 1987), for his story shows that the anticommunist socialists of the old left could never have sustained a movement against the war or for disarmament, or, for that matter, for socialism. While SDS was fighting with the social-democratic LID, some of LID's members were providing the intellectual cover for the war in Vietnam.

Gitlin does, however, express reservations about the vehemence of opposition to cold war anticommunism, which he sometimes lumps together with the romantic excesses of revolution worship. Nowadays, the "romantic" attachment of the New Left to Marxist revolutionaries, especially the Vietnamese, is under attack. These reconsiderations two decades later are not central to Gitlin's narrative of culture and politics, but they should be more central to a political analysis.

Consider, for example, Vietnam. If Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge were as genocidal as they seem to have been, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea merits approval, not condemnation. As with the Allied invasion of Germany, the Vietnamese arguably rescued millions of Kampucheans from destruction. That the American government continues to support the U.N. seat held by the Khmer Rouge and supplies guerrillas allied with them is not so surprising as the willingness of leftists to join in the chorus of condemnation of Vietnam.

But take it farther, to the harder case: the jailing ("reeducation") of Vietnam's collaborators by the Communist regime and the flight of thousands of Vietnamese from that country. Did Americans with democratic values not urge the "deNazification" of Germany and press for the war crimes trials? Did the Vietnamese not do essentially what our historical counterparts advocated (unsuccessfully) for Germany—the removal of an entire cohort of murderers and their hangers-on from legitimate society? Of course, neither of these comparisons addresses the reasons for the mass exodus from Vietnam by the boat people, nor does it excuse the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) for the corrupt process by which boat people were forced to pay their way out.

V

Gitlin recounts a telling moment that brings these strands together. In 1966 a group of older SDS leaders met to consider how to deal with the drastic change brought about by the expansion of antiwar action. The creation of a post-student, adult organization was discussed. A group of San Francisco counterculture anarcho-nihilists, the infamous Diggers, crashed the meeting and disrupted it with violent theatrics. The "old New Left" figures were paralyzed. Their political culture could not sustain throwing the Diggers out. No one was ever excluded—not communists, not sectarians, and not semicrazed.
Diggers. Despite warnings that the effect was the same as government-inspired disruption, the Diggers held forth and the meeting crumbled. No adult organization was launched.

Later, still without a positive understanding of organizational discipline or a confident commitment to socialist democracy, SDS was impotent in the face of the caricatures of Leninism that mandated organizational control. So, by 1970 a tiny rump of deracinated self-appointed revolutionaries—the Weather Underground—liquidated SDS, praised the murderer Charles Manson, and got their own leadership blown up in the infamous Town House bomb factory. SDS went down in flames, ingloriously.

Gitlin tells this story with sad eloquence and penetrating insight about the interaction of radical politics, drugs, music, and the counterculture. He is not as insightful about problems of organization or political strategy.

By contrast, Allan Brinkley's (*New York Review of Books*, October 22, 1987) review of sixty-six literary understandings the problems of organization and localism, but misinterprets the breakup of the movement as the failure of political commitment and the seductions of personal goals. He suggests that self-interest was already evident when the movement evaporated after the draft ended. A neat package, but wrong.

Every study of movement participants shows that their activities in the sixties led to participation in progressive activities in the seventies and eighties. These individuals maintained attitudes that were further to the left than those of their peers who did not take part in the movements for change. (See the academic studies of James Fendrich, Florida State University.) Furthermore, giant demonstrations continued, as in 1971, even after the draft was on its way out. Commitment did not fail; organization did.

VI

Gitlin's emphasis on culture illuminates some of the decade's crucial political stories. Of particular importance is his concise and excellent account of the turning point of the young civil rights movement in 1964. Formed at the cost of three lives in the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer, the integrated Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party failed to unseat that state's segregated delegation at the Atlantic City Democratic Convention. They were excluded by a balancing act demanded by President Johnson and enforced by liberal leaders of the Democratic Party: Humphrey, Reuther, et al.

From then on, young black militants distrusted white liberals and mainstream political activity. The white New Left was ejected from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) but appended itself to the politics of black nationalism. The go-it-alone rhetoric of Black Power within SNCC, and the subsequent rise of the recklessly armed Black Panther Party, are understandable in light of Gitlin's account.

The autobiographical dimension of Gitlin's tale provides another major political insight. A son of Jewish teachers from the Bronx, Gitlin is part of the larger story of secular Jewish intellectuals after the Holocaust. The impact of the destruction of European Jewry on Jewish attitudes toward the Vietnam War has never been analyzed more clearly. Although both young and old survivors were burdened by guilt after the decimation of European Jewry, Gitlin notes that the older Jewish "cold warriors" regarded drawing the anticommunist line in Vietnam as compensation for their inability to prevent extermination in Europe. The younger Jews of the New Left, on the other hand, saw Vietnam in terms of the Nuremberg principle: the positive duty to oppose crimes against humanity.

Gitlin is weaker when he writes about the passing of the sixties into the seventies and the resulting "implosion" of "the Movement." He writes eloquently about the persistent confusion between "expressive" politics and rational or efficacious politics, but he does not tell us how an efficacious politics can be organized. What is the role of intellectuals and students in popular movements? Doesn't a preference for consensus make clarity impossible? Doesn't organizational discipline make more potent the collective effort of many individuals? Gitlin's sad story of cultural disorientation does not contain answers to these questions, but, as he briefly mentions at the end of his work, many members of the New Left community went on in the seventies and eighties to create a whole stratum of grass roots organizations that applied both the positive and negative lessons of the sixties. These carriers of the practical heritage of the New Left merit a history of their own.

While the definitive insider political memoir of the New Left is yet to be written, *The Sixties* will now take its place as the best available discussion of politics among New Left activists, and an essential and fascinating look at a period and movement in danger of becoming an electronic myth. If someone wants to know how it felt in those times—forget the rest of the dreck, read this book. □
Current Debate/The Pope and the Jews

A Catholic Perspective: Eugene Fisher

It is impossible to do justice to all the issues raised in Tikkun’s symposium on “The Pope and the Jews” (Sept./Oct. 1987). In general, all of the essays, Catholic as well as Jewish, reflect an understanding of the deep “memory and anger” evoked in Jewish hearts by the Holy See’s decision to grant a state audience to the current president of Catholic Austria. In searching within myself to discern its implications, I welcomed especially the insights and wisdom of the two veterans of the dialogue included in the symposium, Annette Daum and John Pawlikowski.

Dale Vree’s article also deserves the widest possible circulation within the Jewish community, for it articulates quite well the process that many Catholics have undergone in attempting to grapple with the complex moral and spiritual issues surfaced by the controversy. Indeed, the sensitivity to Jewish concerns evinced by all of the Catholic authors in itself belies the belittling approach to the dialogue taken by Tikkun’s editor.

In point of fact, Jewish-Catholic relations as practiced in this country are nothing like the “dialogue between elites” that Lerner depicts. They have for decades involved thousands of laity and local clergy on the parish/synagogue level and resulted in innumerable cooperative actions, from the labor and civil rights movements of the 1940s and 1950s to the peace and economic justice movements of the present era. And the attitudes of millions of Catholics have become radically more positive toward Jews and Judaism as the direct result of the textbook changes brought about by the dedicated efforts of Catholic educators working painstakingly and carefully with the core group of Jewish professionals Lerner so unfairly disparages.

Dr. Eugene J. Fisher is director of the Bishops’ Committee for Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs in Washington, D.C.

In the midst of his broadscale assault on the church (to which I shall return), Daniel Landes alludes to the striking parallel between the dynamic elements of the Jewish story in the twentieth century and the Jesus story of the first. This parallel, of course, has been strongly debated in both communities since first put forth shortly after World War II and especially since portrayed so dramatically in Chagall’s “crucifixion” paintings.

Landes adds his own “conspiracy theory” to the discussion. If I understand him correctly, his argument is that the Jewish story, like Jesus’ story, is one of abandonment, death, and rebirth (the State of Israel). As such, he believes the Shoah is perceived by Catholics as somehow threatening to “replace the Jesus story as the core myth reflecting an age poised between destruction and fulfillment.”

Hence, he believes, the church has undertaken a very subtle series of steps to “expropriate” once again “the identity and experience” of the Jewish people (as the infamous “teaching of contempt” did in the early stages of Christianity through the decimate charge) in order to “Christianize the Holocaust” and take back the claim to having the “only” religious story capable of summing up the human experience in our time.

While creative, Landes’s theory as he develops it depends on implicit assumptions concerning contemporary Catholic belief and motivation for which he can offer no evidence, much less convincing analysis. While Landes’ conspiracy mythology remains unconvincing, the parallels he adduces between the Jesus and Shoah narratives, as told by our respective communities, is worthy of the deepest dialogical reflection by the best of our respective thinkers working together.

I might suggest, with all due respect, that the reason for the affinity between the two narratives lies in the fact that both, ultimately, go back to the same paradigmatic Jewish story, the Exodus: (1) betrayal and abandonment for forty years in the desert, (2) death of the Exodus generation in exile, and (3) entry of their children into the Promised Land (suffering, death, rebirth).

That is, just as the earliest Christians, being Jews, interpreted the Christ event in terms of the central story of their people (told and retold on Passover through the generations), and thus made Passover/Pesach, Paschal, Easter central to their new movement (which they felt, therefore, remained in some real sense Jewish), so, too, does the present generation of Jews and Christians tend to frame its religious understandings of the Holocaust (as of the destruction of the Temple and the two thousand years of Jewish exile from the Land) in terms of the primal Jewish story, the Exodus. Irving Greenberg puts it this way:

The real point of Israel is that after Auschwitz, the existence of the Jew is a great affirmation and act of faith. The recreation of the body of the people, Israel, is renewed testimony to Exodus as ultimate reality, to God’s continuing presence in history proven by the fact that His people, despite the attempt to annihilate them, still exist. (Auschwitz: Beginning of a New Era?, E. Fleischner, ed., Ktav, 1977, p. 48.)

I believe, as a Catholic, that what Greenberg states is true, true to my own faith and tradition as well as to his. As a Catholic, I find the profound implications of this affirmation challenging but by no means threatening. The church’s official teaching clearly holds (e.g., the Holy See’s “Notes on the Correct Way to Present Jews and Judaism in Preaching and Catechesis,” No. 6), and the pope has reiterated time and again (cf. John Paul II on Jews and Judaism, 1979–1986, USCC Publications, 1987) that the continuing witness of the Jews to God’s faithfulness
to them is a true "sign of the times" that must be taken fully into account in the church's central doctrines. It is not the church, in my opinion, but Landes himself who wishes to turn a meeting point of profound spiritual solidarity between Jews and Catholics into a point of dispute. While what I have said here is awkwardly sketchy, given the depths of faith on both sides on which it touches, I trust it will serve to illustrate at least something of the necessity for pursuing our relationship, panim al panim, in ever-deepening dialogue rather than through accusation and responsive defensiveness. The same dynamics in which Landes would see a nefarious Catholic conspiracy, I would see as leading the church to a humbler acknowledgment of its own radical Jewishness, despite the theological differences that will always remain between us.

We need, throughout the process, to become sensitive to each other's perceptions of the same realities and to be much more hesitant about presuming each other's motivations. The incident of the Carmelite convent at Auschwitz, now happily resolved (through "elite" dialogue between some of Europe's leading rabbis and cardinals), is a case in point. Landes sees it as one more move in the church's alleged manipulation of the Shoah. The Catholic authorities who authorized the convent saw it from the beginning as a sign of prayerful "expiation" for sins committed against Jews, hardly the nefarious motivation Landes would impute to them. Similarly, though Landes dismisses Cardinal O'Connor's emotional remarks after his tour of Yad VaShem in Jerusalem, those who understand the theological framework of such a statement realize how profoundly moved and respectful he was on that occasion.

While Landes attacks what he calls "the pope's speech at the Maidanek concentration camp," in point of fact the pope made no formal speech at Maidanek but, as is proper, preserved a prayerful silence of respect for its victims. His speech on the Holocaust during his visit to Poland came in Warsaw, where he affirmed the uniqueness of the Jewish experience of the Shoah and also the validity of Judaism's continuing witness to the world, especially its witness of remembrance of the Holocaust. Again, a statement intended to be one of solidarity has somehow been skewed through media rhetoric into an assault.

Finally, Landes's charge that dialogue with Jews, for the church, is really a cover for proselytism must be denied, as it has been on numerous occasions by the Holy See. The persistence of such an invidious rumor reveals again the continuing need for deeper theological dialogue between us.

Such tragedies of contemporary misperception of one another increase the need for dialogue, lest we continue to create false images of one another. More than ever, I am impelled by the urgency of that need.

**Rabbi Daniel Landes Responds**

Eugene Fisher's good will for Jews allows him to assent to my analysis of the people Israel's modern saga: betrayal and abandonment by western civilization, suffering leading to death in the ghettos and concentration camps, resurrection within the State of Israel. Fisher's apologetics for his faith, however, lead him to obscure the arguments concerning both the church's attempted expropriation of the Holocaust and its paradoxical lack of real seriousness toward the Jews. Thus he ignores the significance of conferring sainthood upon selected Catholic victims of Hitler; he finesses the question of recognition of the State of Israel; and he denies the deleterious effect of the view that Judaism is preliminary to Christianity upon inter-

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Rabbi Daniel Landes, a member of Tikvun's national editorial board, holds the Roeters van Lennep Chair in Jewish Ethics and Values at Yeshiva University in Los Angeles and is director of the National Education Project at the Simon Wiesenthal Center.

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proof of our desire to erase the outrages so often done to the Vicar of Christ." Not surprisingly, in its early stages the convent was associated with evoking the memory of Edith Stein and Maximilian Kolbe. Fisher's citation of the service of the convent includes the following: "Their [the nuns'] task [is] to live in seclusion offering prayers and expiation for the crimes committed at Oswiecim. Breszinka ... their presence there will be a beacon showing that charity is possible and stronger than evil." This is taken from an address entitled "A Sign of Hope in Auschwitz" by Cardinal Macharski, archbishop of Cracow, in whose diocese Auschwitz lies. "Hope," "beacon," a "charity" that is "stronger than evil" in Auschwitz? In Auschwitz, death was supreme. We Jews neither glorify death—we have seen too much of it—nor do we build shrines to martyrs. There is not enough stone to build monuments in every city and village in Christian Europe for the victims of a 2,000-year-old hatred by Christians against Jews.

If other religions want to treat death differently, it is their prerogative. But let our remains lie in peace. It is immoral to recycle them for fuel to run some devotional machine. It is blasphemous to utilize our dead for the victory of a religion that helped to destroy us. The ashes of once playful children, expectant mothers, and wise old sages need not be raked over. Those who were not turned into smoke but were put in the earth and abandoned certainly don't need the cold company of the much too belated psalms of a religious community now.

The construction of the convent has been frozen while the nuns continue their holy work in a nearby location. In the meantime, the Catholic chapel in Sobibor, where 250,000 victims were exterminated, has become the focal point of that camp. As of summer 1987, garbage mixed with human remains is strewn over the campsite. Those who run the chapel are unconcerned by that situation. Their new contribution has been the addition of two large, carved, wooden sacred scenes outside the chapel. These depict the Sobibor killing center, behind the barbed wire stand the Madonna with Jesus. In Sobibor, however, only Jews were killed.

Eugene Fisher states that the church "affirms the continuing" witness of the Jews to God's faithfulness to them. For the Jews, this witness is the State of Israel. The creation of Israel was itself an act of faith in the midst of despair and is a manifestation of the appearance of God's face after its terrible eclipse. Without Israel the State there would no longer be Israel the People to give witness to the God of Israel. At this point in the dialogue, how does the church conceive of this witness?

Christians are invited to understand this religious attachment [of Jews to the Land of Israel] which finds its roots in biblical tradition, without making on their own any particular religious interpretation of this relationship. This existence of the State of Israel and its political options should be envisioned not in a perspective which is in itself religious, but in their reference to the common principles of international law.*

The pope's position has been further clarified by Dr. Fisher:

The approach of the Holy See is thus one of official and even staunch neutrality. No statements condemning the fledgling state have been issued. And while there has been no official recognition of Israel, there has also been none granted to the State of Jordan either, since the Vatican traditionally waits for the resolution of outstanding border conflicts in such cases.†

Even taking this last statement at face value, the dimensions of moral responsibility of this "stauch neutrality" are manifold. First of all, it is inconsistently applied. The Ayatollah's Iran, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and Assad's Syria, among the 110 totalitarian states, communist regimes, and democracies that the Vatican recognizes, also have "border conflicts." Second, Israel is surrounded by enemy states which have vowed to destroy it. To deny recognition to Israel is to aid future perpetrators to genocide. Third, theological neutrality allows for evil theology to creep in. An example is the AntiChrist (Christopher Publishing House, 1981) by Vincent P. Miceli, S. J., former professor at the Gregorian and Angelicum Universities in Rome and St. John's University in New York City and a popular lecturer. This vociferous anti-Zionist polemic, clearly informed by old hatreds, is typified by this question: "Will the rebuilding of the Temple [by the Zionists] be the next step, followed closely by the erection of the statue of the Antichrist before which all men will be commanded to fall in adoration?" I cite this drivel not because I suggest that the pope harbors any sympathy for it but to point out that it was published in 1981 with the nihil obstat and imprimatur of the New York Archdiocese, which are, as described on the flyleaf, "official declarations that a book or pamphlet is free of doctrinal or moral error." Therefore, while anti-Semitism may be out of bounds, this book conforms to Vatican guidelines regarding Jews and more than suggests that anti-Zionism is a fair position for a Catholic theologian to state out loud. But as we know, much contemporary anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism.

What is the source of this love/hate that the church has for the People Israel and is so strong that it expropriates one core event, the Holocaust, and denies the significance of the other, the State of Israel? It is simply that Judaism is considered preliminary to Christianity in every way. The Holocaust can thus be assimilated into Jesus' eternal suffering, and the exodus, which Fisher claims as having a common meaning for both Jews and Catholics, is actually interpreted in current church teaching as an "experience of salvation and liberation that is not complete in itself, but has in it over and above its own meaning, the capacity to be developed further. Salvation and liberation are already accomplished in Christ and gradually realized by the Sacraments in the Church. This makes way for the fulfillment of God's design, which awaits its final consummation with the return of Jesus as messiah." (The Common Bond).

Judaism, being preliminary, therefore cannot find its redemption promised in the Bible as a return to its own land and the building there of a sanctified and moral life. Rather, all must be resolved in Christ. Israel the Land and certainly the State is not figured in the salvation equation.
The preliminary status of Judaism certainly affects dialogue. The good news in Catholic–Jewish dialogue is that all prospective partners are not to be subject to the least bit of coercion. The bad news is that Jews are still called to hear the Good News:

In virtue of her divine mission, the Church which is to be "the all embracing means of salvation" in which alone "the fullness of the means of salvation can be obtained" must of her nature proclaim Jesus Christ to the world. . . . Indeed we believe that it is through Him that we go to the Father . . . "and this is eternal life, that they know the only true God and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent."

Jesus affirms . . . that "there shall be one flock and one shepherd." Church and Judaism cannot then be seen as two parallel ways of salvation and the Church must witness to Christ as the Redeemer for all, "while maintaining the strictest respect for religious liberty in line with the teaching of the Second Vatican Council. . . ." (The Common Bond)

The intimate connection between dialogue and mission is spelled out in a document generally overlooked by the Jewish community. This is The Attitude of the Church towards the Followers of Other Religions (Reflections and Orientations on Dialogue and Mission), prepared by the Vatican Secretariat for Non-Christians, which was approved by Pope John Paul II and published on the occasion of Pentecost, 1984. Dialogue is conceived as an integral part of Christian Mission:

According to the Second Vatican Council, missionary proclamation has conversion as its goal: "that non-Christians be freely converted to the Lord under the action of the Holy Spirit who opens their hearts so that they may adhere to him. . . ." In the context of dialogue between believers of various faiths, one cannot avoid reflecting on the spiritual process of conversion. In Biblical language and that of the Christian tradition, conversion is the humble and penitent return of the heart to God in the desire to submit one's life more generously to him. All persons are constantly called to this conversion. In the course of this process, the decision may be made to leave one's previous spiritual or religious situation in order to direct oneself towards another. Thus, for example, from a particular love the heart can open itself to one that is more universal.

Jews have been called to a new life after Auschwitz, Sobibor, and Maid- enek. But this new life is the State of Israel and the practice of Judaism. Until the church accepts this, it can have no authentic dialogue with the People of Israel.

Eugene Fisher's alternative to church expropriation of the Holocaust does not work. The passion narratives of our respective communities cannot be merged. While the Jesus and Shoah accounts are parallel as stories, they differ in their core understanding. The Jesus narrative reveals the victory of meaning over death through a willed and gracious sacrifice. The Shoah was the victory of death over meaning which was consumed in total fire. One quakes at the mention of the Holocaust because s/he knows that this suffering and death, after all the novels, stories, poems, political analyses, and theological treatises, was for naught, possessing no redemptive significance. Cardinal Cooke erred in calling the Holocaust a "gift" presented by the Jewish people to the world, thereby confusing triumph with tragedy.

Theologically, moreover, the messages of the two stories are in radical opposition. Christians claim that through Jesus' sacrificial death all is forgiven. Judaism, in comparison, has been characterized as an unforgiving faith. Apologists for Judaism have striven to reveal the nature of the doctrine Teshuah (return to penitence), which evokes God's forgiveness. They correctly point out that Judaism requires deeds of compensation to those who were injured, along with remorse and a resolve never to repeat the act. Many, however, hastily conclude that all sins can be, according to classical Judaism, rectified and absolutely forgiven and atoned for. In the shadow of the Shoah, that myth must be revised and the truth revealed. For this we quote Maimonides' Laws of Teshuah, 6:3:

And it is possible that a man will sin a great sin . . . until the judgment will be set forth by the True Judge that the punishment to be exacted from the sinner for that which he did willingly and knowingly is that he be prevented from Teshuah and it is not given to him the possibility of turning from his evilness in order that he might die lost within the sin that he did.

For Judaism, human identity is determined by actions. The Shoah mandates this position—that great evil cannot be shaken loose or overlooked. It has no statute of limitations nor is it undone by subsequent good deeds.

Even if Waldheim had nobly worked for the cause of peace in the U.N., even if he had regretted his past public lies, even if he had attempted to compensate survivors, his service with Army Group E that destroyed Greek-Jewish communities along with Yugoslavian ethnic groups would have confirmed him as a Nazi. No one has the right to present him with the appearance of forgiveness.

As I deny the identification of the Jesus and Shoah narratives, I similarly reject the reductionism of placing the modern story of the Jew within an exodus framework. Servitude in Egypt is clearly part of the necessary liberation dialectic: Without slavery, no freedom; without Pharaoh, no Moses; without Egypt, no Land of Israel. Is, then, the dialectic of the Holocaust and the State of Israel without extermination, no ingathering; without Hitler, no Ben Gurion; without Auschwitz, no Jerusalem?

Earlier I maintained that Israel was a necessity after the Holocaust. Nonetheless, I believe that it is blasphemous to see the Holocaust as necessary for the rise of the State of Israel. To do this is either to redeem the Holocaust or to demonize Israel—both unthinkable possibilities. Jewish theology simply cannot resolve the tension between these antimonies. What we can and must do is to affirm the reality of death (Holocaust) and its potential mega-occurrence (nuclear war). So, too, must we affirm the reality of life (Israel) and its potential flowering (world peace and liberation).

If Jews continue, God willing, to refuse to hear the Jesus narrative as their own and if Catholics are, in the short run at least, resistant to the import of the Shoah–Israel narrative, where is the dialogue to go? I suggest
the element left out of Dr. Fisher’s sketch of Exodus, namely Sinai. The
giving of the Torah on Sinai—a lonely
hill within a desert—is the actual climax
of the Exodus story of the Pentateuch.
It is through Sinai that the Jews are a
people who require a home. The moral
law of the Torah, however, is shared
with the children of Noah in the
covenant within a rough outline. Jews
certainly take seriously the moral actions
of Christians which arise from their
faith and ethical commitment. There
should be a shared level of discourse
which affirms the significance of service
within the world in preparation for a
greater reality. On this point we can
and must unite. □

LETTERS
(Continued from p. 7)

in literature and in the visual arts, the
exceptional suffering of the Polish
people and its exceptional role in the
history of mankind have nevertheless
become integral parts of the Polish
national myth. The Romantic slogan
“Poland—the Messiah of Nations” has
meant for us the distinctive sufferings
we as a people were chosen by God to
bear and has suggested our guiltlessness.
It has also fostered a profound sense
of grievance against the rest of the
world, which is presumably unaware
of the first and does not believe in the
second. This firm conviction about our
iniquity has engendered a peculiar
national immaturity, an attenuated sense
of responsibility, and an inability to
tolerate criticism.

When Poland, after nearly 150 years,
again claimed its independence, Poles
were wont to see it as the realization
of the messianic promise—that is, as a
“resurrection.” In time Poland turned
out to be like any other country; yet the
dream of an ideal state endured. The
average Pole finds it difficult to fit the
scourge of anti-Semitism into this myth-
ic image, the more so since after the
Second World War criticism of the past
signified not a recognition of historical
consciousness but a political declara-
tion, rooted in the present and firmly
on the side of communism. As a result,
the subject of anti-Semitism became—
in times that I, for one, remember—
cloaked in silence. As Mr. Brumberg
so incisively remarks, this silence had
to be broken for the sake of our national

consciousness. For national conscious-
ness, so important to the Poles, is
inseparable from national conscience.

The most painful problem is that of
World War II. Brumberg shows how
groundless are the illusions on which
Poles are nurtured today—illusions
bolstered by their journalists, their
writers, as well as, unfortunately, their
historians. Among them are illusions
about the magnitude of the help ex-
tended to Jews during the War and
about the number of Jews saved by
Poles. Shedding those illusions would
mean recalling the indifference, the
deliberate refusal to help, and the (let
us hope, marginal) coparticipation in
the crimes by means of blackmail and
persecution.

Every war is an assault upon life. In
the last war, however, murder was the
goal, rather than the means. For this
reason it was imperative to defend,
above all, the value against which the
war was waged—that of life. Independent-
ence, territories, and so on should
have been of secondary importance.
But we proved to be altogether un-
prepared to accept that moral challenge.
We were misled by the church, which
unfortunately had participated before
the war in the dissemination of hatred
—something that I, as a Catholic, am
bound to acknowledge. To be sure, in
time the church provided a haven for
a certain number of persecuted Jews,
yet countless Poles reaped the fruits of
the evil sown in the past. We were led
astray, too, by many who were regarded as the teachers of the nation. The War found us weak not only militarily, but also morally. Yes, we were heroic, but this heroism was a legacy of an earlier era, singularly insufficient in the era of gas chambers.

I do not know what the future of the Polish-Jewish dialogue will be. There are opportunities that history offers us but once. The intractability of the dialogue stems not from the fact that Poles are not in a position to understand the "Jewish experience"—as one writer, quoted by Brumberg, observes. It is neither possible nor necessary to enter into the experience of others. The basic condition for such a dialogue is the acceptance of the distinctive nature of that experience and of its sovereignty.

Unhappily, the only dialogue that is possible now is the dialogue of historians. It is one that deserves respect, especially in Poland, where the interest in history is greater than even the historians themselves realize. A good historian can weaken the strength of stereotypes and condition his people to accept truths injurious to their national pride. At the same time, the historian who panders to national pride is apt to wreak much harm. Personally, I am grateful to Prof. Norman Davies (to whom Mr. Brumberg alludes in his article and with whom he recently debated in the pages of the New York Review of Books) for his enormous sympathy for my people; yet I would rather that he did not retouch the past. The history of Poland was sufficiently great and heroic, and there is no need, therefore, to conceal its faults. Forgive this personal note, but I am moved to make this remark because I find Prof. Davies' impact on many young Polish historians highly disturbing.

There is, of course, the danger that if this problem is left entirely to the historians, it will lose its moral edge. But this is something we can do nothing about. The common past of Poles and Jews is becoming ever more distant, and all we can hope for is to be able to save some of its remnants.

Ela Szufik
Research Center for History and Culture of the Jews of Poland
Jagiellonian University
Cracow, Poland

Abraham Brumberg responds:

There is much in Mr. Plaisner's letter I agree with, and much that I find wide off the mark. His statement about the "Bund" is a case in point: It strikes me as rather absurd to call "not part and parcel of Polish Jewry" a party which won an overwhelming majority of Jewish votes in the municipal and kibbutz elections in the late 1930s; and whether or not I "belonged in [my] youth to the Bund" is irrelevant to my arguments. Either they are or are not valid, regardless of whether I was raised in a Bundist family, or at a Chassidic court, or in a household of assimilationists. The same goes for my alleged "Galut mentality"—whatever that means.

As for equating the guilt of the Nazis with that of all (or "most") Poles, I have said enough about it in my article, and I see no need to repeat myself. At any rate, if Mr. Plaisner can paraphrase me as claiming that "the Jews could escape from the Germans but could not escape from the Poles," he must not have read my piece very attentively, and I find it therefore pointless to go on—much as I understand the impact of his own harrowing experiences.

As for Mr. Twierdcholebow, he and I seem to have read different texts. Professor Blonski most decidedly did not say that "the Poles were about to murder Jews but [for] the outbreak of World War Two." In fact, he rejects the claim that the "Poles had participated in the genocide," though he pleads with his fellow Poles to accept part of the burden for the fate that befell the Jews—an important if subtle distinction which many of his readers have apparently found it difficult to grasp. And since Professor Blonski did not make the statement attributed to him by Mr. Twierdcholebow, Mr. Turowicz could not have possibly "defined it as false."

Nor does Mr. Twierdcholebow seem to know much about what appears in the Polish press. If he doubts Professor Blonski's assertion that the Polish press "swarms with statements full of altogether demented hatred for the Jews," I should be pleased to provide him with a fairly long reading list for his edification. I would include in it an article by Janusz Korwin-Mikke, in the Sept. 20, 1987 issue of the "Catholic Social Weekly" Lada, which I picked up in Warsaw a few months ago. It contains statements such as that the Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion et al "are not anti-Semitic but anti-Zionist" (now where have we heard that before?), and that "violations of law in Israel... will end in anti-Judaism, and again we shall have to hide Jews in our cellars." I would also call his attention to the kiosk of a Catholic church in Warsaw, which for several months sold books such as the Protocols, and numerous others depicting the "international Jewish conspiracy," all of them described in the underground weekly KOS (Warsaw, April 20, 1987). After vigorous protests from Polish intellectuals, the Episcopate finally ordered the priest to shut down his kiosk, though without issuing any public condemnation. One of the future issues of the new journal Res Publica will carry excerpts from some of these works. I hope they will include a few pages from a collection of articles by the father of modern Polish chauvinism and anti-Semitism, Roman Dmowski, containing a glowing introduction by Poland's primate, Cardinal Jozef Glemp.

Now, briefly, with regard to the other letters: I have had my say about Professor Milosza's remarks, so I shall let Mr. Hodos's letter speak for itself. I agree with Dr. Chojnianski, both with regard to the need not merely to present the facts, but to analyze them, and to the need for objective research on the part of Jewish no less than Polish scholars. Indeed, Professor Chojnianski has already made some valuable contributions of his own to the history of Jews and other ethnic minorities in pre-war Poland. I also cheerfully accept Dr. Chojnianski's admonition for using the figure of 300,000 Jews as a polemical ploy: truth be told, when I wrote it I had in mind Professor Richard Davies, who, among other blunt distortions contained in his lengthy tirade in the New York Review of Books (March 9, 1987), cited the figure of 100,000 Jews deported to the Soviet Far East.

Finally, I am grateful to Professor Legutko for his comments about my article, and am moved by Ms. Szufik's eloquent letter.

There is one other matter which cannot be left without a comment: On October 4, 1987, Tygodnik Powszechny, which I had praised for publishing the debate on Polish-Jewish relations, printed a "Statement of the Kielec Diocese Curia Regarding the Position of the
Church on the Kielce Pogrom in 1946: It is a statement consisting of glaring omissions and half-truths, clearly designed to absolve the then-dignitaries of the church (with the exception of the bishop of Czestochowa) for their unconscionable failure either to prevent or to condemn the Kielce massacre. (For a detailed account of their behavior, see Michal Borwicz, "Polish-Jewish Relations, 1944–1947," in The Jews of Poland, edited by Abramsky, Jachimczyk and Polonsky, London, 1986, pp. 190–199.) Unfortunately, the Polish Catholic church still has a long way to go to accept its past role as a major source of and apologist for virulent anti-Semitism.

All They Are Saying: A Survey of Center/Right Periodicals

Milton Mankoff

Just as the crashing condom market ought to make us "just say no" to investing in condoms, we also might "just say no" to condoms themselves were we to believe Michael Fumento’s AIDS: Are Heterosexuals at Risk? (Commentary, November, 1987). Fumento argues that there will never be a heterosexual AIDS epidemic in the United States. His claim is based on epidemiological evidence that AIDS transmission depends almost exclusively on anal sex or infected blood transferred via unsterilized needles or transfusions. Thus, one-night stands even with partners infected with the AIDS virus, are not high risk activities unless the active role in anal sex is practiced by the infected person. Vaginal intercourse seems very safe, and even oral sex, especially cunnilingus, probably involves very little danger.

The author rejects the notion that the predominantly heterosexual African AIDS pattern represents a preview of America’s future. Careless medical practices, closet bisexuality, rampant venereal disease, and ritual genital scarification are ubiquitous in Africa, dramatically increasing the likelihood of infection there.

Fumento accurately reports current knowledge regarding risks associated with specific sexual practices. Nevertheless, the sample sizes in intramarital transmission studies are too small and the retrospective recall of sexual behavior too unreliable to be confident that AIDS is not a major threat to heterosexuals. On the cross-cultural level, the absence of hard evidence about co-factors operating in Africa or the U.S. makes it difficult to determine whether our situation is truly different. Even if some co-factors are unique to or more widespread in Africa, most case histories might involve patterns applicable to us as well.

Fumento is particularly concerned with the politics of AIDS. He contends that scientists, physicians, conservative moralists, and gays have disingenuously created heterosexual hysteria. Medical professionals have done this to stimulate action to fight the disease. Moralists, on the other hand, have sought to justify homophobia and repressive sexual norms. To his credit, Fumento condemns the latter group by noting that monogamous relations can be far more dangerous than one-night stands.

His anger at some homosexual rights organizations, however, seems inappropriate. Fumento maintains that some gay spokesmen knowingly exaggerated heterosexual risk both to combat right-wing fundamentalist gay-bashing and to pressure the government to fund research it might not fund if AIDS were perceived simply as a “gay plague.” But does Fumento think it is preferable for homosexuals to say “Don’t worry, it’s only happening to us,” and assure more deaths?

Fumento also ignores the risks gays have undertaken by suggesting they are not alone. More funds have been forthcoming, but so has intense homophobia, a rise in physical assaults, calls for tattooing by William Buckley and quarantining by others. Even if gays win the AIDS battle, they may lose the civil rights war. Or they could lose both because help may come too late.

While you await the formation of a local Tikkun discussion group (and even afterwards), you might also want to participate in our electronic discussion group on The WELL, a popular computer conferencing system. Not only is there an ongoing conversation with people from all over the United States, but selected Tikkun articles are also available for downloading. We have prepared a short introductory brochure on the conference and how to register. If you have a computer and a modem, write: Tikkun On-Line, 753 Walker Ave., Oakland, CA 94610.

LAW AND IDEOLOGY

(Continued from p. 18)

about whether owners should be able to exclude picketers.

Trashing, deconstruction, and history have the very real utility of exposing the vulnerability of the routine justifications of power, of enabling people to spot the structural defects and to challenge many of the rationales they hear advanced for especially ugly legal practices. But nobody can be content just to trash, and in the second phase of C. L. S. many Critics find themselves trying to do the intellectual spadework, and often some of the political organizing as well, for various concrete projects of reconstruction. Some of these, notably that of the Harvard theorist Roberto Mangabeira Unger, are on the grand scale—a thousand-page reimagining of democracy, with detailed architectural sketches of political, economic, and social life as it might become. Most are much less ambitious and take the form of activism regarding low-income housing policy, legal regulation of pornography and rape, immigration reform, welfare and social security policy, delivery of legal services, labor law and specifically university labor practices, and always, naturally, law school politics.

If one of the effects of law is to constrict our ability to imagine alternative social arrangements, then it should be possible to liberate social imagination by dredging up and then working to flesh out some of the alternatives that are already present but have been suppressed in legal discourse. Historians have recently been revising the "republican" view of the purpose of politics as that of facilitating self-development through participation
in community self-governance—a periodic rival to the dominant liberal view that the end of politics is only to facilitate the individual pursuit of self-interest. Several Critics have begun to ask how republican ideology might influence the redesign of legal institutions—cities, corporations, workplaces, local administrative agencies. Others have followed what Unger calls the method of “doctrinal deviation,” taking a set of practices that have been routinely applied in one social field and imaginatively transferring them to another. Economic democracy is one example. Another is William Simon’s program of “downward professionalization.” In detailed studies of welfare administration, Simon makes the case (backed up by the historical example of the New Deal-era social workers) for entrusting the kind of broad discretionary decision making habitually given by judges and corporate managers to street-level welfare workers, arguing that such a regime could be superior in terms of both efficiency and humanity than the current regime of mechanized administration. Still other Critics are making use of feminist theory and phenomenology to try to evoke richer and fuller descriptions of intersubjective experience than can be found in the abstract and impoverished categories of law and legal economics, to try to recapture the selves from which they claim legal discourses have alienated us, as well as exposing the techniques of alienation.

To return now to where I began: What is it about C. L. S. that makes people so angry? As American critical movements in law go, it has stung the sharpest of any since the Legal Realism of the 1920s and 1930s, which C. L. S. much resembles in its evident delight in showing up the manipulability, vacuity, and arbitrarily conservative conclusions of legal discourses. The other main challenge to mainstream legal thought has been the movement to study law in its social context, which has repeatedly shown how power politics and cultural variation prevent formal legal rules from being enforced and applied in real life the way legal theories and doctrines predict they will be. But lawyers who make their livings expounding formal legal doctrine have been mostly impervious to demonstrations of its limited relevance. It has taken rowdies invading the heart of their own citadel to make them sit up. Still, why such fury?

For one thing, for all the use it makes of conventional academic argument, C. L. S. is a radical movement and of the left, and that’s enough in itself to make some fellow lawyers see Red. The public attacks on C. L. S. make up a fascinating collage of what Americans tend to think a left-wing movement must be about, with bits and pieces pulled from the French Revolution (Burke-Carlyle-Dickens version), vulgar Marxism, Soviet Stalinism, sixties anarchism. In these bizarre fantasies, Critics are Bolshevik saboteurs who will take over if you allow any in your faculty or firm, dangerous (in the Age of Reagan, yet), “nihilist” subverters of the “rule of law,” infantile but basically harmless hippie/yippies—or all of these at once. The attackers automatically suppose—obviously without bothering to read any of their work—that Critics must believe law to be nothing more than the result of ruling-class domination or the personal and political whims of judges, and that the Crit program must be, after a violent seizure of the state, to “socialize the means of production.”

But there are more sophisticated opponents, too. After all, the Critics really are out to reduce the legitimacy and authority of their elders in the intellectual legal establishment; and those elders, no fools, realize that and despise them for it, the more so because the Critics are not always kind or polite. Along with the academic trashling techniques I’ve described go ruder ones—satire, savage mockery, even sometimes scatology and a sort of juvenile thumb-nosing irreverence. Such trashling has a function. As the Norwegian philosopher Jon Elster puts it, in a society where authority is typically legitimized through control of the rational discourses, sometimes the most effective challenges to authority are those of “irony, eloquence, and propaganda,” refusing to talk authority’s language and aping its forms. Law in particular has lent a lot of its persuasive power by its manners: the pompous gravity of its hierophants, their arrogant certainty that the “smartness” certified by their success carries with it command over social truth. (At the same time, such rudeness, while helping to preserve the movement’s edge and to save it from becoming normalized into just another academic school, has undoubtedly alienated a lot of potential supporters.)

Harder to forgive than rudeness is rejection—not only of the elders themselves but of their whole elaborate structure of deference to their own seniors, their system for picking successors, their canon of heroes and respected texts. Much of the Harvard bitterness derives from the Critics’ insulting refusal to accept the long-approved criteria of “smartness” and “competence” for choosing colleagues—criteria, the Critics unkindly pointed out, that (besides yielding a faculty of look-alikes—people who wrote mostly the same kind of doctrinal scholarship, had views varying from the center-right to the center-left of the political spectrum, and included almost no women or minorities), were plainly deficient on their own terms, as evidenced by the fact that many teachers who met them burned out early and produced very little. Some C. L. S. work is disrespectful not only of their
elders' scholarship, but of the political achievements these men personally struggled for and are proudest of, such as the labor-relations policies of the New Deal and after. And C. L. S. perversely sets up its own intellectual counterheroes, who include the disreputable Legal Realists, as well as weird foreign imports, such as Hegel, Sartre, and Foucault. (I have heard one eminent legal scholar denounce C. L. S. as "un-American" and another disparage it as infected with "French and German" influences. Ah, the Continent—that dark breeding ground of dirty postcards and pestilential philosophic vapors!)

Among younger C. L. S. opponents—not caught up in the generational struggle and often as critical in their own way of their elders' work and politics—are the true technocrats, committed to a positivist model of science that seeks, even from social knowledge, law-like regularities that can be used for prediction and control. The technocrats are naturally revolted by C. L. S.'s aggressive antiscientific stance and furious at the reduction of social sciences to rhetorics. Their real quarrel, of course, isn't exclusively with C. L. S. but with the entire "interpretive" strain of philosophy and social science that denies the possibility of objective knowledge. (See Gary Peller's "Reason and the Mob: The Politics of Representation" *Tikkun* July/August, 1987.)

Some opponents see C. L. S. as a threat to liberal freedoms, those maintained by the "rule of law". If every "right" is seen as contingent, up for grabs, capable of being flipped inside out through reinterpretation in the twinkling of an eye, what will we rely on to save us from the "fascists" or the "mob"? These are hard questions, too hard for this sort of space, but a brief Critical answer might run like this: Legal "rights" are shorthand symbols for social practices that we collectively maintain. We value the symbols because of the latent utopian promises they hold out to us—promises of a world where we could freely and safely choose our associations with others without fear of domination by arbitrary authority. Yet, in any actual version of the legal code and its application, such promises will be realized only partially, occasionally, in fragments. The pretense that legal rules have an objective fixed set of meanings, above and beyond political choice, may sometimes help to keep monsters fenced in: If you live in Chile or Poland, or belong to a habitually trampled group in this country, you want to appeal as often as you can to rights and legal principles transcending those recognized by the dominant political forces. But the pretense of the objectivity of law also harmfully mystifies social life, encouraging people to think that the practices codified in law have fixed and frozen what they can hope to achieve, that so long as their rights are protected they can't complain, and discouraging them from political action aimed at transforming the content of rights so as to realize the emancipatory potential of law. A commitment to legalism can never substitute for a commitment to the ideals law distortedly symbolizes. As the Czech dissident Vaclav Havel writes in *The Power of the Powerless* (1985), after insisting at length on the importance of a politics of legalism aimed at embarrassing state authorities into giving some real content to the legal rituals that sustain their legitimacy: [E]ven in the most ideal of cases, the law is only one of several imperfect and more or less external ways of defending what is better in life against what is worse. . . . Establishing respect for the law does not automatically ensure a better life, for that, after all, is a job for people and not for laws and institutions. It is possible to imagine a society with good laws that are fully respected but in which it is impossible to live. Conversely one can imagine life being quite bearable even where the laws are imperfect and imperfectly applied. . . . Without keeping one's eyes open to the real dimensions of life's beauty and misery, and without a moral relationship to life, this struggle [for legality] will sooner or later come to grief on some self-justifying system of scholastics.

Possibly the most violent of all reactions to C. L. S. have come from people who are (like most lawyers) neither technocratic prophets of a scientifically managed social order nor committed to a view of law as determinate neutral principles. After all, if what you're looking for is a picture of law as irrational, chaotic, arbitrary, idiotically administered, loaded in favor of the rich and well-connected, you don't go to C. L. S., but to a veteran practitioner. *Nobody* is more cynical about law than lawyers. The fiercest reactions seem to come from people who have made their own complex peace with the way things are, have labeled that compact maturity and realism, and, for the sake of their own peace, wish that others would as well. For them, C. L. S. is a form of class treachery.

Last year the *New Republic* ran a particularly vitriolic but otherwise typical pair of attacks on C. L. S., Louis Menand's "What is Critical Legal Studies? Radicalism for Yuppies," and Marc Granetz's "Duncan the Doughnut" (both March 17, 1986). The writers argued that the Critics are frivolously self-deluded to suppose that merely by "deconstructing" law or demystifying the law's neutrality or autonomy from politics they are engaging in meaningful political action. In fact, it is argued, they are just posturing phonies eager to glamorize their privileged positions with a political rhetoric that costs them nothing and gives
them a false sense of commitment and self-importance. For Duncan Kennedy (the most conspicuous Harvard Crit), C. L. S. is “merely sport” whatever his politics are, they are not “immediately apparent in his upper-crust schooling and his conventional middle-class life.”

Disregard for the moment the stunning unfairness of the attacks* and focus on the underlying message: You will be permitted the standpoint of radical criticism but only from the margins of society. To earn it you must throw off all your middle-class privileges and opportunities and identify with the proletariat. If you buy into any middle-class privileges, you are forever disabled as a critical intellectual and political actor. Delivered by people who have themselves made the sacrifice, this message carries a real sting. But it is most often heard from those who have renounced nothing.

Behind their attitude—that acquiescence to the status quo comes with the contract of middle-class membership—lies a social theory, ironically shared by Marxists, liberals, and conservatives. It is that, whether you like it or not, the institutions of capitalism and the liberal state form a closed system. If you work “inside the system,” you necessarily help to reproduce it. Even my left-leaning students believe that if they go into corporate law practice, as many ultimately do, they will fill professional roles totally resistant to significant alteration. But this resignation to the imperatives of closed systems is a perfect example of those discourses of “false necessity,” imputing to such social practices as exist a spurious inevitability which C. L. S. has worked hardest to try to dissolve. Michel Foucault, whom many Crits follow on this point, argues that there is no particular central institutional location of social power. Rather, hierarchy is created and reproduced through hundreds of thousands of localized transactions. If power “comes from below,” through acquiescence in its exercise, then there are no systems, save as they are created through acquiescence. Everyone is a victim of hierarchy; everyone, through small acts of resistance and reformulation, a potential agent of liberation. It is simply not credible to suppose that people hemmed in by every sort of restraint—factory workers, plantation slaves, dissidents in totalitarian countries—should be capable of small transformations of their environments, as evidently they have been, but that associates in American law firms should be capable of none. For Eastern European intellectuals and professionals who have so little freedom, the great source of wonder has always been why Western intellectuals, who have so much, do so little with it.

Crits don’t tell their students that going into corporate practice or elite law school teaching is just as good as struggling “outside the system” for social change. The greatest honor in any activist movement must be reserved for those who renounce comfort and privilege for their commitments—in C. L. S., to people like Peter Gabel, mainstay of the working-class New College of Law in San Francisco, or Marc Feldman of Fresno Legal Services. But the point is that choosing privileged occupations does not end all of one’s responsibilities and opportunities. On the scene, one confronts issues of race and gender and class inequality, of democratic procedure, of relations with clients and the communities they affect, that can be the subject of small initiatives involving small risks. And that is finally what may be the most infuriating and subversive message of the Crits—not at all their supposed “nihilism,” but their insistence, to those who have come to equate maturity and realism with a cynical resignation, that there are grounds for hope.

Readers interested in C. L. S., its work and its meetings, can get on the mailing list by writing Alan Freeman or Betty Mensch, C. L. S., SUNY/Buffalo Law School, O’Brian Hall, Amherst, NY 14260. For a list of C. L. S. writings, see the bibliography in Yale Law Journal, Vol. 94, pp. 464-490 (1984), and for an excellent though demanding introduction to C. L. S. ideas, Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Harvard, 1987).

SOUTH AFRICAN JEWS
(Continued from p. 34)

shipping partially finished products to Israel, where the goods acquire some degree of Israeli local content, South African companies can circumvent trade barriers. In fact, they can acquire preferential tariff treatment. Israel also has helped the South African black tribal homelands, places the South African government insists are independent countries but which no other government in the world recognizes. Israel has given the homelands military training and development projects. The homeland government of Bophuthatswana has a trade representative in Israel.

The South African government has returned these favors by allowing Jews exemptions under South African currency restrictions to send extra money to Israel: South African Jews can invest money in certain approved Israeli bonds or businesses.

Traditionally, Israel has defended the links by saying that they were in the interests of the South African Jewish community. But black leaders are questioning that argument. Archbishop Tutu has warned that Israel’s trade with South Africa is harming the image of Jews.

* A few Crits are tenured, but the great majority are not and, as recent events have shown, take real risks with their jobs by association with C. L. S. Almost all are politically active outside academic settings as well. Kennedy’s commitments are sufficiently demonstrated in the generous attention he gives to radical students and their work, his representation of welfare clients at Jamaica Plain’s Legal Services Center, his projects in developing strategies for low-income housing reform, and his participation in union organizing campaigns.
among blacks and could endanger long-term Jewish interests under a predominantly black government.

Another parallel between Jews and Afrikaners is that both claim to be chosen people. At the austere Voortrekker monument in Pretoria, a frieze depicts the high points of Afrikaner historical mythology: The Voortrekkers cross the Tugela River into the wilderness just as the Jews crossed the Red Sea. In the wilderness, the Voortrekkers make a covenant with God and their leader is handed a copy of the Bible, much as Moses received the Ten Commandments. They also withstand attacks from heathens.

Neither Jews nor Afrikaners are comfortable with this comparison. Afrikaners feel that Jews threaten the Afrikaners’ own claim to be chosen. At last year’s Republic Day celebrations at the foot of the Voortrekker monument, the loudest cheers went to right-wing Afrikaners wearing khaki uniforms and armbands with a Nazi-style insignia, a black pointed symbol on a circle of white against a red background. In the parking lot, some of these Afrikaners handed out pamphlets entitled “Absolute, Historical Proof: Jews are not Israelis!” The leaflet asked whether “the Jews ‘chosen people’ masquerade was finally over.” Citing the theory that modern Jews are descended from eighth-century Khazar converts from Eastern Europe, the leaflet alleged that “Jewish politicians, publishers, moviemakers, and opinion molders ... are Mongol and Hun infiltrators of Christendom.”

Jews don’t like the comparison because they feel Afrikaners have twisted the meaning of being chosen. In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich) Hannah Arendt wrote that “like the Jews, [the Afrikaners] firmly believed in themselves as the chosen people, with the essential difference that they were chosen not for the sake of the divine salvation of mankind, but for the lazy domination over another species that was condemned to an equally lazy drudgery.”

Rabbi Ashabi says that “the chosen people syndrome has been misinterpreted. It doesn’t mean that Jews are better than others [but] rather that they are privileged, or cursed, with greater responsibility than others to show that things can be done differently.”

Have Jews lived up to that responsibility in South Africa? Some Jews refuse to generalize about the political orientation of South African Jews and refuse to be surprised that South African Jews are fitting in with mainstream white politics. They argue that it is unreasonable to expect any political difference between Jews and other white South Africans. But by doing so they undermine their own assertions that Jewish identity is special. The very lack of distinction between Jews and other white South Africans drove one liberal chief rabbi to despair in the early 1960s. Chief Rabbi Louis Rabinowitz said in a Yom Kippur service twenty-five years ago that “the most lamentable failure of Judaism to make its impact upon our lives lies not in the failure to observe, but in the almost complete absence of any specific Jewish ethical standards which mark us out from the community in which we live. What do we do to loosen the bonds of wickedness, to undo the bonds of oppression? ... Have Jewish ethics ever descended to a more shameful nadir?”

THE LEGACY OF THE SIXTIES
(Continued from p. 48)

The attempt to attribute the problems of the New Left to “wrong ideas” without understanding the social and psychological dynamics that might lead people to adopt those ideas misses the point that any movement dominated by self-blaming, guilt, and surplus powerlessness may quickly adopt ideas that are far from its original intentions.

There is no doubt that repression, co-optation, and the changing economic situation of the early 1970s accelerated the process of disempowerment, but these factors would never by themselves have been sufficient to defeat a vibrant movement. The economic crisis of the 1970s may have forced many to take jobs and to have less time for politics, but it also presented what could have been a golden opportunity to extend New Left consciousness into sectors of the society that a student-based movement had been unable to address. In the early 1970s, for instance, I used my position as a national leader in the antiwar movement to advocate that the New Left take up the issue of tax reform long before the right in California used that as its mechanism to win popular support with the Jarvis-Gann Proposition 13. A tax initiative in California could have been developed that both relieved the pressure on middle-income people and simultaneously insured protection and even expansion of social benefits for the poor. A coherent and confident New Left could have addressed the economic issues created by the contraction of the economy, dramatically expanding its base in the process. In short, there was no inevitability in the New Left’s decline. Objective conditions presented opportunities as well as constraints.

Similarly, the ending of the war in Vietnam was not the decisive factor. The New Left emerged as a coherent and powerful political force before the war became a major issue, and its internal collapse occurred before the bombings of Vietnam ended. Even though the ending of the war might explain why the movement no longer mobilized millions of people in mass marches, it cannot explain why hundreds of thousands of activists who focused on changing other aspects of American society dropped out of the movement in the next few years. Even the draft was not decisive for them: The
biggest and most militant demonstrations occurred after the draft no longer directly affected the lives of the students and middle-class youth—the bulk of those who continued to protest from 1969 to 1972.

Repression, too, though an important factor, could never have been decisive. The indictments and jailing of leaders coupled with the random shooting of demonstrators at Kent State and Jackson State certainly created deep fear. The frequency with which police used excessive force gives the lie to those who now rewrite history to pretend that New Leftists really were on a self-indulgent joyride or living in narcissistic bliss in the sixties. Even though millions of peace activists only participated in the mass mobilizations in which there was very little personal risk, hundreds of thousands participated in other more militant demonstrations in which they believed (often correctly) that they were at risk of arrest and physical assault. Nevertheless, at an earlier stage, repression had actually enhanced the growth of the movement. It would have continued to do so, had the people inside the movement believed that the risks were worth it. But once they began to question the moral legitimacy of the movement, to doubt whether they were morally acceptable, repression became much more decisive. Why risk jail or permanent physical injury if the movement itself was somehow corrupt, racist, sexist, and elitist?

Some argue that an important reason why people lost faith in the movement was that the inhuman dynamics that I have discussed were themselves produced by police agents who infiltrated the movement. Congressional hearings of the mid-1970s revealed the extensive COINTELPRO program of the FBI, which often effectively disrupted New Left activities. These police and FBI agents helped instigate a climate of violence, both by committing outrageous acts that were attributed to the movement, and by denouncing other movement members for being too wimpy. Similarly, they frequently attacked the most effective leaders, spreading stories about them that reinforced pre-existing beliefs that these people were self-serving, sexist, and elitist. Yet none of this could have succeeded had there not already existed in the movement a basis for the provocateurs’ appeal: a deep sense of inadequacy about who people were and what they had done.

The overall impact of these dynamics was to create a war of all against all in the movement. Everyone was suspect. Most people felt under siege; potentially at any moment they would be revealed as inadequate exemplifications of the values everyone held. From the warmth and solidarity that prevailed in the early 1960s the movement had quickly turned into an arena of ugliness and mutual recrimination. No matter how attracted one might be to its values, the actual experience of being made to feel inadequate and guilty drove people away.

Yet, given the individualist ideology that pervaded the society, those who left the movement often misinterpreted their experience. Instead of realizing that any social movement will necessarily be filled with imperfect people and that the mutual self-blaming and intolerance were manifestations of the way people had been hurt and weakened by this system, people who quit frequently thought that their experience had taught them about the fundamental bankruptcy of radical politics itself. It was not unusual to hear people declare that they had tried politics and discovered, much to their shock and amazement, that the people in radical politics were just as screwed up; as everyone else! Or, as a frequently quoted Pogo comic strip of the time proclaimed, “We have met the enemy—and it is us!” Those who quit were still holding on deeply to the same fantasy of total individual transformation that had led the New Leftists to assume that by individual acts of will they could become living exemplars of their vision of the future. Given this interpretation of their experience, it is no surprise that so many of these former activists became involved in various other quests for personal transformation and individual salvation. To the extent that they believed that it was individual inadequacies that produced political distortions, it became a political priority to seek personal change. Some sought to become “perfect, enlightened beings” through various forms of Eastern spirituality; others to become “open and honest” through human potential movement offsprings; others to become “healthy” through psychotherapies, traditional or alternative. As Reichian ideas helped popularize the notion that neurosis might be ingredient in the body as well, self-transformation led to a new attention to physical health, aerobics, diet, exercise, and massage. It may seem only a few short steps from the self-involvement of the 1970s to the rise of “yuppie” self-indulgence in the 1980s, but it is important to recognize that the initial impulse that eventually led many people into self-absorption was often understood by the participants to be an extension of the same quest to make the world a better place that had led them into the New Left.

H ad the New Left survived through the 1970s, it would have had a massive repair job on its hands, quite apart from repudiating the internal dynamic of self-blaming. That same absence of compassion toward itself was reflected in its attitudes toward everyone outside the movement, and by the early 1970s many Americans sensed that the New Left held them and their lifestyles in considerable contempt. Although some Marxists within the movement continued to preach the centrality of “reaching the working class,”
most New Leftists appropriated the class prejudices of the American upper-middle class. For example, Weathermen and their followers declared that the war and racism were products not just of a ruling elite, but of the "white skin privilege" of American workers. Counterculturists berated mainstream Americans for participating in the worlds of work and family life, since these were manifestations of the deadness of the larger culture. Some people in the women's movement derided all women who remained in relationships with men as being "male-identified" and selling out their sisters. Virtually everyone who retained a commitment to religion was treated with suspicion. Those of us who were in the movement precisely because of our religious commitment to peace and justice and to the sanctity of human life usually kept our metaphysical frameworks in the closet—or else faced marginalization at the hands of most hard-core activists.

To be sure, the disdain for non-movement affiliated Americans was based on some real experiences that could strain anyone's compassion—the widespread racism shown by southerners against blacks who sought to achieve civil rights, and the continued willingness of Americans to vote for political candidates who supported appropriations for the war in Vietnam. Yet instead of asking what kinds of social conditioning might have led to this behavior, instead of reminding themselves that only a few years before they themselves had been prisoners of the same conditioning, New Leftists dismissed all the not-yet-converted to antiracist and peace politics as stupid or evil. They would not allow themselves to overlook the areas of political disagreement so that they might hear the pain and frustration in people's lives.

This same lack of compassion reached even more explicit formulation in the folk wisdom of the 1960s "counterculture." If you worked for a living, you were accused of having bought into the system and thus probably an enemy! With deep contempt, Bay Area hippies would revile people driving home from work with shouts of "Work addicts! Shame on you!" Those who sought to build monogamous relationships were seen as possessive and sexually dead. Not only were people who lived traditional lifestyles attacked as "unhip," they were also accused of being the cause of all that was wrong in the world. For many in the counterculture, the problem was not an economic or political system, but the American people themselves. Although at first political New Leftists tended to distance themselves from the counterculturists, by the end of the sixties these countercultural values were increasingly articulated within the heart of New Left political movements, and the popular perception that these two tendencies represented one unified phenomenon in-

creasingly approximated the reality.

Given this disdain for the lives of most people, New Leftists felt they had little to learn from Americans outside the movement. Had they listened with a compassionate ear, New Leftists would have heard that many Americans were raising the same kinds of questions about the ultimate worth of American materialism and the competitive marketplace that motivated many leftists. These Americans used a different language to articulate their concerns: They spoke about the decline of traditional values, the crisis in family life, and the need for a new and more vital spirituality (born-again religion). Rightists saw a golden opportunity here and helped provide people with a conservative vocabulary in which these concerns could be further articulated and linked to a politics that, ironically, supported the very institutions that generated the problems in the first place. Right-wingers succeeded, in part, because no leftists thought it important to enter this terrain with an alternative analysis, and, in part, because the attack on their lifestyle and values from the left predisposed many Americans to distrust anyone associated with the left.

It was all too easy, given these attitudes, for a hostile press to portray the New Left as representing a repudiation and denigration of the values and attitudes of the majority of the population, not simply of the ruling elites. It was precisely this theme that enabled Nixon and Agnew to position themselves as battling against left-wing elitists and in favor of "the ordinary American" whose values were under siege. In adopting this stance, the right took the first steps towards the creation of a populism that would eventually bring them to power in the 1980s. They no longer represented themselves as the champions of the elites of wealth and power, but rather as anti-elitists defending the majority against a vicious and contemptuous assault by a minority. Even in the late 1980s, the continued accusation that the Democrats are controlled by "special interests" derives its power from the legacy of the 1960s, the suspicion that these special interest groups have contempt for the lives of the American majority. Although the women's movement and black spokespeople can rightfully point out that no one today is making those kinds of contemptuous statements, the popular perception was formed in the early 1970s as a result of real antagonism toward ordinary Americans. Until that image is systematically changed, by the conscious efforts of social change movements to convey a sense of respect for the problems and issues of the majority, any left movement is likely to find itself relatively isolated. Although Americans on the rebound from the Iran/contra scandal and from the economic failures of the Reagan Administration may elect liberal Democrats in 1988, we may see in the 1990s the per-
istence of the phenomenon that governed this decade—majorities disagreeing with the right on the substance of many specific programs, yet trusting these conservative forces because they seem to understand and care for them.

There is only one way that liberals and progressives can change the popular perception of the left. They must begin to address the real pain that people experience in everyday life, show that they care about those pains, and present ideas about how to deal with the underlying causes. This need not mean abandoning the progressive agenda: the fight for equal rights, for an end to militarism and nuclear weapons, for the democratization of the economy and rational economic planning, for a bill of economic rights that ensures employment and health care and housing, for a pro-ecology perspective, and for an end to apartheid cannot be abandoned even temporarily. But in order to be effective in these struggles, the liberal and progressive forces are going to have to overcome the feelings of so many Americans that those on the left cannot be trusted. And the way to do that is to show that the left deeply understands and cares about the daily life experiences and concerns of most Americans. Those concerns include the stress people experience at work, the pain in their family lives, the dissolution of ethical values that they see reflected in the behavior of their children, the rampant materialism, the lack of respect for the physical environment, and the triumph of individualist values.

The irony is that once we begin to talk about these kinds of issues, it is precisely the left that is in the best position to understand them and to show how these problems are rooted in the values of a competitive market society. It is the left that should represent itself as the pro-family movement, because it is the values and operations of a capitalist society, decisively shaping narcissistic personalities ill-suited for loving commitments, that play a major role in undermining family life. Similarly, it is the materialism and competitive individualism of the capitalist market that are decisive in creating a culture that values money and power over all other goods. Spiritual sensitivity, which is so hard to find in this society, sought by many who are attracted to right-wing churches, is systematically undermined by the very institutions that right-wing politicians and ideologies work so hard to sustain! In short, once we take up the pains that people are feeling in daily life, we are in an excellent position to address their concerns in a far more compelling way than the right can do—and in so doing we are immediately led to raise some of the most radical questions about the structures of our society. So, although a focus on issues like family, spirituality, and ethical values seems to be a step away from the list of traditional liberal/progressive issues, it may actually lead us more quickly to the underlying structural problems than some of the current reformist programs of the left.

A central focus of the approach I am advocating is to foster a mass psychology of compassion. Liberals and progressives can help people understand that those pains are not their own fault, but the product of a psychological and social legacy that they cannot, at least as lone individuals, hope to change. Stripped of the self-blaming, however, they can be empowered to work with others to actually change at least some of the conditions that prevent them from having more fulfilling lives.

The most immediate political task is to find ways to translate this direction into practical politics. For some, that direction will involve the development of a national profamily coalition that promotes an analysis of the social/structural aspects of our society that undermine loving relationships and that develops profamily legislation (which would necessarily include programs for increased workers’ control at stressful workplaces). For others, the task will be to develop television advertisements for the candidates and for the social change movements that raise these connections between personal life and social structure—and do it in effectively communicated daily-life-oriented vignettes. For still others, it will be the development of a national network of small groups, based on the women’s movement’s “consciousness-raising,” that provides a context for people to explore the problems they face in work, family life, friendships, and ethical values, and how these are shaped by the social psychological inheritance of a deformed society. My thinking on these issues, of course, has been inspired by what I learned from the analysis and strategy of the American women’s movement. Yet my own work as a therapist in the labor movement convinces me that this is an approach that can work effectively with many people in middle America.

To build a movement that aims to transform the world must necessarily involve the other meanings of the

*In Surplus Powerlessness (1985), I describe my experience leading occupational stress groups and family support groups. These groups had an incredibly empowering impact on precisely those American workers whom you’d least expect to participate in an activity even vaguely resembling “consciousness-raising.” The same thirst for self-understanding, the same pain in personal life that leads so many upper-middle-class Americans into various forms of therapy and self-help groups creates a similar openness amongst most Americans to participate in groups that help them make sense of their lives. If such groups were aligned to a national movement that was doing mass education about the relationship between personal life and those social, psychological, and economic constraints that at every stage of life shape our options and restrict our possibilities, we would quickly find a growing radicalization among many who have never been reached by the liberal and progressive forces. A political movement that incorporated these groups and this focus as a central part of its work, along with the rest of its political activities, would quickly become one of the most popular and powerful forces in American politics.
word tikkan: to heal and repair. Any movement for social change must have as a central task the healing of those wounds that have made us unable to trust each other. And mutual confidence building, an ability to stay in touch with each other's humanity even as we disagree about specific ideas, strategies, or analyses of the situation, is the key to overcoming surplus powerlessness and building a transformative movement. In that process we will continually face moments in which we disappoint each other. Building compassion may prepare us for those inevitably painful moments. Imagine a movement that not only trained people to do canvassing for a political candidate or a cause, not only prepared people for non-violent action or public speaking, but also insisted that its activists do training around issues like: how to rebuild confidence in a meeting after someone has started to put down others, thereby introducing a climate in which people feel reluctant to say what they really think; how to face moments when people act with greater cowardice or self-interest than you would wish; how to uncover the ways that people are unfairly blaming themselves—and how to help them see that more clearly; how to create celebrations of the little victories, so that people give themselves adequate credit for what they have accomplished; how to help sustain commitment through periods when there have been no immediate victories; and how to show people in a social movement that they are really being cared for by each other even at moments when the focus is more outward on winning political victories.

It is useful for non-Jews and Jews alike to realize that some of the elements in building such a movement can be learned by studying the Jewish tradition, its history and practices. Even if you reject its theology, there is much to learn from a tradition that has been built through the centuries and has sustained a people that thinks of itself as having a transformative goal. Its way of transmitting ideas from generation to generation, its ability to laugh at itself and to create a nourishing sense of humor, its way of institutionalizing celebrations as well as days of mourning, its attention to the personal rites of passages like birth, marriage, and death might yet serve as a useful model for those who wish to build a movement that understands that it will not win its battles for a new world in one generation. To the extent that social movements are not able to learn from long-lasting traditions such as Judaism, they will always seem somewhat immature, the products more of twenty-year olds' theories than of accumulated wisdom.

Finally, another word of compassion for the New Left. Given the psychodynamics of American society, it is all too understandable why movement activists would have been imbued with the same kind of individualism and consequent self-blaming as everyone else. Having compassion must, then, include having compassion for ourselves, including compassion for the ways that we are not as compassionate as we ought to be. It is all too easy to imagine a political movement that uses the ideas propounded here and proceeds to recreate a process of people trashing each other—for not being adequately compassionate! Indeed, to the extent that a movement can be seen to embody compassion for its own members and their limitations, to that extent it will be more effective in communicating a similar compassion to those outside it. While my analysis leads me to understand that there will be real constraints on how much we can embody this kind of ideal, it does not prevent me from seeing this as the necessary direction for our collective efforts.

If a spirit of compassion for all those who labor in the vineyards of social change is fundamental, then our reflection on the sixties should also express our deep appreciation for all those who gave part of their lives to the pursuit of moral ideals that remain worthy of our respect. Whatever our faults and weaknesses, we, together, showed that the desire for a morally ordered world continues to be a great hunger of humankind. The task of politics today, then, is to reaffirm our sense of trust in each other, to develop our ability to see through the inevitable defects and disappointments, and to build confidence once again in the possibility of possibility. □

SECOND THOUGHTS
(Continued from p. 52)

Media.) Collier and Horowitz had known weeks before what Cameron was going to say—indeed, they had talked him out of withdrawing from the conference—but most of the audience was astonished and horrified. The tone of his break was harsher than he had planned, in part, because he was appalled that Horowitz and Collier, who had just returned from their Nicaraguan spin, had turned the conference "into a demonstration against the Sandinistas." Derailed by Cameron, the conference never quite got back on track.

V

or did father-son reconciliation work out any better. Eager for lineage, Horowitz and Collier had invited venerable predecessors to scatter holy water at an after-banquet Saturday night ceremonial. Elder titans of literate neo- (rapidly turning paleo-) conservatism turned out: Hilton Kramer (The New Criterion), William Phillips (Partisan Review), Norman Podhoretz (Commentary), Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer (The Public Interest)—hosted by Martin Peretz, whose son calls him "the left-wing of the Right." It
should have made for a theater of reconciliation; for what are prodigal sons without presiding parents to welcome them home? (We should add that the sons were remarkably unaccompanied by daughters. Among thirty speakers there was a grand total of one female, Carol Jannone of Iona College, whose burden was to trash all of feminism and its works. But rivers of blood in Cambodia will not convince today's women that feminism should be repealed.)

One might have thought the fathers would be delighted to receive the wayward ex-young back at the family hearth. To Horowitz's amazement, the once revolting against revolting back, lecturing the striplings for insufficient penance. The fathers didn't want to hear the pitter-patter of word processors, but the sound of a chisel carving final truth—theirs—into granite. And so the evening turned into the theater, or skit, of cruelty. In a scene eerily reminiscent of the League for Industrial Democracy's assault on its offspring SDS after the Peace Now Convention of 1962, the Old ex-Left (all children of Jewish immigrants) alternately savaged and patronized the New (whose relative case with America comes from being the grandchildren of immigrants). "Despite the born-again atmosphere of this morning," grunted Hilton Kramer, "there was the same old moral smugness.... You were all immoralists.... Things are worse now than they were when you were all having such a wonderful time in the Sixties." The more genial Kristol allowed as to how "second thoughts" had come and gone for two hundred years, but he remained unimpressed. ("Kristol is brilliant," Horowitz said later, "but what he said was cynical and stupid.") Horowitz had sent Kristol the book of conference papers beforehand but "I think he didn't give it two thoughts."

The grim, unreconciled Podhoretz took the occasion to chastise that Ur-text of afterthoughts, The God that Failed, for failing to be sufficiently "hard line"—it offered only the bleak choice, as Koestler said, between darkness (East) and grey twilight (West). There is no refuge in liberalism, Podhoretz droned on, lecturing the morning panelists against liberal and social-democratic illusions. The "major problem," in the end, was "this corrupted and poisoned culture." But what Podhoretz loathes is quintessentially American: Emerson, Barnum, dime novels, rock music, making the wrong kind of whoopie. No wonder the fathers of neoconservatism feel embattled—after seven years of the Reagan reign, they believe the press, the universities, Hollywood are hellbent against them. They are obsessed with the "frailty" of American society, indeed, of civilization. They loathe the Left's version of the celebration of victims (or America's alleged victims," as Collier and Horowitz put it in a Commentary article last year), but their own style is self-crucifixion. Bashing fun culture, they doom themselves to perpetual martyrdom. The beleaguered defenders of civility can't get no satisfaction. "They're all puritanical," was Horowitz's afterthought. "Norman and Kristol showed me that the generation gap still exists." As for Nathan Glazer's closing suggestion that "the view of monolithic communism as a danger to the United States is overrated," the crowd by that time was too pummeled to notice.

The next day came chastisement of a different sort. Giving Sunday's luncheon oration was Julius Lester, erstwhile black radical and currently a novelist, professor, and convert to Judaism. Lester, thin almost to the point of emaciation, was dressed in the studied casualness—complete with boots and a cowboy hat—of a New Leftist. He began by explaining his attraction to the movement. Lester told of growing up in a South so segregated that he reached his teens before he spoke to a white person. In this environment, he gently reminded the audience, "Black and white together was a revolutionary statement." There followed tempered praise for Malcolm X—"what he said was hard to embrace but also hard to deny"—and for Frantz Fanon. What, asked murmurers in the audience, was this guy doing here?

Lester's second thoughts, it turned out, were those of an intellectual/artist grown suspicious of any political mission. In the late Sixties, a close friend questioned why he stayed married to a white woman; while Kathleen Cleaver responded to his criticisms of the Panthers with the deathless line, "Fuck Julius Lester! All power to the people!" Lester resigned from the left-wing Guardian after its editors delayed publishing an erotic poem he had written on the death of Ho Chi Minh. The lesson of the New Left's turn to dogmatism, he asserted, is the tyranny of abstract language. "There's no great difference between a radical and a conservative," he concluded. "They disagree only on who is the 'them.'"

Thus the black ex-leftist informed the overwhelmingly white ex's that they still were missing the point. Exchanging one correct line for another would not make them or anyone else free. When Lester's admonishment ended, a few born-again liberals rose to applause, but at the Podhoretz-Decter table nobody moved.

VI

G rumpy Jewish intellectuals, punctuating their talks with references to The New Masses, Partisan Review, Trotsky, Koestler, and Spender, didn’t play much better to the goyish moneyed right, for whom Kronstadt sounds like the latest German beer. "Over my dead body," conference sponsor James Denton opined at the bar later that night. All-or-nothing hysteria and a commitment to marginality aren't enough, in the
end, to stitch together highbrow and lowbrow, fundamentalist and Jew.* The New ex-Left may briefly quicken the right-wing pulse, but most are not reliably manic, or Manichean, and there are not enough of them. Moreover, they inhabit places like Manhattan, Bethesda, and Cambridge, where the Republican Right is weak.

Although anti-communism, Denton said, was the conference litmus test, one could well ask, as the New Left was always asked, What do you people want? To be ex-New Left and anti-communist will be no more sturdy a basis for politics than loathing the American war was twenty years ago. Indeed, the very concentration on foreign policy barely papers over the cracks dividing welfare-staters from libertarians, antifeminists from postfeminists. To make things still shakier for the New ex-Left, beneath the occasional fervor of “Second Thoughts” could be detected an apprehensive, even elegiac note. As for the contras, Third World darlings of the New ex-Left, beneath the oratory of their articulate and civilized spokesmen at the Grand Hyatt one could detect, thanks to the Iran scandal and the Arias plan, the slump of their cause. The best that contra Javier Argüello, a former Sandinista culture official, could do was to deplore America’s need for returns on investments, and to quote Borges to the effect that a gentleman is always in favor of lost causes.

Thirty years ago, the American right asked, to great effect, Who lost China? Today the ex-Left brethren ask, Who lost Vietnam, indeed America? It is as grandiose as it is self-crucifying to answer, We did! The ex-Left’s passion is still riveted to the fantasy of the Left’s absolute power to storm heaven and remake the world at gunpoint. Horowitz, Podhoretz, & Co. need the shade of the Left; once it animated them into tragedy, now in unwitting farce.

But the New ex-Left’s debacle is nothing to gloat over. The political clarity that eludes the New ex-Left also escapes liberals and the bewildered Left. The day after “Second Thoughts,” the stock market crashed (no causal relationship implied), and where were the opposition’s clear visions of what an American economy ought to be in a world growing seamless? Now that The New York Times editorial board, Mario Cuomo, and E. P. Thompson all agree that the cold war is over, where is the clear-headed debate about aftermaths? Ban-the-bomb, a necessary impulse, is not a defense policy for a nation-state. Anti-interventionism without illusions is the beginning of a foreign policy, but only a beginning; to call for solidarity with revolutions does not address the reasons revolutions devour their children, as well as other people’s. There is trouble, too, when the American left-of-center hastens after foreign policy because domestic assurance eludes it—especially the economic variety, which is uppermost in voters’ minds.

The beginning of political wisdom would be to recognize that the Left lost initiative after the Sixties partly because it failed to address the new anxieties and demands of a society which the movement had helped to change. Now there is considerable evidence (see, for example, Craig Reinman’s study of the ambivalent attitudes of working people, American States of Mind) that the old liberal-conservative divide is played out; as Michael Harrington has put it, the country is moving left, right, and center all at the same time. In this moment of shift and abeyance, as the tide goes out on the Reagan Counterreformation, it behooves us to recognize that the Right got as far as it did because, for a time, it swarmed into a political vacuum—a vacuum that remains to be filled.

BEYOND IDEOLOGY
(Continued from p. 56)

Arthur Cohen has his heroine say:

The mind has its work and its materials; it has no choice in this respect. It can do nothing else but work properly—balancing thrust with caution, intuition with verification, argument with detail, interpretation with groundwork, grand truth with the webbing of subtle argument. The working of the mind is a slow and patient procedure. It cannot be rushed… Clarity is the moral luster of the mind.

This was our birthright as intellectuals, but to possess it we needed to withstand the terror, loneliness, and isolation inherent in intellectual life. The intellectual must be an Outsider because only from the outside can one see clearly what is occurring on the inside. We succumbed to the understandable human need to be at the party, standing beside the fireplace, drinking hot cider.

Such failings were predictable because it is only a short step from idealism to ideology. Both hold out the promise of giving life meaning; both promise to shelter us from the uncertainties and anxieties of self-knowledge. Ideology does not permit second thoughts, however, because ideology is a cosmology, answering all questions, past, present, and future. Eventually, thoughts become unnecessary, even first thoughts, and the struggle to be human is scorned as individualism. The factionalism and political name-calling that had alienated so many of us from the Old Left became the language of the Black Movement and the New Left.

In the spring of 1969, SDS passed a resolution asserting that the Black Panther party was the “vanguard” of the Black Movement, the true representative of revolutionary
nationalism. In my weekly column in The Guardian, I objected and wrote, in part: "What is at issue here is the correct relationship a white radical organization should have to the black revolutionary movement. By presuming to know what program, ideology, military strategy, and what particular organizations best serve the interests of the black community," SDS was being "more white than revolutionary."

Two weeks later The Guardian published a response by Kathleen Cleaver, the Panther secretary of communications. Among other things, she called me a "counter-revolutionary," "a fool" peddling "madness," a "racist," and ended with these eloquent words: "Fuck Julius Lester. All power to the people!"

I did not understand. I remembered Kathleen from when she had come to work in the Atlanta SNCC office, a young woman with a big grin and a lot of enthusiasm. We were pals, in the best sense of that word, able to laugh and play together. What had happened to her? What was happening to us all? Why did Kathleen need me to agree with her? Why did blacks need me to leave my wife so they could be black? But when the personal becomes political, persons cease to exist. When persons cease to exist, war is imminent.

I was not surprised to hear rumors that the Panthers were going to kill me. I believed the rumors because I knew people whom the Panthers had threatened with guns because of political disagreements. But all my second thoughts crystallized into an unshakable conviction: I would choose death, because to live and not write what I believed to be true was not to live at all.

The rumors were only rumors and nothing happened, but a new round of second thoughts arose. What did it mean that I had more space and freedom to think and write in Nixon’s America than in The Movement with all its revolutionary rhetoric?

In September of the same year, Ho Chi Minh died. I had been in North Vietnam for a month in 1967, and had witnessed U.S. bombing raids at a time when the government was still denying such bombing raids. Most of all, though, I remembered the lyrical beauty of that country. Perhaps that is why my response to Ho’s death was to write a poem and publish it as my weekly column in The Guardian. This is the poem:

Half awakened by the light of morning
choking in the greyness
of a third of September Wednesday,
I reached out for the
roundness
softness
fullness
allness of her
and she, awakened,
began to move,

softly,
silently,
gently,
and my hand found that place,
that hidden place,
that secret place,
that
won-
der-
ful place
and in the quiescent light of
a third of September Wednesday morning,
I felt my penis being taken into the
salty
thick
fluidity
of her swirling movement
easily
softly
gently
(as the children were waking.)

Afterwards,
my penis, moist and warm,
resting on my thigh like some
fish washed onto the beach by full moontide,
I turned on the radio
and we heard that
Ho Chi Minh lay dying.
(The fog covered the seagulls that
sit on the rocky beach when the tide is out.)

I retreated from her,
not talking that day as the radio told me
(every hour on the hour)
that Ho Chi Minh lay dying.
Finally, when night had covered the fog,
we heard that
Ho Chi Minh was dead
and I came back to her.
Ho Chi Minh was dead.
I wanted her again.
The softness
the roundness
the fullness
the allness.

Ho Chi Minh was dead.

When the next issue of The Guardian came out, a poem of Ho’s was in the space where my column usually appeared. Angry, I called the office wanting to know why my poem had not been published. The editor told me the staff had decided that if the poem were published the week of Ho’s death, it would not be understood as the appreciation of Ho that it was.
They had decided to delay publication of my poem for a week. I asked why they hadn’t let me know, or discussed it with me. The editor said they had been too busy. I was not convinced.

They published the poem the following week, and the week after my final column appeared announcing my resignation from the paper. I wrote about a young black kid named George Best who used to hang around the Atlanta SNCC office. In the summer of 1967 George had gone to West Point, Mississippi to organize and had died under suspicious circumstances. The police claimed that George’s car accidentally ended up in a creek, George inside. I did not learn of George’s death until my return from a trip to Cuba. I also learned that SNCC had not sent flowers to his funeral. I was outraged and frightened and that, perhaps, was the moment when my second thoughts acquired their strongest roots. Near the end of that last column for The Guardian, I wrote about how instrumental SNCC’s failure to send flowers to George’s funeral had been in my eventually leaving the organization:

It became too much to have to fight the enemy and those with whom I was working. We had been through too much, I guess. The burdens had gotten too heavy and the frustrations had become so painful that we could no longer give each other the personal support each of us needed to do our job—make the revolution. Our love for black people was overwhelmed by our inability to do everything to make that love manifest, and after a while we could not even love each other. We got so involved in the day-to-day functioning of an organization, so enmeshed in fixing the mimeograph machine, writing leaflets, raising money, sitting in interminable meetings where we said what we were going to do and had forgotten what we were going to do by the time the meeting was over; and eventually we forget, can’t even remember that the revolution is an “embryonic journey” and that we are the embryos inside society. If we cannot be human to each other, the revolution will be stillborn.

I had thought that the revolution was to create a society in which power elites did not arbitrarily determine what “the people” might and might not understand. Well, I should have known that the revolution wouldn’t be erotic.

I left The Guardian but it was hard to leave The Movement. It had been my identity and life, my family and community. When Dave Dellinger’s magazine Liberation, asked me to write for it, I agreed. Less than a year passed, and once again I wrote something that a Movement publication did not want to publish.

The occasion was the trial in New Haven of seven members of the Black Panther party who had been accused of torturing and murdering Alex Rackley, another BPP member. Three party members admitted their active participation in the torture and murder of Rackley. Yet, black and white radicals were demonstrating on the New Haven Green, and many articles were published in the radical press demanding that the New Haven Seven be freed. The rationale? It was impossible for blacks to receive justice in America. White sycophancy toward the Black Movement had set a new standard for madness. I sat down to the typewriter:

... we can self-righteously cite the verdict of the Nuremberg Trials when we want to condemn the military establishment and the politicians. We can say to them that you are personally responsible for what you do, that you do not have to follow orders and there are no extenuating circumstances. Yet, we can turn right around and become Adolf Eichmann’s eloquent apologists for the Movement’s My Lai... Our morality is used to condemn others, but it is not to be applied to ourselves. We can react with outrage when four are murdered at Kent State, but when a professor is killed in the dynamiting of the Mathematics Building at the University of Wisconsin, we don’t give it a second thought. When we kill, there are extenuating circumstances. It was an accident, we say. The blast went off too soon.

The murder of Alex Rackley was... the logical culmination of the politics we have been espousing, a politics of violence-for-the-sake-of-violence, a politics which too quickly and too neatly divides people into categories of “revolutionary” and “counter-revolutionary.” The murder of Alex Rackley is the result of a politics which more and more begins to resemble the politics we are supposedly seeking to displace.

The editors of Liberation held the article for three months. Finally, I had a tense meeting with them in which they argued that the prosecution could use my article against the Panthers. Did I want that? I was asked. How many times during my years in The Movement had someone tried to control my thoughts, my words, or my deeds by saying that such-and-such would not be in the best interests of The People, that such-and-such would merely play into the hands of the “enemy,” that I was being individualistic and that people in The Movement had to submit to discipline, and that their individual thoughts and lives were not as important as those of The People.

I knew only that as a writer and an intellectual, I was responsible for conveying whatever minuscule portion of the truth I could find. And as a person, my responsi-
bility was to be as fully human as I could. Giving one’s soul to ideology permitted one to rationalize murder, to attack friends, to deny the power and beauty of the erotic. Allegiance to ideology gave one permission to turn other human beings into abstractions, and as a black kid growing up under segregation in the 1940s and 1950s, I knew what being an abstraction felt like because, dear God, my soul still bled from the wounds. If I had learned nothing else, I had learned that one does not turn another human being into an abstraction without becoming an abstraction oneself, and to turn another into an abstraction is murder. I recognized, moreover, that even if murder is justified in the name of God, freedom, justice, socialism, revolution or democracy, it is still murder.

Liberation published the article, but our relationship was over. Nevertheless, among my feelings of sadness and hurt, there was a strange, new feeling. I was free. I was free to be whoever I was and would be; and slowly and painfully in the ensuing years, I came to love all the contradictions and inconsistencies inherent in being human.

Robert Frost said that he was never a radical in his youth because he didn’t want to be a conservative in his old age. I was a radical in my youth, but I have not become conservative in middle age.

I am not radical or conservative because I do not see an essential difference between the two positions, despite appearances. Both are political worldviews that divide the world into an Us against a Them. Radicals and conservatives merely disagree on who is the Them. Because I am Black, because I am Jewish, I must resist the succulent temptation to define another human being as a Them, and sometimes that is very hard.

This does not mean that those responsible for the evil in South Africa should not be held accountable for their deeds. But I do not have to define another as a Them to hold him or her accountable. It is sufficient to say that they have failed, on even the most minimal level, to live humanely.

I am not politically naive about the Soviet Union, but neither do I forget that it is a nation that lost twenty million people in World War II. I cannot imagine what impact that can have on a nation’s character and policies. I look at Iran and see madness, but I cannot forget the years of the Shah’s reign and those of his father; and again, I cannot imagine what an impact that can have on that nation’s character and policies. I am not politically naive, but I am convinced that unless I know and make a part of me the pain and suffering of another, I have no chance of comprehending his or her humanity. Trust between persons is established when each is receptive to the abiding sorrows of the other. I think that may also be true for nations.

There is a Them, but it is not out there. Them is always and eternally Me. To the extent that I take responsibility for the Them that is Me, to that extent do I free others to be persons in all their crystalline fragility. That is the vision with which The Movement began, and it is a vision many of us are still trying to live.

The Movement disappointed us and we disappointed ourselves. Perhaps, then, it is important to remember these words of Bertolt Brecht:

You, who shall emerge from the flood
In which we are sinking,
Think—
When you speak of our weaknesses,
Also of the dark time
That brought them forth….

Even the hatred of squalor
Makes the brow grow stern.
Even anger against injustice
Makes the voice grow harsh. Alas, we
Who wished to lay the foundations of kindness
Could not ourselves be kind.

But you, when at last it comes to pass
That man can help his fellow man,
Do not judge us
Too harshly.

I sincerely hope that, in our second thoughts, we will judge ourselves, but not too harshly. Judging ourselves too harshly is to think that the proper expiation for radicalism is conservatism. Having attempted to balance ourselves by standing on our left legs, we must not shift all our weight to our right legs.

Standing on both legs, the weight distributed evenly throughout the body, is an intricate and demanding task. It means being neither radical nor conservative. It means examining issues and recognizing that in certain cases a radical methodology is wisest. In others, a conservative methodology will bring us closer to realizing the ideals of freedom and justice and economic equity. Though both theories present themselves as if they are truth incarnate, they are not. But each does carry a truth, and each must be listened to for its truth.

Radicalism and conservatism are merely two ways that one attempts to make sense of the world. We delude ourselves when we use them to seek our identities, when we wear them and think we know who we are. Identity cannot be resolved so easily.

Ultimately, the task is to be utterly human. Only to the extent that I know and accept my humanity will I be able to see others as they are, as nothing more and nothing less than utterly human. When we are able to do this, we will have moved beyond ideology into terror and then, only then, will we be free.
What does Tikkun stand for?

Formed originally as the liberal alternative to the conservative voices in the American Jewish world, TIKKUN seeks to remain true to the Prophetic tradition's commitment to the struggles for peace and justice and opposition to all forms of tyranny and oppression. In this sense, TIKKUN identifies with the liberal and progressive forces in the U.S.

Yet TIKKUN challenges the left as well. We are critical of its failure to address the basic psychological, spiritual, and ethical needs of the American public.

*Liberals tend to focus exclusively on “external” issues: economic survival and political rights. We are on their side on these issues. But human beings are more complex—and part of the continued success of the American right has been its willingness to talk about the family, ethical values, and spiritual life—dimensions of experience that are too often ignored by the left. We totally reject the right’s approach to these issues, but we believe that they are amongst the most important concerns that need to be addressed.

*We are also critical of the left’s exclusive focus on individual rights. We identify with its critique of patriarchal families and authoritarian communities. The struggle for individual rights is an important corrective to those who would use religion, family, or community to impose their own values and agendas on everyone else. But TIKKUN insists that human beings are fundamentally social and that our need to be in loving relationships and ethically meaningful communities, far from being a weakness, is a manifestation of our uniqueness and strength.

*TIKKUN draws upon the richness of the Jewish tradition, its culture and religion and literature. Yet about one-third of our readers are not Jewish. They read TIKKUN because they realize that even in those articles specifically addressed to Jewish concerns, TIKKUN draws lessons that usually have universal significance.

*TIKKUN is lovingly critical of Israel. We have been America’s most forthright critic of Israel’s policies on the West Bank and its ties to South Africa. But we have also criticized the double standards that are sometimes used in judging Israel.

TIKKUN has been highly praised because we print articles presenting positions sharply at variance with our own. Unlike many magazines that shove “the correct line” down their readers’ throats, we believe that it is precisely the clash of alternative perspectives that gives readers the best chance of reaching deeper truths. As a result, TIKKUN is unpredictable and exciting.

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All the rest is commentary.