

TIKKUN

Reviews by Tom Edsall, Martin Gilbert,
Steve Wasserman, Alan Wolfe

Poetry by David Gewanter, Kathryn Hellerstein,
Peter Viereck

Fiction by E.M. Broner

A BI-MONTHLY JEWISH CRITIQUE OF POLITICS, CULTURE & SOCIETY

VOLUME 2 NUMBER 2

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Czeslaw Milosz
Poland & the Jews

Todd Gitlin
TV after Amerika

Cynthia Arnson
Contra Funding

Chaim Potok
On Philip Roth

Chava Weissler
Women in Paradise

Michael Ferber
The Arms Race

Betty Mensch & Alan Freeman
The Politics of Dr. Seuss

Robert Westbrook
Politics & Photography

David Biale
On Pollard

Special Feature:

20 YEARS ON THE WEST BANK


Editorial: The Disastrous Occupation; Israeli Roundtable with Meron Benvenisti, Zeev Sternhell, Itzhak Galnur & Eliezer Schweid; Yoseph Ben-Schlomo on Gush Emunim; Moshe Halbertal on The Struggle for the Heart of Judaism; Adi Ophir on A Strategy from the Israeli Left; and Hannan Hever on Hebrew Poetry under Occupation.

WILDPEACE

Not that of a cease-fire,
let alone the vision
of the wolf and the lamb,
but rather
as in the heart after a surge of emotion:
to speak only about a great weariness.
I know that I know how
to kill: that's why I'm an adult.
And my son plays with a toy gun that knows
how to open and close its eyes and say Mama.
A peace
without the big noise of beating swords into plowshares,
without words, without
the heavy thud of the rubber stamp; I want it
gentle over us, like lazy white foam.
A little rest for the wounds—
who speaks of healing?
(And the orphans' outcry is passed from one generation
to the next, as in a relay race:
the baton never falls.)

I want it to come
like wildflowers,
suddenly, because the field
needs it: wildpeace.

YEHUDA AMICHAÏ
(translated by Chana Bloch)



TIKKUN

A BIMONTHLY JEWISH CRITIQUE OF POLITICS, CULTURE & SOCIETY

VOLUME 2 NUMBER 2

- 2 Letters
6 Publisher's Page

Editorials

- 7 On Yuppies; God and History
10 J'Accuse: The Pollard Affair
12 Contra Funding

David Biale
Cynthia Arnson

Articles

- 14 TV After *Amerika*
20 Beneath the Stars: The Real Arms Race
24 Lewis Hine and Progressive Photography
30 The Existential Politics of Dr. Seuss
35 The Exile of the Shekhinah
36 An Interview with Czeslaw Milosz
43 Women in Paradise
47 The Yishuv and the Holocaust
109 Plastic Dreams

Todd Gitlin
Michael Ferber
Robert Westbrook
Betty Mensch and Alan Freeman
Alijah Dessler

Chava Weissler
Idit Zertal
James Boyle

Special Feature: Twenty Years on the West Bank

- 51 Editorial: The Disastrous Occupation
61 Israeli Roundtable

66 Occupation: The Israeli Left's Response
72 An Interview with Yoseph Ben-Shlomo
78 The Struggle for the Heart of Judaism
84 Hebrew Poetry Under Occupation

Meron Benvenisti, Itzhak Galnur,
Eliezer Schweid, Zeev Sternhell
Adi Ophir

Moshe Halbertal
Hannan Hever

Fiction

- 88 The Repair Shop

E.M. Broner

Poetry

- 13 *English I*
35 *The End of Prayer*
106 *A Universal Language*
107 *Revolution; Song to the End*

David Gewanter
Steve Silberman
Kathryn Hellerstein
Peter Viereck

Reviews

- 91 Potok on Roth
94 The Protestant Ethic
98 Gays and the Holocaust
99 Cuba and the Romance of Revolution
103 Right Turn?

Chaim Potok
Alan Wolfe
Martin Gilbert
Steve Wasserman
Thomas Edsall

TIKKUN

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Letters

ON TIKKUN

To the Editor:

I am not one for fan letters; however, I was entranced by the quality of your recent issue of *Tikkun*. It was erudite and fascinating. Your point-counterpoint articles were superb.

I intend to propagandize on behalf of *Tikkun*, however I can.

Dr. Max Vorspan

Vice-President

University of Judaism

Los Angeles, California

To the Editor:

I find *Tikkun* a wonderful addition to the stimulation and guidance of those interested in Jewish affairs.

If the level of editing, writing, and thinking is maintained as highly as it is in the first several issues, I am sure that I, as a reader, can look forward to many years of enjoyable reading. I was a little concerned at the outset that the publication, by positioning itself so strenuously as an alternative to *Commentary*, would box itself into a dogma that might skew or limit its selection of material. This doesn't seem to be so, and for that I am relieved.

In any event, my thanks for your courtesy, and my very best wishes for a long and fruitful publication.

Morton A. Kornreich

Chairman of the Board

United Jewish Appeal-Federation

of Jewish Philanthropies of

New York, Inc.

New York

To the Editor:

Tikkun is the true and rightful heir to the COMMENTARY Magazine that Elliot Cohen founded, whom Lionel Trilling, in his eulogy, called "a man of genius ... [whose] power of affectionate acceptance was extraordinary ... in our time when it more and more becomes our habit to define ourselves by our exclusions, our calculated indifference, our disapprovals."

Hans Zeisel

Professor Emeritus

University of Chicago Law School

STANDING AT SINAI

To the Editor:

I have a difficult time understanding the first, and basic premise of Judith Plaskow's article on "Jewish Memory from a Feminist Perspective." Plaskow asserts that Moses' proscribing men from coming near women during the three days prior to the entering of the covenant indicates that women were invisible during the covenantal experience. She further argues that the covenant was given only to the men and not to the women.

In studying chapter 19 of Exodus it is clear that the entire *Am* (nation) was present throughout the entire covenantal dialogue between God and his people (Exodus 19:16). It was to the *Am* as a whole that the decalogue was

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transmitted (Exodus 19:25). Further, in chapter 24 of Exodus the entire *Am* responds, "We will do and we will hear," (verse 7) and in verse 8 Moses enters the entire *Am* into the Divine Covenant. Throughout the Torah the word *Am* connotes the whole people, men and women. Two of many examples are Exodus 11:2 and Exodus 36:6 where the command is explicitly stated in the verse as being to the *Am* of both men and women. It is impossible to read the text in the hundreds of other examples as meaning anything but that of the inclusion of the entire community (men and women) under the rubric of the word *Am*. In the end of Deuteronomy, chapter 29, the entire nation *Am* (verse 12) which explicitly includes women (verse 10) is once again entered into a formal covenant with God. It is clear that the women were not only not invisible but rather a very distinguished group, part of a special *Am* that took part in the covenant.

Maimonides points out in his Code (*Hilchot Ishut* 1:1) and it is likewise found in the literature of the Near Eastern culture, that it is the man who took the initiative in dealings involving a woman. The text therefore states that *he* took the initiative and refrained from coming near her. The text is further telling us that both parties (man and woman) entered the covenant pure both physically and spiritually. The language of the decalogue is directed to the economic supporter of the family (20:10) but the laws therein relate to both men and women alike. It should likewise be noted in the passage in Tractate Sotah 11b on the merit of righteous women in Egypt that the whole *Am* was redeemed. It seems strange that a book whose beginning is on the centrality of women would not include them in the culmination of their exodus. Rather, the women who were key figures in the epic of slavery (Exodus 1:17), and who later rejoiced at the sea (Exodus 15:2) were likewise an ever present participatory group at Sinai. The Mechilta (as quoted by Rashi) clearly understand this when the verse says: "Say to the House of Jacob" (Exodus 19:3) as being directed to the women who were about to enter actively into the covenant with God.

Shira Isaacs
Drisha Fellow
Women's Institute for Jewish
Learning
Yonkers, New York

To the Editor:

Judith Plaskow's "Standing Again at Sinai" presents a challenge to Jewish feminists. In calling for the recovery of Jewish women's history, she emphasizes that feminists must recognize that the Jewish community "is today a community of women and men, and that it has never been otherwise." Such an understanding does not necessarily fit well with the other elements in her essay, namely her call for new midrash and innovative ritual. Her examples of these activities seem to suggest that women alone can create Jewish community, that separatism is a point of departure rather than the painful struggle with and potential subversion of androcentric normative texts. The tension between doing women's history and reconstructing Jewish collective memory is very real. In attempting to yoke both to the same goal Plaskow reveals to us the pitfalls and possibilities facing Jewish women who seek to stand again at Sinai.

Deborah Dash Moore
Vassar College
Poughkeepsie, New York

To the Editor:

I was delighted to read Judith Plaskow's stimulating essay entitled "Standing Again at Sinai: Jewish Memory from a Feminist Perspective." Plaskow's call for Jewish women to recover our past and then to refashion a living Jewish memory through feminist midrash and liturgy represents an important new stage in Jewish feminist writing. While she lucidly articulates the feminist critique of Judaism, she moves beyond that critique to suggest ways to open Judaism to the experience, perceptions, and interpretations of women. Moreover, she points, correctly I think, to the inadequacy of historiography alone in expanding Jewish memory. Women must "do Torah"—through exegesis and the responsible creation of liturgy and ritual—in order to expand Jewish revelation to include us. The task is a daunting one—it is always easier to conclude with the critique—but it is the only fruitful path for Jewish feminists to follow.

Paula Hyman
Lucy Moses Professor of Modern
Jewish History
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut

Judith Plaskow responds:

Shira Isaacs misunderstands my point. To say that women are rendered invisible by the language of Torah is not to say that the covenant was given only to men. On the contrary, my claim is that we women know ourselves as part of the covenant and, therefore, must recover our experience within it.

The passages Ms. Isaacs cites as obviously including women share the ambiguity of all generic language. Sometimes the words "man" or "mankind" are truly generic, and sometimes they are not. Sometimes it is clear from context that women are included, and sometimes it is not. Thus in Exodus 19, we read along quite convinced that *Am* includes women, until suddenly in verse 15, women are excluded. Such startling shifts are common in androcentric texts. *Whether or not male generic language is meant to include women, however, it always obscures and renders invisible any experience of women that might be different from that of men.* This is my point.

Of course Maimonides says that men took the initiative regarding women: This is a basic premise of the Torah and of Judaism as a patriarchal tradition. *But is it true? And how did women experience this initiative? How did they struggle within and against it? How did they subvert it?* These are the questions the text is not interested in that we must begin to explore for ourselves. It is the answers to these questions that will potentially transform Jewish memory.

Unlike Deborah Dash Moore, I do not see a conflict between recovering the Jewish tradition as a tradition of women and men and creating new midrash and ritual by women. On the one hand, since it is almost entirely women scholars who are seeking to recover Jewish women's history, I suppose one could say that all three paths (history/midrash/ritual) are separatist. On the other hand, none of these paths is being pursued with the intention of creating a separate community. Jewish women's history seeks to become part of mainstream Jewish history. Women's midrash appears in periodicals addressed to women and men. Many new rituals by women—birth ceremonies for girls are probably the most obvious example—are being embraced by the wider community.

Of course, separatism is a necessary element in feminist Judaism: only

women can articulate women's experience. And after 3,500 years of male separatism, we have difficulty accepting separation as a female choice. But this is separation for the sake of equality in a transformed Jewish community, separation that is part of a larger rhythm, and that therefore should be energizing to the whole community.

THE JEWISH FAMILY

To the Editor:

While I appreciate Anne Roiphe's attempt to defend the personhood of Jewish women against the onslaught of those who seek to relegate us to the household on the grounds of maintaining and strengthening "the Jewish family," I am disturbed by the limited nature of that defense. Jewish feminist criticisms of the particular ways the Jewish community has dealt with women and families go considerably beyond the picture Roiphe has drawn, leading us to question the sanctity of the family as she portrays it. In fact, Roiphe's article perpetuates a mystified and glorified view of Jewish families which misrepresents both historical and present realities, and makes thinking about appropriate solutions more difficult.

What feminism *has* done is to attempt to de-mystify that family: to recognize that nuclear families have not always been the safest places for women or for children (there has been abuse in the Jewish community as well as in the non-Jewish); and that it has certainly not always been those nuclear families which have manifested "our ability to take care of the weak and bind together the relatives in a stronghold against the hostile stranger." Jewish communal institutions were created precisely because individual families often cannot meet such challenges. To assume that they did and can is to put a burden on them which leads to precisely the abuses and the frustrations that contemporary community organizations (and Ms. Roiphe) bemoan.

Further, Ms. Roiphe seems to assume that "our" goal is "strengthening the Jewish family, holding it together and bringing up our birthrate and making our homes warm and happy places...". Maybe, but not for everyone. Not all Jews live in the "traditional family" she appears to take for granted: some are

single, some are divorced, some are living communally, and some are happily engaged in non-married long-term gay or lesbian relationships. Any of these people might well have children in their lives; but there seems to be no place for them in Ms. Roiphe's discussion of Jewish families. Is there only one model of family life: mother, father, and children? If Judaism is to adapt to contemporary conditions (as she, and I, seem to agree it must), why limit the adaptation to providing day-care for working parents? Why ignore the large percentage of people, both male and female, who are living *Jewish* lives, often in *Jewish* communities (where the support is there for them), but who are not living in traditional families. Some might choose to live in such families if the option were available; but many would probably choose *not* to, for a variety of reasons. If our concern, as a community, is Jewish *continuity*, rather than simply Jewish "families," then we ought to be concerned to welcome and support *all* these people, not just the ones who fit Ms. Roiphe's stereotype.

It is, finally, the recognition of the diversity within our community that feminism points us to, insisting that there need not be only *one* right way to live a life. A more fully inclusive feminist perspective on Jewish families would, I believe, recognize that there is more than one way to raise Jewish children. Why limit our support only to that one?

Martha A. Ackelsberg
Department of Government
Smith College
Northampton, Massachusetts

Anne Roiphe responds:

Absolutely yes. Absolutely agreed. I should have said it in my original piece. There is a diversity within the Jewish community and we must support all the ways we know to lead a Jewish life.

It is, however, still true that the vast majority of Americans, American Jews male and female will for better or worse the first, second or third time combine into families that consist of parents and children. No one has yet come up with a more popular design for protecting the young and nourishing the changing needs of male and female. Inadequate as it is, overglorified as it has been, the traditional family remains as the majority choice, a brave attempt at lasting

human connections. No "ism" under the sun has yet replaced the hope most people place in family life. To run away from traditional families, rather than attempting to strengthen them, is as impossible as having a dream without a dreamer.

To the Editor:

Your "Current Debate" On Intermarriage in Volume 2, Number 1 shows that *Tikkun* intends to be creative and provocative—not just a stodgy intellectual magazine. I congratulate you on your willingness to deal with issues that are often personal and painful.

Nevertheless, I think the debate would be greatly helped if we had some word to distinguish between two very different categories of what are now both called "intermarriage": (1) People who marry non-Jews and who bring those non-Jews into the Jewish community, building Jewish homes and raising their children as Jews with a strong Jewish education, and (2) People who marry non-Jews with the idea that their homes will not be "Jewish" but rather reflect both cultures, and who will raise their children with an awareness and familiarity with both traditions, but without settling for their children the question of their identity or their religious upbringing.

It is quite reasonable to believe, and recent data supports, the contention that people in category (1) often make important contributions to the Jewish world, and that children being raised in such families are likely to become Jews with just as strong a commitment to their Judaism as any other Jews. In fact, in these cases many of the non-Jewish partners end up converting to Judaism. I think it is important for Jews to find ways to support this process, and to not socially ostracize or put undue pressure on people involved in it. These kinds of developments take time, and social pressure from outsiders usually has a detrimental effect—causing resentments that may make it harder for the non-Jewish partner to eventually take the steps to solidify his or her connection to the Jewish world.

On the other hand, I think it is an illusion to think that people in category (2) are likely to strengthen the Jewish community, except insofar as something in the process eventually leads them to move back into category (1). The notion that children can be "free"

to choose a religious commitment without having been exposed to the in-depth education necessary to understand Judaism is simply an illusion. It may be possible to choose Christianity or some other religion this way, but Judaism is not just a belief system but a way of life—and depriving children of the opportunity to experience it as a way of life in their childhood, and not just as a possible “religious belief,” already makes it almost impossible for the child to know what Judaism is really about.

My point here is based on my own work as a social worker with many Jewish and intermarried families. I have seen that even within the Jewish families, where the issue of identity is less problematic, it is extremely difficult to pass on to the next generation a sense of why they should be Jewish from families that themselves have little experiential basis in Judaism. When Judaism gets restricted to a yearly Seder, a Chanukah party plus gifts, a brief visit to a synagogue on High Holy Days, plus some participation in a Jewish “Y” and giving money to a Federation to show support for Israel, the children in these families have little reason to stay connected to Jewishness. If, for example, they have never experienced a full day of Shabat observance, with the joy and energy and peace that it entails, how are they going to know that Judaism as a religion has something intrinsically valuable—valuable not just as a loyalty to the past, but as a present reality? And if this creates a difficulty for children of families with a marginal Jewish identity, how much more so for children who are being raised in families where not only they are missing these kinds of experiences, but they also are missing any clarity about what is lacking.

Frankly, I believe that at this point the notion of “free choice,” so central to our modernity, loses its validity. The notion that a child can choose from a position of having no foundation is ridiculous—what actually happens is that the child does have a foundation, only it is one that is formed by the social conditioning of the outside world. It’s not that the family gives children real freedom, but rather that the family abdicates and allows the dominant culture to form the foundation from which the child’s choices are made. And that outside culture is de-

cidedly not a Jewish one, and has undercurrents of hostility to that which is uniquely Jewish.

Given this reality, one doesn’t have to be a bigot or in any way anti-Christian to resist and oppose intermarriage type (1).

Marilyn Cohen
Los Angeles, California

NUCLEAR MADNESS

To the Editor:

Your editorial, “Nuclear Madness Triumphs Again” brilliantly punctures the skin of the pro-Star Wars rationale right in its boost phase. It deserves wide reading. Clearly, the Reagan Administration has had scuttling the ABM treaty as a goal from the outset, and wants to enhance U.S. strategic offensive capabilities without restraint.

One factor that seems important to us at SANE for your readers to remember is that Star Wars is also classic military-industrial complex pork barrel. Once again major defense contractors will be the main beneficiaries of all those exotic research dollars (\$5.3 billion proposed this year).

One quibble. SANE and the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign are about to merge into the largest and most powerful peace organization in America’s history. We are not hung up on the counter-cultural, anti-leadership ideas of the 1960s, and we expect the new organization to provide strong, visible leadership to an expanding grass roots movement. Again, thanks for a fine editorial.

Robert K. Musil, Ph.D.
Director of Communications and Education
SANE

To the Editor:

Your editorial “Nuclear Madness Triumphs Again” did an excellent job of fleshing out the most salient lesson of Reykjavik: We can have arms control or we can have SDI. We can’t have both. Indeed, the American people have a fundamental choice to make between the reality of nuclear weapons reductions versus the dream of a perfect defense.

I was, however, surprised that you were willing to accept the threat of nuclear weapons use by a terrorist or third party nation as a justification for some level of strategic defense. Star

Wars-type defenses, if effective, would counter only ballistic missiles. Given its technological complexity, a ballistic missile is not likely to be the nuclear weapon of choice for a newcomer to the nuclear club or a terrorist who makes or steals a nuclear device. The nuclear novice is much more likely to choose a weapon that can be delivered by bomber, bus or backpack *under* any defensive umbrella we might build. As an insurance policy against the use of nuclear weapons by a third party, SDI provides scant coverage.

Jane Wales
Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF JEWISH MEN

To the Editor:

I read with great interest and an equal amount of distress, Jacob Neusner’s article “The Virtues of the Inner Life in Formative Judaism.” ... I was both intellectually grateful and

(Letters continued on p. 108)

“Night,” by Elie Wiesel

A Gift
of the
Spirit
in Leather
and Gold



Night, the story of a young man’s coming of age in the worst of all possible worlds. This inspiring 1958 classic launched the career of Nobel Prize Winner Elie Wiesel. Six by nine inches, bound in burgundy English mouton leather, spine embossed in 23 karat gold, printed on acid-free paper. Foreword by Francois Mauriac. Yours for just \$39.95.* Send check or money order to:

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Publisher's Page

In this issues of *Tikkun* we are embarking on a discussion about Israel and the West Bank. This subject is extremely charged—in any public forum, on any radio talk show, we can predict that once the subject is raised, hands will start waving, telephone lines will light up and voices will become higher and more intense.

Discussion about the West Bank within the organized Jewish world is often knee-jerk defensive. It is considered to be an expression of disloyalty to make critical comments about Israel, and the admonition to unconditionally support Israel's policies is strong. Underneath the "don't-criticize-Israel" pressure is the fear that open discussion will lead to a lessening of US Jewish commitment to Israel. And if that were to happen, the fear is that US military, economic and social support of Israel would be undermined.

Counterposed to the organized Jewish world's defensiveness about Israel's relationship to the Palestinians, there is pressure from the liberal/Left world for Jews to *not* support Israel because of the oppressiveness of Israel's policies. Many people end up disavowing their Jewishness because they can find no way to separate what is positive in Judaism from what is happening with the Palestinians.

The American Jewish world needs to discuss the West Bank situation honestly and openly. Now that twenty years have passed, it is important to take stock of what has happened to the Palestinians, to the Israelis and to ourselves because of the occupation. We need to allow ourselves to lovingly criticize Israel and to make assessments of what should be done.

We at *Tikkun* present this beginning discussion about the West Bank with some degree of trepidation. Because the mood these last years in the US has been either to totally accept everything Israel has done with the West Bank (which we don't) or to totally denigrate Israel for its actions (which we don't), we know there may be a price to pay for taking on this subject. People are not used to speaking knowledgeably, openly and non-simplistically about the West Bank.

But the cost of silence, we think, is too high. What is happening in Israel is not in accord with many of the values in Judaism that are so important to us, such as social justice and respect for "the stranger in your

midst." Remaining silent would violate our moral commitment to fight for a world that is a better place for all peoples.

We do not think that criticism of Israel's actions on the West Bank will lead to the catastrophe imagined by the organized Jewish world. Paradoxically, if American Jews can legitimately and openly express their questions and criticisms about what is happening, this will strengthen, not weaken, our ties to Judaism and to the Jewish community in the US and in Israel. In the long run, the kind of commitment generated by openness in the Jewish world will produce a new generation of Jews better able to advocate for Israel and for Jewish interests in the world of American politics.

Tikkun is going bimonthly, starting now! Each issue will be shorter in length (96 pages), which will please some readers—a "criticism" we sometimes hear is that the magazine is intimidating because it has so much in it. (We tell people not to feel guilty if they don't read it all.)

We receive a lot of good material that we can't print because we don't have the room. Going bimonthly will allow us to print more over the year's span, even with shorter issues. It will also allow us to provide more in depth analysis on crucial issues. For example, our next issue will have several important articles about feminism and the future of the women's movement.

This issue completes our first year of existence. *Tikkun* has plugged into a very large community of people who share similar concerns, and this has been incredibly exciting for us.

In the start-up of a new magazine there is bound to be unevenness—the first year is a "shake-down" period when relationships with printer, typesetter, subscription house and so forth get established. All told, we've had few problems. But if any of you have had any snafus with your subscription or your magazine delivery, please call us or write us. We want to make sure you get *Tikkun* on schedule. □

On Yuppies

The concept of Yuppies was developed to drive home a political point: Everyone eventually gives up on youthful political idealism. The generation of the 1960s, we were told, had challenged the established order of its day, but now things were different. The most serious challenges to the established order came from those who attempted to create a counterculture, we were told; in their day, some had dubbed themselves Yippies (after the Youth International Party, founded by Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman, but also to suggest that politics should be playful). Now, irony of ironies, they were becoming Young Urban Professionals (some say, young, upwardly-mobile professionals), or Yuppies. Having given up on their youthful idealism, the story goes, they are now all engaged in a frantic pursuit of professional success, material well-being, and the very comforts of life that they previously disdained.

End of morality tale.

Wrong on all counts.

First, the history. Only a small fraction of those who were moved by the spirit of protest in the late 1960s and early 1970s thought of themselves as part of a counterculture that would change the society. Though there were hundreds of thousands of people who did, there were millions who opposed US policy in Vietnam, supported the movements for Black and women's equality, supported a democratization of the society, and rejected the dominant forms of materialism—but who did not think that growing their hair long or smoking dope or wearing short skirts or jeans would really be the instrument by which things would change. In fact, most had no theory of how the society could be changed, although they hoped that their generation would play some important role.

Many of these people tried out the various movements for social change. They were often disappointed, partly for bad reasons, partly for good. The main bad reason was this: People had unrealistic expectations. The dominant existential philosophies in American society had obscured the way that psychological histories and current social forces tend to restrain the possibilities for immediate self-transformation. People can be any way they want to be, it was thought, if they just make a choice to be that way. So, if we want to have human beings who are really decent, loving, caring,

idealistic, non-egotistical, fully realized, all we need are individual acts of moral will, acts of self-transformation and transcendence. The movements for social change themselves propagated this illusion: "We will be better than our parents," they often seemed to claim, "because of our higher level of consciousness and deeper moral commitment." Ignoring all the external and internal constraints on such self-transformation, the generation of the 1960s was deeply disillusioned when it found that its own movements failed to produce the "new human being" who would be an embodiment of all the ideals that it believed in. Instead of having compassion for each other, based on a reasonable assessment of human limitations, people were furious that "people were no better inside these political movements than anywhere else."

... what is amazing is how many people have remained loyal to their ideals and willing to nurture many of the same visions for a better world that they fought for.

The slightest psychological or sociological sophistication might have led to an understanding of some of the forces that constrain transcendence, and hence to a greater appreciation for how much real transcendence was actually being achieved. The fundamental reality of any non-elitist, popular social movement is that the people coming into it will embody all the same distortions that everyone else in the society has. Sharing an ideal, even the ideal that some of these distortions (like racism and sexism) should be overcome, could not possibly be sufficient to overcome a lifetime of psychological and social conditioning. People should have been honored for taking the first step—the step of recognizing that they wanted to embrace a different set of values and wanted their society to shape people in a different way. Instead, they treated each other in a disrespectful and judgmental manner—psychologically and spiritually beating each other up with clubs like "You aren't non-sexist enough," and "You aren't non-elitist or non-egotistical enough." The fact is that, unless you expect to change America with a tiny vanguard of the pure (in which case, count us out), any social change movement will contain many of the problems

of the larger society, and the way to approach them is with a strong dose of compassion, not with utopian expectations about how wonderful everyone should be. Disillusionment with the movement based on these utopian expectations ("I tried it, but I saw that politics didn't really work, so after a few years I gave it up...") too often led people not into more limited or reformist politics but instead into a life devoid of any active political engagement.

But there was also a good reason. The movements of the 1960s had no coherent vision of a future, and no coherent strategic vision. Politics too often devolved into symbolic acts of resistance to injustice, devoid of any plan for how that injustice might ultimately be remedied. This was fine for someone in one's early twenties—at a stage in her or his life when taking risks, demonstrating, getting arrested, experimenting with new lifestyles, seemed developmentally appropriate. But as people began to form families and to seek jobs, there was neither model nor sanction for ways to continue to be part of a social change movement. Indeed, there was a climate of distrust toward people who worried about job advancement and security, toward people who asserted that building a family was an important part of their lives. If forced to choose, most people chose family life and an investment of time in securing some measure of economic stability.

There is no denying that many people who participated in social change activities in the sixties were later remolded by the kinds of thinking that they needed to adopt in order to "succeed" in the economic marketplace. Once involved in the struggle to "make it," it's almost inevitable that we begin to adopt ways of treating each other and looking at the world that are antithetical to our earlier ideals.

And yet, what is amazing is how many people have remained loyal to their ideals and willing to nurture many of the same visions for a better world that they fought for in an earlier period. There are, of course, the obvious cases: the large number of people who have gone into jobs that they hoped would give them some opportunity to stay loyal to their ideals—the lawyers, health care professionals, teachers, psychologists, government employees, trade union activists, employees of non-profit organizations—most are now frustrated by unexpected limits on what they can do, but many still nurture the flame of idealism that motivated them in the 1960s. But equally exciting is the fact that many people whose work has led them into a business or a job that seemed superficially discordant with their earlier ideas nevertheless often remain committed to ideals of social change.

The media distortions have been based on stories that show our preoccupations today: jobs, raising families,

exercise and health care, good food, comfortable living. Perhaps we who do not come from a Puritan religious tradition should be the ones to announce the following truths to the world: There is no inherent conflict between good values and good living. The Weathermen in the 1960s thought that America's material comforts were bought at the cost of exploitation of the Third World, but even back then most of us rejected that theory. There is nothing wrong or inherently conservative about wanting economic security, or material well being. In fact, we want these things for everyone, not just for a small sector of the world's population. But people who currently want a comfortable life are not necessarily impeding the struggle for social justice, nor are their croissants and pasta taken out of the mouths of the hungry. Raising families, worrying about the schools your children attend, paying attention to good food, exercise, and health care; all of these are perfectly reasonable activities, in no necessary conflict with a life of commitment to principles. Because the media delights in comparing today's material comforts with the virtues of poverty espoused by a small portion of the counterculture of the 1960s, they lead many people to think that they no longer can feel good about claiming their own loyalty to their ideals.

So while we don't deny that many people have been fundamentally changed by the process, it is equally important to recognize that the concept "Yuppie" is meant to do ideological work, convincing people that if they personally retain a critical perspective and a moral vision, they are somehow out of step with their times, the me-first-ism of the 1980s. The truth is this: lurking inside many a yuppie is the same moral idealism that was there in the sixties.

If there are so many people who retain a commitment to the idealism of the 1960s and early 1970s, why don't we see them more in current political life? There are two answers. First, we do see their reflection in current political life—for example, in the popular opposition to Reagan's Nicaragua policy. Second, there is good reason why many of them are not part of any organized Left—because what passes for an organized Left is so disorganized and so largely bereft of coherent strategy and vision that people often perceived that "there is no there there." Understandably occupied with their own lives, many of these people no longer have the energy or time to shape a credible movement on their own; but until there is one worthy of their response it is quite premature to write off their willingness to participate in it. When specific activities have seemed credible—the Freeze, for example—many of these so-called Yuppies were committed and available.

To help highlight this ongoing commitment to principles, *Tikkun* will be sponsoring an event to honor all

people who have at one point in their lives let their idealism prevail over their self-interest. On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, we will sponsor, in the summer of 1988, a reunion for all those who participated in or identified with the movements of the 1960s or early 1970s. Our goal is not just to relive the past or to pander to nostalgia but to reaffirm a commitment to the future and to honor those many people whose present lives do not provide them with the opportunity to live out the values and idealistic dreams to which they still remain loyal.

God and History

One of the great escapes from confronting human evils is to put the blame for everything on God. Egged on by religious traditions that purport to find "the finger of God" behind every event in human history, some people now seek to find "God's purpose for the Holocaust" or for other historical disasters. Similarly, the military victories of the State of Israel have been attributed to God's intervention, and retention of the territories won in the 1967 war is sometimes defended as God's intention in giving Israel victory.

While these kinds of issues do not much bother the large number of *Tikkun* readers who in any event reject a theological framework, for those of us who take God seriously this perspective is deeply troubling. It seems to blame God for human evil and to shift attention from the fundamental responsibility we have for changing the world.

Consider instead an alternative theological perspective: God intervened in history several thousand years ago to reveal Her/His teachings. We shall return to that revelation shortly, but for now our point is this: After that moment of revelation (however long that moment lasted may be in dispute—as the Psalmist puts it, "A thousand years in Your eyes are like the yesterday that has just passed, and like a night watch") God begins to contract Her/His presence in the world, in order to allow for human freedom. What Kabbalists and Hasidim described as *tzimzum*, the contraction of God, is the process by which God chooses not to intervene in history, so that human beings have the opportunity to shape their own destiny. The claim that human beings are shaped in God's image is a Biblical claim that human beings are free to respond to God's call and command, but that freedom requires that God not be involved in shaping every particular historical event, or in secretly guiding the world so that it comes out God's

way. Enough that God has built a certain moral necessity into the physical functioning of the universe: As the Torah puts it, the very structure of the world requires human goodness, and evil will eventually result in ecological as well as social catastrophe. But this is a long-term process (we see it gradually emerging in the way that unbridled human greed, enshrined in capitalist multi-national corporations, is slowly but inexorably destroying the life support system of the planet)—and in the short run, God does not provide one-to-one punishment for each act that violates the divine order.

The accent on human dignity and self-determination may be hard for those whose religious models stem most from feudalistic models of subservience to a heavenly king. Certainly that model has a rich history within Judaism, reflected also in many prayerbook motifs. Yet the Jewish tradition has a very strong counter-motif, that of the community of scholars who have been divinely empowered to interpret the Torah, even in ways that God did not originally anticipate or necessarily support. "Torah is given into human hands" is a principle with ramifications for our theology. The point of giving this power to humanity is so that God can withdraw, allowing human beings to take the revelation and develop ourselves in accord with our divine-like human capabilities.

... God does not lurk behind every event, secretly ensuring that its outcome will be according to Her/His will.

So God does not lurk behind every event, secretly ensuring that its outcome will be according to Her/His will. God's will is that human beings freely shape their world in accordance with God's will—but that takes God's non-intervention. Like a caring parent who realizes that at a certain stage in development a child must be allowed to break free and develop on his/her own, without promise, threat, or possibility of parental intervention, so God may deeply care for Her/His creatures, but respect them too much to intervene any more in their affairs. So stop blaming God for Auschwitz, and stop thinking that whatever horrible things (or good ones, for that matter) happen are what God *really* wants.

What we have to guide us is God's revelation. That moment in human history, perhaps lasting a thousand years, was unique. It was the moment in which a certain notion entered human history: that human beings are infinitely precious and deserve respect and caring, that this extends to people who are different from us and who

are differently situated, and that social arrangements which do not embody that sense of human preciousness are themselves unworthy and must be replaced.

Many of the ancient religious and spiritual traditions seem to have received this same revelation in the thousand-year "moment" that the revelation was also vouchsafed to Israel, and we need not invalidate the way that they heard it to claim that our truth also comes from God. Many other peoples seemed to get this message through inspired teachers. For the Jews, the experience of a national liberation struggle against slavery in Egypt gave an entire people a sense that they had directly heard the message of God and had been personally enjoined to be a holy nation, a nation of priests, a nation in which every member had a direct access to and responsibility for God's revelation being upheld on earth. It was this access to the divine demand, this refusal to have the message mediated through some other (be it an inspired teacher or a more direct emissary of God), this fundamental democratic commitment of the people (itself quite plausibly a product of the emancipatory experience of the liberation from Egypt) that led them to see themselves as a chosen people, rather than just as recipients of the teaching of a chosen teacher or divine emissary.

This picture needs to be qualified in two ways: First, the revelation necessarily involved human interpretation; it was through the mouth of God but the ears of human beings. As such, the dominant ideological framework and assumptions necessarily shaped how God's message would be heard. We can find in the Torah, then, not the absolute words of God, but the more historically specific way that people at that moment heard God. That is why interpretation, midrash, has always been central to the Jewish tradition—because in each new historical moment, Jews have had to struggle with hearing God's word anew. If we imagine the revelation as a kind of spiritual earthquake, and each moment in God's eyes to be equivalent to a thousand years in human experience, then we can see that we are still living in the aftershocks of that earthquake, and our own ears can be attuned to God's revelation that can still be heard. But just as we are aware of how the hearing of each past generation was influenced by the ideological assumptions and psychology of its day, so we must recognize that we, too, are likely to be hearing God's word through the filters of twentieth-century consciousness and that we must listen with humility as we struggle to understand what God wants from us and must avoid claims of knowing more than we could know. We can recognize the legitimacy of other religions and spiritual traditions which have received God's word through their own equally partial and equally distorted human framework, validate the diversity of ways that God's word can be heard,

without in any way relinquishing our own claim to have a valid, enduring, and unique path to God. Without demanding that others follow our path, we can validate the obligation we accept to live the mitzvot, guided by our hallachic tradition.

Yet the distance from the "ought" to the "is" remains great. God told us that we should live a particular way; but divine intervention does not guarantee that the world will magically come out okay. The re-creation of the State of Israel, so soon after the Holocaust, may seem to many an act of divine redemption, but it was rather a wonderful and marvelous human creation, with human flaws and human inadequacies. When *Tikkun* endorsed the language of the prayers in saying that Israel is "the beginning of the flourishing of our redemption," we meant to point out that the possibility finally existed for the Jewish people to create a society compatible with our vision of the days of the Messiah, though accomplishing that might well take another thousand years of mistakes, inadequacy, and human frailty. We would be misguided indeed if we were to identify "what is" with "what ought to be." This, we believe, is the essence of idolatry. It is this form of idolatry that may unintentionally be reintroduced by those who see God's work in the specific creations of human history.

J'Accuse: American Jews and L'Affaire Pollard

David Biale

The scenario is not new: A Jew in a high place is convicted of espionage for a foreign country and the fact that he is a Jew becomes central to the case. From Dreyfus to the Rosenbergs, the theme of the Jewish spy, more loyal to a foreign power (*any* foreign power) than to his or her own land of birth, has been a staple of the anti-Semitic diet.

But now a new wrinkle appears in this hoary paradigm: The allegiance of the Jewish spy is not to any foreign country but to Israel. What could be more satisfying to the xenophobia of the anti-Semite than to discover that the Jew, whose innate disloyalty was always obvious, had finally revealed his true colors by spying for the Jewish state.

How, then, should an American Jew respond to the affair of Jonathan Pollard, convicted of spying for Israel and sentenced to life imprisonment? Is the true issue for Jews the old accusation of double loyalty, as anti-Semites might contend? There is no doubt a widespread unease, a fear, that the Pollard case may be turned

against American Jews as a collectivity, as a whetting stone for the knives of those who harbor no love for either Israel or the Jewish people. Perhaps this is the reason that some American Jews who hitherto considered public criticism of Israel to be nothing less than Jewish heresy have suddenly started voicing their critical views in public. It is ironic that they have suddenly discovered that it is appropriate for them to criticize Israel on moral grounds when it comes to their perception of American Jewish interests. Would that they had displayed such moral sensitivity in questioning the invasion of Lebanon or the continuing occupation of the West Bank or Gaza.

From Dreyfus to the Rosenbergs, the theme of the Jewish spy, more loyal to a foreign power than to his or her own land of birth, has been a staple of the anti-Semitic diet.

Yet, the proper response should not be fear of anti-Semitic aspersions on Jewish loyalties. Jews understand that their enemies do not need a Jonathan Pollard on whom to base their accusations. Neither does the American Jewish response have anything to do with a "galut mentality" as Shlomo Avineri has gratuitously charged. The identities of American Jews and the politics of Jewish self-assertion are too deeply rooted to be torn up by the behavior of one member of this Jewish community.

No, the proper response should not be fear, but outrage—outrage in full and equal measure against the government of Israel and the government of the United States. For it was Israel, or agents of the Israeli government, that exploited Pollard's naive and perhaps boastful Zionism and then abandoned him to his fate after he was caught. That Pollard would inevitably be caught does not seem surprising from everything known about him. He was exactly the type a good spymaster would know was doomed to give himself away. While Pollard is responsible for his own actions, he could never have committed them without the encouragement, support and, some even say, temptation of his Israeli paymasters. In this sense, Israel betrayed Jonathan Pollard, for it never should have exploited his desire to help Israel by asking him to commit a crime.

Throughout Jewish history, the most fundamental crime a Jew could commit was to betray another Jew to the Gentile kingdom. For such betrayal, Jewish communities would not infrequently seek to put the informer to death. What an irony that the first Jewish

state in two thousand years should find itself the betrayer of a Jew in the Diaspora. For this betrayal, the State of Israel owes an apology to the Jewish people, not because it has revived the problem of double loyalty, but because the illegitimate exploitation of an individual Jew is an offense against the Jewish polity as a whole.

But Israel owes more than an apology. If those who recruited Pollard were operating on their own (Israeli versions of Oliver North and John Poindexter), then instead of being promoted, they should stand trial. On the other hand, as seems much more likely, if their operation was approved by members of the Israeli cabinet, then those politicians should take the full responsibility and pay the full political price.

It would, however, be insufficient to level an accusation only at Israel. The behavior of the American government is no less egregious. If, as Pollard insists and as the evidence has yet to contradict, he revealed intelligence only about foreign governments such as Libya and the Soviet Union, was the case prosecuted so vigorously? Why such a draconian sentence? Why did Caspar Weinberger say that Pollard deserved execution (unless the shades of the Rosenbergs still haunt the Pentagon)? Where is the crime for which this is the punishment? Surely spying for the government of a friend and ally, crime that it is, is not commensurate with spying for an outright enemy.

Moreover, if Senator Durenberger, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee, is correct that the United States planted a spy in the Israeli military in the early 1980s, then all the American outrage at Pollard appears hypocritical in the extreme. Allies spy on allies, but they don't typically make a public scandal of it when they catch each other doing it.

Until and unless we are provided with much more persuasive evidence, we can only assume that another agenda lies behind Pollard's extraordinarily harsh and thoroughly unexpected sentence. That agenda may well have something to do with the Iranian arms scandal, for it would be no surprise if the likes of Caspar Weinberger and Edwin Meese regard Israel as the main culprit in dragging Ronald Reagan's presidency to the brink of disaster. For the real and imagined crimes of Israel, Jonathan Pollard may well have been seen as a likely sacrificial scapegoat, a way of sending a message to Israel and perhaps to the American Jews not to step out of place again. If this is the message, then instead of cowering in fear of dual loyalty accusations, Jews need to hurl the accusations back on the doorstep from which they came. As misguided and mistaken as Israel's actions in the Iranian-Contra disaster may have been, the Reagan administra-

tion bears the full measure of responsibility for its illegal behavior. And Jews will not be silenced by the Pollard affair in their opposition to this regime, which has sown terror abroad and hunger and homelessness at home. □

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Contra Funding

Cynthia Arnson

Throughout the month of March, Congressional Democrats and a handful of Republicans renewed their campaign to end funding for the Contra war against Nicaragua. The immediate issue was the final \$40 million installment of the \$100 million in military aid approved by Congress last year. Neither Senate nor House Democratic leadership believed it was possible to stop the final payment (it would have to muster a two-thirds majority to overcome a certain presidential veto). Rather, the debate became an opportunity to “strike while the iron was hot,” to capitalize on the Iran-Contra funding scam and the dip in presidential popularity, and to attack the program overall.

The decision to exploit the domestic aspects of the scandal made political sense. Foreign policy, particularly when Congress gets involved, is always in part a domestic affair. When the CIA mined Nicaragua’s harbors in 1984, for example, Senator Barry Goldwater’s outcry was less over international law than over the fact that the Intelligence Committee which he chaired had not been informed. Moreover, President Reagan’s popularity and single-minded determination to support the Contras have been key in swinging undecided members to his side. A weakened president could only provide an opening for his critics.

It may well be that domestic affronts—the alleged breaking of criminal statutes by administration officials and private operators, the deliberate circumvention of laws passed by Congress, the President’s role in authorizing or ignoring such acts—will eventually prove sufficient to scrap the Contra aid program. But Washington’s current fascination with the sordid details of who-knew-what-when eclipses the equally important issue of whether the Contras themselves represent sound policy. There is substantial peril in sidestepping this issue, as it is the one on which the administration will confront its critics next September. Then Congress will wage the real fight over the Contra war, in deciding

whether to approve an additional \$105 million to continue the program next year.

The administration and its supporters already have begun to argue that the Contras are innocent victims of Washington run amok and that to abandon them would leave the Sandinistas free to consolidate totalitarian rule at home and continue subversion abroad. This was not the argument, however, that succeeded in convincing a majority of Congress to support the rebels. What persuaded the “swing group” of moderates, including many Democrats, to back the program was a twofold proposition: that the war exerted “pressure” on the Nicaraguan regime to enter in good faith into peace negotiations—being proposed at the time by the Contadora group—and that the Contra movement, once infested with Somocistas, now included genuine democrats committed to reform and respect for human rights. Most notable among these was former Sandinista leader Arturo Cruz.

... funding mercenaries to fight in steamy jungle wars tarnishes our values even before it corrupts our institutions.

Nearly two years after the House first voted aid to the rebels on these grounds, both premises have been badly shaken.

First, Cruz’s abrupt resignation from the Contra leadership in early March does more than deprive the Contras of their most powerful democratic symbol. It strips away the pretense that control of the movement, particularly of its military force, could be wrested away from “a clique,” in Cruz’s words, of Somoza supporters in the main rebel force, Fuerza Democratica Nicaragüense (FDN). That Cruz (who remains strongly anti-Sandinista) criticized the CIA as well, suggests as much about the US role in perpetuating Contra abuses as it does about Contra responsibility for them.

Second, Contra supporters could argue that maintaining the Contras to pressure the Sandinistas would not necessarily be bad policy if the ultimate objective was indeed a negotiated settlement. But the Reagan administration is not interested in negotiation, except as a cover for continued war. In April 1986 Philip Habib, President Reagan’s special envoy for Central America, wrote to a member of Congress that US aid to the rebels would end upon signature of a verifiable Contadora peace pact honored by Nicaragua. Congressional Republicans cried for Habib’s head on a platter, and they got it when the administration repudiated Habib’s statement.

Entering into real negotiations with Nicaragua would be a recognition that the regime, even if it could be induced over time to evolve in a more democratic direction, is here to stay. It would also be an acknowledgment that the goals ostensibly pursued by both the Administration and its opponents—of bringing participatory democracy to Nicaragua, restricting or eliminating Soviet-bloc influence, and containing the Sandinistas within their borders—are not served by the current policy. Indeed, that policy is producing the opposite effect. The problem, then, is not really the lack of an alternative approach to achieve US goals, but the a priori dismissal of negotiations as a means to achieve them.

Those who claim that we have a moral obligation to back the Contra struggle ought to examine another immorality—that of sending teenagers to die in a war in which, even by US government estimates, they cannot prevail. Contra ambitions aside, it may well be that the Contras were never intended to win but only to bleed the Sandinistas indefinitely. Our Reagan Doctrine. Their lives.

If the Reagan administration really believes that the existence of a Sandinista Nicaragua is incompatible with US interests, then it ought to prepare the public for an intervention of US troops and a prolonged occupation. That is the only way the Sandinistas can be removed, albeit with uncertain results. The lack of public support for such an endeavor, however, is testimony to the endurance of the “Vietnam syndrome” despite seven years of Administration efforts to expunge it. Taking seriously the alternative policy—of regional negotiations, currently spearheaded by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias—precludes the reauthorization of Contra funding. The Arias initiative is a more promising basis for achieving US objectives within the constraints of domestic opinion.

There is a certain irony in the public’s oft-registered opposition to the Contras even while their representatives rush to support them. For the public has known something that its representatives seem not to have grasped: that funding mercenaries to fight in steamy jungle wars tarnishes our values even before it corrupts our institutions. Perhaps that is the message that needs to be heard in September—that those who might be “losing Nicaragua” are the very ones who see strength in purely military terms. □

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English 1

David Gewanter

FIRST, We tied to each other
 NEXT, Coconuts for the swimming
 THEN, The Boat-Soldiers shoot
 MEANWHILE, Many dying
 AND THEN, We swam with dead People
 LATER, We get on the land
 FINALLY, We left our dead Friends.

What grade does this exercise deserve?
 Homework folded like a handkerchief,
 A little book of tears, burns, escape—

And still I mark the blasphemies
 Of punctuation, common speech;
 The English tune will help them live.

Rickety Hmong boy, flirting simply
 With the loud girl from Managua—
 I taught him how to ask her out,

Taught her how to say no, nicely;
 My accent and suburban decorums
 Are tidy and authoritative as

The checks I make for right answers,
 The rosy golf-clubs on the page.
 By next year they’ll talk their way

Out of trouble instead of smiling
 As they do hearing me drone *Silent Night*—
 They join in, shy and hypnotized,

Saigon chemist, cowed Haitian, miming
 The words I once told my music teacher
 That Jews shouldn’t sing: “Holy Infant.”

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The Talk About *Amerika*: Post Mortem on the Politics and Antipolitics of Network Television

Todd Gitlin

1.

Mortem indeed. To our relief, and that of sleeping pill manufacturers everywhere (Kris Kristofferson having served as a free, safe substitute during the week of February 15), ABC's *Amerika* has subsided and soap opera addicts can return to the more momentous adventures of Lt. Col. North and The Man Who Did/Didn't Know. God knows enough has been said about the fourteen and a half interminable hours that made up *Amerika* itself. But in fact those fourteen and a half hours were not by any means the entirety of *Amerika*. By the time the show aired, the movie had already been surrounded, contested, framed, and counterframed by critics, counter-critics, organizers, journalists, talk shows, and, not least, ABC itself. There came into being a meta-*Amerika*, an object composed by network strategies, critical strategies, and audience pre- and post-conceptions on top of, alongside, and even within the film itself.

My purpose here is not to add much to the exegesis of or fulmination about this simultaneously appalling and stupefying spectacle. Rather, I want to comment on the discourse that was generated by, for, and against *Amerika*. For in the end what was most interesting about *Amerika* was the way in which "it"—meta-*Amerika*—became a politicized, contested zone; in the process, the film was reframed and its significance, perhaps even its "effects," thrown up for grabs. ABC's successive rationalizations amounted to a strategic defense initiative—one as full of holes and as instructive about essential purposes as its namesake. The language and management of the controversy by the show's defenders are themselves revealing of the commitments of American television; of its ideological missions, some of which are impossible, and of the friction that shows up in the course of fighting impossible missions; of network powers, structure, and, not least, limits. *Amerika* with a "k" turned out to be about America

with a "c" after all, though not in the way the American Broadcasting Company would have had us believe.

2.

The most animated thing about *Amerika* was the spectacle of ABC slipping and sliding around to justify its devotion of fourteen and a half hours of prime time to a soap opera about Americans coping with a Soviet occupation.

An early network line of defense was that the show wasn't about a Russian invasion at all; it was a civics lesson. In the words of ABC entertainment chief Brandon Stoddard, *Amerika* was really about "freedom and responsibility and the American character." Writer-director-executive producer Donald Wrye said the show's purpose was to "make us think about our values and about the responsibilities of being an American." In this phase, ABC's strategy was to rework politics into myth. "The American character," "our values," "the responsibilities"—nothing debatable here. The language of the civics rationale was a language of national unity, with the same function: to stifle controversy, i.e. democratic debate. The language of civics was a way to wriggle away from the self-evident truth that you can no more make an apolitical miniseries about Americans up against invading Russkies than you can speak without prose.

The reworking of politics into myth was a matter of ideology and market strategy inseparably fused. The marketing goal, of course, was to accumulate the largest possible audience, an audience understood to be diverse in regional, educational, even political terms. From the outset, ABC feared losing the left-of-center audience. The marketing imperative therefore drove them to denature their political claims. It blurred the film itself. From the outset, ABC's executives didn't want to make *Red Dawn*; they wanted to cover their bets, to placate liberals. Straining to avoid the crudity to which the show's essential premise inclined it, they slid into the crudity of incorporation: something for everyone. Marketing pressure converted the show into a pastiche. *Amerika* appropriated symbols of left-wing resistance for its civics lesson. Thus Kristofferson's

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hero, Devin Milford, was a Vietnam vet turned antiwar organizer. (Some of the hodgepodge was incomprehensible if one were so pre-postmodern as to demand a coherent plot. We were expected to believe that Devin Milford, one of those Milfords ostensibly rooted in Milford, Nebraska for generations, was a Congressman from Massachusetts [?!] when he ran for President against the invaders in 1988. The political symbolism—Kennedy, Kerry—was more salient than the geography.) There was an underground railroad in which a putatively charismatic Black minister loomed large. There were tensions between violent and nonviolent resisters. A youth riot was instigated by punk provocateurs acting out a KGB scenario. Pastiche was the tribute paid by marketing strategy to the ideological scatter of the mass audience.

The ideological face of ABC's marketing strategy took the form of a public denial that the miniseries had any point of view at all. Thus Donald Wrye, in a different mood: "This isn't a little political science course. This film is not intended to be a civics lesson. You know, it's an entertainment." On other occasions, Wrye said that, had he had his druthers, he would never have started with ABC's invasion premise, but never mind: The unaccountable Russian invasion was nothing more than a "story device." (The script had tried to explain the invasion with a one-line reference to a Russian Electromagnetic Pulse, but since that tidbit raised more questions than it settled, ABC wisely excised it.) In a feeble attempt to placate critics, the fiction defense was even inscribed in a disclaimer running in front of each episode—in small print. But if the show was civics, how could it simultaneously be pure fiction? More to the point, could there be such a thing? Only in the fantasyland of a culture industry that insists on entertainment's immaculate conception. So urgent was the need to extricate the show from the taint of propagandistic effect, any argument would do; one sees the hapless Wrye thrashing about for the argument nearest at hand, as in that ritual exercise of desperate question-begging, the Hollywood story conference.

But the entertainment defense—the show couldn't have meant what you say because it was all in fun—was hard to sustain for a film about *Russian* invaders and *United Nations* troops set in *Nebraska* in 1997—names, places, dates, meant to exude an aura of credibility. *Amerika's* Russians were, after all, generic Russians, not extraterrestrials (who might have been more gripping, as in NBC's *V*); the American morale in need of resurrection—in the person of the brain-damaged but ultimately heroic Kristofferson character—was, before all else, a defensive virtue whose purpose was to repel invaders. In this sense, Donald Wrye was

utterly right to call himself a Kennedy Democrat, vintage 1961, as in: "Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.") As for the United Nations Special Service Unit troops, with their East German *Kommandant* and Spanish-speaking legions, they made it into the final film intact (albeit outfitted in black Darth Vader uniforms), as did the white-on-blue UN flag. Protests were for naught—from the United Nations itself, from the United Nations Association, and from a galaxy of luminaries including former Secretaries of State Haig, Muskie, and Rusk, National Security Advisers McFarlane and Scowcroft, and UN delegate Kirkpatrick. (Wrye told Tom Shales of *The Washington Post* that he had ordered the UN flag redesigned and then "I just sort of forgot about it until after we stopped shooting, at which point I looked at the flag and realized they hadn't carried out the design change,

The reworking of politics into myth was a matter of ideology and market strategy inseparably fused.

and I was just astounded. It's the kind of thing that falls between the cracks.") As in the script, the UNSSU troops raped, burned, slaughtered the homeless, and eventually blew up the US Capitol and massacred Congress. Like other network officials, ABC Vice President and chief censor Alfred Schneider consistently maintained that the UN in the film bore no resemblance to the actual UN. I asked him what he would think if he heard that CBS, say, were making a miniseries in which an armed force called the American Broadcasting Special Service Unit swept through the countryside, raping, looting, and killing. "That's a hypothetical question," he said. "I'm not going to answer it."

3.

ABC's fiction defense was meant, of course, to deflect political criticism. So was another argument: Prior criticism of *Amerika* was premature, since there was not yet an *Amerika* to criticize, only a script. Thus, on January 25, John Corry of *The New York Times*, whose franchise is normally nonfiction TV, knocked this writer among others who had the audacity to attack *Amerika* without having seen it: "Critics of all persuasions aren't arguing about a television production; they are arguing their moral and political positions." (The husband of the erstwhile head of Women for Reagan is shocked by critics arguing their moral and political positions?) In a move Orwell would have approved for the Newspeak

dictionary, Corry ineptly likened *Amerika* to what he called the “metaphor” of Orwell’s *Animal Farm* barnyard—as if calling Russians Russians and United Nations troops United Nations troops were “metaphorical.” Meanwhile, the script of December 3, 1985 proved to be close indeed to the filmed version. The line about “social humanism” was gone, along with the Electro-magnetic Pulse; the East German UNSSU brute murdered one less refugee; there were a few—not many—other changes, none very consequential.

Nothing binds a network to consistency; whatever works, works. Eventually, ABC tried to make the most of both the civics and the fiction rationales. While the front office claimed fiction, the promoters claimed fact, and so ABC’s rationales turned out as much a pastiche as the show. In the weeks before February 15, ABC’s spots featured well-spoken Eastern European exiles looking squarely into the camera and saying, “How lucky you Americans are, you take your liberties for granted, you have no idea what it is like to have them crushed.” Which might have been apropos a docudrama on Poland or Afghanistan—or Chile, Guatemala, or Nicaragua, for that matter. Invasion of the USA was invasion of a different color.

ABC’s final recourse was that the returns weren’t in; that we didn’t yet know what America thought. True enough. Yet this was a way of disowning responsibility, having your Nielsen ratings and eating them too. Of course, what we don’t know about what audiences made of *Amerika* would fill volumes. The question is, What should we make of our ignorance? Ask coastal sophisticates and they’ll tell you *Amerika* was so tedious it can’t have had any ill effects. Some of ABC’s defenders also argued that the show can’t have been pernicious because it was clunky, dull, dumb, incoherent, or—like any network television—equivocal.

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of generating a public philosophy.
American society finesses the conflict
between absolute laissez-faire and
absolute democracy through the
ideology of consumer sovereignty.*

In a typical sleight-of-hand, John Corry wrote: “Much of the criticism of *Amerika* is based on the notion that viewers are entirely dense, unable to make judgments, swayed to great passion by everything they see. Much of the criticism, in fact, is elitist and patronizing. Viewers, which means most of us, are simply too dumb to know we’re only watching television; we’ll

take *Amerika* for gospel. If we don’t call for nukes, we’ll at least lynch a red. This is also unlikely.” The straw elitist rears its head. By Corry’s standard, no program could be so stupid or offensive as to warrant criticism—since, after all, viewers are free to walk away. The actual position of most critics was that the show would, to some degree, legitimize and reinforce paranoid responses to the Soviet Union; that it might have some retrograde impact on some of the untutored young. The straw elitist is the last refuge of critics masking their own politics. And of cultural commissars like Brandon Stoddard, the actual elite who arrogate to themselves the power to patronize the audience with a steady diet of dopey shows.

Such arguments are what Hollywood calls “creative.” It’s as if once the dials started turning all over America, the miniseries’ crackpot premises about Russian invaders, UN stooges, and the dangers of public divisiveness (also known as democracy) became excusable. Leaving aside the aesthetic effects of *Amerika* occupying the airwaves for an entire week—the aesthetic equivalent of soy syrup—the ideological consequences are undemonstrable. My best guess is that for much of the audience, the clunkiness of the execution undercut the crackpot premises; but that for some minority of the audience (a minority of the forty million people who were watching at any given moment, mind you), the soap opera lent credibility to those same premises.

ABC’s timing was bad; had the show not swelled from its original three hours length, it would have aired before the discrediting of Ronald Reagan by the Iran-Contra scandal, and its resonance might have been all the greater. Who knows? Still, if the effects are unknowable, does that justify mindlessness? If the best that can be said for *Amerika* is that it was incoherent and well-nigh unwatchable, what are we to think of the aesthetic judgment, not to mention the moral code, of the top network managers? With defenses like that, ABC doesn’t need enemies.

4.

Taken for granted throughout the controversy was Capital Cities/ABC’s claim of an absolute private right to plump for its version of public virtue. ABC was floundering, but not just floundering. Examine the logic of their rationales and one sees how they found themselves—had to find themselves—in the jaws of a contradiction. They claimed that the show was entertainment, therefore inconsequential; entertainment, after all, is the network’s franchise, the argument with which they safeguard their power to program as they see fit. At the same time, they sought the moral high

ground by arguing that they were performing a public service. They tried to square the circle by insisting that the people, finally, in some unspecified way, would speak, and consumer sovereignty would out. Thus, since the ratings were higher than what ABC normally drew during those prime-time hours, their commercial judgment was vindicated. The only appropriate language was commercial, not moral or political.

Thereby ABC bespoke Reaganism in its core contradiction. Laissez-faire is not capable, by itself, of generating a public philosophy. American society finessees the conflict between absolute laissez-faire and absolute democracy through the ideology of consumer sovereignty. On the assumption that any need can be expressed as consumer demand and all demands are made manifest through the free market, it is supposed to follow that if certain programs are not manifest, there must be no demand, therefore no need for them; Q.E.D. But this position can be sustained only by ignoring the fact that consumer demand can only be expressed clearly for program types that have already been on the air. If the supply is pinched, so is the demand. Yet the artificial shrinkage of program possibilities is obscured by the sort of demonized, bipolar rhetoric Donald Wrye articulated, in appropriately Kennedyesque cadences, on ABC's *Viewpoint* the night after *Amerika* ended: "There are generally speaking two systems in the world today. One system is a system [in] which the people serve the government. The other is a system in which the government serves the people. We happen to enjoy the latter."

ABC was forced to waffle because its commercial rationale depends on keeping political controversy muted. For all ABC's hoopla about "responsibility," the public discussion kept begging the question of ABC's—and the other networks'—public responsibilities. The political problem is that there is little public realm, little language of public justification in the name of which to argue against the claims of consumer sovereignty. Instead, as a sort of ministry of permissible controversy, we had Ted Koppel's *Viewpoint* panel with Stoddard and Wrye, featuring as critics Teds Turner and Sorensen (the UN lawyer—and the author of the JFK lines quoted above—who also allowed as how a UN-less movie about totalitarian takeover would have been fine with him), along with a Soviet spokesman, balanced against Jeane Kirkpatrick. Koppel, to his credit, was tough enough on Wrye to cause Stoddard to come to his rescue, and tough enough on Stoddard to coax forth an "I've got a problem with that, Ted"; but he also safeguarded his own reputation for judiciousness by giving short shrift to Andrew Breslau of Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), the only

anti-American organizer called upon in the audience. Breslau had rightly pointed out that none of the protesting groups was represented on the panel.

Koppel's closing statement was a masterpiece of ideological management, permitting the network—in the person of its most even-handed spokesman—to praise itself as the institutional answer to all disputes; and so I quote it in its entirety:

There is one disturbing aspect to all the criticism of *Amerika*. This after all was not *Rambo* or *Red Dawn* or *Missing in Action*, movies in which the plot never reaches the dizzying heights of a cliché. What seems to have genuinely troubled so many people about *Amerika* was precisely that it grappled with ideas. [Ideas lost.—T.G.] Would Americans in large numbers become collaborators, as do many people, or as so many people have done, in other countries under foreign occupation? [Here Koppel embraces Stoddard's definition of the theme.—T.G.] Raising the question doesn't make it so. It's an idea, a provocative one to be sure, but still just an idea, the

It would be good if the fight over Amerika could be a rehearsal for a larger campaign for public subsidy—without government control—of television.

sort of stimulant we're supposed to cherish in an open society. But if we find nothing of ourselves in the collaborators, then where's the harm? And if a sensitive chord is struck, then shouldn't we be relieved that there's still something we can do about it? We're supposed to thrive on ideas—good ones, bad ones, brilliant ones, stupid ones. It is the venting [curious word—T.G.] of all ideas that pumps oxygen into the lifeblood of a democracy. And for a medium like television, which is not exactly saturated with thought-provoking material of any kind, stimulating a little controversy ought to generate applause. To their credit, hardly anyone among the critics called for censorship. What are perceived as bad ideas, after all, may be painful, but even they are preferable to a society in which we can't try good and bad ideas out on one another.

Observe how Koppel nimbly sidesteps any challenge on the question of network control. He is above the battle. Taking viewers behind the scenes, the network confers a kind of pseudo-empowerment upon an audience which it encourages to *feel* sovereign. Thus the

enshrining of the commercial imperative. The principal statement of this exercise in containment is: Leave the business to ABC. The network is ecumenical, universally hospitable. If you don't like the entertainment division, the news division will speak for you. Stoddard says: Silence yourself until the audience (somehow) speaks. Koppel says: It has spoken.

5.

And yet Koppel's conclusion should not be permitted the last word. The happy side of the dreary tale is that meta-*Amerika*—*Amerika* outfitted with all its surrounding discourse—was reframed by the protest against it. By the time *Amerika* aired, most of its stars, for example, had been coaxed into distancing themselves from it, or at least professing to believe it something other than right-wing propaganda. To great media fanfare, Kristofferson, apparently conscience-stricken, made a commercial for the United Nations, pro bono. *TV Guide* quoted most of the stars awash with leftist credentials, cresting with Kristofferson's "I wake up in a sweat sometimes, thinking this will be the one regret I will carry to my grave." (To its credit, the greening *TV Guide* also ran a Harrison Salisbury piece headlined, "Could a Soviet Takeover Happen This Way?" The answer was no. Hmm. Could the Russians already be softening up the American media, starting with Walter Annenberg's weekly? But Mr. Annenberg is well known as a friend and devotee of Ronald Reagan. The implication is too hideous to suggest.... Reagan himself must be a Russian mole, having been turned in the late 1940s.... But I digress: That is the subject for another miniseries.) My own favorite surreal moment of the week was a Phil Donahue show featuring Reed Irvine blasting the show for being soft on the Russians, and William Colby denouncing it for hysteria—while live via satellite from Moscow, taking a break from a Gorbachev peace conference, none other than Kris Kristofferson professed revulsion toward American assaults on Nicaragua. Only in America. When the actors defended their own attempts to soften the show—"We wanted to balance the scales, to make it a critical of the American government as of the Soviets," Christine Lahti told *TV Guide*—they made meta-*Amerika* more complicated; they weakened its plausibility as hysteria.

And ABC got a bad press it hadn't expected. *Tikkun*, *Mother Jones*, and much of the Canadian press were one thing, but *Newsweek* also bashed the show in advance, and George Kennan published a strong denunciatory letter in *The New York Times*. The largest and most visible sponsor, Chrysler, keeping its left fender covered, pulled its seven million dollars' worth

of commercials. News coverage, including ABC's own, was skeptical; perhaps, subliminally, network news people seized upon *Amerika* as a symbolic expression of the takeovers they were more concerned with, namely the takeovers of the networks by Capital Cities, General Electric, and Lawrence Tisch.

The moment may be more propitious than in many years for public debate about the purposes which television ought to serve and the institutional arrangements and regulations that would be required to further them.

The most startling and welcome meta-*Amerikan* event was a Peter Jennings Nightly News report pointing out that although the Soviets had never invaded the United States, the Americans had once invaded the USSR—in 1918; whereupon he showed footage of the American troops which spent 1918-19 in Archangel and Murmansk, and, true to network formula, dug up a survivor of the expedition to reminisce about how well the Yanks had gotten along with the Siberian citizens. ABC's local stations and affiliates milked *Amerika* all they could, dotting their local coverage with Afghan, Vietnamese, and East European refugees. Still, the ratings came in below what ABC expected. The show was inordinately expensive, and foreign sales, usually considerable for a miniseries, came down to one—Canada's CTV. The networks will think twice before again plunking forty million dollars into a miniseries that might prove another such commercial miscalculation.

6.

It is easy enough to see why ABC would be caught in self-contradiction. What is more troubling is that its bizarre commercial version of noblesse oblige has not been convincingly disputed. The question left unanswered is why a few hundred people should control a medium that reaches tens of millions. The networks are not licensed, but the profitable local stations they own are. These stations have market values in the billions of dollars—they are publicly subsidized, in effect. Therefore, it is entirely proper for public bodies to debate their legal obligations to serve (in the language of the 1934 Communications Act) "the public

interest, convenience, and necessity." The Left opposition's task is to articulate a public philosophy which honors the powers of audiences to make sense of what they see while challenging the power of the television elite to set the agenda with constricted choices. The ideology of consumer sovereignty has to be met head-on; why should publicly subsidized players get to do anything they please? The Left has been daunted by ten years of deregulatory fever. But these fevers do not last forever.

Kris Kristofferson said at one point that he wished *Amerika*'s opponents would get equally exercised about real-world events. Fair enough, though one cannot always choose one's battles. Nuclear disarmament, in particular, could use a political push. In the talk after Reykjavik, for example, the headlines went to Senator Sam Nunn, who was horror-struck by Reagan's muddled lurch toward banning the bomb; hardly anyone was heard to say that the problem with Reagan's zero option was that his insistence on holding on to Star Wars canceled it, not that zero nuclear weapons would leave Europe defenseless against Soviet tanks. One does not have to look farther than Senator Nunn's uncontested stardom for an example of restricted choice in the ostensibly free market.

Control over media, too, is a political process that takes place in the real world. It would be good if the fight over *Amerika* could be a rehearsal for a larger campaign for public subsidy—without government control—of television. One model worth exploring is Great Britain's mixed-brow Channel 4, an interesting public-private hybrid. Channel 4 is subsidized by the commercial channel, ITV, which takes in whatever money Channel 4 gets from the sale of commercial time. But ITV exercises no control over programming. Control is left to professionals who commission drama, movies (among them *My Beautiful Laundrette* and *Letter to Brezhnev*), and documentaries galore, but also broadcast sports and American TV along with Third World films.

ABC set the winter agenda with *Amerika*, but it would be a pity to leave the matter at that. Within the media themselves, there is widespread anxiety about the future of networks run by Tisch, Capital Cities, and General Electric, with Rupert Murdoch as a possible



fourth player. The moment may be more propitious than in many years for public debate about the purposes which television ought to serve and the institutional arrangements and—pardon the word—regulations that would be required to further them. *Amerika* was in some ways idiosyncratic, but in other ways show business as usual. This episode points up the Left's need to generate a program for television just as it needs to generate programs for welfare, foreign policy, and scads of other matters. The battle over *Amerika* was necessarily defensive, rearguard, like the liberal campaigns against TV violence, exploitative children's programs, and other conspicuous abuses. But all these campaigns may prove to have a larger use—if reformers can appreciate the need to go beyond rearguard battles. □

Beneath the Stars: The Real Arms Race

Michael Ferber

The political power shift from the White House, now in retreat after the Iran/Contra scandal and under new management by a "regent" from the Senate, to the Congress—both houses of which are now in the hands of the Democrats—raises hopes that serious arms control may not have to wait for a new President. That is the official view of the Soviet Union, which has just "de-linked" a settlement of the European intermediate-range missile problem from the Star Wars plan the President prizes so highly. It is the official view of the White House, which has insisted all along that it wants to negotiate even though Star Wars is non-negotiable. And it seems to be the official view of the Democratic Party, which will prod the process along by protecting the existing SALT and ABM treaties, urging (and perhaps compelling) compliance with an explosion test ban (CTB), and cutting the Star Wars request (SDI) to last year's level or below. If Congress does make serious cuts in SDI it will make it easier for Soviet leaders also to de-link strategic (long-range) missile negotiations, as Andrei Sakharov has been urging them to do since his release from Gorky. They will see not only that SDI is unlikely ever to work even if it is fully funded (Sakharov agreeing with the majority of American scientists) but that its funding is in serious doubt. And the Reagan-Baker team may agree that it is not in the future interest of the Republican Party to let a weakened and dubious program block an agreement. So there is a chance that the knot that strangled the Reykjavik summit conference will be untied, or at least loosened enough to let some arms agreements slip through.

Though some of it may now be dissipating, so much confusion was bred by the Reykjavik conference in October that it is fair to ask if confusion was not its main purpose, at least in the minds of the White House staff. Under pressure by three countries' right-wing parties to produce some sort of arms-control agreement that they could brandish in their election campaigns—US Republicans increasingly distancing themselves from Reagan on arms control and South Africa; British Conservatives, under challenge by an invigorated Labor

Party committed to unilateral nuclear disarmament; and German Christian Democrats, facing a similar challenge by the SDP and the Greens—the administration went to Iceland hoping for the least significant agreement it could manage to obtain. The preferred agreement was probably a modest cutback of Euromissiles; that would placate the British and German parties and the moderate Republicans, while only slightly affecting the massive US strategic weapons build-up.

It is generally agreed that Gorbachev stunned the Americans with the depth and scope of his proposals, with the result that Reagan clung to his impossible Star Wars dream as if to a security blanket, even though Gorbachev was offering to get rid of everything Star Wars was designed to eliminate. The failure of the summit was manifest on the first day but brilliantly disguised and transformed afterward by Reagan and his media masters. In the months following Reykjavik, no agreement emerged from Geneva or Vienna, both sides remained intransigent over SDI, and all the talk about the "substantial progress" made at Reykjavik faded before the fact that for six years Reagan has not, as he still has not, agreed to a single arms-control measure. But in one respect the summit was a success for the Administration even before it took place: The House of Representatives yielded nearly all of its unprecedented arms-control legislation to White House demands that the President be given a "free hand."

Soviet motives for rejecting SDI, now relaxed somewhat, are not at all obvious and are doubtless complex. But one reason Soviet spokesmen keep giving is that, granting SDI will not protect the United States from a massive first strike, it might very well protect the United States from a small retaliatory strike *after* a US first strike eliminated most of the Soviet strategic arsenal. That would mean the end of deterrence for the Soviet Union, but not for the United States. It would mean a return to the situation of the 1950s when the US enjoyed an unanswerable first-strike capability, but at a much more dangerous level, since the United States would remain vulnerable to a first-strike attack, as it was not in the 1950s. American commanders would know that, in a crisis that mounts toward war, they could launch first with near-impunity (leaving aside the nuclear winter), while Soviet commanders would know that, while they could not launch first with impunity, launching first would still be their only hope of surviving at

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all. Each would have to make a decision very rapidly, lest it lose the absolute advantage of going first, but there would have been no necessity to make such a decision, no crisis of this sort would have arisen, if one side did not enjoy a first-strike capability. Having seen their forces continually weakened with each deployment of an SDI component, moreover, the Soviets might prefer to see a crisis sooner rather than later.

With Star Wars in place, for the Soviets to agree to reduce the number of strategic missiles might be to place them at an even greater disadvantage. If a US first-strike eliminates all but a fixed percentage of the Soviet missiles it targets, then that percentage will represent a smaller absolute number of missiles for the SDI battle stations to mop up afterward.

All of this assumes that the American downward-shooting battle stations will work, say, at ten percent of the efficiency that the President's scenario envisages. This might seem a reasonable concession to possible technological breakthroughs, but in fact the difficulties of destroying even a very few missiles on their upthrust are staggering, not least because the SDI stations are themselves more vulnerable than the missiles they target. Sakharov dismisses the first-strike threat of SDI as negligible, but so far the Soviet government is unwilling to take the risk of allowing SDI to go forward upon a speculation that a major program by its technologically superior enemy will fail.

Star Wars remains an even greater obstacle to clear thinking, and the public is quite baffled over it. So is Congress, and so, it seems, is a large portion of the peace movement. An obsession with Star Wars on all sides of the question has led to a dangerous neglect of the real developments in America's strategic arsenal. This neglect is hard to explain in the face of the Soviet argument about SDI's role in a first-strike, which is often cited by arms-control advocates as a reason against SDI, even though they now seem to be underplaying the political struggle against the weapons systems that will provide the first-strike capability.

Even the most ardent supporters of SDI do not claim that it will alter the strategic balance for the remainder of the century. By that time, however, several new weapons systems will be fully developed whose only plausible military mission is to launch an unanswerable first-strike against the Soviet Union.

THE AMERICAN FIRST-STRIKE ARSENAL

If the United States ever decided to launch a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union, its initial targets would not be population centers or industrial plants. Unless it wanted to commit suicide, the United States would

first try to destroy all Soviet weapons that could reach the United States in retaliation, and the bases they are launched from: These are:

- ICBMs, long-range land-based ballistic missiles carrying from one to fourteen nuclear warheads, launched from silos or from vehicles on roads or tracks,
- Missile-carrying submarines, armed with multiple-warhead medium-range ballistic missiles (SLBMs) launchable from under water, and the submarine bases;
- Bombers, based at three major airfields but possibly dispersed to many back-up airfields. It would also attack the command, control, and communication centers so the Soviets could not coordinate a retaliatory strike even if some of their weapons survived.

It is important to remember that the arsenal of the Soviet Union is not a mirror image of the arsenal of the United States. The United States is a naval power with many warm-water ports at home and overseas; the Soviet Union is a land power with few ports anywhere. The Soviets have built submarines to carry part of their ballistic-missile arsenal, but the bulk of it remains on the land. As of 1986 more than sixty percent of Soviet warheads are on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); fewer than thirty percent are on submarines. With the United States it is nearly the reverse. Over half the American nuclear warheads are on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Strategic Triad of Nuclear Weapons

	USA	USSR
Land Leg		
missiles (ICBMs)	1014	1398
warheads	2114	6420
Sea Leg		
missiles (SLBMs)	640	924
warheads	5632	3120
Air Leg		
bombers	268	150
warheads	3484	760
TOTAL		
launchers	1922	2492
warheads	11230	10300

Note: Warheads on bombers include bombs and cruise missiles. These figures do not include long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) on either side. (Figures from the Arms Control Association, August 1986.)

Because the Soviets rely on land-based forces more than we do, they are more exposed than we are to weapons designed to hit land targets. As targets on land are much easier to locate and hit than targets under water, America has a considerable first-strike advantage. The Soviets have put most of their eggs in their weakest basket. You would not know this from listening to the debates in Congress over the MX, Star Wars, and arms control, for many policymakers point to the Soviet ICBMs as a terrible danger, indeed a "first-strike threat," to American ICBMs. Forgotten are the nearly 6,000 US warheads on submarines that Soviet ICBMs cannot touch. This loudly proclaimed threat from Soviet ICBMs conceals a more plausible threat to them from the United States, thanks to the asymmetry of the two arsenals.

TARGET A: SOVIET SILOS

There are 1,398 Soviet ICBMs of various kinds. Until recently all of them were housed in fixed silos. Silos are an underground version of the grain storage structures they are named after on American farms. They are tubes set into the ground and "hardened" in various ways to withstand the shock, heat, and overpressure of a nuclear explosion. A nuclear explosion would vaporize or flatten a farm silo five thousand feet away; but a missile silo less than one thousand feet away, if it were well hardened, would emerge intact and the missile inside could be launched from it. In order to destroy a silo in the ground, then, what is needed is extreme accuracy: It takes a nearly direct hit so the silo can be "cratered" and shattered. A second desideratum is a more powerful warhead, in order to make a larger crater.

Whichever side waits to go second will lose most if not all of its strategic weapons and will suffer far worse casualties than if it went first.

The United States is developing four missiles with the accuracy and explosive yield to destroy Soviet silos.

(1.) *The Trident D-5 missile* will be the centerpiece of America's first-strike arsenal. It will utterly dwarf the much better known MX program. The first deployment of 24 missiles is scheduled for the ninth Trident submarine in 1988. If the Navy builds 24 Trident submarines it will deploy 576 D-5 missiles on them (the first eight submarines, which now carry the C-4 missile, are to be refitted for the D-5 after 1991). Each missile can carry eight of the new W 88 warheads (also called the Mk-5), with a yield of 475 kilotons apiece, nearly

five times higher than the warhead on the C-4. That adds up to 4,608 warheads, if the eight-warhead configuration is put on all the missiles.

What makes the D-5 distinctive is its high accuracy. The median miss-distance (the distance from the target within which half the incoming warheads will land) is about 400 feet, within the "cratering" range. Depending on how well hardened Soviet silos may be, the likelihood that one warhead will destroy one silo ranges from high to very high; one estimate of this "Single-shot kill probability" is about ninety-six percent. That may be too high, but there will be enough warheads on the Trident D-5 system alone to target every silo twice, and with such numbers the chances of complete "success" approach one hundred percent.

There remains the possibility that the Soviets, having detected incoming D-5 warheads, could launch some missiles before they arrive. To guard against that possibility, the US might launch D-5s from near Soviet shores, thereby reducing the warning time to less than fifteen minutes. Many Soviet ICBMs are liquid-fueled missiles that require hours of attention before they are ready to launch, and if the US moved rapidly enough up the rungs of escalation as it plans to, few of them could be placed on a launch-on-warning posture. The US might also try to knock out electronic circuits in Soviet command and control networks with the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generated by a high-altitude nuclear burst.

Some have claimed that a first strike cannot be launched from submarines because of time delays between missile firings and the difficulty of communicating simultaneously with many submarines. Submarine experts have confirmed, however, that 24 missiles could be launched in a few minutes from one submarine. The communication problems are being addressed by the extremely-long frequency (ELF) system installed in northern Wisconsin and Michigan. Its only apparent purpose is to make possible the communication needed for a coordinated attack; a strictly retaliatory capacity would not need it.

The D-5 remains the "unknown missile." It is briefly debated each year in the House and approved with strong majorities. The Senate has never debated it. Only a few Representatives seem to understand the crucial difference between the D-5 and the missile it will replace, the C-4. Their ranges are the same, and they are equally invulnerable to Soviet attack, but the C-4 is a retaliatory weapon only, incapable of destroying silos. The D-5 adds nothing to the C-4 but the capacity to strike first.

The Pentagon has asked for over \$3.5 billion in FY 1988 for the D-5 missile, the largest procurement item

in the military budget. It will go for the first full installment of 66 missiles, with similar installments scheduled through FY 1999.

(2.) *The MX missile*, which President Reagan with a straight face named the "Peacekeeper," has been one of the most controversial weapons of the last twenty years. The incredible series of proposals for an invulnerable basing mode made it the laughing-stock of the country, and the eventual decision to place it in Minuteman III silos made it less funny but even less popular because it was the vulnerability of those silos that was invoked to justify the MX program in the first place. Some members of Congress opposed the MX for that reason alone; others more thoughtfully argued that its vulnerability meant it had to be used first; only a few recognized that its *accuracy* made it a high-priority target because the Soviets would fear for its ability to make *their* missiles vulnerable.

By the strange new laws of first-strike readiness, each new missile, whatever the motive behind acquiring it, subtracts a measurable quantity of security.

The MX has the accuracy needed to destroy silos, about a 400 foot median miss-distance. It will carry ten high-yield warheads (the W 87 or Mk-21). Its range is at least 7,000 miles. Its first deployments begin in late 1986. President Carter wanted 200 MXs deployed, President Reagan asked for 100, and Congress has capped deployments at 50. The 500 warheads on the 50 missiles would be added to the D-5 warheads targeting on silos or other land targets.

The Pentagon has not abandoned its hopes for the full contingent of 100 missiles, and has asked for \$600 million in FY 1988 for a "rail mobile" basing mode plan.

(3.) *The "Midgetman" SICBM* (S stands for "small") owes its tenuous existence to a 1983 compromise between the administration, which wanted the MX, and a group of Congressmen, who did not. In return for authority to build the MX the administration reluctantly agreed to go forward with a small, mobile, single-warhead ICBM. In theory, one warhead per missile is less destabilizing than ten per missile, for each missile would be a threat to only one enemy missile and the dispersal of warheads would mean a higher "absorption" of incoming warheads. Be this as it may, the fact remains that the US has plans to begin deploying 500 to 1,000 *additional* highly accurate nuclear warheads by 1992. It will incidentally violate the SALT II Treaty

forbidding more than one new ICBM (the MX being our permissible new one).

(4.) *Cruise missiles*, the slow-speed, low-flying but highly accurate pilotless drones, are not usually considered first-strike-capable weapons because of the time they take to reach their targets. But for some Soviet targets there would be lots of time: Many Soviet SCBMs are liquid-fueled and cannot be launched "cold." While the faster US ballistic missiles are taking out the ready-to-launch ICBMs, air-, sea-, or ground-launched cruises could be sent against the others. Moreover, the effect of "fratricide" or interference from nuclear blasts might hinder incoming ICBMs, but would probably not affect cruises.

We need to add, finally, that the existing "generation" of strategic ballistic missiles can be upgraded in accuracy. According to Robert Aldridge, a former Lockheed engineer who worked on the Trident missiles, the guidance system of the C-4 can be vastly improved by deploying the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, a constellation of eighteen satellites that can radio the precise coordinates of a warhead while its carrier is in its coast phase; the carrier can correct its position and launch the warhead on a much more accurate path, perhaps to an average of 300 feet from the target. The Minuteman III can also be upgraded. The explosion of the Challenger Shuttle last year has delayed the launching of NAVSTAR satellites by two years, but by 1990 there will be enough D-5s, MXs, and upgraded C-4s and Minuteman IIIs to pose a significant first-strike threat to the Soviet ICBM arsenal.

TARGET B: SOVIET MOBILE MISSILES

During the last year or so, the Soviet Union has begun dismantling older missiles in silos and deploying small one-warhead mobile missiles much like the Midgetmen (the SS-25), and has been testing larger MIRVed mobile missiles (the SS-X-24). The SS-25 will be driven around on trucks, the SS-X-24 will be drawn around on railroad tracks.

In theory, to make missiles mobile is a step toward stability, since they are more likely to elude incoming counter-force missiles than they would if they remained in silos. The United States ought to encourage the Soviets to make their missiles mobile for the same reason the Scowcroft Commission recommended we build the mobile Midgetman: It makes it harder for the other side to feel confident of a first-strike. Instead, the Reagan Administration has proposed banning mobile missiles. Even more ominous, a second configuration of warheads on the Trident D-5 may be designed precisely to destroy mobile ICBMs.

(Continued on p. 110)

Lewis Hine and the Ethics of Progressive Camerawork

Robert Westbrook

No one contributed more to the iconography of American industrialization than Lewis Hine; yet Hine died a penniless and unappreciated artist. Even today, despite the widespread familiarity of his photographs, few people are much aware of who Lewis Hine was or of the ways in which his work reflected a consistent moral vision and engaged some of the central ethical and political issues posed by progressive reform in the United States between 1890 and 1940. In order to grasp the full significance and power of Hine's photographs, they must be seen not only as evidence documenting the lives of those who populate his images but also as important texts in the cultural history of progressivism, less because they reflect the beliefs Hine shared with those in the mainstream of American reform than because they pose a challenge to the benevolent posture at the heart of progressive ideology.

I

In some important respects, Lewis Hine was a *typical* progressive reformer in that he was committed to what historian Richard Hofstadter termed the "business of exposure." Before I turn to an effort to number Hine among those extraordinary progressives who were attuned to the ethical pitfalls of this business, it is perhaps worth recalling Hine's commitment to this widely shared progressive impulse.

Hine's reform credentials were, of course, impeccable. He began his career as a photographer during a brief stint as a teacher in the Ethical Culture School in New York City, an important center of educational experimentation. After abandoning the classroom for a full-time career as a photographer, he signed on as the photographer for Paul Kellogg's pathbreaking 1907 survey of social conditions in Pittsburgh and began his longtime affiliation with Kellogg's important reform journal, *Survey*. Around the same time, he began to

accept the series of assignments from the national Child Labor Committee that over the next decade would provide the occasion for the photographs of working children that are his finest work. Although in the last decade of his life Hine was excluded from the remarkable photographic project of the Farm Security Administration, which set the standards for documentary expression in the 1930s, he did find some work with the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Works Progress Administration, and other New Deal agencies.

As a reform photographer, Hine shared with many other progressives a belief that his first task was that of providing his fellow citizens with a clear view of the sordid realities of American social life that had been obscured by ignorance and unconcern. As Hofstadter observed, reality for these men and women was:

a series of unspeakable plots, personal iniquities, moral failures, which, in their totality, had come to govern American society only because the citizen had relaxed his moral diligence. The failures of American society were thus no token of the ultimate nature of man, of the human condition, much less the American condition; they were not to be accepted or merely modified, but fought with the utmost strenuousness at every point. First, reality must in its fullness be exposed, and then it must be made the subject of moral exhortation; and then, when individual citizens in sufficient numbers had stiffened in their determination to effect reform, something could be done.

For these men and women, progressive reform was a politics of revelation. Knowledge of the "inside story" of what American society was "really" like would activate the will of its citizenry to clean up its dirty, hitherto hidden corners.*

Hine fully shared this commitment to the business of exposure and urged his fellow reformers to recognize the importance of the camera to their cause. In an important lecture to the National Conference of Charities and Correction in 1909 entitled "Social Photography: How the Camera May Help in the Social Uplift,"

Robert Westbrook teaches History at the University of Rochester. This essay is a revision of a lecture accompanying the documentary film by Nina Rosenblum and Daniel Allentuck, *America and Lewis Hine*, in a program on "Film and the Humanities" sponsored by the New York Council for the Humanities.

*Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), p. 202.

he argued that "the great social peril is darkness and ignorance" and urged social workers to take their byword from Victor Hugo: "Light! Light in floods!" In the crucial task of opening the eyes of the "great public" the camera was an essential tool. "In this campaign for light," he declared, "we have as our advance agent the light writer—the photograph." The picture was a powerful symbol that "brings one immediately into close touch with reality," for it told "a story packed into the most condensed and vital form." Reformers should not hesitate to take advantage of the heightened realism of these pictures and play upon the widespread belief that "the photograph cannot falsify."

Hine's work for the National Child Labor Committee was a paradigm of the progressive business of exposure. As Alan Trachtenberg has observed, Hine opened to view workplaces that were "fast becoming secret and secretive places, buried in dark corners of tenements, hidden behind imposing brick walls of factories. . . . This secrecy, Hine learned, hid shameful sights . . . and he came to define his task as that of showing the world of consumers exactly what the world of makers was like. This task became a ripping aside of the veil that disguised and mystified the brutal system of production."²

His work entailed as wide a range of humanitarian espionage as reform ideology recommended. Hine was called upon in many of his investigations to act as a progressive spy, passing himself off as a salesman or a photographer of machinery in order to infiltrate mills, fields, and sweatshops brutally exploiting children. Concealing a note pad in his pocket, he recorded the ages and sizes of the children he encountered, many of whom he measured against the buttons on his coat. Like any secret agent he worked under the constant threat of violence: "I have a number of times been very near getting what has been coming to me from those who do not agree with me on child labor matters."

II

The naïve optimism of reformers like Hine has been an easy target of criticism, and such historians as Hofstadter have attacked progressives for their blind faith in the power of knowledge and the efficacy of good will. This is an important criticism, but it does not get at the most troubling feature of the progressive politics of exposure.

A more penetrating criticism is that advanced by historians who have found in progressive ideology a will to power that seeks to rescue the victims of indus-

trialism from the depredations of evil capitalism only to subject them to the cultural hegemony of the reformers themselves. From this perspective, the overriding aim of the progressive in exposing the exploitation of the immigrant working class was to render these unfortunate people the object of paternal bourgeois benevolence. This, in effect, substituted one form of objectification for another. Critical of unscrupulous factory owners who treated immigrant workers merely as a factor of production, middle-class reformers sought to render them little more than passive beneficiaries of the solicitude and culture of their more fortunate neighbors. The language of middle-class benevolence often betrayed in its metaphors this sense of the "urban masses" as inert material upon which reformers might work their will. Addressing an audience of female social workers, for example, one reformer warned that the "Christian worker" who went among the "unchurched masses" must "root up weeds of false teaching, dig out rocks of ignorance and prejudice, break up the fallow ground, and be glad if it is given to her to drop a seed of divine truth here and there."³

The critical perspective on this sort of farming for souls has produced an abundant historical literature that treats progressive reform as a species of "social control." This is an argument that is, in many instances, persuasive. What it often overlooks, however, is the presence among progressive reformers of several important figures who were well aware of the troubling ethical implications of paternal benevolence. Lewis Hine, I contend, was among these figures.

Before attempting to support this contention, it is worth considering briefly how this issue was treated in the work of the most important progressive critic of the paternalistic impulse, John Dewey. Although Dewey's own thought and activism, particularly his philosophy of education, has also been targeted (unpersuasively) by the critics of bourgeois hegemony, there is abundant evidence, from the earliest stages of his career forward, of Dewey's deep antipathy to "do-gooders" and to the objectification and antidemocratic consequences of paternalistic benevolence. To cite but one example of this, writing in his *Ethics* (1908), Dewey argued that "regard for the happiness of others means *regard for those conditions and objects which permit others freely to exercise their own powers from their own initiative, reflection, and choice.*" It was precisely in this regard that so many reformers were deficient:

the vice of the social leader, of the reformer, of the philanthropist and the specialist in every worthy

²Alan Trachtenberg, "Ever—the Human Document," in *America and Lewis Hine* edited by Walter and Naomi Rosenblum (New York: Aperture, 1977), p. 129.

³Edwin L. Earp, *The Social Engineer* (1911) as quoted in Christopher Lasch, *The New Radicalism in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), p. 167.

cause of science, or art, of politics, is to seek ends which promote the social welfare in ways which fail to engage the active interest and cooperation of others. The conception of conferring the good upon others, or at least of attaining it for them, which is our inheritance from the aristocratic civilization of the past, is so deeply embodied in religious, political, and charitable institutions and in moral teaching, that it dies hard. Many a man, feeling himself justified by the social character of his ultimate aim (it may be economic, or educational, or political), is genuinely confused or exasperated by the increasing antagonism and resentment which he evokes, because he has not enlisted in his pursuit of the "common" end the freely cooperative activities of others. This cooperation must be the root principle of the morals of democracy.

Surveying the course of reform in his own society, Dewey concluded this cooperative ideal had "as yet made little progress," and "the inherent irony and tragedy of much that passes for a high kind of socialized activity is precisely that it seeks a common good by methods which forbid its being either common or good."*

Hine may well have been influenced by Dewey's argument. He studied briefly with the philosopher at the University of Chicago, and they traveled in the same circles in New York after the turn of the century. An even more likely source of Dewey's influence on Hine was Frank Manny, a member of a coterie of undergraduates who gathered around Dewey at the University of Michigan in the 1880s and who were deeply influenced by his moral philosophy. It was Manny who brought Hine to the Ethical Culture School when he became superintendent of that institution in 1901, and the two remained lifelong friends (Hine's only book, *Men at Work*, is dedicated to Manny). In any case, whether or not Dewey's philosophy directly influenced Hine, his camerawork manifested the same sensitivity to the ethical problems of reform.

Perhaps the greatest strength of Hine's work in this regard was its sensitivity to the ways a reform photograph that "exposed" the seamy side of society ran the risk of conveying "knowledge" of its subject as little more than an object of horror or pity. He seems to have perceived the ethical implications in the way reformers saw the oppressed and to have recognized that various "ways of seeing" served as a condition of or an obstacle to the development of democratic reform politics that would permit all the members of the society to, as Dewey put it, "exercise the voluntary capacities of a



Lewis Hine, "Young Russian Jewess at Ellis Island," from America and Lewis Hine.

voluntary agent."

In keeping with this Deweyan ethic, Hine approached his subjects with decorum and tact. He rarely took candid shots but rather encouraged eye contact between the camera lens and the subject. As Trachtenberg says, "he learned how to achieve a certain physical distance, corresponding to a psychological distance, that allowed for a free interaction between the eyes of the subject and the camera. . . he allowed his subjects room for *their* self-expression."

Hine's respectful approach contrasted sharply with that of Jacob Riis, the father of American reform photography, whose expeditions into the dark world, the "other half," were literal attacks on vulnerable working-class targets. Recalling his adventures, Riis remarked that:

It is not too much to say that our party carried terror wherever it went. The flashlight of those days was contained in cartridges fired from a revolver. The spectacle of half a dozen strange men invading a house in the midnight hour armed with big pistols which they shot off recklessly was hardly reassuring, however sugary our speech . . . and it was not to be wondered at if the tenants bolted through windows and down fire escapes wherever we went. But as no

*John Dewey, *Ethics* (1908), *The Middle Works of John Dewey V*, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), pp. 276-77.

one was murdered, things calmed down after a while, ... though months after I found the recollection of our visits hanging over a Stanton Street block like a nightmare.

The people Riis fixed with his flashgun were dazed and off-guard. In few of the photographs in his pathbreaking book, *How the Other Half Lives*, do his subjects face the camera on their feet, and many are not only "down" but "out," altogether without consciousness.



Jacob Riis, "Quarters for the Night."

Unlike Riis, who regarded the posing of his subjects as a *problem*, Hine welcomed it as an *opportunity* for them to collaborate in their portrait, rendering it less an "exposure" of a life than a revelation and, in part, a self-revelation. Hine's best reform photography is *democratic* in Dewey's sense; it allows its subjects to participate actively in the production of the knowledge others will have of them. His was an ethics of reform camerawork that pointed toward working-class self-portraiture, a conclusion that Hine appears to have recognized. "The greatest advance in social work," he wrote in 1909, "is to be made by the popularizing of camerawork, so that these records can be made by those who are in the thick of the battle." And near the end of his life he wrote a friend that "I have had all along, as you know, a conviction that my demonstration of the value of the photographic appeal can find its real fruition best if it helps the workers realize that they themselves can use it as a lever even though it may not be the mainspring of the works."

As a consequence of his commitment to a democratic ethic and his resistance to benevolent paternalism, Hine's photographs of workers not only opened to view the difficult circumstances of their lives but also revealed their strength and solidarity. The persistent power of Hine's photographs of children also rests, in



Lewis Hine, "Breaker Boys in Coal Chute," from *America and Lewis Hine*.

part, on his refusal to present them simply as one-dimensional victims of industrial capitalism. His children, like his adults, are not thoroughly beaten down into passivity and defeat but retain resources of resistance: They are tough, defiant, and more often than not, they smile. The child labor photographs are moving because we are made aware of the *struggle* that was waged in factories, fields, and sweatshops between the spirit of Hine's children and their exploiters. We face not deadened boys and girls, but are thrust instead into the midst of their deadening, a much more painful prospect. Hine's photographs call upon us not to "do good" for (or to) such children but, as Dewey would say, to establish the conditions that will enable them to actively develop for themselves the powers that peek out from beneath their coal-smudged faces.

III

The contrast I have drawn between the ethics of Hine's progressive camerawork and that of his predecessor can also be drawn between his work and that of many of the younger photographers who documented the trauma of the Great Depression. Hine was frozen out of the greatest documentary project of this decade, the work of the historical section of the Farm Security Administration, by its director Roy Stryker. Stryker claimed that Hine was not employed in the project because he was personally difficult to get along with, but, given the tension between Hine's photographic ethic and that which prevailed in the FSA, it is perhaps worth speculating that the antagonism between Stryker and Hine ran deeper.

As William Stott has demonstrated in his superb book *Documentary Expression and Thirties America* (Oxford, 1973), many of the photographers in the FSA were as anxious to avoid posed photographs and the



Margaret Bourke-White, "Okefenokee Swamp, Georgia."

open participation of their subjects in their "exposure" as Riis. They were after a particular "look"—"half frown, half appeal; a look vacant but despairing; a look that expects rebuff yet *asks* anyway"—and they devised often elaborate strategies to get it. For example, in order to get "the look" in a famous photograph of the wife and child of an Arkansas sharecropper, Arthur Rothstein developed a careful plan of deception. Frustrated because the woman and her child would, on direct approach, give him only "Sunday snapshot smiles," Rothstein manipulated them into the "forlorn look" he wanted by getting a local acquaintance of the woman to question her while Rothstein stood unobtrusively in the background, camera ready to hand. Whenever she responded to her neighbor's questions with "anxiety and concern" Rothstein snapped the picture, and this method, he said, "gave me what I wanted, a factual and true scene."

The most aggressive of the thirties photographers in this respect was not, however, Rothstein but Margaret Bourke-White who took the photographs in the decade's most celebrated documentary book, *You Have Seen Their Faces* (Viking, 1937) for which Erskine Caldwell wrote the text. These photographs were a compendium of variations on "the look," accompanied by captions authored by Caldwell and Bourke-White that put words in the mouths of the people portrayed in order to render them as even more conventional icons of despair. "The legends under the picture," Caldwell and Bourke-White wrote, "are intended to express the authors' own conceptions of the sentiments of the individuals portrayed; they do not pretend to reproduce the actual sentiments of these people."


The contrast between the ethic of photographers like Bourke-White and Hine can be seen in a comparison of photographs that each took in the thirties of very similar scenes. In Bourke-White's image of a meager



Lewis Hine, "Miner's Family," from *America* and Lewis Hine.

family meal in Georgia, everyone has "the look" (though it looks a bit forced where the children are concerned, and the older boy almost appears to have been *told* to gaze longingly at his brother's more substantial dinner plate). The impression offered is one of wholesale deprivation, despair, and resignation to a lifeboat ethics in which, as the caption reads, "the littlest one gets taken care of." In Hine's photograph of the meal of a miner's family in West Virginia, by contrast, the poverty of a shack papered with newspaper encloses and is in tension with a family gathering that transcends these circumstances and renders its subjects considerably more complex than those forced on the procrustean bed of Bourke-White's benevolent conventions. Here the miner's baby appears to have done something to amuse his older sister, evoking a family bemusement that I have often seen at my own dinner table. While Bourke-White's subjects are objectified as types trapped within a very limited repertoire of feeling, Hine's family betrays a full range of emotions and human capabilities struggling with difficult circumstances.

My speculation that Hine might not have fit in at the FSA takes on a bit of weight in light of Walker Evans's failure to do so, for Evans, fired by Stryker in 1937, is the thirties photographer whose camerawork ethics seem to most closely approximate Hine's. Evans had, as Lionel Trilling observed in an acute review of *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* (Houghton Mifflin, 1960), "perfect *taste*, taking that word in its largest possible sense to mean tact, delicacy, justness of feeling, complete awareness and perfect respect." In portraits like that of Annie Mae Gudger, Trilling remarked, "the sitter gains in dignity when allowed to defend herself against the lens. The gaze of the woman returning our gaze checks our pity. . . . In this picture, Mrs. Gudger, with all her misery and perhaps with her touch of pity



Walker Evans, "Annie Mae Gudger."

for herself, simply refuses to be an object of your 'social consciousness'; she refuses to be an object at all—everything in the picture proclaims her to be all subject."

Evans and his collaborator on *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men*, James Agee, were outraged by the success of *You Have Seen Their Faces*. As Evans said, "we thought it was an evil and immoral thing to do. Not only to cheapen [the tenant farmers] but to profit by them, to exploit them—who had already been so exploited. Not only that but to exploit them without even *knowing* that that was what you were doing."

This outrage moved Agee to include a savage attack on Bourke-White in an appendix and helped shape *Let*

Us Now Praise Famous Men into an extended meditation on the epistemological difficulties and ethical conundrums of documentary expression. Calling for an "effort to perceive simply the cruel radiance of what is" while at the same time acknowledging the extraordinary difficulties this task presented, Agee declared that "the camera seems to me, next to unassisted and weaponless consciousness, the central instrument of our time." He felt "such rage at its misuse; which has spread so nearly a universal corruption of sight that I know of less than a dozen alive whose eyes I can trust even so much as my own."

Agee's hostility toward Bourke-White and others who corrupted the capacity of the camera "handled cleanly and literally in its own terms" to record "absolute, dry truth" was contained in a larger skepticism about reform itself and a religious vision that despaired of any cure for suffering short of that provided by "our father who art in heaven." Progressivism, he suggested, could only treat the poor as "social integers in a criminal economy" and necessarily obscured the fact that every man and woman was "a creature which has never in all time existed before and which shall never in all time exist again and which is not quite like any other and which has the grand stature and natural warmth of every other and whose existence is all measured upon a still made and incurable time."

Hine's camerawork suggests a different vision. It points toward a reform ethic grounded not in pity for downtrodden "masses" but in respect for the resilient particularity of individual human lives—not in objectification under the gaze of benevolence but in an empowering dialogue of shared revelation. Such a democratic ethic, as Dewey said, requires a reconstructed conception of "helping others" that rests on "the discovery and promotion of those activities and active relationships in which the capacities of all concerned are effectively evoked, exercised, and put to the test." It was the genius of Lewis Hine to recognize that democracy also requires a reconstruction of the very way we see those we would help. □

Getting to Solla Sollew: The Existential Politics of Dr. Seuss

Betty Mensch and Alan Freeman

In early 1986, there appeared in the world a book of forty-two (unnumbered) pages, written in rhythmically repetitive and meticulously rhymed simplistic verse which some would call doggerel. Every page is illustrated in bright colors, with large and fanciful cartoon characters. One is a friendly, sympathetic goldfish named Norval. The story is about the awful experience of going to the doctor for a checkup, but the experience is made less threatening through the author's mode of silly exaggeration.

This format and story line suggest a children's book, one fairly typical of the genre. In fact, however, the book is *You're Only Old Once*, by Theodore Seuss Geisel, also and usually known as Dr. Seuss, and its intended audience is grown-ups, especially the elderly. However improbable the idea of writing a children's book for grown-ups, on March 8, 1987, the book celebrated a full year on the *New York Times* Best Seller List. As recently as February 22, 1987, it was number four on the list.

This success should not be surprising. Dr. Seuss merely employed the form that has over the past fifty years made him one of the most successful writers of children's literature in the history of the English language, ranking him with such as Lewis Carroll or Beatrix Potter. He has sold more than one hundred million books. What worked for his elderly audience has been working for children all along.

What the snobbish may dismiss as Dr. Seuss's doggerel is an incessant, bouncy anapestic rhythm punctuated by lively, memorable rhymes. In opposition to the conventional—indeed, hegemonic—iambic voice, his metric triplets offer the power of a more primal chant which quickly draws the reader in with its relentless repetition. Moreover, what seems to be the silly whimsy of his books—the made-up words, the outlandish creatures and machines—carries an empowering message. Seuss is a smasher of conventional boundaries. He invents his own words, defying the language/

nonsense boundary; he invents his own creatures, defying the human/animal boundary; he is unceasingly sarcastic and satirical yet profoundly serious, ultimately defying the boundary between what is serious and what is absurd.

This form reaches the powerless, such as small children and old people, who are expected to be passive and are objectified through their nonconsensual submission to authority. For such readers (or, listeners, in the case of the children), the books offer a discourse of resistance; they are accessible, easily consumed, and utterly irreverent. Their suggestion that categories need not be taken for granted is empowering to those who are told they have no choice, that that's the way things are, that "life is like that."

The amazing success of *You're Only Old Once* is an obvious tribute to the magic of Dr. Seuss. For those of us familiar with the magic, it was no surprise. We knew that there was something special and appealing in the children's books, not just in the cuteness of the lines but in their at-least-as-serious-as-funny treatment of underlying themes and issues. We wrote this essay to offer our sense, through the lens of our now aging yet still resolute 1960s political consciousness, of the profoundly existential political world of Dr. Seuss.

Empowerment is the core theme in Dr. Seuss, for with all of his irreverent nonsense he offers readers a space within which they can search for both identity and virtue, free from the oppressive force of authority and orthodoxy. Seuss develops this theme with surprising richness and complexity. Described thematically (rather than chronologically), he starts by exploring the child's struggle to achieve identity in the family, with its conventional norms of behavior and its demand for passive compliance with authority. Seuss moves from there to a description of the need for authentic, existential struggle in the world generally. He then explores quite specific forms of oppression in the modern world—hierarchy, racism, environmental devastation, and militarism—and all the suffocating ideological forms which are used to justify them. Finally, Seuss suggests the possibility of moral and political transformation. This transformation requires the creation of new selves, liberated from orthodox assumptions about scientific truth, gender, and the limited range of moral

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choice in the world. So transformed, we might even become open to the experience of forming an authentic community, in which virtue and authority are no longer at odds with each other, but reunited in new conditions of freedom.

In our world, especially in its public realm, we experience authority as disconnected from virtue. Virtue means the possibility of living a moral life; authority is what obliges us to conform to social or, more exactly, legal norms. Virtue, for most of us, means personal morality that is subjective and privatized. Authority means the state or one of its disciplinary agents. There have been times in our history, however, when it was imagined that virtue and authority might reside in the same place. Such was the claim of medieval monarchy, which supposes itself divinely sanctioned. In contrast, the modern secular state merely enforces an aggregate of subjective political choices. There remains, however, one realm in our contemporary experience where the two still purport to be united: the role of the parent. To empower children in their own quest for virtue inevitably means subverting the role of the parent. Therefore, a description of Dr. Seuss's work properly starts with his lively family psychodrama, *The Cat in the Hat*.*

In *The Cat in the Hat*, with the simple elegance of a 220-word vocabulary, Seuss depicts in powerful symbolic form the core childhood dilemma of identity and authority within the family. The (nameless) narrator is a boy—the archetypal male child seeking to define himself in relation to his mother and also in relation to both conventional morality and his own chaotic, anarchic impulses. Thus the book is quite specifically about *boyhood*, and the male quest for self-definition in the nuclear family of the 1950s, when mother was the most powerful repressive presence in the family and the most immediate representative of convention. (It is a testament to the power of gender in that culture—and also in the traditional Freudian version of childhood—that *The Cat in the Hat* would be a very different book if written about a girl.)

At the start of the book the narrator and his sister, Sally, are alone and bored at home on a cold, rainy day, accompanied only by their fish in a bowl, when a loud bump suddenly announces the unexpected arrival of the slyly grinning Cat in the Hat. This cat promises “lots of good fun that is funny,” and quickly dismisses the fish’s strident objection that the children must not let the cat in when their mother is away:

*But our fish said, “No! No! Make that cat go away!
Tell that Cat in the Hat you do NOT want to play.
He should not be here. He should not be about.
He should not be here when your mother is out!”*

The cat insists that the children should “Have no fear!” and repeats his promise that “we can have lots of good fun . . .” This he then demonstrates with his first game, a complex juggling trick that begins with the fish being tossed high in the air. After this balancing act collapses, the fish once again scolds the cat and orders him out. The cat refuses to leave, instead summoning two nameless things from a red box, thing one and thing two, who are strange, soulless, golem-like creatures resplendent in their perfect amorality. Once released, the things enter into a chaotic frenzy of unrestrained play. Like demon spirits from an animalistic id, the things run wild, wreaking havoc and even violating the absent mother’s most intimate realm:

*On the string of one kite
We saw mother’s new gown!
her gown with the dots
That are pink, white and red.
Then we saw one kite bump
On the head of her bed!*

Just as the children are becoming nervous at the extent of the destruction, the fish, quaking with fear, announces that mother is home. Finally frightened, the narrator seizes the things and orders the cat to take them away. As the fish laments the awesome mess left in the house, the cat returns with a magic machine and restores order. When mother does return, and asks what the children did, they are uncertain what to tell her. Then, in the last two lines of the book, another voice asks us all a dreadful question: “What would you do if your mother asked you?”

Dr. Seuss pushes beyond conventional liberal cliché to offer a more radical version of both the problems and the likelihood of their eventual solution.

The children are thus confronted with powerful cultural images. The fish, with his incessant scolding, articulates all the socially constructed norms defining what good little children should do, norms which parents systematically and unreflectively instill in their children. Drawing on old Christian symbolism (the fish was an ancient sign of Christianity), Dr. Seuss portrays the fish

*For a similar reading of *The Cat in the Hat*, stressing its psychodramatic and anti-authoritarian qualities, see chapter six of *Down the Rabbit Hole*, by Selma Lanes (1971).

as a kind of ever-nagging super-ego, the embodiment of utterly conventionalized morality. Thus, as if under seige by Nietzsche himself, the fish scolds, frets, chastises, and tries to induce anxious fear of authority, but unlike the cat, he can attract the children with no independent power of his own, and his demands are designed to make the children utterly passive. The fish would have them just, "*sit, sit, sit, sit.*" Therefore, Dr. Seuss is merciless in his mockery of the fish and the conventionality the fish represents. In the hands of the cat (his natural predator) the fish is subjected to mad-cap, slapstick violence—he is balanced on the cat's umbrella, dropped into a teapot, and dangled from the lines of a kite.

With all of his elaborate (and not always successful) juggling tricks, the cat seems to act as a kind of mediator: However irreverent, he complies with social norms at least enough to avoid dreaded punishment (he *does* clean up his mess), while at the same time retaining his utter commitment to having fun. Unlike the accommodationalist ego of Freudian imagery, however, the cat is more liberator than integrator, too much a fierce deconstructor of norms to be content with mere balancing. With his magical, prescientific technology and his offer of unrestrained fun without accountability, he is the most destabilizing character in the story. The cat has long served in Western culture as an embodiment of magical, even satanic forces. Here the cat carries on that tradition by demonstrating to the boy narrator a possibility of powerful action in the world, action unconstrained by the fish's fearful anxiety and obsession with propriety.

I*Had Trouble in Getting to Solla Sollew* also explores the theme of action and self-definition, but here the arena of struggle is the world at large, beyond the family, where a young hero—again, a nameless male narrator—must forge his identity in the face of “a sea of troubles.” In a text that resonates with the classic *Man's Fate*, by Malraux, Seuss suggests that neither utopian self-delusion nor foolish escapism can neutralize the need for day-to-day existential struggle. *Solla Sollew* is a parable of innocence and experience, of paradise lost and never regained. Its nameless protagonist starts out “*real happy and carefree and young,*” in a place where “*nothing, not anything went wrong.*” By the second page, however, this poor lad has already stubbed his toe and sprained his main tailbone. Now having experienced trouble for the first time, he tries to persuade himself that if he keeps his eyes straight ahead, he'll “*keep out of trouble forever.*” He quickly learns, however, that it is foolish to think that one can overcome troubles by merely looking out for them (i. e., by passive avoidance). Whatever direction you're looking in, our poor hero

discovers, they'll get you from another one, as in rapid succession various troubles bite his tail, sting his neck, and chew on his toes.

Mightily discouraged, the gullible protagonist is taken in by the promise of utopian escapism, as a chap driving a one-wheeler, camel-pulled wubble pledges to deliver him to the “*City of Solla Sollew, / On the banks of the beautiful River Wah-Hoo, / Where they never have troubles! At least, very few.*” At that point our happy pilgrim jumps aboard for his brief (as he anticipates) trip to the Promised Land. The journey proves perilous, however, as nature and society both reveal a dark and sinister side. Disease soon strikes the camel, so that the once stalwart puller must now be pulled along a steep and tortuous path. Before long the bed-raggléd hero finds himself doing all the pulling while his supposedly generous wubble-owning companion rides beside the camel.

There is always choice. No matter how heavy the weight of the past, the possibility of existential, committed action remains.

At this point, in a single page that works as well as anything Marx ever wrote on the subject, Dr. Seuss provides a scathing critique of the division of labor as an ideology of meritocratic hierarchy that legitimates oppression through the pretense of mental superiority. Discovering that he has been doing all the pulling, the weary hero comments, “*This is rather unfair.*” In response, the wubble owner condescendingly explains, “*Don't you stew. I am doing my share. / This is called teamwork. / I furnish the brains. / You furnish the muscles, the aches and the pains . . .*” Then true to his word the wubble owner “*sat and he worked with his brain and his tongue / And he bossed me around just because I was young. / He told me go left. Then he told me go right. / And that's what he told me all day and all night.*”

The next illusion to be shattered is the one of technological dependability. Leaving the wubble owner and the sick camel behind, the young pilgrim tries to take the “*Happy Way Bus,*” which supposedly leaves at exactly “*4:42, and will take you directly to Solla Sollew.*” As it turns out, however, at the bus stop is a sign cheerfully announcing that the 4:42 is no longer running, and then adding “*But I wish you a most pleasant journey by feet. / Signed / Bus Line President, Horace P. Sweet.*”

Technological breakdown is followed by natural disaster as the “*Midwinter Jicker*” pours down torrential

rain. Our hero floats about aimlessly for twelve days "without toothpaste or soap" and concedes that he had "almost given up hope." At that point he seems to be rescued by a powerful helping hand, but he barely has a chance to say "Thank you, my friend" before he discovers that his friend is really the fascist-looking "General Genghis Kahn Schmitz," who impresses him to serve as the lowliest soldier in his army. The General promises (as we remember being promised so often during the Vietnam War) that "the glorious moment of victory is near!" Nevertheless, the enemy Poozers of Pompelmoose Pass turn out to be far more numerous than expected, and the general finally orders his troops to retreat with the not-so-comforting explanation: "This happens in war every now and again. / Sometimes you are winners. Sometimes you are losers. / We never can win against so many Poozers . . ."

Left to confront the Poozers alone, the protagonist is saved only because he falls down a vent into a strange, surrealistic, bird-filled underground tunnel, suggesting nightmare images of eternal strife, oddly composed of mundane, everyday details of modern life, like bikes, ladders, bottles, campaign signs, and garbage. He becomes a lonely figure struggling upstream against a pressing flow of disconnected, seeping materiality.

Narrowly escaping once again, our hero emerges from below, astonished to discover that he is in front of the door leading to Solla Sollew. With utopia only a step away, he unfortunately learns that exception has become the rule: There are, indeed, almost no troubles in Solla Sollew, but the one little trouble currently in residence is not effectively barring entry through the single available door. Like other idealist visions of perfection, Solla Sollew remains for our pilgrim only imaginary, never real.

Horton finds he must stake his epistemological ground against mockery, humiliation, and physical abuse in order to save what he has started to recognize as a voice of real community.

The hero now reaches a moment of existential choice. Declining an opportunity to journey to yet another Promised Land where there are not just few, but *no* troubles, he chooses instead to go back to where the troubles all began—but not in a spirit of meekness, passivity or resignation. As he recognizes, "I know I'll have troubles, / I'll maybe get stung, / I'll always have

troubles. / I'll maybe get bit . . ." But, in the best tradition of Mao and Che Guevara, he also realizes what one must do in the face of troubles:

*"But I've bought a big bat. I'm all ready, you see.
Now my troubles are going to have troubles with me!"*

While *I Had Trouble in Getting to Solla Sollew* is a story about existential struggle in general, four of Dr. Seuss's books have dealt with familiar and quite specific social issues: Illegitimate hierarchy, racism, ecology, and the arms race. In each, however, Dr. Seuss pushes beyond conventional liberal cliché to offer a more radical version of both the problems and the likelihood of their eventual solution.

One of Dr. Seuss's earliest and most obviously political stories was *Yertle the Turtle*, written in 1950. Its central theme is hierarchy, which is depicted with stark, corrosive simplicity. Yertle is the turtle king who constructs his throne by requiring his subjects to stack themselves in an ever-higher pile. The weight on the turtles below becomes heavier and heavier as Yertle feeds his arrogant, fantasy rulership of all he can see. Only Mack, the plainest and lowliest of the subjects, dares to voice his opposition: "Your majesty, please . . . I don't like to complain, / But down here below, we are feeling great pain. / I know, up on top you are seeing great sights, / But down at the bottom we, too, should have rights."

Finally becoming indignant when he sees the moon rising higher than himself, Yertle announces that he will stack his subjects all the way to heaven. At that point, when the pain becomes unbearable, Mack becomes "a little bit mad," and does a "plain little thing": he burps, and that burp tumbles the whole precarious pile of turtles. Yertle takes a nose dive and is returned to his proper station—resituated in the pond, he is mockingly called "king of the mud," while all the other turtles "are free / As turtles and, maybe, all creatures should be."

In *Yertle*, and in later stories as well, Seuss ruthlessly exposes the artificiality of hierarchy. Oppression is not just evil—it is petty and pointless as well, serving nothing except the self-important delusions of those who rule. As Yertle rises up and his field of vision expands, he proudly (and ludicrously) proclaims:

*"All mine! . . . Oh, the things I now rule!
I'm king of a cow! And I'm king of a mule!
I'm king of a horse! And, what's more, beyond that
I'm king of a blueberry bush and a cat!
I'm Yertle the Turtle! Oh, marvelous me!
For I am the ruler of all that I see!"*

Since Yertle's authority is premised on deluded consciousness alone, submission to his oppression is therefore not an act of political necessity, but one of exaggerated fear, so that the oppressed are essentially complicit in their own oppression. The turtles trembled with fear when Yertle "*bellowed and brayed*" out his orders, and they obeyed. As it turns out, however, they are not nearly as powerless as they felt, for only one slight, whimsical act of opposition is enough to send Yertle's whole structure toppling. The scene at the end is one of joyful frolic, as the turtles happily cavort together in the pond. While Yertle scowls out from under his crown of mud, the others play in a state of anarchic but companionable pleasure.

Yertle the Turtle provides an important lesson about surplus powerlessness, but Mack's burp might have been *too* easy—a single, slight, contemptuous gesture is sufficient to topple oppression and transform the turtle world into utopia. Nevertheless, in dealing with specific social issues Dr. Seuss became increasingly unwilling to suggest that solutions were easy; as time went on there was a mounting pessimism in his work, combined, however, with a greater sense of urgency in the call for committed moral action.

The Sneetches, written in 1953, a year before *Brown v. Board of Education*, is an indictment of racism.* In the story Seuss mocks the way in which culturally constructed otherness becomes the basis for oppression. Despite his mocking tone, however, Seuss also recognizes how deeply embedded the construct of otherness is in our culture.

The Sneetches opens by describing a society whose central, organizing principle is domination and subordination based on a supposedly important and natural physical difference: some Sneetches have little stars on their bellies, while others do not. Those with stars maintain their social domination through a process of systematic exclusion:

*But, because they had stars, all the Star-Belly
Sneetches
Would brag, We're the best kind of Sneetch on the
beaches
With their snoots in the air, they would sniff and
they'd snort
We'll have nothing to do with the Plain-Belly sort!*
...
*When the Star-Belly Sneetches had frankfurter roasts
Or picnics or parties or marshmallow toasts,
They never invited the Plain-Belly Sneetches*

*Which is not to suggest that Dr. Seuss is perfect on the question of racism. In *If I Ran the Zoo* (1950), he failed to rise above his generation, depicting both Asians and Africans with racially stereotypical caricature.

*They left them out cold, in the dark of the beaches.
They kept them away. Never let them come near.
And that's how they treated them year after year.*

By itself, this description ridicules the insidious social practices based on racism. Dr. Seuss's analysis goes one step further, however. Seuss is not only sensitive to the unjustified self-importance of the excluders, but sensitive as well to its effects on its victims. He understands that the experience of exclusion can push victims to the point of wanting to take on the norms and values of their oppressors, so that they try to deny their own identities in order to pass as dominators. It is that psychic reality of racism, and cultural domination in general, which provides Seuss with a point of departure for a critique that is far more radical than the conventional liberal denunciation of racism as simply not rational or nice.

*Seuss has, in effect, aligned himself
with the anti-authoritarian cat, in
order to give children the space they
need to make more morally affirma-
tive choices.*

In fact, Dr. Seuss introduces a third party who represents a class whose interests might well be served by the perpetuation of racism. In his story, the key character is Sylvester McMonkey McBean, a predatory and exploitative entrepreneur who plays skillfully on the fears and anxieties of the Sneetch victims who are caught up in the racist world view of their oppressors.

For three dollars each, McBean, with a very large machine, transforms the Sneetches without stars into creatures indistinguishable from their former oppressors. Confronted with the abolition of physical difference, the original Star-Belly Sneetches desperately proclaim, "*We're still the best Sneetches and they are the worst, / But now how in the world will we know ... / If which kind is what, or the other way round?*" McBean, looking as sleazy as can be, now charging \$10 each and using a fancier machine, removes the stars from the bellies of the original oppressors. Next, of course, McBean offers to remove the stars he has sold to the original victims. As this selling process escalates, the scene turns into an orgy of capitalist exploitation, with constant streams of Sneetches paying to enter one machine to be starred and then to enter another to be unstarred, while McBean stands grinning in the center, in front of an ever-growing mountain of cash.

(Continued on p. 113)

The Exile of the Shekhinah

Rabbi Alijah Dessler

Recognition of God in the innermost heart constitutes “the *Shekhinah*’s* resting upon Israel.” As the Rabbis of blessed memory said, “‘And I shall dwell in *YOUR* midst’ (Exodus 25:8) is stated in the plural, not in the singular.” Even when a person is within a great eclipse of the soul—a condition of actual *Tumah*†—nonetheless the innermost holy spark latent within every heart of Israel is not extinguished. This is included in God’s promise “... I will not cast them away, nor will I abhor them to destroy them utterly. . . .” (Leviticus 26:44). But through iniquity and sin and through cozying up to *Tumah* the human forges an iron wall separating the holy point residing in the heart and the I, causing the holy spark to fall into *Tumah* and rendering it useless in illuminating the soul. This then is the meaning of “the *Shekhinah* in Exile”—that the innermost point of the human is not revealed and illuminated, but hidden and darkened.

There is “the Exile of the *Shekhinah*” of the individual—the innermost point of a singular being—and there is the “Exile of the *Shekhinah*” of the group—when the nation as a whole pushes aside its holy spark through gross materiality and ignorance. This is the worst condition that a person can be found in, when the thread of one’s spiritual life and attachment to holiness is almost severed, approaching total loss. This condition spread into the community is a condition of *Hurban*.‡ If one neither feels nor is pained by this, that itself is a sign that *Hurban* has overtaken. But one who feels “the Exile of the *Shekhinah*” within and is pained—with a pain that approaches weeping—by the inability to cleave to the Blessed Name and by the *Hurban* of the Temple of the Heart—this itself is a *Tikkun* of the Exile of the *Shekhinah* of the heart. As the Rabbis of blessed memory said—“whoever mourns Jerusalem will merit to see its happiness.” (*Taanit* 30). This means that even presently they can see the *Tikkun* of their innermost heart and they can rejoice over that. This is the meaning of the eternal weeping established for all generations (over the Temple)—even as it reflects punishment it is the only road to *Tikkun*. Moreover, all travail that God brings is in order to provide soulful opportunities for one to be pained for the spiritual destruction within the heart. And *this* is the path of redemption.

Excerpt from MIKHTAV MA-ELIYAHU (Vol II, page 47). Translation by Rabbi Daniel Landes.

*Shekhinah—(Feminine) Divine indwelling.

†Tumah—Impurity, alienation.

‡Hurban—Destruction (of the Holy Temple).

The End of Prayer

Steve Silberman

Said, “Take me some place Jewish”
we drove down ancient December avenues around
Bowery
until a delicatessen, with blue windows dripping
silhouetted
cavernous, half-empty, knots of mostly older
white-haired Jews sipping tea or soup—
I took a ragged slice of brisket and sat down
my father and mother and me. Soon a frail
apparition at my father’s jacketed elbow, almost
mischievous
of aspect, obviously curious and with a secret.
“Are you,” she addressed my father, “a college
professor?”
pronouncing the words as if in a foreign language,
carefully. It is happy to say yes, happier
to tell the truth, and wonderful
to have guessed rightly and not made a fool of
oneself—
She asked then, “Are you a Communist?”
kvelling over her accuracy, already we were set apart
from the gossiping mob busy
with fork and plate. Not afraid to tell her life story
began her recitation, gathering into it
the Czar, Lenin, certain offices of the Politburo
and duties as a secretary—nothing startling
if I remember, execution of policy and the confidences
the job entails;
along with a midnight getaway—some wealth—
not necessarily hers—through ballroom-red teardrop
earrings
glittered and danced where once something more
beautiful—
the last question: “Do you know the Internationale?”
She sang, and wept.
Of her weeping and singing there is nothing in the
ancient texts;
but of the phrase “The prayers of David the son of
Jesse are ended”
Rabbi Yitzhak said, “All prayers and hymns are a plea
to have His glory
revealed throughout the world. But once the whole
earth is, indeed,
filled with it, there will be no further need to pray.”

Steve Silberman was an apprentice of Allen Ginsberg at Naropa Institute in 1977 and lives in San Francisco.

Poland and the Jews: An Interview with Czeslaw Milosz

In recent months a fierce controversy has reemerged in Poland about the responsibility of the Poles for the destruction of Polish Jewry. In an article by Jon Blonski in the Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny, Poles are accused of both forgetting and denying their actual roles. Blonski cites favorably the work of Czeslaw Milosz, whose poetry spoke bluntly and eloquently about the suffering of the Jews of Poland.

In light of that controversy, and in view of his stature as one of the cultural heroes of progressive forces in Poland, Tikkun conducted this interview with Professor Milosz. In our next issue the relationship of Jews and Poles will be further discussed by Abraham Brumberg.

Czeslaw Milosz is a world famous poet and a recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature.

Tikkun: There are two famous poems of yours, "Campo dei Fiori" and "A Poor Christian Looks at the Ghetto," that call upon Polish people to acknowledge the role of anti-Semitism in Polish history, and in particular, in relationship to the Holocaust. Is it your sense that that call has been paid serious attention by the Polish people?

Czeslaw Milosz: It is being discussed and my poems written during the war are quoted in this connection. I am very much concerned with the question of mutual resentments on the part of the Jews and of the Poles. We are many decades after those events. And for young generations those things are very often difficult to grasp.

Tikkun: Well, I know that that's true, because I know that it's very hard even for Americans today to grasp the full meaning of slavery. Many Blacks insist today on reminding us of the distortions that followed in American society, based on the history of slavery. Yet that is over a hundred and twenty years ago, and here we're talking about something that was a mere forty years ago.

Milosz: Yes, yes.

Tikkun: What do you think the right attitude is for Jews to take towards Poles today?

Milosz: First of all, not to extend resentments to the

young generation, because the younger generations don't know very much about it. But, let me say this, I belong to a generation brought up before the war. For me, the world before the war is quite a vivid reality. I am in a different position, and I think that whoever wants to understand the question of anti-Semitism in Poland has to go back to that period before the war. For instance, look at Isaac Bashevis Singer's autobiography, *Love and Exile*. It is an excellent image of Jewish life in Poland before the war, his childhood and his adolescence, especially his youth, and it gives you the picture of two societies living side by side, but not penetrating each other, completely isolated. And there was, of course, the question of my colleagues who were so-called assimilated Jews, but didn't consider themselves Jewish, either religiously or culturally. Those who belonged to Polish culture underplayed their Jewishness.

Tikkun: Wasn't that in part a function of existing anti-Semitism? In other words, wasn't it the case that Poles saw Jews as Jews, even when Jews tried not to see themselves as Jews?

Milosz: Sure, of course. But there was also a factor of so-called emancipated Jews rejecting what they considered the religious obscurantism of the Jewish masses.

Tikkun: Well, the thesis of the Sharf article "In Anger and in Sorrow: Towards a Polish-Jewish Dialogue" in the journal *Polin* is that basically it has been very difficult for Polish writers and intellectuals, even up to this very day to acknowledge the fact that anti-Semitism was not just a factor, but a dominant factor in Polish life before the Second World War. It's much easier for people to talk about anti-Semitism as having been introduced by the Nazis and imposed on the Polish people. Yet some people argue that had there never been an invasion, Poland would probably have instituted some version of the Nuremberg Laws and that the strongest parties in Poland previous to the war and the invasion of the Germans were explicitly anti-Semitic.

Milosz: The fact is that Polish political life between the two wars was dominated by two basic forces: the Polish Socialist Party and the nationalistic parties. The first

head of the state, Pilsudski, who was from a socialist background, represented the anti-nationalistic tendency. His man was elected the first president of Poland in 1922, and assassinated a few days later by a nationalist fanatic. And this socialist and progressive camp was not anti-Semitic. On the contrary, the argument for assassinating the president advanced by the nationalist party was that he was elected by the socialists and so-called minorities. There were two currents in Polish life. Life in Poland between the two wars was quite complex. There were also several political parties within Jewish society. And Singer shows the rebellion of the young generation against the religious authorities. Young Jews went to the Left. Which of course added venom to those things, because the nationalist party was strongly anti-Leftist and so on. So you see, if you look closer, you see a sort of mosaic, very complex.

Tikkun: Well, the account that's given now, after that time, by at least some people, is that even those Jews who went to the Left found that in order to survive in the Left, they had to play down or dissociate themselves from their own Jewishness. Many people report that in the Left itself, there was still a strong undercurrent of anti-Semitism.

Milosz: I wouldn't like to appear here as an advocate of things which cannot be defended, but maybe I am somewhat in a position of Agnieszka Holland, a Polish film director [who directed *Bitter Harvest*] who is half Jewish, half Polish. And she said "When I am with the Jews, I defend Poles, when I am with Poles, I defend Jews." So I try to be just.

You mentioned this very important factor, but don't forget, that those Jews who went to communism embraced internationalism, which meant complete rejection of the Zionism and Jewishness of their fathers. But those who went to the Bund had no need to pretend anything, because the language of the Bund was Yiddish. There was a Polish anti-Semitism that sometimes manifested itself as a feeling of cultural superiority to Jews—and this was absurd. Jewish life between the wars in Poland was very rich, and whatever can be said about Polish anti-Semitism, the fact is that those various movements could survive in Poland, because the number of the Jews was extremely high there. There were three million people, a large percentage of the population. But as far as persecution, strictly speaking, I guess that Poles are accused of anti-Semitism primarily because of that attitude of completely unjustified sense of superiority. Polish anti-Semitism was what French language defines as "mesquin." Mean.

Tikkun: Weren't Poles also voting for anti-Semitic par-

ties? Presumably part of the reason that these parties articulated anti-Semitic ideas was because they felt that they would strike a responsive chord in the mass psychology of Poles.

Milosz: Undoubtedly. Those parties, especially the National Democratic Party, for the main tenet had anti-Semitism.

Tikkun: So then that may have laid the basis for the Poles' collaboration with the Germans on the issue of Jews? The Nazis could build a common bridge to the Polish people around the shared anti-Semitism, and they could count on that in their day-to-day operations.

Milosz: I don't agree that Nazis created the concentration camps in Poland because they counted upon anti-Semitism. With this I do not agree, because, simply, the largest mass of the Jews was there. And they couldn't create those things in the West, because it would be immediately known.

Tikkun: Is it true that Jews, when trying to deal with the Nazi oppression, faced not simply indifference, but rather active hostility from the Polish people as a whole? Of course there were individuals, many righteous Polish people who stood up as individuals. But looking at the picture as a whole, is it true that the society as a whole en masse was not only indifferent, but actively collaborated? That Jews could expect to be identified as Jews by other Poles who knew them and sent to concentration camps? And that there was a much higher level of cooperation with the Nazis in Poland, than, say, Jews experienced in Holland?

Milosz: A danger for a Jew escaping from the ghetto of being identified was real, and that's a fact. However, as far as collaboration with the Nazis, there was no collaboration between the Poles and the Nazis. There was no collaboration. This should be said clearly, because there was no Polish pseudo-government under the Nazis. The Polish population was treated by the Nazis as the next to be destroyed, and the Poles knew that.

Tikkun: What about the experience that Jews reported when they reached out even to the resistance forces and found anti-Semitism even there?

Milosz: You probably saw a film, *Partisans of Vilna*? I consider it a very honest film, and there is the fact that the Polish Home Army practically didn't accept the Jews, which was a result of prejudice. The Jews are not good soldiers, and so on. That's the arrogance of the

military, because the underground army was largely a regular army, not truly a guerilla, but just a regular army in civil dress.

Tikkun: So, in light of these facts, what is the appropriate attitude of Jews towards Poles who were alive then, and who still are the senior generation of leadership in Poland today?

Milosz: You know, if you think of keeping permanently the account of those things, I wonder how you can travel to Germany. I personally try not to go to Germany, but I know that that's sort of traumatic on my part, and I do not think that this is a correct attitude. But, you should take into account many resentments on the Polish side towards the Jews.

Tikkun: What resentments do you think are legitimate, that Poles have towards Jews?

Milosz: I am very strongly against looking at phenomena by cutting them from the past, from a long history. We shouldn't forget that Polish-Jewish relations in Poland had a background, namely foreign occupation of the country during the whole nineteenth century. During the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, assimilation of the Jews to the Russian language made great progress. To some extent, they were assimilated in Galicia to the German language, but primarily Russian attracted Jews from the East. This created conflicts with the Poles, because, let us be frank, the Jews had no special interest in playing the game of the Poles. They were a different society. They looked for their place in a larger social reality than Poland, and this created considerable resentment. Then there was the fact that the young generation of Jews was very sympathetic towards the Soviet Union, and of course greeted the Red Army to the eastern part of Poland very favorably, immediately after the Stalin-Hitler pact. Soon this became known in Poland and created resentment. Then at the end of the war, when the Soviet Army entered Poland, many Jews who survived the war returned to Poland and divided themselves into two categories. One category treated their presence in Poland as temporary, on the way to going to Israel, to America, and so on. The other category, those who wanted to stay, were Communists. They occupied all the top positions in Poland and also in the very cruel security police, because they were more reliable, simply, than the local population.

Tikkun: Let's turn to young Jews' reaction to the Hitler-Stalin pact. The young generation of Jews would have some feeling that Stalin, no matter how deplorable, did

not have a policy of mass extermination of Jews, whereas the Nazis, while they had not yet begun the mass extermination, nevertheless advocated it.

Milosz: Do not mix two things. In the beginning of the war, in 1939, nobody imagined that those things which were going to happen in a couple of years would be possible. There were many Jews who returned from the eastern zone to Warsaw, to the German zone, because they wanted to be with relatives, and so on. Nobody imagined what would happen.

Tikkun: So, it was just young Jews who were enthusiastic about the Soviet Army, whereas most young Poles ... ?

Milosz: I must say that young Poles were mostly to the Right. But socialists also considered the partition of Poland by Hitler and Stalin as a kind of terrible blow to the national aspirations.

Tikkun: Whereas the young Jews, the young Jews didn't, so it was ...

Milosz: Why should they? They were internationalists.

Tikkun: I've been pressing you on some controversial issues. I'd like to give you the opportunity to add whatever points you'd like to this discussion.

Milosz: Certainly. I am concerned very much about building bridges between the Jews and the Poles, and I am not alone. There are many people of the younger generation who share this interest. It is complicated by campaigns of the Polish government against Zionism in connection with the military victories of Israel and by their toeing the line of the Soviet Union.

But I must voice here the opinion of many Poles who are ready to recognize the role of Polish anti-Semitism, yet at the same time are wounded when they are put on par with the Nazis. Whatever the contribution of anti-Semitism to the fate of the Jews, only a small number could have been saved with the best help of the Polish population. I believe that putting the Nazis' murder and the mean anti-Semitism of the Poles on a par is not correct in the name of justice.

Tikkun: In building the relationship between Jews and Poles, it seems to me that there still is a problem in relation to the Catholic Church.

Milosz: Yes. That's very important. Of course there are many good signs of a certain rapprochement between the Catholic Church and the Jews, certainly with the Pope.

Tikkun: Maybe you could say more about that, because the recent move by the Church to forbid its American Cardinal to visit the government of Israel has brought new strains to that relationship and a new sense on the part of Jews in America that the Catholic Church, while now no longer accusing Jews individually of killing Jesus, nevertheless collectively is not willing to allow for the national self-determination of the Jewish people through the state of Israel, nor for the religious right of the Jews to have a religion of their own.

Milosz: You see, here I cannot enter those things, because my attitude towards Israel is a kind of gut reaction, favorable, because of my feelings about the Nazis' occupation.

But the question of Christianity as responsible for anti-Semitism, this has been with me for a long time. And I know at least one attempt to connect directly the apostle Paul with Auschwitz. The apostle Paul who created Christianity as beyond the Jewish sect. And this is absurd, because anti-Semitism doesn't begin with Christianity. It's much older. Of late, I was working on translating the Wisdom of Solomon from Greek. It was written by a Jew of Alexandria in Greek. And there were terrific tensions in Alexandria between the Greeks and the Jews. The Jews were completely assimilated. They spoke Greek. So let us not lose the perspective.

Tikkun: The fact that Christianity didn't create anti-Semitism doesn't undermine the argument that Christianity has been a major purveyor of anti-Semitism.

Milosz: I basically don't agree with the argument of Lanzmann in *Shoah* or Professor Raoul Hilberg that the Holocaust is nothing else but intensification of anti-Semitism which existed in Christianity for centuries. I do not believe it at all, because it was not a gradual increase. The Holocaust was a qualitative jump which was created by a pagan movement of Nazis. Nazism was not Christian at all.

Tikkun: So how do you understand that jump, if it seems to have no historical roots in Christianity? Why use anti-Semitism? Why was that something that the Nazis could use and where did it come from?

Milosz: Where from? I guess that basically that was a movement of half-baked minds vulgarizing science. Popular science is at the root of Nazism, what a half-educated mind gets from science. Survival of the fittest. Darwin applied to nationalism in Europe, the vision of nations who are better, and worse, like struggle in nature between species.

Tikkun: So it's not Christianity and Christianity's legacy?

Milosz: No.

Tikkun: But why then the Jews? Why use half-baked science against the Jews? After all, Jews were themselves activists in science, helped develop science? Certainly on the basis of looking around at the society and asking who were the people who seemed to be least educated in the society, it would be hard to pick the Jews!

Milosz: Listen, my late friend, the Polish writer Witold Gombrowicz, several times addressed the Jews and he said "Why are you so surprised by anti-Semitism? Why are you so surprised? You produced Jesus Christ. You produced Marx, Freud. You produced so many things of human genius, and you are surprised that you have to pay?"

Tikkun: Actually many Jews aren't surprised because they've been dealing with Christian anti-Semitism for two thousand years.

Milosz: You have to assume a strange mystery of your place in the world, because there is a mystery, of course.



Tikkun: Well, some people say we could do without this mystery. When you talk about what happened to the Jews as fate, it seems to mystify a reality that some historians attribute to real social forces. One of those real social forces was the history of Christianity, the indoctrination of large numbers of people in the belief that the Jews were, in fact, responsible for the death of the Lord.

Milosz: You see, the history works in a very crooked way. Jews were in general, in the beginning of their emancipation, usually on the side of progressive causes. On the side of liberation of the human mind from the shackles of the authorities, the Church and so on. But science, a result of the Enlightenment, is at the root of horror. Let us look at the Nazis and their gas chambers as one of the by-products, yes, together with all of the blessings. There are many other by-products, of course. Atomic bomb is another. Let us remember that the Nazis, in the name of so-called social engineering, murdered also the gypsies, the mentally ill, and castrated those Germans they considered genetically inferior.

Tikkun: Could you say another word or two about what you didn't like about the movie *Shoah*?

Milosz: In his treatment of the Polish peasants, Lanzmann was more a Parisian intellectual than a Jew, and exhibits the scorn shown for specimens by an anthropologist. But, I disagree precisely in one aspect, namely that he draws a line of continuity between Christianity and *Shoah*.

Tikkun: Right. Do you see there being a need for any kinds of changes in Christian thought in order to undermine the degree to which there has been anti-Semitism in it?

Milosz: I don't know. Personally, I have been trying to do what I can in order to introduce the Jewish dimension to my translations, my writings, my translations from the Bible, and my frequent references to the Kabbalah.

Tikkun: Do you see any fundamental problem in Christianity's relationship to Judaism?

Milosz: I guess that the Church, the Catholic Church officially recognized that the accusations directed to the Jews, of killing Jesus, were without foundation. It has been done.

Tikkun: I notice you have a picture of yourself with the Pope.

Milosz: He is looking at my translation of the Psalms.

Tikkun: Do you see anti-Semitism as having played any role in Solidarity? That is: is anti-Semitism merely a historical question, or is anti-Semitism alive in Poland today? Is it alive even in the forces of Solidarity?

Milosz: Well, you see, there is not one Solidarity. Solidarity was ten million people. So there were many tendencies in Solidarity. And, I don't know, but it seems to me that looking constantly for signs of anti-Semitism, you become a little too obsessional.

Tikkun: Well, in the New Left in America in the sixties, because we acknowledged that we all grew up in a racist society, the struggle against racism became a central focus, including our own very real internalized anti-Black feelings. The ethic of concern was so great that no one could remain a leader without at least giving lip service to this concern. Has there been any kind of similar development in Solidarity, or is it still possible for people to assume positions of leadership, be leading activists in that movement without attempting to come to grips with anti-Semitism?

Milosz: There is a certain curiosity now, a great interest in Jewish affairs, because the young generation doesn't really know much about Jews. But there is a paradoxical development, because Jews are a kind of legend of the Right, which survives in some circles. Not in the Committee for the Defense of Workers, which really initiated the whole turmoil in Poland, and some of whose leaders are Jewish. But the legends of the Right have a strong life, and there is a myth of the forces of Freemasonry and Jews, and those myths still exist.

Tikkun: Do they play any significant role in the Catholic Church?

Milosz: I have read in some obscure clerical publications attacks on Solidarity and the Committee for the Defense of Workers as working for alien forces which are Freemasons, Jews, America and so on.

Tikkun: So the mythology of the powerful Jews still remains.

Milosz: In a way, yes, but those are of course obscurantist tendencies. It's very difficult to examine mythology of half-educated minds, because the prejudices are hardly on the surface. Very rarely do they go to the surface. You cannot find them, for instance, in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, the leading Catholic weekly, and as somebody defined it, the only free periodical between the

Elbe and Vladivostok, the Pacific Ocean. The same applies to the Catholic monthly *Znak*, and a publishing house of that name.

Tikkun: Do you see any signs of a literary renaissance in Poland?

Milosz: There are a great number of independent publications, publishing houses, and so on, underground publishing houses. But I am rather skeptical because I see an obsession with current politics. Whether you are pro-Communist or anti-Communist, when you are obsessed with political issues of the day, you cannot write good literature.

Tikkun: In terms of the relationship between the Polish people today and the state of Israel, which is the only place in which the Jews have any national self-determination, the Polish government follows the line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is completely hostile to the state of Israel. In your experience of Poland, do you think that there are forces within Solidarity or elsewhere that would move toward more friendly relations with the state of Israel?

Milosz: I have not the slightest doubt. You see, there were waves of great sympathy for Israel in Poland. All of the victories of Israel after the war were greeted with enchantment by the whole population of Poland.

Tikkun: But there were also the anti-Semitic waves.

Milosz: Now wait a moment. Both were directed against communism, against the line of the Polish government. The whole wave of so-called anti-Zionism in Poland in 1968 which chased from Poland a great number of Jews (who mostly went not to Israel, but to Sweden) was an internal purge within the apparatus. A tactical move to win Polish nationalists. In the post World War II period, anti-Semitism has swept the population when Poles have felt that the Communist apparatus was dominated by Jews.

Tikkun: And that in turn generated new anti-Semitism amongst the people, who hated the Communist Party?

Milosz: Yes.

Tikkun: One last question about the Poles. In the United States, rightly or wrongly, the impression that many liberal Jews have is that the American Poles tend to be very conservative politically. The anti-communism of those Poles has very quickly translated into an identification with the Right, that goes much further to the



Right, for example, than any kind of similar anti-communism that exists amongst Jews—who have plenty of reason to be anti-Soviet, because of the oppression of Jews in the Soviet Union, but who nevertheless are much more discriminating in their political judgments of the United States. Is there any truth in this perception?

Milosz: Part of the problem is that a large number of people of Polish descent in this country are below the middle-class, so their scale of values is largely a scale of values of hard hats.

Tikkun: How did that happen? Why is that?

Milosz: Well, the situation has changed because there is an influx of Solidarity people, young people, people with technical education, but how it happened is very simple. Those were illiterate peasants who immigrated to this country. Their first job was usually in the factory. Manual labor. So that's the core, that's the root. But undoubtedly there is another factor: they are strongly anti-Communist. And you know, it's very difficult in this country to maintain a line which is not pro-Soviet, but at the same time not to the Right.

Tikkun: That's exactly the line we are trying to maintain in *Tikkun*. □

When re-reading our interview, I had a feeling of hopelessness. Whoever tries to look for justice on this sad subject is exposed to suspicions from both sides. It seems to me that Jews refuse to reflect seriously on the phenomenon of Nazism, thence their attempts to see the Holocaust as a consequence and a final product of centuries of Christian anti-Semitism.

I have been thrown by your questions into the role of a reluctant apologist for Christianity or for the Poles. But it is my conviction that Nazism was something specific, possible only in the twentieth century. In order to give it full weight, one must realize deep transformations in the human mentality that have been occurring for a couple of centuries under the impact of science. A quantitative thinking characteristic of science and technology has been gradually applied to society and, in consequence, human masses started to be regarded as statistical units. The idea of exterminating certain populations coldly, deliberately, with the use of modern technology, belongs to the category of social engineering. Nazism, unfortunately, was not an isolated aberration. It is a part of totalitarian schemes which are surfacing again and again. Christianity, with all the atrocities committed in its name, has been basically alien to quantitative thinking. Even when burning heretics, Christianity was concerned with individuals, i. e., their souls. And if Polish nuns and monks distinguished themselves in saving many Jewish lives, it was because they did not think of human beings in terms of statistical units.

That scientific revolution gathering momentum since the time of Galileo may lead to horrors and that endeavors of reason may be turned into unreason, like in Nazism or in atomic weapons, is a sad fact and it should not be turned against science. Yet I am not a nut when I refuse to blur the issues and when I stress that the Nazi movement arose in a highly industrialized, modern country, and also one of the most de-Christianized.

I have recently read the best-seller *Maus* by Art Spiegelman, and I thought that the story told is as exotic for young readers of that cartoon as it is for the narrator listening to his father. I found no discrepancies from reality and I believe young readers receive an exact picture of the Polish Jews' fate, except for some details. A map shows a part of Poland named by the Germans "General Gouvernement" but the caption names it as "a puppet state." In many countries of Europe occupied by the Nazis there were puppet states, but not in Poland. There was no Polish administration;

universities and high schools were closed, and publication of books and periodicals were forbidden to "an inferior race." Since the Jews in the cartoon are presented as mice, the Germans as cats, and the Poles as pigs, a young reader would create in his mind an image of Polish-German collaboration. The behavior of those Poles (pigs) who appear in the cartoon corresponds to reality, yet there was also another reality which translates itself into three million dead non-Jewish Poles. It is true, this number embraces not only those who died in concentration camps, before execution squads, or during "pacifications" when whole villages were raised to the ground and the population killed, like in Oradour, France; it also includes those who perished on the battlefield and in Soviet captivity after the Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939. In Lanzmann's film *Shoah*, people who leave the hell of the Warsaw ghetto and reach "the Aryan side" tell about a perfectly normal life in the city. And that is understandable, for there were two perspectives. For us, in that "Aryan" side of Warsaw, life could be called normal only if manhunts in the streets and executions at the street corners every few days would deserve the name of normalcy. But cafés and restaurants were full, merry-go-rounds turned in the amusement parks? Of course. Let us not imagine that the life of a big city can be reduced to a simplified picture, if in the ghetto itself for a long time it showed all its contradictions.

That something should be done to elucidate the past of Polish-Jewish relations is clear to many people and that was the topic of the Oxford conference in September 1985, grouping historians and writers from Poland and Israel. The conference resulted in the creation of the Institute for Polish-Jewish Studies and the yearly book *Polin* is an organ of the Institute. In the fall of 1986 a similar conference took place in Cracow, Poland. As the best source for the present state of discussion on the years 1939-1945 I can recommend the special issue of *Aneks*, a quarterly in Polish published in London.

Born in Lithuania, growing up in the multilingual city of Vilna and accused by some nationalistic Poles of lacking true "Polishness," I have been familiar since childhood with the futility of bitter accusations meted out by one national group against the other, for instance by the Poles against the Lithuanians and vice versa. Some divisions ran through my family. Perhaps for that reason I do not believe in collective responsibility and would prefer not to contribute to the rebirth of that notion in new forms.

Women In Paradise

Chava Weissler

Over the last decade and more, consciousness of the disparities between women's and men's participation in public religious life throughout Jewish history has sparked reevaluations of the roles of women in Judaism, and stimulated efforts to recover and reclaim the history and experience of Jewish women. Scholars who have taken as their starting point the works and systems created by learned men, most notably Jewish law, have sometimes concluded that the Jewish woman was, in the words of Rachel Adler, "the Jew who wasn't there." Yet such conclusions oversimplify the historical reality. An investigation of the history of Judaism which includes popular as well as learned religious literature yields a more complex and multi-layered portrait of Jewish religious culture. Such a study shows that traditional Judaism contained varied conceptions of the religious aspirations appropriate to women, and that a monolithic view of "the role of women in Judaism" simply did not exist. Further, a comparison of popular and learned religious literature points up the importance of such factors as social status, as well as specific historical conditions, in the shaping of women's religious lives. Finally, the evidence for the multi-layeredness of Jewish life which this comparison yields reminds us that "the history of Judaism" must include the history of the unlearned along with the learned, and of women along with men. This article makes a contribution to this more inclusive Jewish history by tracing the transformations of one motif, which originates in an esoteric mystical text, through translations and adaptations in Yiddish popular literature.

Yet precisely because we want to recover the history of Jewish women *as part of the history of Judaism*, it is vital to consider issues of women's religious life within the framework of the concerns that underlie *all* religious life. So let us begin by asking a big question: How can we imagine spiritual fulfillment? What, in a religious system, can give us a sense of the possibilities inherent in the religious life? Ashkenazic Judaism, the religious civilization of Central and Eastern European Jews, gave a variety of answers to these questions,

answers embedded in Halachah (Jewish law), musar (ethical literature), and kabbalah (mystical literature), as well as customs, folk religious practice, and social structure. The legal and ethical materials address such issues primarily in the context of our mundane realities: Given the circumscribed and limited nature of earthly life, how should a Jew live? To what standards of behavior should a Jew aspire? How can one live a holy life? Yet if we remember that religion exists in tension with mundane reality, that it both strives to sanctify the everyday and to transcend it, we realize that there are other ways of phrasing the question, other kinds of ideals to which a Jew may aspire. Thus one may ask, can we imagine ourselves untrammelled by earthly limitations? How high could our liberated souls reach? Such transcendent visions are more prevalent in the mystical literature, and perhaps because of the esoteric character of Jewish mystical speculation, were, for many centuries, available only to a rather restricted intellectual elite.

To look at the question of spiritual aspiration from a different angle: It is clear that Ashkenazic Judaism implicitly differentiated between the religious goals of the learned elite and of the *'amey ha-arets*, the ignorant or the common people, who might be called the "folk," and explicitly distinguished the religious duties, responsibilities, privileges, and aspirations of men and women. Torah study, the study of God's word and law, especially the Talmud and later legal literature, was the most important religious duty of men, in which women had no part. Women rarely mastered Hebrew, which would have enabled them to read the religious classics of Judaism. When they attained literacy, it was usually in Yiddish, the vernacular of Ashkenazic Jews. They were excluded from participation in such public arenas of religious life as the house of study, the rabbinical court, and the hasidic conventicle; even in the synagogue, they sat in a balcony or separate room, screened from male eyes, participating in public worship only from a distance. Suffice it to say that their mundane reality was circumscribed indeed.

Despite that fact, the varied and voluminous Yiddish homiletical, ethical, and devotional literature written for and sometimes by women during the 16th through the 19th centuries gives evidence of an intensely lived religious life and a richly imagined spiritual world. Yiddish works for a female audience include collections

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of pious and exemplary tales, guides to the upright life, paraphrases of the Bible, and *tkhines*, supplicatory prayers for a wide variety of occasions.¹ There is, of course, much in this women's literature which hallows the everyday: prayers for a sick child, or for baking bread, or for the three "women's commandments"—lighting Sabbath candles, separating a portion of dough in memory of the priestly tithes, observing menstrual prohibitions. There are prescriptions for how to be a good wife, and strictures against idle chatter in the synagogue. Yet did this literature contain anything which suggested that women could transcend the limitations of their earthly roles? How could women—and men—imagine the spiritual aspirations of Jewish women? How high could *women's* souls reach?

One place to look for the answer to these questions is in the material which quite literally transcends the life of this world: descriptions of Paradise. Paradise can, of course, be imagined in ways that reinforce earthly roles and limitations. There is, for example, the well-known motif which states that women in Paradise will be their husbands' footstools.² There is also a chapter in the *Brantshpiql* (the "Burning Mirror"), an ethical treatise in Yiddish for women by Moses Henoch Yerushalmi Altshuler, first published around 1600 C.E. with the fascinating title "This chapter explains how women, with much talking, can talk their way into eternal life." The *Brantshpiql* does not waste much time describing Paradise, except to state that husbands and wives will be together there. (It makes the point that the joy of a righteous *man* in Paradise is only complete when he is together with his wife.) But the work does discuss the question of whether and on what grounds women can deserve a heavenly reward. In general it follows the Talmudic view (Berakhot 17a) that women gain eternal life by bringing their children to school or to the house of study, and by waiting for their husbands with a nice hot meal when they come home from the house of study or (the *Brantshpiql* adds) from business, and in general by caring for their husbands' needs.

Yet there is also another description of Paradise which gives a very different picture of the religious

possibilities for women's souls, a description of a separate Paradise for women where, unencumbered by their earthly roles, women occupy themselves with prayer, study, and contemplation. I first came across this description in an 18th century book of *tkhines* entitled "The Three Gates." The striking contrast it presented to other depictions of women in early Yiddish literature intrigued me, and set me searching for its source, and for parallel versions. I discovered that this motif derives from the *Zohar* (the "Book of Splendor"), the great classic of medieval Jewish mysticism, and that it was widespread in 17th and 18th century Yiddish literature (and through reprinted editions, also in the 19th century) in a number of different versions. The early part of this period, in particular, was a time of the popularization of Jewish mysticism, a phenomenon which made new visions of the religious life available to those outside the learned elite—women and unlearned men. But this is only half the story. As we shall see, the visions were also transformed in the process of popularization and translation.

... traditional Judaism contained varied conceptions of the religious aspirations appropriate to women, and a monolithic view of "the role of women in Judaism" simply did not exist.

In addition to the text in "The Three Gates," I found Yiddish descriptions of the women's Paradise in two sorts of literary settings: as a portion of running translations or adaptations of large sections of the *Zohar*,³ and as a separate "story" or "tale" (*mayse*), variously entitled "A grand story of Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai" and "A wondrously beautiful tale from the *Zohar*," appended to other texts.⁴ These versions differ from each other and from the original *Zohar* text in a number of significant ways, even when the differences are only small details. Yet it is important to note that all of these versions, including the original, were available in the culture at roughly the

1. For a readable survey of this literature, see Israel Zinberg, *A History of Jewish Literature*, trans. by Bernard Martin; vol. 7: *Old Yiddish Literature from its Origins to the Haskalah Period* (New York: Ktav, Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1975). On the *tkhines*, see Chava Weissler, "The Traditional Piety of Ashkenazic Women," in *Jewish Spirituality*, Vol. II, ed. Arthur Green. (New York: Crossroad, forthcoming).

2. This seems to be a well-known traditional oral motif in Ashkenazic, especially Eastern European, culture. However, I have been unable to trace it to any literary source earlier than I. L. Peretz's short story, "Sholem bayis."

3. In the *Nahalat Tsevi*, also known as the *Taytsh Zohar* (the

"Yiddish Zohar"), by Tsevi Hirsh Khotsh, first published in 1711; and, more importantly for our present purpose, in Part 2 of *S. Ma'asei Adonai*, by Simon Akiva Ber ben Joseph, first published in 1694. The Yiddish translation of this passage in the *Nahalat Tsevi* is quite close to the original *Zohar* text.

4. These versions appear as separate sections of other books. They include: "*Ma'aseh gadol me-rabi Shim'on bar Yohai*," appended to *S. 'Olam ha-ba* (Hanau: 1620), a lengthy description of Paradise, pp. 7a-8a; "*Ayn vunder sheyn mayse oyz den Zohar parshas Lekh Lekha [!]*," printed as an addendum to *Ayn sheyn getlikh lid Oray Hayyim* (Fuerth: [1692-1698]), a poem describing the ethical life, pp. 8a-8b.

same period, and that in any case, a number of the versions were available simultaneously.

Thus, part of the argument will be that even this single motif shows that there was a range of views about how high a woman's soul could reach. The texts that contained these views were aimed at and/or were accessible to particular audiences, male or female, learned or unlearned. The point is that for us to understand how women's spirituality was imagined among Ashkenazic Jews, by women and by men, we must investigate the distribution of versions to audiences. There is no simple or single picture to be drawn of the spiritual aspirations appropriate to women.

While all of these versions are of interest, three of them—the *Zohar*, one of the running translations, and the *ikhine*—form a direct literary chain. They are thus a particularly illuminating example of changes in content as related to changes in audience, and I will devote

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most of my attention to them in this discussion.

Let me begin, then, with the original (*Zohar* III 167b). In this account, Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai, the hero and putative author of the *Zohar*, is receiving a report of various heavenly secrets from one of his disciples:

... Oh my teacher, they showed me six palaces, which contained enjoyments and delights, in the place where the curtain is spread in the Garden, for from that curtain onwards, males do not enter at all.

In one of the palaces is Bithia, daughter of Pharaoh,⁵ and several myriads and thousands of righteous women are with her. Each one of them has places of light and delight without any crowding. Three times a day, criers announce, Behold, the image of Moses the faithful prophet is coming! Then Bithia goes out to the place where she has a curtain, and sees the image of Moses, and bows before it, and says: Happy is my lot that I brought up this

light. And this is her special pleasure, more than all the other women.

She returns to the other women, and they exert themselves in the study of the commandments of the Torah. All of them are in the forms they had in this world, and they are clothed in garments of light like the garments of males, except that [the women's garments] do not shine as brightly. In that world, they exert themselves in the study of the commandments which they were unable to fulfill in this world, and the reasons for them. And all the women who dwell with Bithia daughter of Pharaoh are called *nashim sha'ananot* ["tranquil women"; Isaiah 32:9], because they have not suffered the pains of Hell at all.

In the next palace is Serah, daughter of Asher,⁶ and several myriads and thousands of women with her. Three times a day it is announced before her: Behold, the image of Joseph comes! She rejoices, and goes out to a curtain which she has, and sees the light of the image of Joseph, and rejoices, and bows down before him and says: Happy was the day on which I gave the good news about you to my grandfather. Afterwards, she returns to the other women, and they busy themselves with the praises of the Lord of the World, giving thanks to his Name. And each of them has several places and joys. Afterwards, they turn once again to the commandments of the Torah and the reasons for them.

At this point, the text describes the palaces presided over by Jocheved, the mother of Moses, and Deborah the prophet, and then continues:

Oh my teacher, oh my teacher who has seen the rejoicing of the saintly men and righteous women who serve the Holy One, be blessed! Way inside all of these palaces are the four hidden palaces of the Holy Matriarchs, which it is not permitted to reveal, and no one has seen them. And all day long, [the women] are by themselves, as I told you, and so are the men. But every night, they all come together, since the hour of copulation is at midnight, both in this world and in that world. The copulation of that world [consists of] the cleaving of soul to soul, light to light.

The text concludes by explaining that the fruit of these heavenly midnight trysts is the souls of those who become converts to Judaism.

5. Although a Bithia, daughter of Pharaoh, is mentioned in 2 Chron. 4:18, it is not clear that she is the same person as the daughter of Pharaoh who rescued Moses (Exod. 2:5-10). The rabbis, however, made this identification and explained her name as meaning "daughter of God" (Lev. Rabba 1:3). This identification was accepted by the author of the *Zohar*.

6. Serah, daughter of Asher, is mentioned in the Bible only in

genealogical lists (Gen. 46:17, Num. 26:46, 1 Chron. 7:3). However, later legend portrays her as gently breaking the news to Jacob that Joseph was still alive by playing the harp and singing about it so that Jacob could hear (*Sefer ha-Yashar*, *Va-yiggash*). Other stories are told about her in the midrash; for a summary, see Yosef Heinemann, *Aggadab and Its Development* (Hebrew), (Jerusalem: Keter, 1974), pp. 56-63.

Let me make a few observations about this text before describing the Yiddish versions. First, it is clear that the author of the *Zohar* honors the saintly women of Paradise. Nonetheless, although he depicts these women as freed from the cares of their earthly roles as wives and mothers, and devoted to such spiritual pursuits as singing the praises of God, he indicates that they retain their inferior status, even in heaven. For example, women's heavenly garments do not shine as brightly as men's. Further, both Bithia and Serah humbly bow to Moses and Joseph, respectively, and acknowledge their good fortune in acquiring merit through their association with these male figures. And finally, the women's study of "the reasons for the commandments" is focussed on those commandments that they were unable to fulfill on earth, by implication, because they were women. *Ta'amei ha-mitsvot*, speculation concerning the reasons for the commandments of the Torah, has a long history in rabbinic, philosophical, and mystical Jewish thought. Compiling comprehensive lists of the commandments justified in mystical terms was a popular activity of Jewish mystics. Women, however, were forbidden to engage in such speculation, even when they were permitted to study such practical matters as the religious laws they themselves were required to observe.⁷ It seems, then, that here the author of the *Zohar* allows women in Paradise to repair or make up for their female disabilities.

Second, the author of the *Zohar* does not single this narrative out. Although, obviously, he was interested enough in the fate of women in Paradise to include a discussion of it, he sets this passage into a running narrative which describes many other features of Paradise. This contrasts most sharply with those "wondrously beautiful tales," in which the entire narrative is devoted to this one motif. Finally, remember the audience for this text in the period under discussion. Despite the fact that the study of mystical materials was spreading in the 17th and 18th centuries, the original text of the *Zohar* was still in Aramaic, and thus accessible only to a rather limited segment of the population, and one that may safely be presumed to have been almost exclusively male.

Striking as the *Zohar's* depiction of the women's Paradise is, the version contained within the *Sheloshah She'arim*, "The Three Gates," changes it in significant ways. A popular book of *tkhines*, "The Three Gates" originated in the 18th century and was reprinted repeatedly throughout the 19th century. This work is a collection of devotions connected with the following three topics, the "three gates" named in the title: the

three commandments which were the special duties of women; the penitential season, especially the eve of Yom Kippur; and the New Moon. This sophisticated, powerful, and erudite text is attributed to Sarah bas Tovim, a legendary figure whose name became a symbol of the *tkhine* genre. This was so much the case that Eastern European male Yiddish authors, writing pot-boiler *tkhines* in the late 19th century to eke out a meager living, liked to attach her name to their productions. There seems to be no direct historical evidence about Sarah's life apart from the autobiographical material contained within "The Three Gates" and one other *tkhine* collection attributed to her which can be reliably dated to the 18th century. I have as yet reached no conclusions about whether or not she existed or was the author of this text; however, one of my concerns in studying "The Three Gates" was the question of whether or not a woman could have or did write it.

The description of the women's Paradise is contained within, or one might even say, abruptly plunked down into, the section of the prayer which deals with the Blessing of the New Moon. After an impassioned plea for the Messianic redemption, and a paraphrase of a version of the prayer recited in synagogues for the Blessing of the New Moon, the text continues as follows:

Lord of the World, I pray to you, God, as Esther the Queen prayed. Lord of the whole world, with your right hand and your left hand, you have created the whole world with both your hands. May you spread your mercies over me.

There are also there in Paradise six chambers in which there are several thousand righteous women who have never suffered the pains of Hell. Bithia the Queen, daughter of Pharaoh, is there. There is a place in Paradise where a curtain is prepared to be opened, which allows her to see the image of Moses our Teacher. Then she bows and says, *How worthy is my strength and how knowing is my power!* I drew such a light out of the water, I brought up this dear light! This happens three times a day.

In the next chamber, there are also thousands upon thousands upon myriads of women, and Serah daughter of Asher is a queen. And every day it is announced three times, Here comes the image of Joseph the Righteous! Then she bows to him and says, *Praised is my strength, and how worthy is my power*, that I was privileged to tell my lord Jacob that my uncle was alive. And in the upper chamber, he studies Torah, and in the other chamber, they sing

(Continued on p. 117)

7. See, for example, *Sefer Hasidim* (ed. Wistinetzki), par. 835, which specifies that a man is obligated to teach his daughter the legal rulings which concern her own observance, but that "one

does not teach the depth of the Talmud, the reasons for the commandments, or the secrets of the Torah to women or minors." I am indebted to Prof. Ivan Marcus for this reference.

The Poisoned Heart: The Jews of Palestine and the Holocaust

Idit Zertal

In the last issue parts of this essay were out of order. We are reprinting it in full with apologies to Ms. Zertal

When Yitzhak (Antek) Zuckerman, one of the leaders of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, died several years ago, a record of remarks he made for a documentary film about the Holocaust in Europe and the yishuv in Palestine was found among his personal effects: "The Land of Israel, our hearts' beloved, did not love us," he said. "There was a psychological abyss ... it will never be forgiven."

In another place at another time, Zuckerman said to Israeli poet Haim Guri: "If 500 Palmah fighters had set out for Europe, German anti-aircraft fire would have downed 490 of them. And if the remaining ten had parachuted into Poland and reached the ground alive, we would have had the problem of how to conceal them, with their ignorance of Polish and Yiddish, their Mediterranean faces, and their *sabra* Hebrew. You could not have saved us; you were not supermen. But why didn't one come? One?!"

In these unforgettable words of this somewhat inarticulate man—who told Claude Lanzmann, creator of the film *Shoah*, that "If you could lick my heart, it would poison you to death"—we have an historical reckoning of the failures of the Jews of Palestine, Eretz Israel, "the chosen people" among the Chosen People, the personal fulfillers and crowning jewels of the Zionist idea.

Quite apart from the moral accounting we can demand of the rest of the world there is a Jewish reckoning, to be pursued among Jews. Never had Jewish civilization and heritage, with all its facets and values, been put to such an extreme and revealing test as during those years, and never had the Jewish communities' unity, mutual commitment, and reciprocal responsibility of one Jew to another been subjected to such a serious ordeal.

This reckoning is being done today by an ever-in-

creasing number of Israelis who are aware of themselves and their history, and are willing to look carefully at themselves and their forbearers. This is a symbol-heavy reckoning, for it essentially belongs to the plane of consciousness, perception of reality, and images of self and others. Only a part is concerned with the historical circumstances themselves. For these were so unequivocal, so crushing, that the maneuvering room of individuals and groups, even if not absolutely zero, was extremely marginal.

Antek Zuckerman's remarks are intrinsically symbolic. He knew Jews could not stop the Nazi machine, and he knew there was almost no way of landing fighters or paratroopers from Palestine in the heart of occupied Europe. He knew it even though thousands of emissaries, couriers, and spies belonging to espionage and underground groups—including Jewish and Palestinian groups—circulated throughout occupied Europe and succeeded in penetrating the ghettos and even the extermination camps, when rescue was still possible, when there were still people to rescue. And he knew that if a fighter from Palestine were to succeed in reaching the area, he would have caused his "hosts" severe complications and problems, if not mortal peril, as they fought for their lives. It was not actual help he expected, then, but something in the domain of a humane gesture, a symbol from the world of symbols, an indication of fraternity and responsibility on the part of the Palestinian yishuv.

The other side, the yishuv, also harbored expectations—of itself and of the Diaspora. These belonged more to the level of ideology and consciousness, and less to the dimension of real, concrete action.

When the emissaries of the pioneering movements in Palestine returned from occupied Poland in late 1939 and early 1940—only a few months after having voted unanimously, in a display of fervor the night the Zionist Congress in Geneva ended, to return to the countries to which they had been sent, and to their "flocks" in the Diaspora, with all the risks this entailed—Berl Katznelson, one of the founding fathers and guiding lights of the Labor Movement in Palestine, turned

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upon them angrily at a special reception held for them, and criticized them witheringly for their "caution": "I would like," he cried, "(to see) ten emissaries fall in the occupied territory as martyrs to God." That night he wrote in his diary: "My heart groaning, I shouted throughout Wolyn and Galicia, where are Hanna and her seven sons?"

Here again, there was no outcry for real, sweeping, and meaningful action on the yishuv's part toward helping and rescuing the Diaspora. Rather, Katznelson articulated his own need for a symbol, an atoning sacrifice for Palestine's failure, its inability to save the Diaspora—an expression of the need for a mythical figure who redeems and restores.

Thus, when we come forth to explore the yishuv's attitude toward European Jewry during the Holocaust, and the questions which stem from this central inquiry—e.g., did the yishuv make every possible effort to mobilize for European Jewry, and did it make rescue its foremost concern and priority, summoning all its resources to this end?—I believe we touch only the symbolic fringes of these dilemmas. The basic, decisive, all-consuming fact was the might of the Nazi regime and its determination to attain its objective of annihilating the Jewish people. Only when the democratic world mobilized at the last moment against everything represented by the German dictatorship did the process of murder of the Jews come to an end, far too late. These facts, though nearly banal, must be mentioned if we are to understand the objective limitations of the Jewish community in Palestine—only 450,000 strong at the time, with no political sovereignty, limited economic resources, and a clandestine military force in its infancy—in doing anything real and rendering the Holocaust into something other than what it essentially was. We must cite these realities, too, in order to demarcate and define the boundaries of our discussion.

Thus, in the classic extreme situation—nearly total helplessness against the might of the Nazi state, and unprecedented dimensions of destruction which defied human comprehension—what remains is the realm of psychology, of consciousness; and the territory of symbols which, in the words of Kenneth Boulding, "remove the human organization from the prison of the immediate here and now ... and the image of man therefore soars off to the galaxies, to the beginnings and to the ends of all things, to the realm of the impossible and almost to the inconceivable."

In general, human leaders and societies are tested *inter alia* by their ability to break the hidden code of events as they occur, and by their ability to adjust to new situations and meet challenges thrust upon them by their time. Viewed thus, the Zionist leadership failed

the test, and did not rise to the demands of the bitterest time in Jewish history. The behavior of the yishuv's leadership when confronted with the Holocaust, and its reaction to the devastation, were marked by failure in almost every possible respect, apart from malice. The yishuv leaders' behavior was typified by shortsightedness, failure to comprehend developments in occupied Europe, and enslavement to ideologies and predetermined concepts that committed them irrevocably to obsolete and inappropriate patterns of thought and reaction, precluding a correct response to an unprecedented situation such as the Holocaust.

Alongside the so-natural human reaction shared by all Western societies—refusal to believe the unbelievable—and in addition to the psychological barriers which people (Jews and non-Jews, Zionists and non-Zionists) erected at the time in order to preserve an ambience of sanity and continue to function in a relatively normal way while confronting a disaster of too great a magnitude for the psyche to handle, many members of the Zionist establishment in Palestine harbored yet another inhibition, this one ideological. Total annihilation, historian Dan Diner asserts, seriously undermined the special imperative of *having* a Jewish state, as Zionism explained this imperative in terms of saving Jews from the worst excesses of anti-Semitism. The reports of total destruction, of the "final solution," challenged the validity of Zionism's answer to anti-Semitism. Such reports had "no right to exist." To continue pursuing the mission of creating a Jewish state in Palestine, the Zionist leaders had to refrain from perceiving Nazism in its full horror—despite their traditionally pessimistic position concerning the fate of the Jews in exile.

... they were so preoccupied with planning the postwar world that they could not see what was happening before their eyes in Europe.

How else can one explain the stance of Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive—the yishuv's embryonic government-to-be—the most prominent Palestinian Jewish leader and, several years later, Chaim Weizmann's successor as the political leader of the entire Jewish people?

As early as the summer of 1933, Ben-Gurion, after reading *Mein Kampf*, declared that "Hitler's regime is a menace to the entire Jewish people ... Who knows,

there may be only another four or five years (if not fewer) that stand between ourselves and that terrible day." In 1938, he asserted that "There could be a war which would bring a catastrophe upon us ... There is Hitler, and he can be relied upon in this manner ... If there is a world war, he will carry this out. First of all he will destroy the Jewish people in Europe." Ben-Gurion, who with penetrating vision was capable at times of breaking through the barriers of the present and contemplating the future with precision, never appointed himself, even when the horrifying facts about the annihilation became fully clear, as the leader of the yishuv's rescue efforts. By behaving in this fashion, he in fact relegated rescue to a role of secondary importance, both on the yishuv's practical concrete agenda, and in its consciousness and ethos.

Rhetoric was not lacking. By November, 1942, the reports which sixty-nine Palestinian Jewish eyewitnesses had provided—members of kibbutzim, scientists, and veteran Zionists who had been trapped in Europe when the war broke out and exchanged for German residents in Palestine—were confirmed: European Jewry was being systematically slaughtered. The yishuv marked its identification with the devastated Diaspora by holding ceremonies and declaring days of mourning. At this time, Ben-Gurion, in a special session of *Asefat ha-Nivharim* (the representative assembly elected by Jews in Eretz Israel during the British Mandate period) declared: "We do not know if, upon the victory of democracy, freedom, and justice, Europe will not prove to be a vast Jewish cemetery in which the bones of our fellow nationals are strewn ... Our own children, our own wives, our own sisters, and our own elderly are being singled out for the special treatment of being buried alive in graves dug by themselves, of being incinerated in crematoria, of being trampled underfoot to the point of strangulation, and of being murdered by machine gun...." Continuing, he tied the fate of Europe's Jews with that of Palestine's, and linked their rescue to the Jewish state: "Let us tell our dear brothers and sisters, the tortured martyrs of the Nazi ghettos: your disaster is ours, your blood is ours ... And we shall allow ourselves no rest until we redeem you from *the Nazi inferno* and from *the degenerate state of exile*, and bring you up ... to our land, which is being built and redeemed." Ben-Gurion not only viewed a future Jewish state as a *sine qua non* for rescue, but was even capable of creating in his psyche and his design a symmetric parallel between the Nazi inferno and the "degenerate state of exile"—i.e., between the atrocities of systematic, assembly-line annihilation of a sort the world had not known hitherto, and the "degenerate" condition of

exile, which had been familiar and routine since time immemorial. Addressing the Zionist Executive on December 6, 1942, Ben-Gurion said "We are duty-bound to make every effort, and we must not reject in advance the possibility of effecting a rescue."

His personal commitment, however, was not primarily to the rescuing of Jews, but to the building of the Jewish state itself. In pursuit of that goal, he fought for the integrity of his party, Mapai, and devoted day and night to the endless political discord which shredded the Labor Movement in Palestine from within—while the Jews were being slaughtered in Europe. He succeeded in viewing the intra-party struggle as the essential issue, and concocted a strange dialectic in which it proved to be a condition for rescue, if not during the war, then after it. "Although the burning issue is the matter of rescue," he told the Mapai Secretariat in a meeting in early 1944, "and although the matter is desperately urgent in Rumania and Bulgaria, we must consider the internal (party) matter as a first item on the list at this moment ... The party's work ... is perhaps the only road to rescue."

Ben-Gurion left the rescue efforts to his colleagues, whose powers, aptitude for leadership and ability to persuade, within the yishuv and vis-à-vis world Jewish organizations and heads of state, were far inferior to his.

Everyone in Palestine had relatives in Europe ... nevertheless ... repression mechanisms were hard at work.

"Two facts may be established firmly," writes Ben-Gurion's biographer, Shabtai Tevet (whose quotations from Ben-Gurion have been used here). Ben-Gurion "did not give rescue top priority in Zionist policy, and did not view the rescue enterprise as a central matter which he was duty-bound to head. Neither did he feel it necessary to explain his behavior—at that time or at other times."

At the end of January, 1943, after prolonged arguments and disputes as to the representation of many parties and organizations active in the yishuv, the Jewish Agency succeeded in establishing the *Va'ad Ha'hatzala*, the Rescue Committee, as an umbrella framework for the coordination of rescue operations, and installed Yitzhak Gruenbaum as its chairman. Though an admired leader of Polish Jewry, Gruenbaum had little public and political clout in the Palestinian yishuv, and, worse still, did not enjoy the esteem and backing of Ben-Gurion himself.

Throughout the entire period, the Rescue Committee was pulled this way and that by the various and conflicting interests within it, and failed to establish an unchallenged position in shaping and implementing the yishuv's policy on rescue. Gruenbaum's leadership was controversial, and provoked harsh criticism on the part of the committee members, the Jewish Agency Executive, and the yishuv's emissaries in Europe.

To continue pursuing the mission of creating a Jewish state in Palestine, the Zionist leaders had to refrain from perceiving Nazism in its full horror . . .

Ironically, it was Gruenbaum (a figure connected more with Polish Jewry than with the Palestinian yishuv) as head of the Rescue Committee who remains in historical memory as the man who is most clearly identified with valuing the yishuv above all. In a meeting of the downsized Zionist Executive in Jerusalem on January 18, 1943, convened for discussion of the possibility of mobilizing the yishuv on behalf of Diaspora Jewry, Gruenbaum refused to allocate JNF funds for the rescue efforts. "I said that the yishuv is the emissary of the Diaspora," said Gruenbaum. "The yishuv is holding the deposit which Warsaw, Berdichev, and Zhitomir entrusted to it. I dare say, in the name of all the tortured Jews of the Diaspora, that the yishuv should safeguard this deposit first of all. Whenever this deposit is endangered, the yishuv should be concerned with it alone, letting events in the Diaspora occur as they will. This kernel will emerge from this catastrophe, from this war, not only intact but stronger, larger, and ready to serve as a homeland for those who escape the inferno in Europe." His remarks provoked a tempest. Some of the speakers insisted that rescue be the prime goal of Zionism at that time—"This is Zionism now"—and insisted that funds of the Jewish Agency Executive be devoted to it. Gruenbaum objected: "Let them call me an anti-Semite (as a Tel Aviv newspaper did, in fact); [let them say] that I do not want to save the Diaspora; that I don't have a *varm Yiddische hartz*, that I've forgotten the Diaspora. They can say what they please. I shall not demand that the budget of the Jewish Agency Executive, the money we've got, include a sum of \$300,000 or 100,000 pounds [sterling] pledged to this cause [rescue]. I won't call for it. And I think anyone who makes demands like these is performing an anti-Zionist act."

To allocate funds is to express policy. In *An Entangled Leadership*, a new book (in Hebrew) about the Jewish Agency Executive and the Holocaust, historian Dina Porat reveals details of the yishuv's expenditures that show that the Jewish Agency Executive was very slow and hesitant about budgeting expenditures for rescue purposes. Its considerations were practical: wouldn't the money be squandered in hasty operations? Were the chances of offering help real, sure, and even useful? In September, 1943, Ben-Gurion said that "the cause of rescuing the Jews of Europe has not only a financial aspect but a moral one. It is one of the major issues at the present time. It not only constitutes aid for the Jews of Europe; it also advances the cause of Eretz Israel. By pursuing it, we advance the most exalted of all causes. The fact that the Jews of Eretz Israel positioned themselves at the head of the rescue operation is an important Zionist asset, and every Zionist asset is also an asset of the cause." Moshe Shertok, Ben-Gurion's colleague in leadership circles and Chairman of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency Executive, added: "If the matter is considered in Zionist terms, the most urgent and essential thing in terms of present requirements, and the thing which draws the most attention to the yishuv's responsibility and its [position as] the center of the people—is an enterprise such as this [a special fund-raising drive for the Diaspora]." Fund-raising for rescue, and rescue itself, were therefore considered important aims in themselves by the Zionist leadership. At the same time, they were also, and perhaps chiefly, Zionist assets which might lend the Zionist enterprise importance and prestige, and underscore its centrality as well.

Yishuv emissaries in Istanbul and Geneva, who maintained ties from these cities with Jewish communities and organizations behind the occupation lines, had to wage a daily battle for their operating budgets. Direct appeals for help came in from the occupied countries, too—while the yishuv argued at length about every pound diverted to the rescue effort. Thus, in April, 1944, a telegram from the Jewish National Committee in Warsaw was read aloud in a meeting of the Secretariat of the Histadrut Executive Committee. "We appeal to you at the last moment, before the last remnant of Polish Jewry is destroyed . . . The monies which reach us are like drops in the ocean. We are presently receiving from you the last increment of ten thousand Palestine pounds . . . We beg you: please increase your financial help tenfold . . . The last survivors of Polish Jewry are waiting for you to save them."

According to the Rescue Committee's balance sheets, the yishuv spent 1,325,000 Palestine pounds (\$31,800,000 in today's dollars) on rescue between Feb-

(Continued on p. 120)

TWENTY YEARS ON THE WEST BANK

In June of 1967 Jews around the world stood in fear and trepidation as the Arab world mobilized its armies and confidently predicted that it would push the Jews into the sea. The military triumph of the State of Israel seemed to many of us like a modern miracle, confirming the miracle of the creation of the state in 1948.

And yet, the policies that Israel adopted after the Six Day War have caused considerable controversy within

the Jewish world. In this issue we are focusing on Israel and the West Bank. Following our editorial, we present the views of many Israelis who are deeply worried about the fate of their country should those present policies persist.

In future issues other points of view will be presented and the issues raised here will be debated in greater detail.

EDITORIAL

The Disastrous Occupation

The occupation of the West Bank, now lasting more than half of the years that Israel has existed as a State, is an unmitigated disaster for Zionism, the Jewish people, and most Israelis. For those of us who love Israel and who nurture the Zionist dream, the time has come to make public our private misgivings, and to voice our concern loudly but lovingly. With deep sorrow and sadness we must acknowledge that our most cherished ideals have been used not only to justify oppressive policies toward another people, but to sow the seeds of Israel's own self-destruction. Indeed, the arguments against Israel's policies of occupation are as strong on grounds of rational self-interest as they are on moral and religious grounds. The so-called pragmatists and hard-nosed realists who provide leadership for Israel's right-wing parties and for establishment organizations of American Jewish life will find themselves condemned by history, not only in the name of Jewish values but in the name of Jewish survival.

One cannot be misled by fantasies that this situation will gradually change over time, that we need only be patient. As recently as March 29, 1987, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir urged two thousand delegates to the Herut party to fight any attempt to relinquish the occupied West Bank or Gaza. "They will be in our hands forever," Shamir promised. The seeds of future disaster are being sown today. As Abba Eban, one of the most principled of Jewish leaders in the Labor Party, told us in *Tikkun* a few months ago, "the darkest shadow hanging over Israel comes from within itself." We who are Jewish liberals can no longer shut our ears to the calls for help from so many Israelis who, like Eban, seek to change Israeli policy.

Yet before immersing ourselves in this critique, it is important to state its boundaries. Israel and Zionism

have been subjected to a worldwide campaign of vilification so hypocritical and deceitful it is no surprise many Jews have assumed a defensive posture, not allowing themselves to even consider the possibility that some criticisms may have legitimacy when articulated by friends. The sheer power of Arab oil to coerce Japan and many other Asian and African countries into supporting anti-Israel resolutions in international conferences and organizations began not with the occupation of the West Bank, but with the creation of the State of Israel. Those same countries and organizations were totally silent about creating a Palestinian state on the West Bank in the pre-1967 years when the West Bank was occupied by Jordan!

It is truly appalling to listen to totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union wax eloquent about self-determination for Palestinians while their own people are not permitted any significant degree of freedom—or to hear the pious words of countries such as India (which suppresses the Sikhs while denouncing Israel), Iran (whose war with Iraq has killed over 500,000 people), or the authoritarian regimes in Black Africa. The failure of the international Left to champion Jewish self-determination before the Holocaust or to purge its ranks of anti-Semitism is matched only by its current obsession with magnifying distortions in Israel while overlooking or explaining away these same distortions, or worse, in the countries it supports. Against such a background, further strengthened by memories of how few countries acted on ethical principles when the Jews were being wiped out less than fifty years ago, many Jews have become immune to criticism of the State of Israel, confident that underlying the criticism is some variant of power politics or anti-Semitism. Their intuition is largely correct—but their conclusion wrong: Those of us who love Israel must

pay attention to the content of the criticism because it has a validity independent of the hypocrisy and moral bankruptcy of some of those who articulate it.

It would be easier for many Jews to hear these criticisms if they were articulated by people with some minimal understanding of the history of the Jewish people. It would be helpful to remember that the Jewish people's right to national self-determination in Judea was terminated by Roman imperialism, not by our choice. And the Jews still remained in what the Roman conquerors renamed Palestine until Arab Islamic fanatics disallowed any Jewish presence in the land. Centuries later, small groups of religious Jews reestablished communities in Hebron and Safed, and finally in Jerusalem—always as second-class citizens in a society dominated by Islam. When, in the early part of the twentieth century, a larger number of Jews—desperately seeking sanctuary from the oppression of European and Islamic regimes elsewhere—returned to Palestine, they found a land big enough and potentially prosperous enough to support both its current inhabitants and returning Jews. Of course, to many Palestinian small farmers, the Jews' return to their land seemed potentially threatening. Yet it is doubtful that their response would have been as intense had it not been systematically stirred up by Palestinian landlords and Islamic religious leaders fearful that the socialist and modernizing ideologies of the Jews might undermine their own feudal hold over the Arab masses, and by British colonialists who could use hostilities between the two communities to divide those seeking independence from English colonial domination.

Israel and Zionism have been subjected to a worldwide campaign of vilification so hypocritical and deceitful it is no surprise many Jews have assumed a defensive posture, not allowing themselves to even consider the possibility that some criticisms may have legitimacy.

Wouldn't it be wonderful if in our world one could rectify past oppressions without creating new problems and new injustices? Wouldn't we be happy, for example, if affirmative action for women or Blacks never involved displacing qualified men or whites? The tragedy of Zionism was that in order to build a new society for Jews in the homeland from which they had been forcibly removed, Jews found themselves in conflict with Palestinians who had no desire to make any accommodations

to a people fleeing oppression. Just as some men and some whites see themselves as the innocent victims of affirmative action in the US ("It wasn't our fault that there was past oppression—we didn't do it, we shouldn't suffer because of it"), so Palestinians felt that they were unfairly being asked to bear the burden of Jewish suffering in the rest of the world. We would not accept this response from whites or men in the United States.

Palestinian resistance to Jewish immigration, then, was at best morally questionable. From the standpoint of the 1980s, with Palestinians living in refugee camps and Israelis living off the fat of the land, it seems clear who has power and who does not. But Jews rightly insist that anyone who provides us with solutions first understand the historical reality: that it was only a short seventy years ago when Jews faced pogroms and later mass murder, that it was Jews who were virtually homeless and in mortal danger. Palestinians, living comfortably in their land, responded to these Jews with intransigence, moral indifference, and finally with violence.

Indeed, it was the original hostility of Arabs to the trickle of Jewish immigration that stimulated the development of right-wing Jewish elements who felt that national self-determination could only be won through force and violence. Right-wing Zionists, while always a small minority within a Zionist movement that in its majority sought a peaceful accommodation and sharing of the land, played neatly into the anti-Zionist rhetoric that Palestinian landlords encouraged among their mostly illiterate population. But these fears could have been assuaged by any serious willingness on the part of the land's Arab residents to find a way to live with the returning Jews. While the Jews feverishly debated in the 1920s and 1930s whether the best solution would be partition or a bi-national state, the Palestinians tragically allowed themselves to be led by people who envisioned no peaceful compromise and were deluded into relying on surrounding Arab regimes whose desire, then as now, was simply to incorporate the land into their own dreams of empire.

This tragedy culminated in 1947–48 when the majority of Palestinians rejected the United Nations resolution that would have allowed them a state of their own, based on partition of the land, and opted instead for armed struggle, believing they could literally push the Jews into the sea. Recent revisionist scholarship has revealed how some Israelis encouraged Palestinian flight in 1948 once it became clear that the Palestinian community as a whole had opted for armed struggle. Deplorable as these Israeli actions are, they come in response to a war that would have been averted had the Palestinians accepted a territorial compromise. Ironically, this very refusal to share the land would condemn them to a fate that confirmed their very worst fears

about Zionist expansionism and seemed to validate the anti-Jewish rhetoric of their leaders.

Tragically, then, their experience strengthened the very intransigence that led to their fate. Unable to acknowledge their own contribution to their current situation, retaining the demonizing theories about Zionism that had precipitated the errors of 1947–48, the Palestinian people created a leadership in their own liberation movement, the PLO, whose public pronouncements and violent strategies could only lend credence to the most militaristic Israeli leaders. Unable to recognize the moral ambiguity of their original refusal to share what they had with a people seeking refuge, instead insisting that they had simply been innocent victims of European colonialists who had unjustifiably seized their land, the Palestinian movement could only develop two strands: those who would become “realists” and eventually ask for some kind of accommodation with the “evil devils” who had victimized their people, and those who would stand loyal to “a higher principle,” and would see themselves as being morally required to fight to the end against these invaders. Framed in this way, is it any wonder that many younger Palestinians are drawn to the more extreme and more armed-struggle oriented of the positions, seeing any talk of compromise as a “sell-out” or an accommodation with evil?

The dynamic ever since has been one in which rejectionists on both sides are able to frame the debate by reinforcing each others’ worst fears. Extremists in the Palestinian camp proceed to kill their “moderate” comrades, commit acts of violence against the civilian population in Israel, and then point to the predictable retaliatory strikes from Israel as proof that only armed struggle will work against Israeli militarists. Meanwhile, Israel hawks create a political climate in which “moderates” and “centrists” in the Israeli establishment are intimidated into believing that any substantial move for peace will undermine their electoral support. The result is that these moderates engage in a series of token gestures ostensibly oriented toward peace but actually weighted with so many qualifications and limitations on what they discuss and with whom that the process is guaranteed to fail.

Israeli moderates sincerely believe that by accommodating the demands of the Right, they will eventually win enough electoral support to have a freer hand in negotiating for peace. But the opposite is actually happening: While Israelis may warm to the possibility of a new Labor-led government, many Labor voters have moved to the right on the underlying issues. The longer the occupation lasts, the deeper will be this tendency, resulting in political constraints on Labor’s ability to negotiate in a way that would produce a meaningful

settlement. The failure of negotiations, in turn, is used by extremists on both sides as proof that only military solutions are possible. A new generation of Arabs and Jews is now entering its twenties, a generation that knows nothing of Israel before the occupation, a generation whose experience of Israeli leaders has been primarily that of strong right-wingers like Begin and Sharon or indecisive coalition governments that merely succeed in preserving a status quo destructive to both sides. To this generation of Israelis, talk of the old borders increasingly sounds like ancient history, while for Palestinian youth the idea of an Israeli leadership that is not rigid and uncompromising begins to sound like a made-in-the-West fairy tale.

MILITARY OPTIONS

Many Israeli military leaders agree that there was never any strictly military reason why Israel had to hold the West Bank after its initial conquest in 1967. Although the war in the West Bank was precipitated by Hussein’s own aggression against Israel, the military threat was always rather insubstantial. Making adjustments for military security as necessary, redrawing the boundaries to eliminate immediate “clear and present danger,” occupying the Golan and annexing Jerusalem, these leaders argue, would have provided Israel with as much military security as it now has through military occupation. The circumstances in 1967 allowed Israel to hold free elections and encouraged a Palestinian leadership to emerge which probably would have been considerably more moderate than the PLO eventually became. Israel could then have negotiated a permanent peace agreement with the Palestinians. In yet another military plan, drawn up and refined in the ensuing years, Israel could have established a series of military bases on the eastern border of such a newly independent Palestinian entity and made their continued presence there a condition for Palestinian autonomy.

Time is not on our side.

Instead, Israel opted for a military occupation that has denied the Palestinians the right to self-determination. The two possible solutions to the situation have always been obvious: (1) Annex the West Bank, make the Palestinians citizens of Israel, and thereby create the bi-national state dreamt of by Martin Buber and other idealistic doves of the thirties and forties. The obvious objection is that the large number of Arab voters would quickly constitute a major political bloc, and their participation would add a powerful and subversive voice to a country that still wishes to be primar-

ily a Jewish state. Whether the demographic crisis would come in ten years or in fifty, the inevitable domination of the State's political apparatus by Arabs would undermine the original Zionist vision of the State. (2) Give the West Bank autonomy by allowing the Palestinians to democratically select their own leadership and then negotiate with that leadership the terms of Israeli withdrawal.

If their highest goal is to achieve a life of material comfort, such a life may be more available in Los Angeles than in Tel Aviv.

None of us who wish to support this second alternative would be willing to see Israel face any unnecessary military risks. Hence, we would favor the creation of a Palestinian state that faced the same constraints on its autonomy that Austria faced after the second World War. Just as Austria was given total national self-determination but faced enforced disarmament and neutrality, so a Palestinian state should be required by the family of nations to accept military and political neutrality, with guarantees for Israeli troops to enforce border regulations and prevent any importation of arms. Jerusalem, remaining open as one unified city, would become the capital of two sovereign states—a model of peaceful reconciliation for the world. While individual acts of terror would probably continue by extremists on both sides, the fact of having their own state would give most Palestinians a stake in an existing reality, and violence would gradually subside as people finally had “something to lose” in continuing the struggle. Moreover, a Palestinian state would actually have common interests with Israel both in terms of economic development and in resisting the sure-to-continue expansionist drive of Syrians and Iranians (which would at that point be seen as a threat not only to Israel but also to the newly created Palestinian state).

Unfortunately, neither of the two options described above has been chosen. Instead, the worst alternative persists: a military conquest that for twenty years has poisoned the hearts and minds of Israelis and Palestinians alike.

Time is not on our side. Every year that goes by generates a larger number of people on both sides who see no alternative to a future of endless wars and struggle. The more people killed, imprisoned, or expelled, the more children who feel a desire for revenge. The more Palestinian universities and schools are closed by the military occupation, the firmer becomes the commitment of this new generation to a lifetime of struggle. The

more Israelis who grow up knowing no other alternative, the more land concessions will seem “unnatural” to even those with no specific ideological commitments.

At the present moment Arab countries are disunited and at odds with each other. Iran and Iraq are at war. In these circumstances, Israel has the best chance of securing favorable conditions for a settlement both with Palestinians and some surrounding states. But things can only grow more unfavorable for Israel. The military balance can change, and Israel may find itself having to make a settlement on terms much less favorable than it could secure today. From the strictly military and strategic point of view, the time to take dramatic steps for peace is now.

THE DAMAGE TO ISRAELI SOCIETY

Some American Jewish theorists, perhaps not understanding the daily damage being done to the heart of Israel by the continued occupation, talk about the situation as though it were only a matter of coming to grips with our new historical reality. They rightly point out that Jews are not used to exercising sovereign authority. In this new situation, we are told, Jews revert to two ways of thinking: Either inappropriately trying to hold on to “ghetto values” and expectations of moral purity that work fine when you don’t have power but are unworkable in the day-to-day complexities of a real state; or else forgetting everything about our Jewish values and justifying Israeli society as living in the same dirty way that every other state does. The task, these *mayvins* tell us with deep sighs of profundity, is to forge a new path that builds on Jewish values but does not reject the complexities and moral ambiguities of political sovereignty.

Fine. But that doesn’t get us very far down the road. Israel is not acting just like every other nation—it is militarily ruling a million people, roughly equivalent to the US trying to occupy a country with eighty million unwilling people. And the Prime Minister, as quoted above, says he wants this occupation to last forever. Telling us that we need to recognize the moral complexities of power doesn’t absolve us of our real and on-going responsibility to make concrete moral judgments specific to the details of this situation. When we do so, we find ourselves agreeing with a very large minority within Israel who find the deeds and program of their country at odds with their own moral sensibilities and destructive to the spirit that binds their country together.

The damage to Israeli society is incalculable. The occupation distorts every aspect of Israeli life. Palestinians are viewed as problems to control rather than as human beings with whom one must find an accommodation. The Israeli military, traditionally a progressive

force in Israel, must now act as the ruler of a million unwilling Arabs. As a result Israelis serving in the army, develop a consciousness which helps move the political dialogue further to the right. When the military chops down olive trees on West Bankers' land, defends Jewish West Bankers who have acted provocatively toward their Arab neighbors, averts its eyes from harassment against individual Palestinians—these small acts tend to have a cumulative impact on the psyche of a nation, eventually becoming the mode of interaction among the Israelis themselves. Life takes on a meanness, an edge of hostility, that cannot be explained away as a reaction to difficult economic circumstances, and that was not characteristic of life in the Eastern European *shtetl* or in the Jewish ghettos in Arab lands.

Locked into occupation as a solution, Israel becomes increasingly dependent on the United States for military and economic support. Earlier dreams of socialism fade as American economic influence grows—producing short-term economic gain, but only by shaping the economy as an adjunct to American economic needs. The relative material prosperity in Israel seems to validate the values of “the free marketplace,” but it also strengthens the ethos of individualism and self-interest that is the ideological underpinning of capitalism. Encouraged to adopt the self-centered ethics that have dominated American society, many Israelis begin to wonder whether it is in their self-interest to struggle economically and risk their own and their children's lives in military conflict. If their highest goal is to achieve a life of material comfort, such a life may be more available in Los Angeles than in Tel Aviv. As a result, a growing proportion of Israelis seek refuge abroad, and the number of *yordim* (emigrants) exceeds the number of *olim* (immigrants). Within Israel, a narrow materialism and culture of self-interest makes any form of idealism appear weird and out-of-step with “reality,” so that even those who wish to take risks for peace must swim against a current of cynicism and despair.

Eventually, the liberal forces which have defended Israel in the US will find themselves unable to justify repressive policies and unwilling to lead the fight for aid to Israel.

The crisis of meaning that accompanies the triumph of self-centered capitalist values produces a counter-reaction: a new search for a world view that can justify the sacrifices required by a permanent state of war. The resulting return to Judaism is an appropriate rejection

of the dominant values of a self-interested society, but, unfortunately, the legitimate needs that lead people to turn back to religion are then channeled into two equally destructive variants of Judaism that have the largest political and financial backing in Israel. On the one hand, there is a fundamentalist form of Judaic belief, enshrined in various Yeshivot and Chasidic sects, that rejects the validity of the Zionist state and preaches a kind of political quietism that repeats the defeatism and pessimism of ghetto life. On the other hand, there is a Judaism of Gush Emunim, falsely imbuing the deeds of the Israeli Right with messianic significance. For those of us who are committed to Judaism, these are troubling and destructive developments, only partially offset by the recent emergence of Netivot Shalom, a religious peace movement that seeks to counter Gush Emunim.

Meanwhile, encouraged to see any Arab as a potential enemy, Israeli youth are increasingly attracted to Kahana and to a violent form of racism. While Kahana's party may be successfully quarantined by the campaign to stigmatize his explicit racism, his ideology has become increasingly legitimized. It is now articulated in a more sophisticated form through the voice of the right-wing Tehiyah Party. The major right-wing party, Likud, feels increasingly pressured to compete with Tehiyah by showing its own militarism and racism more clearly, as do some opportunistic elements in the Labor Party.

The racism, to be sure, is seemingly “validated” by random acts of violence by Palestinians against individual Israelis. Yet these acts are an inevitable, though completely abhorrent, consequence of the occupation: As the “status quo” persists, individual acts of rage will inevitably supplement the organized activities of terrorist groups. The response in Israel is also predictable and deplorable: Enraged crowds of Israelis unleash random violence at Arabs in retaliation for acts by other Arabs. This is the kind of logic of collective responsibility that led medieval Christian mobs to respond to the alleged misdeeds of a single Jew by organizing pogroms against the whole Jewish community. It is a tragedy for the Jewish people that such acts should now recur, as they did in the fall of 1986, in the State of Israel.

THE STUPIDITY OF THE “REALISTS”

The occupation is also a threat to the internal security of the State of Israel. Within the old boundaries of Israel (the so-called Green Line), over three-quarters of a million Arabs now live. Their economic, social, and educational needs have been systematically underserved throughout the history of the state, and they have legitimate grievances. Continued violence in the occu-

pied areas, combined with escalating Israeli racism, threatens to radicalize these Israeli Arabs. This process, already begun, is not yet irreversible. But more years of the occupation will eventually create a dynamic that will be devastating for the internal security of the state. The potential Lebanonization of Israel would make life intolerable for most Israelis and could only lead to a military situation far more precarious than any that would result from the emergence of a Palestinian state on Israel's border.

"When you come into your land, do not oppress the stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt."

Those dismissed today as "idealists" for their commitment to a speedy, peaceful resolution of the conflict will almost certainly be judged as the ultimate realists by a history that looks back at this period as one in which the potential Lebanonization of Israeli society could still have been averted. That is why we cannot allow ourselves to be marginalized or intimidated into silence. Our love of the Jewish people and of Israel requires that we act to remove the mantle of leadership from those "realists" leading Israel and the American Jewish world down a path of self-destruction.

These realists are enmeshed in a series of deeply engrained self-deceptions. There is, first and foremost, a chauvinistic sense of Israel's invincibility based on the assumption that Israel will remain America's Middle Eastern pet, always able to match Soviet-supplied military escalations with the latest in American military hardware (which Israel will continue to help develop). As a description of current reality, this is accurate. But as a position on which to base the long-term survival of the State, it is wildly naive. Perhaps Israeli realists have allowed themselves to be taken in by the reassurances of American Jewish establishment leaders who have a deep psychological need to see themselves as more securely entrenched in America's political elite than they really are.

The sad fact is that American capitalism's long-term interests will be better served by an alliance with Arab regimes than with Israel. Arab countries, even if governed by an Islamic fundamentalism, might still allow American economic penetration. It was this assumption which underlay Reagan's overtures to the Iranians, and though the specific overtures failed this time, making those connections remains an abiding possibility for American economic interests. In the long run the opportunities for American capital in the economically developing world of over one hundred million Arabs

will seem more attractive than those presented by three million Israeli Jews. And if Arab hostility toward Israel continues to grow, American capitalists will increasingly be forced to make a choice.

This fact has to some extent already influenced America's policies in the Middle East, providing impetus to the delivery of weapons systems to Arab countries which remain implacably opposed to Israel's existence. If at times the desire of America's economic elites to strengthen their ties with Arab autocracies has been undermined, it is largely due to the democratic constraints imposed by the Congress of the United States. It is the Congress that has in the past two decades created a tilt toward Israel in American policy in the Middle East, often in relatively close votes, usually in opposition to the primary corporate interests in American life.

Congressional support for Israel is a democratic reflection of the support of the American people. Although the economic and political clout of Jews in some key urban areas has certainly played a role in bringing along some congressional figures, that clout is not extensive enough to account for the widespread support of Congressional representatives in areas where Jews play a relatively insignificant role and where AIPAC money could easily be matched and bested by money from America's corporate elite. The fact is that the American people have a deep commitment to democracy, a real belief in the values on which America was originally founded, and it is this belief which has been successfully mobilized in support of Israel.

Precisely because support for Israel is so dependent on the popular perception that Israel embodies the highest moral values of American society, the long-term survival of the State of Israel dictates that it cease to occupy the West Bank. The view of Israel as a moral country—already compromised by its role in the arms deals for Iran, its willingness to supply arms for the Contras, and its continued role in South Africa (despite the equivocal ban on arms announced in March)—will be dramatically undermined in the years ahead by its continued repression of Palestinians in the West Bank and of Israeli Arabs within its own borders. This moral contradiction will be exploited by America's corporate elite, who will disproportionately emphasize Israel's undemocratic occupation to legitimize their own pro-Arab agenda. These corporate interests will use their power in the media to ensure that Israel will continue to receive negative publicity, arguably out of proportion with the actual evil of its deeds. The prospect of years ahead in which Israeli forces appear on television and in the news media repressing a civilian Arab population, years in which Americans of Palestinian descent will become increasingly adept at using the mass media

to explain their side of the story, years in which anti-Arab racism in Israel will become more widespread and cause even deeper resentments in the US, should give pause to any political realist who understands the mass psychology of American politics. A corporate-led anti-Israel offensive, dramatizing Israel's anti-democratic occupation of the Palestinians, will take its toll. Eventually, the liberal forces which have defended Israel in the US will find themselves unable to justify repressive policies and unwilling to lead the fight for aid to Israel. It is critical to remember that it is these liberals, and not right-wingers, who have always been the ones willing to stand up to the State Department and the pro-Arab corporate forces. When their support wanes, Israel will be in big trouble.

This scenario is almost inevitable unless Israel plays a positive role in the creation of a Palestinian State in the region. It may be possible for Israel to travel its current path for another ten or twenty years, but eventually it will have eroded its base of good will in the United States. This is a slow and cumulative process, but once it happens it will be irreversible—no last minute switches towards accommodation will be sufficient to overcome the years of negative feelings that have already begun to accumulate and which will become more intense in the next decades. As a result, the kind of military aid that Israel really does need to counter threats from Iran, Syria, Iraq and Libya will be increasingly unavailable as the US Congress's commitment to Israel weakens. Nor will the next generation of Jewish voters, themselves likely to be increasingly ambivalent about Israeli policy toward Palestinians, automatically involve themselves in pressuring American politicians to go out on a limb for Israel. As a result, Israel may face severe military jeopardy—a consequence of its intransigence toward Palestinians. This nightmare is almost a certainty unless those of us who love Israel can influence it to change course.

American-Jewish neo-conservatives, whose thought dominates many of American Jewish political institutions, have completely failed to communicate this reality to Israelis. Their plans to provide long-term support for Israel depend exclusively on them being able to manipulate American elites, ignoring what is happening in the larger American public, unconcerned that most Americans will eventually turn away from supporting Israel if it is perceived as unfairly imposing military rule over the Palestinians.

We cannot afford the luxury of this kind of political irresponsibility. Those who wish to preserve Israel must unseat these sophisticated charlatans from their positions of influence and replace them with people who understand the complexities of the contemporary world and who can serve the real interests of Israel and

the Jewish people. In terms of hard-nosed realism, an immediate and just solution to the Palestinian problem is a survival necessity for the Jewish people.

THE UNDERMINING OF JUDAISM

Many of *Tikkun's* readers are either not Jewish or are Jews who do not see themselves primarily in terms of a religious commitment to Judaism. But for those of us who put primacy on our religious commitment, the policies of the State of Israel strike at the heart of Judaism. While we understand that Jewish commitment to the oppressed transcends our religion and has been strengthened by our historical experience as a scapegoated people in the Diaspora, we nevertheless see Judaism as intrinsically tied to the historical call to fight oppression. If there is one fundamental lesson that God's revelation sought to communicate to the Jewish people, it is this: Do not recreate in your own society the oppression from which you fought to free yourselves by leaving Egypt. This message is stated in every possible way, as explicitly as possible, in the Torah that religious Jews read each week: "When you come into your land, do not oppress the stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt."

To keep alive the consciousness of ourselves as "the stranger," to insist that we be ever mindful of our struggle against oppression, Jewish religion builds its holidays around the story of liberation. The weekly reading of the Torah, year after year, keeps the story fresh. And this commandment not to oppress the stranger, not to copy the ways of the Egyptians, is repeated more frequently than any other in Torah. It is the essence of the Jewish call to pursue justice. Without taking this call seriously, Judaism becomes idolatry. To be sure, there have been moments when the revolutionary thrust of Judaism was ignored or suppressed by its practitioners even in ancient Israel. And there were those in the Rabbinical tradition who reinterpreted the tradition to narrowly define who "the stranger" is. But the authentic voice of God speaks so clearly through the text that in every generation Jews have been reinspired by its moral demand.

Now, just as it becomes possible to build a society based on this tradition, the trauma of the persecution and oppression of the Palestinians has led many to abandon any form of religious vision. Instead of responding to the unique message of the Prophets, they respond by saying, "We were oppressed and now no one has the right to judge us if we want to switch positions and become oppressors." Or, they say, "In order to make peace we must trust that the Palestinians will act like normal human beings, preferring peace based on the little bit of land that a settlement would

give them to a war dedicated to our total extermination. But our experience in Europe makes it hard to base any policy on trusting other human beings to act in fundamentally human ways. So we must treat them as enemies." These attitudes are understandable, and none of us who did not personally experience the oppression in Europe can judge those who say these things or can deny their experience. But as a policy for the Jewish people as a whole, their positions represent a fundamental rejection of the Bible and Jewish religion. The Bible story itself tells of a genocidal attempt on all Jewish male babies, of a history of slavery, of a brutal struggle for freedom. Against this backdrop we might well have expected to hear these same voices in the Bible (and perhaps they are there, reflected in the ugly commands to wipe out the idolatrous nations that lived in Canaan). Yet the strongest voice is a different one, a voice that says: "Do not fall victim to repetition compulsion; do not recreate the ethics of the oppressor; do not become like those whom you rightly detested. Instead, become a holy people."

If there is a reason to fight for a distinctively Jewish society, it must be that that society in some important way embodies the values that have been central to the Jewish experience through the ages.

If we no longer want to create a society based on Torah values in Israel, a society in which the injunction not to oppress the stranger has as much force for us as the injunction to keep ourselves well armed, then why bother creating a Jewish society in Israel? If, as so many Israelis will tell you, they just want to be like everyone else, then why bother to stay in Israel, when a life in America would be more comfortable? If the answer is "anti-Semitism," and Israel is meant to be our refuge, then it's time to face a reality unanticipated by the original Zionist theorists: Jews are less likely to be killed or attacked as Jews in New York or Los Angeles than in Jerusalem or Hebron.

If there is a reason to fight for a distinctively Jewish society, it must be that that society in some important way embodies the values that have been central to the Jewish experience through the ages. This need not mean that Israelis must be "religious" in some conventional sense. There may be moments in the life of a people when the rebellion against religion, at least as officially constituted, may have deep spiritual legitimacy. But if that rebellion extends to the guiding prin-

ciple of Jewish existence, if Israeli society recreates in modern dress the spirit of Egypt rather than the spirit of Moses, then the very legitimacy of Zionism may be called into question.

There are some Jews who believe that the whole of Biblical Israel rightfully belongs to the current Jewish state, and that abandoning it would be both a religious sacrilege and a turning of one's back on God's intervention in history manifested in the victory of the 1967 war. But the Israeli religious peace movement does not dispute the legitimacy of a Jewish claim to the Land of Israel. It only asserts that it is neither wise nor morally justified for Jews to assert that claim in these historical circumstances. Not only does this claim rest on historical assumptions that might simultaneously invalidate any Jewish claim to Acre, Jaffa or Gaza, which may not have been part of God's promise to Abraham or part of historical Judea, but further, we must recognize that other people have developed a different and equally valid claim to the land, based on their own life on the land for hundreds of years. If, as some believe, divine intervention made possible the 1967 victory of the Israeli army and subsequent occupation of the territories, the divine purpose might well have been to give us an opportunity to actualize the Biblical mandate to be a holy people—by showing the world how a victorious people could justly treat the conquered by giving them sovereignty and thus rectifying whatever wrongs may have been committed in the struggle in 1948. If people need to see God working in each specific historical development, they should still interpret God's works in ways more consistent with the moral thrust of Torah.

If we do want to see God's hand in history, we should certainly keep in mind the strong Torah warnings that we have no essential right to the Land of Israel if we don't live a life of Torah within it. It takes powerful blinders to miss that a society that oppresses Palestinians clearly violates the Torah's mandates. The Land of Israel is believed to have a special spiritual quality, and those who introduce moral pollution will be thrown out. Jewish tradition tells us clearly that twice before we polluted the land, and twice before we faced Exile. Those of us who are unwilling to see a new dispersion cannot allow Israeli society to be led by moral cretins, because they risk destroying the spiritual substructure which is the necessary precondition for Jewish life in Israel.

But it is not only Jewish existence in Israel that is at risk in the current policies of the state of Israel. Much more is at stake.

Israel is the moment of truth for Judaism. If religious Judaism remains identified with oppressive policies at the moment that it finally has an opportunity to participate in shaping a society, it will be discredited for

generations to come. Nor is this just a question of discrediting the orthodox. Anyone who seriously believes in the Jewish religious tradition, whether as a Reform, Conservative, Reconstructionist, chavurah, or new-age spiritual Jew, must eventually come to grips with the uniqueness of this period. The Jewish people are now actors on the stage of world history, and if what they create is a society unworthy of Jewish ideals, those ideals themselves will ultimately be placed in severe jeopardy. Anyone who believes in socialist values knows the incalculable damage done by the actual practices of the Soviet Union. No matter how loudly we proclaim that the Soviet Union isn't a "real" socialist society, the emancipatory ideals of the socialist tradition have received a definitive historical setback by their identification with the Soviet Union. Israel could do the same to Judaism. Anyone who cares about the future of Judaism must stand up now, while the struggle for the future of Israel is being waged. A Judaism must be forged which both directly struggles to change Israel so that it becomes an embodiment of Jewish ideals (hence it makes sense to support the Netivot Shalom and other organizations forging this kind of Judaism in Israel) and which also creates a clear voice for a Judaism in the United States that is both proudly Zionist and unequivocally critical of those Israeli policies which are wrong. The future of Judaism may well depend on our ability to lovingly but fiercely articulate the difference between Jewish ideals and Israeli realities. Yet we must do so lovingly—not with a sense of moral superiority, but rather with compassion for the many Israelis who truly want a decent and just society but who, mistakenly, have adopted policies that cannot and should not receive our respect or support.

THE TASK FOR AMERICANS

The American Jewish community is not on the sidelines when it comes to shaping the future of Israel. American Jewish institutions have persistently sent the wrong message to Israelis—that they can count on our support regardless of how oppressive they become to the Palestinians. American Jewish leaders, deluded by their own temporary access to influence, have misled Israeli policy makers by letting them believe they could deliver American political and military support even if the majority of Americans grow increasingly skeptical of an Israel that has become an occupying force. This blank check gives undeserved credibility to Israeli right-wingers, and allows Israelis to choose options that not only isolate Israel from the rest of the world but will eventually alienate the American public.

American Jews must reject this kind of destructive leadership and reject those voices in the American Jewish world that are happy to fight to the last drop of Israeli Jewry's blood. The Right has challenged liberals in the Jewish world to defend their right to criticize Israel without taking the risks of living in Israel. But it

Precisely because we love Israel, the Jewish people and Torah, we can no longer allow established Jewish organizations and leadership to speak for us, to silence the voices of criticism, and to pretend that all Israel needs from American Jewry is more money and more tourism.

is much more relevant for us to ask: How dare you encourage policies that will risk Jewish life; how dare you criticize the Israeli peace movement when you are unwilling personally to take the risks that your militaristic policies lead to?

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The perspective articulated in this editorial represents a mainstream position inside the Israeli Labor Party, and although it is still a minority position in Israel, it is one that commands support from some of Israel's most respected political and intellectual leaders. In America it has heretofore been heard only from fringe groups and those alienated from the Jewish world on so many other issues that this one seems to function only as another justification for rejecting their Jewishness. We who are liberals in the Jewish world, who have been saying these kinds of things quietly to our friends, must now finally come out of the closet, identify with the peace forces in Israel, and say these things publicly. Precisely because we love Israel, the Jewish people and Torah, we can no longer allow established Jewish organizations and leadership to speak for us, to silence the voices of criticism, and to pretend that all Israel needs from American Jewry is more money and more tourism. If ever Israel needed our courage and our caring, it is precisely now. We must loudly and unequivocally support those who want Israel to embark on a path toward recognition and reconciliation with the Palestinians. Our voices must be heard. For Jerusalem's sake, we shall not be silent. □

A Challenge to the Palestinians

Conditions exist today that make it possible for Palestinians to win for themselves their own state within ten years, and yet meet the legitimate security needs of the State of Israel.

Those who understand Israel and the Jewish people know that the central problem has always been the fear that most Palestinians would not settle for a state on the West Bank, but would use it as a launching pad for a future war to reclaim all of Palestine for themselves, in the process slaughtering the Jewish people. The central task of a Palestinian movement must be to dispel that fear.

The steps necessary are clear, simple, and straightforward.

A credible Palestinian leadership must present itself and unequivocally and without reservation do the following:

(1) Renounce all forms of violence or terror and declare itself committed, both ideologically and strategically, to the value of nonviolence. All forms of struggle for a Palestinian state will be committed to the spirit and practice of nonviolence, and it would commit itself to punishing Palestinians who violate that spirit. It would also engage in massive nonviolent civil disobedience. To make this more than empty rhetoric, the leadership would commit itself to (a) Holding public trials, and then punishing any Palestinian violating the discipline of nonviolence, from rock-throwers to bomb setters to kidnappers to supporters of Palestinian sects still engaged in military struggle. (b) Creating schools of nonviolence in the refugee camps and teaching nonviolence in all Palestinian schools and student organizations. (c) Propagandizing for nonviolence in newspapers, television and in the mosques.

(2) Announce now, unconditionally, that it accepts the legitimacy of the State of Israel. Further, it announces its willingness, speaking for the Palestinian people, to renounce all Palestinian claims to the pre-1967 territory of the State of Israel as part of the negotiated settlement, in exchange for which Israel would recognize a Palestinian state within the West Bank and Gaza.

(3) Announce its willingness to accept a demilitarized and neutral state (roughly equivalent to what was imposed on Austria after World War II), with its border patrolled either by Israeli or by an international armed force partly composed of Israelis whose task would be to prevent any military arms from being imported into the state, and that it recognize Israel's right to intervene militarily should any significant quantity of arms be brought into the state. Israel, in turn, would be asked, in conjunction with an international

force, to protect the Palestinian state from the plausible incursions to be expected from Syrians and Iranians.

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We have no doubts that if this program were adopted—not as a propaganda face alongside other forms of violent struggle, but as the new dominant reality of a Palestinian movement—it would quickly precipitate a massive move towards the peace camp both within Israel and among Diaspora Jewry. It would be the functional equivalent of a Sadat visit to Jerusalem—but it would take longer, because Israelis, wearied by years of terrorist attacks and violent rhetoric, would be initially skeptical.

The Palestinians should recognize that the only way to move a democratic state is to appeal to its own values. The use of nonviolence would trigger a response based on the best aspects of the Jewish tradition. Once they were convinced that the Palestinians were serious, large numbers of Jews would participate with them in the nonviolent civil disobedience. Anyone who understands the psychology of Jews and Israel knows that this strategy would totally transform the political scene and that Palestinians would be able to win for themselves the very self-determination that is doomed by the current Palestinian struggles.

A program of this sort would not be easy for Palestinians to adopt. They would have to resist provocation by Israeli rightists, settlers, and militarists. They would have to find other ways to let out the pent-up hostilities and aggression of those whose patience has long since disappeared. They would have to discipline members of their own people who have come to glorify militarism and armed struggle. They would probably have to abandon the PLO and create a new structure for democratic leadership. But is all this any worse than having to endure endless decades in the future as a people condemned to be refugees? Eventually, even if it takes many decades, the Palestinians will realize how mis-served they have been by their current leadership. Is it too much to ask that they avoid future suffering by taking these steps now?

Those of us who are liberal supporters of Israel tend to put all our energy into making demands on Israeli policy makers to change their approach. But it is time for us to make similar demands on the Palestinians: If they want peace, if they would genuinely live in peace with Israel, as their moderate spokesmen in the US continue to insist, then it is time for them to put up or shut up also. Here is a strategy that would almost certainly achieve for the Palestinians the very self-determination they want. Isn't it time for the Palestinian people to replace their current leadership with people who would adopt and faithfully follow this plan? □

—ML

Israeli Roundtable: Facing the Meaning of Conquest

In the early spring of 1987 Tikkun sponsored a roundtable discussion in Jerusalem on the issue of Israel and the West Bank. We asked several prominent Israeli intellectuals to discuss with each other how they understood the present situation, the legacy of twenty years on the West Bank, and what they thought were the present policy options that flowed from their analyses. We have reprinted selections from that roundtable here. **Zeev Sternhell** teaches Political Science at the

Zeev Sternhell: I regard the Six Day War as the beginning of twenty years of conquest, and this is one of the greatest misfortunes that ever befell the Zionist Movement. The Six Day War has reopened the debate that existed in the Zionist Movement of the thirties, i.e., whether Zionist goals could be achieved in *part* of Eretz Israel. The War of Liberation and the twenty years that passed before the Six Day War showed that Zionism could be realized inside the borders consolidated after 1948. This was accepted by a majority of Israelis, and by most nations, except the Arabs. Up to the Six Day War, the principle of partition of Western Eretz Israel was not seriously questioned by the traditionally right-wing Zionists.

The conquest has become an integral part of other processes in Israel following that war. We entered the war at a time of lengthy recession, unemployment and deep moral crisis. We came out of it with a stupendous economic and moral feeling about our new "empire," from the Jordan River to the Suez Canal. The condition of the Israeli society had undergone a thorough change. Money was plentiful and the process of corruption had begun, continuing even after the Yom Kippur War. I think that the Yom Kippur War was less important, regarding the subject which is under our consideration now; it may very possibly be mentioned in the history books only incidentally in relation to the "Camp David Accords" and the peace with Egypt. The Six Day War and the conquest, on the other, had created a new and different reality.

The two traditional opponents in the Zionist Movement, the Revisionist Right and the old Labor Movement, have come closer. After twenty years of conquest, the argument between the Right and the Left is not

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qualitative but quantitative. On the basis of the situation as described by Meron Benvenisti, when half of the West Bank is annexed *de facto*—land, infrastructure, natural resources, and law—even serious people have stopped using the term "territorial compromise" and use instead "functional compromise." Even such a compromise could possibly apply only to half the area that is yet unannexed and on which we are expected to share control over the Palestinians with King Hussein.

One additional result of the new situation is national and religious extremism. This internal nationalism, nationalism of "Blood and Land" existed in the Zionist Movement (as in all other national movements) even before the Six Day War, but that war gave it a tremendous impetus. The balance kept by the traditional Zionist Left—between nationalism and universal socialism—has completely shattered. The new growth of the nationalistic stream of the Revisionist Right, coupled with religious extremism, has created a new political force more powerful than anything enjoyed by the Right before the war.

This new reality has resulted in a feeling of helplessness and passivity even on that part of the population that perceives in this reality the seeds of destructive processes in Israeli society. I believe that the National Unity Government is the result of this acceptance and not only of coalition arithmetic. The ease by which this unity—of such supposedly opposing sides—was created, allowing the continuation of the annexation process, demonstrates that the consensus is wide enough to enable cooperation between those who support occupation and those who realize its destructive nature but find no way of combating it.

We live in an indubitably colonial framework: two

societies, one living on top of the other, and each governed by a separate and different set of rules. The Jews in the territories enjoy the taxes paid by all of us and are defended by our army. This state of affairs makes us—the Jews outside the territories—full partners in perpetuating this colonial condition, which could not but influence our day-to-day life in the future; that is so despite the fact it appears to us that the price paid by Israeli society until now has been relatively small.

Our refusal to accept the fact that we face here a legitimate struggle between two national movements which must end in compromise will of necessity bring about disastrous results to our society.

Meron Benvenisti: I am not prepared to accept the colonial model as characterizing the relations between Israel and the territories. The Israeli Left has adopted this model because it enables it to treat the Six Day War as the root of all evil, to believe that before 1967 we lived in a world free of problems, to shelve the problems of the Arabs who were given Israeli citizenship, to believe that the problem of the Arabs in the Galilee is a separate one, to live in the illusion that simple solutions are easily available.

Against the colonial model which regards the reason

for the state of affairs as external, I believe that the origin of our problems is internal, the result of our pluralistic society. In a colonial regime one state and its citizens, forming a mother country, conquers an alien land and forcibly rules it. The colonial idea presupposes that, in the end, the conquerors will return to their mother country and release the conquered from bondage. In a pluralistic society such as Belgium, Ireland, Canada or South Africa, the struggle is an internal one between two communities, neither with a mother country to which to return.

I maintain that we Israelis first adopted this model of colonialism in the War of Liberation. It was convenient for us to export the problem across the border and to present the war as between Israel and the invading Arab countries. Ben-Gurion, by the way, understood this point and preferred to call that war, the "War of Independence." From that war until 1967 it was convenient for us to treat the Israeli-Arab conflict as external, and in fact it was so, to a large extent. But in 1967 the problem returned to its natural locale and could be understood as a pluralistic struggle between two communities. The idea of the "Jordanian Option" is an attempt to re-export the problem, to turn it back into a colonial one, and thus to make it solvable.

The truth of the matter is that there is no real

Some Basic Facts on the West Bank

Some 60,000 Jews now live in the West Bank, of whom about 13,000 settled during the past two years, the years of the National Unity Government.

About 20,000 of the inhabitants live in quasi-suburbs of Tel Aviv, a forty-five minute ride from that city (an increase of roughly 6,000 in the past two years), while 28,000 live in the municipal areas of Jerusalem and Kiryat Arba near Hebron (an increase of 6,500 in the two years). In the mountain back area—settled mainly by Gush Emunim—the number of inhabitants totals no more than 4,200 Jews in the north and about 1,200 in the south, and the increase during the period in question was only about 450, practically all of them newly born babies. In the Jordan Valley, the Alon Plan area, there was a decrease of population of some 550 in the past two years. That is to say, there is a definite population increase in urban areas of the West Bank, but a relative freezing in rural and agricultural areas.

These numbers show that Gush Emunim has exhausted its potential, and that settlement—once ideological in character—has now become an ordinary urban expansion issue. I estimate that until the end of the decade, the division will remain as it is today, i.e., about eight-five percent in nine urban settlements (as

opposed to fifty-one percent in 1980), while the remaining fifteen percent will be scattered in 100 rural settlements.

Government investments across the Green Line (the pre-1967 border of the State of Israel) now total approximately \$150 million per year, compared to about \$220 million per year in the last two years of the Likud Government, but the relative proportion of these investments to total government investments remains the same. Most are in housing and the completion of an infrastructure, largely already in existence.

In the same period of time, the attitude toward Arabs in the occupied areas under military rule (with Rabin, a member of the Labor Party, as Minister of Defense) has worsened considerably. There is a marked increase in punishment without trial and demolition or closure of houses. There were seventy-three such cases under the Government of National Unity, compared to eleven in the seven years of the Likud Government. There are at present 100 detainees (down from a previous total of 130.) Let it not go unnoted, however, that collective punishment has decreased; curfews and closures of universities are shorter. □

Meron Benvenisti

difference between the Arabs of Israel and the Arabs of the territories. It should be borne in mind that the PLO will never agree to less than their return to Jaffa and Beersheba, and any Arab prepared to accept less will be regarded as a traitor. The attempt to present the Arab-Israeli problem as a conflict between states is an illusion. The problem with Egypt was such a conflict, and the solution was therefore relatively easy, no one doubting where the respective centers of government were.

The assumption that the conquest has caused corruption is highly optimistic. It is based on the supposition that evil done in the territories eventually can reach the consciousness and sensitivity of the ordinary Israeli. But the truth of the matter is that the relationship of that Israeli to the situation in the territories is characterized by boredom, pure and simple. The Palestinian problem does not interest anybody, almost anybody.

Itzhak Galnur: I agree with the statement that the West Bank does not exist anymore as a territorial conception, but as a political conception it does expressly exist, and its presence in the political consciousness of both Jews and Palestinians cannot be cancelled out. I think that one ought not see in the continuation of the conquest a design, but rather our being dragged down by fears, paying a low price in the short term while avoiding the responsibility necessary to make meaningful decisions.

The 1967 war brought us back to being "young and beautiful," to the spirit of pre-State days, opened a new frontier, especially to those groups that did not manage to express themselves in the Zionist revolution of 1948. An anecdote that was repeatedly told then was: "The Messiah has arrived: The Americans send us money, the Russians are sending us immigrants, and the Arabs are building the state." This expresses well the feeling of the time and the new phenomena of new religious Zionism, messianic Judaism, economic boom, the new link with the Diaspora.

The consensus in all fields—religion, state, constitution, security—was, in effect, to delay any change as much as possible, as long as the price was not unbearable. The ideological and practical convergence of the two large groups, labor and Likud, was unavoidable.

Sternhell: The consensus in the matter of the continuation of the conquest is a central reality. Every party has responsibility towards its portions in the West Bank. The Left annexed the Jordan Valley, Kiryat Arba, while the Right is in the midst of endeavors to annex all the rest. The debate on annexation is therefore quantitative, not ideological, not even strategic. The alignment used the ethos of security in order to justify the annexation of the Jordan Valley—a kind of "deluxe annexation" of

areas without population, in accordance with the Alon Plan, but it was obvious to everyone that the Jordan Valley was worthless from a security point of view.

Left and Right are thus together tied to an umbilical cord, and the argument between them is about the amount of money to be invested in the areas and not about the desire to hold on to them. This situation is quite comfortable for the Right. The freezing of this state of affairs is highly satisfying to them and gives them irreversible advantages. The change the Left needs to make cannot be made under present conditions.

As Itzhak Galnur says, there is a fear of any change, which might upset the apple cart. This conservatism manifests itself in the unproductive waiting for Hussein and in the frozen structure of the large parties. Logic has it that the political structure in Israel should be dismantled and rebuilt, but in the past twenty years Israeli society was unable to take any meaningful step in that direction—not in the economic field, not even in health services, and obviously not in the political/security field—and this may be the most important reason for our continued presence in the territories.

Eliezer Schweid: I do not agree. The political and military activities are, in the main, unavoidable. We have before us two opposing national movements. Both before and after the Six Day War, the conditions were not ripe to reach a reasonable agreement and, therefore, the war and the conquest that followed it were unavoidable. For when there is no peace agreement, sooner or later a war breaks out, and in that war one side wins. If the Arabs had won, Eretz Israel would have united under Arab conquest, but because we were the winning side, we are the conquerors. We form a part of a comprehensive, historical and political process, in which we are a minor, not central, factor and we must find our bearings in it.

I feel rather uneasy in this discussion. Firstly, I believe that the terms "Right" and "Left" are archaic and do not serve any useful purpose in our discussion. Secondly, I do not agree that there is a consensus between Labor and Herut. I would have been happy if it were true, but I feel that we live in a diametrically opposed state, religiously and politically. The contention that there is no debate going on in Israel is highly exaggerated. I agree that the Labor Party does not see that the responsibility for change rests on it and it does not act decisively. But, by the nature of things, opposition parties become less radical when they attain power and are obliged to encounter problems and to carry responsibility.

When I maintain today that we have no alternative but to remain in the territories, it is not because I believe that we should overlook the problems caused

by conquest, but because I do not find a better alternative. If one maintains that the sole responsibility for the situation and for its change rests on us, one should suggest a real plan of action that will enable us to act more justly, politically and morally. He who suggests such a plan should also present its price. Whoever suggests unilateral withdrawal, leaving the territories as they are, must also ask whether the moral problems may not then become even worse, e.g., should we have to pursue warlike actions (in order to prevent terrorism) or to return as conquerors after a short time.

I mention all that because I am aware of the fact that the price we pay for our presence there as conquerors is much higher than one can assume from your words. More than that: I believe that this price is unbearable, unbearable not in the sense of a personal problem but of a national one.

Morally, we live in one of the most difficult times ever experienced by Israeli society, in an age of heavy-hearted despair, feeling we face an insoluble confrontation. That it is doubtful there is a future for us here is felt especially among the young. I do not maintain that there is no way out but only that there is no simple, clear-cut, immediate one, such as the proposed establishment of a Palestinian State or unilateral withdrawal in favor of Jordan. Nor do I see a solution in annexation with full human rights, because such a step will endanger the Jewish character of the State of Israel.

Galnur: I disagree with the proposition that we are unable to influence events. I do not feel any anxiety that concessions will lead us to a position similar to that of the Christians in Lebanon. I am convinced that Israel is strong enough to take upon itself the risks of unilateral measures. The real dangers to the continued existence of Israeli society are not in its military security problems but in the continuation of the conquest that is likely, in the long run, to destroy Israel.

I think that Israel today has an interest in getting rid of the territories. It is not in our power to solve the Palestinian problem; neither is it our function. Israeli society is like a ship that developed engine trouble on the high sea and must get rid quickly of nonessential, dead weight—the territories—to save itself.

I believe that it is possible to forge a majority within Israel—in coalition with most Diaspora Jews—not only against annexation but in favor of Israel's renouncing its intention to claim sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza.

Schweid: I also believe that a change is possible. I believe that the disappearance of Hussein and/or Arafat from the political arena will shuffle the cards. It may be assumed, for instance, that no heir of Arafat could

continue holding the shaky coalition of the central stream of the PLO, and its disintegration will cause an increase in freedom of action among the inhabitants of the West Bank. The reaction to this hypothetical event will be different if public sentiment toward the present situation is one of dissatisfaction. The intellectual should promote this dissatisfaction. The idea that Israel is acting like a colonial country could increase sensitivity and awaken unclear consciences within that public, generating a new concern with values. Intellectuals have a clear role in awakening this sensitivity.

Benvenisti: I do not accept that the intellectual should wear the hat of the politician. The function of the intellectual is to ask the correct questions. The intellectual should give his adamant personal view without searching for the compromises of the politicians. Here is our potential intellectual treachery: We have easy answers that are searching for easy questions, and not the other way around.

We should accept the fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be fully and comprehensively solved. We must also accept that the problem of Jerusalem, for instance, could not be solved by mere political means; every institution, every stone there bears potential struggle between the two nations.

The only way open to us is to proceed slowly, step by step, toward partial solutions, based on the recognition that the conflict is communal and not colonial. Our interest should be to enable the Palestinian community to get itself built and developed—and not through a pointless struggle against us as alien conquerors. Our answer lies in our opening for them, gradually, a gate through which they would have an ever growing place where they could lead their own lives. I mean elections, and we should not be frightened to find out that the PLO would have a majority. Most Palestinians do support the PLO in one way or another anyway. We should develop the universities, etc., and nourish a Palestinian elite, so that in time the two elites could discuss cantonization of Eretz Israel, of all Eretz Israel, including the Galilee and the Negev. We should get rid of this fiction called the Green Line. It is impossible to defend a barrier that has already been shattered.

Schweid: My argument with Meron Benvenisti concerns the question of our ability to define the composition of the situation by ourselves. If it were a mere quarrel by two communities, a *modus vivendi* would have been reached long ago. But the Palestinians have a complicated set of relations with Arab countries and we with the Jewish world. We also must not forget the US and the USSR, which have their respective interests.

If not for the Arab countries, the conflict would have ended in 1948. The maze of these relations prevents cut and dry solutions, not even partial ones as suggested by Benvenisti.

I think that we should adopt the direction proposed by Benvenisti and thus neutralize as far as possible the immoral aspects of the situation of conquest, which, first and foremost, hurt us. Benvenisti's attitude shows his personal awareness, that he witnesses a situation of great distress and senses our inability to cope with its problematic nature. In the short term, the focus should be on moral sensitivity. In the long term, the only possible solution is one based on federal relations between Jew and Arab, without a partition of Eretz Israel and without depriving the Arabs of their rights.

Sternhell: I do not agree that we should abandon the hope of having a comprehensive solution by means of Israeli and Palestinian representatives. The cardinal question before us is, "What is the moral basis of Israel?" Is it not the right of a nation to have self-determination, the right of individuals and groups to be masters of their own identity? Could this universal right be enjoyed by Palestinians in exactly the same way it is by Israelis? Or is the right of self-rule a right that belongs only to Jews, and is there a double standard, one for Jews and one for Arabs? This is the problem, and the political answer lies in the partition of the country and in mutual recognition, one in the state of the other. If the Palestinian problem is found insoluble—due to the stubbornness of demanding Jaffa, too, or due to lack of responsible leadership, then the Jordanian solution would be preferable to the present situation. Should Hussein reject it—because he could not see himself giving up Jerusalem—it would be better to proceed with unilateral withdrawal from ninety percent of the



West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Even by that third option, Zionist goals will be better served than by the status quo.

If it should come about that there is no solution beyond the status quo, I would personally prefer to return to exile and to live in a Jewish canton in Brooklyn than to remain in a Jewish colony in Eretz Israel. These are our options and they should be brought home to the public by the intellectuals in their full seriousness. □

Occupation: A Perspective from the Israeli Left

Adi Ophir

Twenty years into the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip the Israeli Left appears to be more lost than ever. The process of annexation seems to be tangible and certain, while the "peace process" remains a rusty saw of political rhetoric. The thesis propounded by the researcher Meron Benvenisti, according to whom the Jewish takeover of these territories has passed the point of no return and the situation is now irreversible, finds ever wider acceptance.

The Palestinian leadership provides the Israeli peace camp with few straws to clutch at. Nationalist sentiment seems to be dominant in the Jewish streets, insensitivity to injustices done by Jews to non-Jews in the territories increases, and in almost every matter of public controversy the Left has in recent years always found itself on the bottom: Jews have been permitted to settle in the heart of the city of Hebron; only six members of the Jewish underground remain in prison—all the others were granted presidential clemency before serving out their sentences; construction and settlement by Jews in the territories, chiefly in urban areas, continues; the extra-parliamentary protest movement "Peace Now" seems to exist only on paper; administrative detention and summary punishment continue to be imposed in the territories; the military government does not allow the consolidation of a local Palestinian leadership and thereby cooperates with the Jordanian government. The Israeli Left is so despondent and so impotent that it no longer even asks the central question that should concern any opposition in a time of conflict, namely, What must be done? Of course vain discussions of this question take place in pointless Friday evening parlor conversations, in meetings among intellectuals, and on the pages of the daily newspapers and various periodicals. But all this debate tends to lead to unripe fruit, lots of smoke, and ideas for someone else to implement, always someone else—the government, the people, the military authorities—but never, or almost never, oneself. The Israeli Left hardly asks *itself* what, under the present conditions, has to be done by *us*?

Despite the feelings of despair and hopelessness—and perhaps because of them—this is the most urgent question on our current agenda. It is so precisely in the

face of the Left's political weakness, and in face of the fact that there is currently no Israeli government able to do what truly must be done, that is, to sit down and talk with the Palestinians about the partition of Eretz Israel between the two peoples who reside in it. Precisely because of these conditions, the question of what strategy should be adopted by the Left in the struggle becomes crucial.

In order to answer this question, we on the Left must first of all define our starting point, the assumptions underlying the struggle: We are not willing to belong to a society of masters; our refusal to perpetuate the occupation is categorical; our involvement in the Jewish mastership over Arabs in Eretz Israel is temporary and conditional, that is, only until an Israeli-Palestinian political settlement is found, and only so long as Israel is seriously endeavoring to reach such a settlement. This principle is not subject to negotiation or compromise with the Israeli Right. On the basis of this principle we need to sketch anew the framework of the political struggle of the Israeli Left. That exact same principle must guide the tie between the American Jewish Left and the State of Israel.

In order to clarify the nature of the principle enunciated above, I will first consider the main argument challenging it in the context of the current debate in Israel. The moral question involved in Jewish dominion over Arabs in Eretz Israel is not the unique possession of the Left. On the Right, too, there are those who are disturbed by it and seek a solution. The most serious rightist position, which speaks in the name of a commitment to the principles of Western democracy, envisions the following solution to the problem of Jewish rule over the Palestinian people: the establishment of a Palestinian state on the East Bank of the Jordan River, that is, in place of the Hashemite Kingdom; gentle encouragement, with material and political inducements only, of the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank to move to the East Bank; and the granting of full equity and civil rights to those Palestinians who prefer to remain on their land, on condition that they swear allegiance to the State of Israel. All rights will be restored to those Palestinians who accept the terms of this settlement—except, of course, the right to determine for themselves their common destiny, to declare their affiliation as they choose, and to continue to fight for their existence as a nation in the districts of their

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birth. They would not recover this basic freedom, even though they would be able to demand other freedoms through the Israeli judicial system, and under the aegis of the Jewish democracy.

But it is not only on the Right that voices are heard seeking to grant legitimacy to the annexation and to lessen the pangs of conscience connected with the occupation by granting civil rights to the “loyal” Arabs of the territories. A similar position is stated with great clarity and vigor by a man who can hardly be suspected of a right-wing nationalist ideology: the researcher Meron Benvenisti, formerly deputy mayor of Jerusalem and today head of the West Bank Data Project, a superb diagnostician of the Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. After twenty years of an Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, claims Benvenisti, the Green Line is dead, and it is no longer possible to reach an agreement to partition Eretz Israel along the lines of the 1967 borders. Consequently, annexation is preferable to the present situation in which the Arabs are residents without civil rights. A “respectable” and “honorable” annexation, says Benvenisti, would enable us to fight against the injustices being done to the Palestinians, would permit them to conduct their own struggle on matters that concern them, and would decrease the points of friction and conflict between them and us. A “decent” annexation would save what can still be saved, that is, our honor as occupiers and their rights as annexees.

Benvenisti has given up on what had been the starting point of the struggle of the Israeli Left since 1967: the opposition to transforming the occupation from a temporary situation into a permanent fact. He concedes this point not because he has been persuaded by the arguments of the Right concerning the Jewish title to all of Eretz Israel or concerning the alleged security risk involved in territorial concessions. He gives it up because the facts—as he gathers and understands them—indicate that the Jewish takeover of the territories has passed the point of no return, because in his opinion we are speaking of an *irreversible process*, because a continuation of the present situation, while evading a recognition of the intensity of the annexation process, creates an intolerable situation that will lead us to a terrible synthesis of the worst aspects of Belfast and Pretoria.

Meron Benvenisti is wrong. He errs, both in his understanding of the meaning of the historical process and in the political conclusions that he draws from them.

His first mistake is rooted in how he understands the irreversibility of the geopolitical situation in the occupied territories. That the situation is irreversible is true, but in a trivial sense—and precisely for this reason it is

impossible to draw any political conclusions from it.

Assume that not a single settlement had ever been built in the territories. Even so, after twenty years of Israeli occupation the situation would still be irreversible. And were the settlements to be dismantled one after another, it would still not be possible to detach the West Bank from Israel and the Israeli presence. The historical acts cannot be undone because of the nature of the historical process, because of the historicity of human action and consciousness in general—and not simply because of nationalist ideology and annexationist policies. Thus the argument is trivial. Why, then, are we so upset by the claim that the political situation in the territories is irreversible? The answer is that, knowingly or unknowingly, we have not abandoned the desire to turn back the clock to the situation that existed before June 1967. We yearn to recapture pre-1967 Israel—the idealized past that overshadows the inferior present reality—and find it difficult to separate our nostalgic image of that “beautiful Israel” from our critical perspective on the distressing present.

At every instance in which Israelis or non-Israeli Jews have any contact with the occupation, they must act in ways that delegitimize it.

There are more than a hundred settlements and tens of thousands of Jews living in them. The Jewish hold on the territories is complex, deep, and multi-faceted. Benvenisti, who explains this to us and portrays the ugliness of the Israel occupation with such eloquence, rightly demands that we draw a political conclusion. But the conclusion he himself reaches is not a legitimate corollary of the “facts” he presents, because facts themselves do not entail a specific conclusion. The “facts” are merely constraints on the possibilities of political action, but they cannot finally dictate one specific course of action. The direction taken by political action is determined by our values and ultimate goals that lie outside the realm of facts. Positing such value-laden goals of action requires practical reason and analytical talent; but also—as those who are despondent need to be reminded—imagination, sagacity, and daring. Benvenisti is one of the despondent. His despair has led him to give up the most important moral goal of the struggle for peace: an end to the Jewish domination over the Palestinian people. We should not follow in his footsteps. We must have the imagination, sagacity, and daring that he lacks—and this is no small matter, for Benvenisti is undoubtedly a courageous and imaginative person.

Benvenisti's second mistake is rooted in his failure to distinguish between the institutionalization of a power structure and the legitimation of power. Benvenisti describes in a single breath the processes connected with the institutionalization of the Israeli domination of the West Bank—for example, administration by edict, the establishment of regional councils of Jewish settlements, the creation of administrative positions to deal with the territories in all of the civilian ministries of the Israeli government—alongside the processes connected with the legitimation of the Israeli domination—for example, the involvement of the Supreme Court in affairs in the territories and the consensus between the two major parties on most practical matters connected with the territories. The exact, profound, and persuasive scientific work done by Benvenisti involves the description, documentation, and analysis of the processes of institutionalization of Israeli domination of the occupied territories. In parallel, he makes a number of claims, less well documented but still plausible, concerning a decline in the level of the legitimation required by the Israeli government in order to attain a consensus favoring Israeli actions in the territories. Benvenisti lays special stress in this context—and rightly so—on the yoking of the Supreme Court to the cart of legitimizing Israeli dominion in the territories. Nevertheless, even if the processes of institutionalization are accompanied by a decline in the level of legitimation required for the Israeli power system, the distinction between institutionalization and legitimation remains. It is precisely this difference that leaves the Israeli Left with the scope required for its fight against Jewish dominion over Arabs in Eretz Israel. Moreover, this distinction defines the specific goals of the Left in its struggle against the occupation, twenty years after.

There are many Jews, both in Israel and around the world, who lose sleep over the vision of an Israel with a lust for power, the Israel that scorns the moral values of democracy.

For even if after twenty years of occupation Israeli rule in the territories has been irreversibly institutionalized, there still is not—and there must never be—any legitimacy for this domination. The legitimacy of Jewish domination over the Palestinians—of a permanent domination, not a temporary one until a peace settlement is achieved—is a matter of constant controversy, at the very heart of Israeli political debate ever since 1967. And

in the long run there is not institutionalization of power without its legitimation. Of course there is no chance that the Palestinians will accord legitimacy to Israeli domination, with or without civil rights—and this fact defines Israeli domination as irremediable dictatorship. Palestinian weakness does indeed reduce the price that mastership claims from Jewish society, and—together with Palestinian extremism—it is one of the reasons that the level of legitimation required of the Israeli regime by most of the Jewish public is diminishing. Nevertheless, it is a fact that despite the weakness of the Left and the apathy of the political center, the Jewish public has not granted legitimacy to annexation.

From the perspective of legitimation, one cannot speak of processes from which there is no return; for it is not at all clear that we are dealing here with an unambiguous process moving in a clear direction. In a democratic society—and Israel within the Green Line is still a democratic society—a power system that lacks legitimacy—however deeply institutionalized—is a fragile system, and one open to change. The removal of Jewish settlements from the Sinai cannot serve as a model for what would happen on the West Bank when the moment of truth arrives. But one thing can be learned from it: The institutionalization of the hold on the territory of Sinai was insufficient to perpetuate this hold when conditions of severe delegitimation arose. Similar developments may someday also delegitimize Jewish rule over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is incumbent upon us today, twenty years after the occupation began, to do everything possible to prepare the ground for the total delegitimation of this rule. So, even though we may have lost the struggle over the institutionalization of power, we still have not lost over its legitimation. What we should learn from Benvenisti is that we must now devote the full intensity of the struggle to encouraging processes of delegitimation of Jewish rule over the Palestinian people.

This struggle for delegitimation must be conducted on two parallel planes. One belongs to the very presence in the occupied territories, and the other to each of the countless aspects and details of the power system by means of which Jews rule over Palestinians. The political weakness of the Israeli Left—but also its conspicuous presence in all of the social elites with the exception of the political elite—determines the character of this struggle.

The delegitimation of the role of master is a matter of words; it can take place only in the context of public political discourse. We must first direct our energies against the empty and unsupported rhetoric of peace and the idle steps of the Israeli government, and especially

of the Ma'arach (the Labor Party coalition), which pretends to seek peace and yet, in fact, daily promotes the consolidation of Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The delegitimation of the Israeli occupation must take place also on the level of deeds: at every instance in which Israelis or non-Israeli Jews have any contact with the occupation, they must act in ways that delegitimize it.

We are speaking then of a struggle for the political consciousness and moral sensitivity of the Jewish people. There are two parts to that struggle: First, a rejection of the phoniness and false consciousness that parades itself as "the peace process"—a process which has as its aim to put forward procedural and substantive demands that will always ensure the inability of the other side to join us and reach a real settlement. The second struggle is even more serious: It is to let Israeli leaders understand that the crisis of legitimation about their role in the territories is explosive—precisely because it might eventually lead to a crisis of legitimation for the very existence of the regime in Israel. The focus of this struggle is not a debate with the Right, but rather an attack on the moderate Left and the apathetic Center who have been willing to go along with the public charade and close their eyes to the reality that all that is happening is a deepening integration of the territories into the reality of the State of Israel.

Yet this struggle will also have a very positive side—because it will give a message of hope to the many non-Israeli Jews for whom Israel as Master, Israel as Arrogant, is not their Israel. There are many Jews, both in Israel and around the world, who lose sleep over the vision of an Israel with a lust for power, the Israel that scorns the moral values of democracy. For many of these Jews, the very creation of a loud voice in Israel that struggles to delegitimize current Israeli policies will be the basis for their ability to increase their identification with the State of Israel. Far from losing the Jewish people, it is the very way that we shall regain their attachment.

So let us turn to consider the two channels of the struggle to delegitimize the occupation.

DISENCHANTMENT

Before we talk to our adversaries we must sober up from certain delusions. The first relates to our image of the Israel of the nineteen years from 1948 to 1967 as the embodiment of all our hopes and desires, as a model society to be recovered. That Israel, if it ever existed, is lost forever. Similarly, we must rid ourselves of the repertoire of misleading political concepts whose proper context is that lost, promised land. Among these concepts are "safe and recognized borders," "political compromise," and even "the Jordanian op-

tion"—whose possibility and attractiveness fluctuate with Hussein's moods. As for the current hot topic on the political agenda—the "International Conference"—we must evacuate the hot air from the trial balloon floated by Foreign Minister Peres. The conference has more names, nicknames, code names, and epithets than there are people who truly believe in it. Whether one speaks of an "international forum," or an "umbrella," or an "opening," or a "first step"—all the effort surrounding Peres' latest initiative (as of March 1987) is intended to do no more than give the process a name. Naming the event has become itself a happening that replaces the real event, whatever its name. And, as always, we are left with much thunder and lightning and pomp and circumstances, all the empty theatrics that convert political action into a display of rhetoric.

Peres, from consideration of internal politics, wants to demonstrate that he is providing momentum to the wheels of peace; but those very same political considerations prevent him from finding the courage and force to define the content of the process, by stating explicitly that the essence of a settlement can only be the partition of Eretz Israel between the Jewish state and a Palestinian state, both independent. Only in making such a statement and politically fighting for the concept behind it would Peres have any chance of propelling the peace process forward.

It should be clear that we must stop talking about the "peace process." This term is no more than a glib way of designating a series of diplomatic events staged more for the media than for changing reality. We should instead speak of a gradual process of reconciliation. Rather than invent a process of images, or the image of a process, we must shape the start of a real historical process. Israelis must begin acting in Gaza and Nablus, and not only, or mainly, in Paris and Washington—and not even in Cairo.

The delegitimation of the current peace rhetoric must be accompanied by clear political vision, which would find expression in a vocabulary drawn from a different discursive framework. Considering the historic process, one should concentrate on a gradual waning of the struggle for Eretz Israel, on a slow rapprochement between Jews and Palestinians, on a step-by-step easing of the points of friction. We must once again discuss the partition of the country. This is the one political principle for which there is no alternative. All the rest—"Jordanian option," "border rectifications," "autonomous areas," "demilitarization"—are simply means to achieve this aim, ways to attain a gradual relaxation of the conflict; and, as such, they are all subject to negotiation.

The partition of the country should not be according

to any historical partition plan, nor according to the Green Line, which in this respect is no more sacred than the borders of the Promised Land. The two decades of occupation and settlement, the changes in the face of Jerusalem, the growth of terrorism and of military forces in the region, should all be reflected in the new partition plan. Perhaps we should henceforth speak of partitions, in the plural. The most realistic solution may be a series of overlapping partitions: areas of sovereignty, demilitarization, and military presence; a separation between municipal administration and central government; a distinction between citizens and residents who hold the citizenship of a twin-country (and the concomitant option of granting citizenship to non-residents). In other words, there is no reason why the partition of the country into two sovereign political entities must coincide with its division into areas of military and police presence. And the relationship between municipal and central government in the particularly sensitive cities—Jerusalem, and perhaps Hebron—need not be the same as in other places. Jews should be allowed to continue to live in certain districts within the Palestinian state without holding its citizenship, while the Arabs of Israel should be entitled—if they so desire—to give up their Israeli citizenship in favor of Palestinian citizenship, without leaving their homes in Israel. All these divisions and distinctions—and others that may prove expedient—should evolve as part of a comprehensive and lengthy process, which will gradually bring about a measure of trust between the parties and lead to eventual co-existence with mutual respect and equality.

If Israeli society openly and avowedly becomes one of conquest, if dominion over another nation becomes an accepted state of affairs, we Israelis will have to . . . choose then between trampling on the freedom of others and a life of exile.

The partition of Eretz Israel, in accordance with its different national elements, is essential and represents the only realistic chance of achieving peace and eliminating the dictatorial domination of the Palestinians by the Jews. The proposed partitions would still the conflict between the opposing national entities but not annul their differences, would neutralize the mutual threat but not uproot the sources of that threat. We must not consider such a partition plan as our final destination. We must not allow the Israeli Left, because of the

distressing burden of the occupation and the Left's ever-increasing feelings of guilt, to sanctify the national state and become the flag-bearer of national separatism. Today, in the Eretz Israel of 1987, the segregation of the two nations, Jewish and Arab, into separate national entities is imperative. But we should not forget that it is a necessary evil and not our hearts' desire. The divisions we would build now must be designed with care and credibility, so that they can be torn down in the future. This may seem far-fetched today; but it is not impossible. Our children and theirs, or our grandchildren and theirs, may overcome this egocentric nationalism, the divisive, separatist, and xenophobic hatred that feeds on the antagonism towards the stranger. For we must bear in mind that the combination of national and political independence is not a universal phenomenon, but the product of historical circumstances, a situation that is not essential, often even disastrous, and generally evanescent.

We have no reason, moral or pragmatic, to glorify this combination, or to consider it to be a political imperative *per se*. We should therefore regard the idea of partitions as a temporary expedient—however long it may last—preferable to years of peaceless occupation. We must conduct our campaign as if all options for negotiations are open, and simultaneously reject the inevitable permanence of the now two-decade-old Jewish dictatorship. We must resist acceptance of the status quo and choose rejection.

THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMATION

There is another aspect to rejecting Mastership, and the time has come to speak clearly and courageously on the subject. If the occupation is truly a fait accompli, it can be so without us. We should make it clear that we will not cooperate with a regime that has given up the search for peace and is not interested in eliminating the occupation. Our involvement in the Master-Servant relationship is temporary and conditional, and will not continue if the current state of affairs is allowed to become permanent, if the government stops looking for a way to put an end to it and seeks only for ways to legitimize it. We must organize to confront such a possibility, prepare ourselves to sever our connection with the systems and structures involved in the establishment, cultivation, and management of the Jewish domination over the Palestinian nation.

A straight line leads from the settlement of Jews in the heart of Hebron to the final solution of Kahana; a parallel straight line leads from not travelling across the Green Line to refusing to serve in the army. The refusal to serve—in the West Bank and

in the army in general—is the extreme position in a range of refusals, of which the other extreme is the modest and innocent act of withdrawal performed by the individual who refuses to cross the Green Line without an express order to do so. Many who follow this tack are thereby saying, “let me not be among you as far as possible, if only for the sake of my troubled conscience, since I have long since despaired of yours.” These sporadic acts—mostly the result of non-political and personal reasoning—should be arranged and ordered into new patterns of political activity.

The refusal to serve is merely a banner, a battle-cry, and in no way exhausts the options of the struggle. Just as freedom is stolen away hour after hour, just as imprisoning free men and women requires constant effort, intention, and organization, so too must the “No” be a continued affair, a deed constantly renewed. Like cooperation, which is a daily routine and almost self-evident, so must be our “No”: a daily routine, a permanent nuisance, an act repeating itself in continual deeds of disengagement from every possible arena of cooperation with the occupation—from trips in the territories to paying slave wages to refusing services to the settlers. Our “No” should become a way of thinking, a fixed mode of behavior. The day will not be long in coming when this “No” will find itself in confrontation with the forces of occupation. More deeds will be demanded in the future, and our “No” has the power to give birth to such deeds.

The Left’s refusal to serve is still a kind of participation. The refusal, along with other ways of avoiding cooperation with the occupation, is part and parcel of a political activity whose object is to give a clear sign. The refusal draws a border; but, unlike exile or mutiny, the sign comes from within. Beyond this line of demarcation no further agreement is possible. Beyond this line we rejectionists will not pass; we will not agree to cooperate with a society that resides on the other side. Were that society to trespass this border in a truly irreversible way, in a manner that leaves no hope, then we shall become—unless we become other people—exiles or insurgents. Exiles, I assume, rather than insurgents. That is, if Israeli society openly and avowedly becomes one of conquest, if dominion over another nation becomes an accepted state of affairs, we Israelis will have to decide whether it remains possible to participate in such a despotic and tyrannical Jewish society. We will have to choose then between trampling

on the freedom of others and a life of exile, between illusory perfection in a torn world and a schizophrenic existence elsewhere, without sovereignty, without political responsibility, for the sake of our nation, and without participation in an unending evil. The moment of decision is getting closer: This is what is signalled by the refusal. This is what makes it so urgent and so essential.

The refusal makes this sign to *us* as it does to our adversaries. That is, one who opts for refusal is a symbol to all the unwilling participants who still cooperate. S/he is a symbol to the conquerors and bystanders that the social order is crumbling, that the wholeness of the Land can be obtained only by sacrificing the wholeness of the People. Even those on the Left who condemn this refusal must admit that the objector is needed as a warning sign, an alarm. Without the objector, the struggle of the Left—in the corridors of power and in the streets alike—will remain a heap of toothless words. Let leftist politicians criticize the objectors if they must—their attitude may be understandable in the context of their own, narrow political struggle. But let them know full well, along with our opponents on the Right, that refusal is the only arrow left in our quiver. Today the number of objectors is small, a sop to the conscience of the others on the Left who still cooperate. But if this difficult hour passes, and the general direction does not change, a darker hour will come, and refusal itself will seem to be too much of a token, too inadequate.

As long as permanent occupation and the disintegration of Israeli democracy take place, so too must the refusal to serve in the army. The Zionist Left must recognize this refusal as a corollary of withdrawal and non-cooperation. More than that: The Zionist Left should support this action, even if its majority believes that the time has not yet come to disobey orders. Our “No”—however expressed—is not only an effective weapon in the struggle against the Right; it is also the only way open to us to live as moral human beings in this country.

For Americans who support us, this is the time to speak out, to challenge other American Jews who wittingly or unwittingly cooperate with the occupation. It is time to raise these issues whenever Jews are asked to give money, whenever tours are organized to Israel, whenever institutions and organizations invite speakers who cooperate with the occupation. □

In Defense of Settlement: An Interview with Professor Yoseph Ben-Shlomo

Tikkun conducted this interview in Jerusalem in the Spring of 1987.

TIKKUN: Can you expound on the essentials of your philosophy of history, and show how two events—the Holocaust and the Six Day War—fit into it?

PROFESSOR YOSEPH BEN-SHLOMO: I won't talk about the Holocaust. It is too early to relate to that event, and I object to attempts to interpret it. The Satmar Rebbe's explanation of the Holocaust as a punishment for Zionism is disgraceful. Nor do I accept the interpretation by Zionist circles that the Holocaust played a dialectical role in the establishment of Israel. I think it's too shallow-minded.

Don't forget that only seventy years after the great catastrophe of medieval Jewry—the expulsion from Spain—the first spiritual reaction took shape. Lurian Kabbala was a great success, it dominated Jewish mystics, and this was because it represented a metaphysical expression of the historical event which was the expulsion from Spain. The expulsion was reinterpreted into a voluntary self-contraction of God's presence in the world—a divinity that expels itself. Yet R. Isaac Luria makes no explicit reference to the expulsion from Spain, not even a single word. Compared to the Holocaust, the expulsion from Spain was a trifle. Do you expect me to respond appropriately to the Holocaust only fifty years later, while some of the victims are still living among us? So I won't talk about the meaning of the Holocaust.

One can understand history in two ways: as a continuity of events succeeding one another in time—the descriptive and analytic attitude of the historian—or as a process of meaning and laws. The latter I call historiosophy, the great innovation of Judaism. It is historiosophy, including the Messianic idea, that marks the Western Judeo-Christian culture that grew out of the Bible. Ernest Renan, for example, viewed the philosophy of history as the great achievement of Judaism. Even Sartre, at the end of his life, said this about the Messianic idea.

Professor Yoseph Ben-Shlomo, a leader of Gush Emunim, teaches Jewish Philosophy at Tel Aviv University. He was a student of Gershom Scholem and is one of the prominent intellectuals of the Right in Israel.

Unlike the Greek and Roman historians, the Bible was "weak" in historiography. In a manner that looks "provincial" it ascribes central importance to events that are marginal in the history of the ancient East. Deutero-Isaiah, for example, describes all the conquests and wars of Cyrus in Babylon as leading to Cyrus' proclamation that Jews may return to Zion. Historiographically, this is absurd. After the fact, however, it seems that Isaiah was right: of everything he did, Cyrus will be remembered in human history as the man whose proclamation made the Return to Zion possible, and thereby Christianity, and the matter is well known. Events such as the Exodus or the Hasmonean rebellion were local, and left no mark on the historiography of their time. The Exodus is not mentioned in any Egyptian document. But these events are of supreme importance in history. Even opponents of Judaism such as Nietzsche admitted as much.

But the Bible does have historiosophy. That is, it understands events according to inner laws and meaning. This is an idea running directly from the Bible to Marx, and it is not by chance that a doctrine phrased in this manner was not produced by the great civilizations of China and India. The perspective that history is a fulfillment of certain precepts reached China from the West, and ultimately from the Bible, via its secular incarnations in Hegel—who still phrases his creed in a pseudo-religious way—and Marx.

In such a view of history, contemporary events affecting Judaism must also be given meaning in historiosophy. In principle, this includes the Holocaust.

It is self-evident that there can be different meanings, insofar as there may be different historiosophies. The ascendancy of Zionism, for example, is perceived differently by Marxists and Zionists. However, Zionism itself did not have a philosophy of history; even Ahad Ha-am did not have one. Marxist Zionists such as Syrkin and Borochoy are exceptions. Zionism had a positive role in their Marxist historiosophy. The anti-Zionist Marxists believed the Jewish people were at the end of their role in history, and would be obliterated through the world revolution. The Bolshevik Revolution, it has been argued by many, was but a secular-cosmopolitan incarnation of the Jewish Messianic idea, and it is therefore no great wonder that the presence of Jewish Marxists in the Bolshevik elite—from Rosa Luxembourg, to

Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and others—was immeasurably greater than the proportion of Jews in the population.

All Jewish historians, except for A. I. Kook, and, to a certain extent, Buber, rejected Zionism on philosophical grounds. Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig view Judaism as a faith of the spirit that needs no political fulfillment. Consider Cohen's famous pronouncement on Zionism: "These people want to be happy." Since they cannot be happy, according to Cohen, Zionism is doomed to be a passing episode. American philosophers such as Salo Baron and many East Coast Jewish-American authors think the same way. Saul Bellow, Bernard Malamud, and Philip Roth all stress the element of an outsider perspective in Judaism. This has to be taken seriously, because these attitudes are enjoying a great revival today.

One Left Hegelian philosopher who became a portender of Zionism is an exceptional example in this context. He is Moses Hess, a socialist and a teacher of Marx. In his book *Rome and Jerusalem* he contends that a world center will develop in Palestine that will once again bring the Good News to the world, as did the Bible and Jesus. Hess views the return of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel as a matter of world significance.

TIKKUN: What about Martin Buber?

BEN-SHLOMO: Although he favored the establishment of Jewish institutions in Palestine, Buber objected to the establishment of a state. Only A. I. Kook reserves a place for Zionism as an element of substance in a comprehensive system that embraces the interpretation of the relationship of God to the world and relates this to contemporary events.

TIKKUN: Do I understand that you consider yourself a disciple of A. I. Kook?

BEN-SHLOMO: Absolutely. If his doctrine is correct, then the process clearly did not end with his death, and his disciples continue to understand subsequent events in the spirit of his teaching. The Holocaust and the Six Day War (which is a direct continuation of the War of Independence) are part of a dialectical process preceding Redemption, a progression of precipitous descents and broken paths—three steps forward and two steps back, as Lenin said. This is neither militaristic chauvinism nor simplistic optimism. It is an interpretation that follows a philosophical system, as do Marxist, and Hegelian interpretations.

TIKKUN: Since you've mentioned Hegel, he holds that the identifiable and intelligible stage of the process has already ended, whereas in contemporary Orthodox

Judaism, the emphasis is placed on active involvement in history.

BEN-SHLOMO: Certainly. "The owl of Minerva flies at dusk," and the historian who describes our era has not yet been born. For anyone who accepts Hegel's doctrine, every action is a gamble whose results will become apparent only in the future. You believe you know in what direction things will develop, and you go with it. Man cannot sit on the sidelines altogether; he is an active historical creature. If you don't believe this, you are neither a Hegelian nor a Marxist, and you do not even belong to the Judeo-Christian tradition, for this is the idea that makes the tradition distinct from that of Oriental civilizations (which I do not disparage). Here, too, Jews depart from the Greeks. For Aristotle, man is a *political* creature, but in Judaism man is an *historical* one.

The problem of the relation between the "lawfulness" of the historical process and the freedom of man participating in it is not particular to A. I. Kook's historiography; it perturbs every Marxist, and is not substantially different from the general problem of freedom of the individual (in the metaphysical sense): some things are permanent, and others can be changed. The Sages were puzzled by the contradiction between two terms applied to Redemption: "speedy," and "in due time" (cf. Isaiah 60:22). They resolved it as follows: "If they merit [it], [the Lord] will speed it. If they do not merit [it], it will [occur] in due time." The historical process can be accelerated or slowed, but natural law is objective and acts on its own. As Hegel emphasized, understanding the logic of a process plays a positive part in the process itself.

TIKKUN: Can one discuss and predict the substance of Redemption?

BEN-SHLOMO: It's impossible to describe Redemption concretely. There are, of course, literary visions: "Every man under his vine and his figtree," or "And they shall beat their swords into plowshares." But there is no point in trying to prophesize; it is not even fair. In any event, visions of Redemption are always the Biblical-classical ones. Most important of all—from the Bible through Moses Hess to Gershom Scholem and Buber—it is clear that the Jewish people have a special role in the process; they are a chosen people. The idea of chosen people can be interpreted in contradictory ways. Franz Rosenzweig, a man of the most profound philosophical thought, takes this idea, adds Hegelian and Existentialist considerations, and arrives at a rejection of Zionism—whereas Buber lauds it. Sartre, too (and I deliberately mention names that are not suspect of primitive religiosity), understood by the end of his life the need for a "singular people"—a

historical entity with the special avant-garde role of causing fermentation. This typifies that trend in modern Judaism (alone) that the literary critic B. Kurzweil called "anti-destiny." One can argue as the writer Hazaz does in *Ha-Drasha* (the Sermon): "I'm sick of being chosen and afflicted; there is no Jewish history, let's go out and play soccer." This is how early Zionist thinkers like Berdyczewski and Klatzkin—not Ahad Ha-am—looked at the matter, and this is how Israeli politicians like Abba Eban or Amnon Rubinstein think. But there is no ignoring the idea of a chosen people, and anyone who understands it does not confuse it with racism. One reason is that one of the basic elements built into the idea as early as the Bible is an added measure of suffering, not of benefit.

The problem, as I said, is that modern perspectives in Judaism do not view the State as part of the fulfillment of the chosen people idea, but rather as something of a contradiction to it. Only A. I. Kook thinks differently, and he is religious and Orthodox. Hence the anti-Zionism of American Jewish thought, and what is left of Jewish thought in England and France. For this reason I'll follow the coming issues of *Tikkun* magazine with interest. Perhaps they'll provide a new perspective in this field.

TIKKUN: I understand that in your view Zionism has not come to an end; it continues to exist, and its most conspicuous manifestations today are found in Gush Emunim.

BEN-SHLOMO: Not only in Gush Emunim, but in anyone who views Zionism both ideologically and practically and not just pragmatically. Gush Emunim does stand out, because it surfaced at a time—1973—when Zionism was in the doldrums. It is a matter of pioneerism. It was not confined to Gush Emunim alone; it embraced the entire "Greater Israel Movement," which represented non-Orthodox people and included not only a man like Uri Zvi Greenberg—a great poet who was labelled a "Fascist"—but great luminaries of the spirit like Alterman, Agnon, Hazaz, and Dob Sadan, as well as a political leader like Tabenkin and the Ahdut ha-Avoda Movement.

Individuals like M. K. (Member of the Knesset) Shulamit Aloni and Amnon Rubinstein view Zionism pragmatically—a movement aiming to set up a state like all other states. Not an Albania, to be sure, but a Denmark. But the fateful question is why bother to establish a state like Denmark, when one can live in Denmark. We all believe in democracy, freedom, justice, and order, but these are pan-human values, not Zionist ones. You can't persuade a Jew to leave the country he's living in and come live in Israel on their basis alone, for in such a perspective Israel forgoes its Jewish

uniqueness.

This is the "normalist" trend in today's Judaism, and it is leading back to the territorialism of Herzl and Pinsker. "It doesn't matter where the Jewish State is established," they said. "We'll take Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel) wherever we go." They look on Eretz Israel as a random piece of land that serves the State of Israel.

TIKKUN: I believe we can now turn from historiography to history—to the events themselves.

BEN-SHLOMO: The turning point was the Six Day War. I would like first to stress the importance of May, 1967. While waiting for the war, many *sabras* underwent a psychic upheaval—identification with Holocaust Jewry and determination that "It won't happen here." Suddenly the peril of annihilation was in the air, and a decision was taken: even if we are killed, we won't return to Auschwitz. May, 1967, added a historical dimension to the *sabra's* mindset, as well as an existential comprehension that we have no one but ourselves. There are other memories, too: George Steiner sitting on the sidewalk in London waiting for Israel, Rimmon Aron saying he wouldn't want to go on living after Israel was no more, and Arthur Rubinstein telling Piatagorsky, "Come, let's die with them."

There were leftists who didn't think kindly of the victory from the very beginning. George Steiner said "So sorry we won." But spirits really did soar at first, and the Six Day War was understood as an important stage on the way to Redemption. Very quickly, however, the process of erosion with regard to Eretz Israel and Jerusalem began to set in. The erosion does not stop at the Green Line. When you begin to doubt our moral right to Judea and Samaria, you can only agree with Professor Dan Meron and Professor Haroshovsky, who doubt the very justice of the War of Independence and our right to be here. Alterman makes the point beautifully in his last poem, "Thus Spake the Devil." The Devil realizes he cannot vanquish the nation by direct means, so he decides to infect its heart with gnawing doubt, causing it to forget that justice is on its side.

Those who forget justice is theirs in Hebron go on to forget it in Galilee—and certainly in Jerusalem, too. M. K. Yossi Sarid said it in so many words. The "occupied territories," as the world defines them, include not only Kedumim, where I live, but neighborhoods in Jerusalem such as Gilo and Ramat Eshkol! Half the Arabs in Galilee and the 100,000 Arabs in Jerusalem—we are lording it over them, too, against their will. The poet Wieseltier says "When the Arabs reach the shore of the Yarkon, then I'll pick up a rifle and fight them." But why stop them at the Yarkon? Why not Jaffa? If you have no right to Hebron, you have no right to Jaffa;

it's a question of ethics, not politics. I have not yet heard any serious answer to this argument, which seems infantile. Why is the Jews' "right of distress" valid in Jaffa and not elsewhere? If the essence is lacking—that Eretz Israel is your homeland, not the Palestinians'—you're just as much a colonialist in Jaffa as in Hebron! Does the Palestinian have to hand you his homeland—Jaffa, Beersheva, Acre—because there was a Holocaust?

You can sum it up in one sentence: what happened in the Six Day War was either the liberation of territories in Eretz Israel or the beginning of the "corrupting" occupation. Only time will tell which of the two proves to be correct. I believe in the former and have rational arguments on my side. The arguments of the other side can be adduced in Abba Eban's article in Vol. 1, No. 2 of *Tikkun*. He uses the same arguments and tone about Eretz Israel that Chamberlain used about Sudetenland in 1938.

TIKKUN: There are general social processes associated with the occupation, and they cannot be swept aside by calling it "liberation." I'm referring to the side effects of the occupation: anti-democratic phenomena, moral weakening of the army, a Jewish underground that emerged in the territories. I believe you should relate to the profound discomfort in Israel, the feeling Emanuel Sivan calls "colonialism with a bad conscience."

BEN-SHLOMO: Let's differentiate. If people feel bad because they're dominating a foreign people, Jaffa and Jerusalem should make them feel just as bad as Hebron does, and what such a feeling means is that Zionism is rooted in error. Respectable people hold this opinion, but it is simply anti-Zionist. As for the rest, I definitely agree with you. If the phenomena are not brought to a halt, the State of Israel will be laid to waste just as the Second Temple was. If the erosion does not stop, Hermann Cohen will have been right, and Zionism will have been a passing episode in Jewish history.

The fundamental error in your question is that it obfuscates the distinction between issues of personal ethics (like attitudes taken toward the Arabs who live in Shechem and Hebron) and the issue of our historical right to Shechem and Hebron. On the personal level, it is unethical to drive an Arab off his land. But that was done by the Hashomer Hatzair kibbutzim, not by Gush Emunim. Arabs were driven away in Jaffa and Abu-Tor, not in Kedumim! The personal side—the fact that I will not expel an Arab from his home if he does not endanger me—is obvious. But I'm speaking of parts of my homeland, which I am entitled to incorporate into my state; and I have every right to expel anyone who objects to this and compounds his objec-

tion with terror. Is it conceivable that an Englishman would part with Wales or Scotland for the sake of peace with the separatists?! The example of Sudetenland applies to the defense aspect of the problem, while the Wales example applies to the ethical side.

True, these are not pleasant matters, but if you do not understand that they are the birth pangs of a homeland, you are an out-and-out colonialist. The French were colonialists in Algeria, but not in Marseilles. Beating up or throwing out an Arab is not "colonialism with a bad conscience," but pure and simple thuggery. But this is precisely the point. If you agree that this is an occupation, then it certainly is, and behavior follows suit. If you do not believe that the Israeli army in Hebron is an occupying force, you object to Jewish acts of thuggery. For this reason, Rabbi Levinger, a leader of the settlers in Hebron, is a leading opponent of Kahane. He understands that if he wants to live in Judea and Samaria, he must relate to his Arab neighbors as human beings and citizens.

The thought that the occupation ends at the Green Line represents weakness of mind. The Arabs never said anything like this. They sing about returning not to Nablus but to Jaffa, and how "With blood and fire we'll liberate Galilee." Will they forget about the "plundered lands" once they're sitting in Palestinian Kalkilya, a stone's throw from Israeli Kfar Saba? Occupation prevails within the 1967 borders, too, and a concession would only elicit a greater hail of stones and bombs because it would prove that justice isn't ours. Occupation is just as unpleasant for a million Arabs as for 50,000, and after the pullback we'll have to beat up and throw out Arabs in Kalkilya. Those of "beautiful soul"—and I don't say that disparagingly—whose stomachs turn at the thought of these phenomena can only conclude as Hermann Cohen did, that Zionism was a mistake through and through. Some have indeed reached this conclusion. The only way to avoid unpleasant actions is to live in New Zealand (as the poet Dalia Rabikowicz writes). War, however justified it may be, and the patriotism that we still consider vital, involve unpleasant deeds—as long as Redemption has not arrived. I know that some of our best people, our best pilots and warriors, are leftists. They still think it possible to avoid the decision, to claim that occupation takes place in Hebron alone and not in Jaffa, and to create a normal state here. But the Jewish people is not a normal one, and Israel will never be a normal state! Gershom Scholem, who cannot be suspected of Gush Emunim affiliation, said: "I have never accepted the silly claim that the House of Israel is like all the nations."

I have a brother who's ultra-Orthodox. He gambles that the Jewish people can preserve itself the old-

fashioned way, the ghetto and self-sequestering way. He may be right. The ultra-Orthodox alternative is available now as always. True, statistics show that only three percent of the Jews are ultra-Orthodox, but M. K. Rabbi Shapira was maybe right when he said that these three percent are the ones who will survive. For the ultra-Orthodox Rabbi Shach there's no border problem; he objects to Zionist Tel Aviv as well, although you'll never hear him insinuate that we are an occupying or malicious people. He believes we ought to study Torah and wait for the Messiah. I do not accept the stance of Rabbis Shapira and Shach. I espouse the alternative offered to me by the historiosophy of A. I. Kook, and believe secularism is part of the dialectic process of history. You on the Left fail to understand that the only serious and reasonable option you still have is the anti-Zionist one, the position of Hermann Cohen or Franz Rosenzweig. It's a serious position! I have yet to hear serious arguments for an in-the-middle stance of the kind you're trying to adopt.

This is no abstract theoretical discussion; these are the visible facts. Retreat from Zionism is a psychic process, and the psyche has no "green line." We must ask ourselves: When did Zionism ever take the Arabs into account? Take, for example, the establishment of the Etzion Bloc, or settlement of the Beit Shean Valley. Those were genuine incursions into the heart of settled Arab areas (and a price was certainly paid; almost all the Etzion Bloc settlers were killed). It was the essence of Zionism. The only reason for settling there was that there were no Jews there. These reasons, ideology and security, are valid today, too, for Gush Emunim. Ethically speaking, I simply don't understand the claim: Jews settled in Hebron, twenty-nine were slaughtered in riots, so Jews aren't allowed to live in Hebron today? Pragmatically speaking, anyone who believes the Arabs will forgo the "plundered lands" when they're sitting in Kalkilya is the real "oddball mystic." If the erosion process goes on, the Palestinians will vanquish us, and rightly so. History knows no mercy, and we are collapsing from within.

TIKKUN: Gush Emunim criticizes the emptiness and materialism that the Left imported from the West, and professes to offer an alternative. In particular it criticizes the quest for instant solutions expressed in the name "Peace Now." Do you share this criticism?

BEN-SHLOMO: Peace Now is made of individuals. Some of their best people are extremists about instant solutions in the sense you mentioned, and some are not. Politically, Peace Now is just as "now-ist" as Chamberlain at Munich. Why this historical short-sightedness? The Swiss, the Dutch, the Yugoslavs, the Greeks—all of them needed centuries to attain peace.

My basic contention is that man is not a creature contained in his present reality (a "now-ist"). By nature, he has a tendency to transcend himself. "Man searches for meaning," as psychologist Victor Frankl writes. As for simple people who are not artists or men of spirit, one of the great ways of infusing life with meaning is, of course, religion. I cannot argue against Peace Now by claiming it is a "now-ist" movement, but I can contend positively about Gush Emunim that it offers an alternative—not necessarily a religious one—to that cultural "now-ism" you mentioned, an alternative to stand alongside ultra-Orthodoxy, or Marxism, or Fascism.

TIKKUN: Territorial compromise is not necessarily a "now-ist" solution. Surely one can claim that the process may take decades or centuries, but that the only conceivable solution, when it comes, is compromise—a partitioning of Eretz Israel.

BEN-SHLOMO: One can certainly argue that way, but I have summoned arguments that demonstrate why the path you're proposing is highly dangerous. Now the burden of proof is yours: why will the Palestinians give up the idea of conquering the "plundered lands" once they get a state in Judea and Samaria? You will have to justify risking another war, this time fought within the 1967 borders.

I've got a solution, and here I represent myself alone. I do believe in territorial compromise. I am willing to forgo three-fourths of Palestine—Mandatory Palestine. That is: Transjordan. I'm not referring at all to Biblical Eretz Israel. The historical connection to Amman is not as deep as to Hebron, and I am willing to make a concession in hopes of gaining peace. The Palestinian people were born in fraud, but a successful fraud. Today there is a Palestinian people, and we will know no quiet until a Palestinian state comes into being. Well, let it arise in Jordan. Perhaps in a vast country, at a healthy distance from Jaffa and Jerusalem, and helped along by their own internal disputes, the Palestinians will finally leave us alone.

But the discussion is purely theoretical. I have no doubt that the victory will ultimately be yours, men and women of the Left, and that will be a sorry day for us. Victory is yours because the Left dominates all the instruments of education and communication. Lies like "Settlements are supported at the expense of development towns" have become common currency in the development towns. Almost all the educators of this generation are on your side. The lie about the Palestinian people has become real, the Zionist malaise deepens, and, with it, so does the world's pressure and the temptation of peace. In the end, everyone will be ready to relinquish Judea and Samaria, probably to Hussein.

The only legal basis we've got is the 1947 partition borders, and I'm convinced we'll find ourselves in a dispute about the 1947 borders "in order to prevent war, in order to spare the blood of youth." And then—in the inevitable war—we'll either reach the end of the line or reconquer Judea and Samaria (and perhaps Sinai, for the Egyptians may be tempted to get off the fence in such a situation). Then, perhaps then, we'll sober up.

TIKKUN: The idea that the Left is about to triumph is surprising. Any thinking person on the Left will express the exact opposite. Look at Benvenisti's conclusions about the processes of integration between Israel and the territories. Look at the *de facto* partition between Israel and Jordan of spheres of influence and control in the territories. Look at the growing numbness of the Israeli public toward the occupation and its ethical price. Just as you ask me to argue against the risk of war, you've got to explain how we can avoid becoming the South Africa of the Middle East.

BEN-SHLOMO: We'll find ourselves within fifty years in South Africa, even inside the Green Line. The same demographic forces are at work there, too. If faith in Zionism is dead, the State of Israel is a lost cause in any case. There's no way of knowing. The indications are not good, I know: Jews are leaving South Africa for Canada and Australia, not for Israel, and Western Jewry is showing no sign of a spiritual awakening. But if fifteen years ago someone had said that 170,000 Soviet Jews would settle and acculturate themselves in Israel, he would have been thought insane. The same problem existed in 1947: how could you declare a state with a million and a quarter Arabs and 600,000 Jews? "There was a miracle," said Moshe Sharett, "and the Arabs fled." You can't rely on miracles when you plan, but as Ben-Gurion said, in our history a total realist is simply a pessimist.

I, like Benvenisti, believe we ought to annex the territories. Ethically, all the Arabs in Eretz Israel should be given the right to vote. They'll have equal rights if they have equal duties. They'll pay taxes, and if they cannot serve in the army, they'll do national service and pledge allegiance to the Israeli flag, just as every American citizen pledges allegiance to the American flag. It's a risk I've got to take, and I believe in the inner dynamic of the process. Just as there are now fourteen Arab Members of Knesset today—although there should be more according to the proportion of Arabs in Israel's population—so the Jewish majority will not be undermined if the territories are annexed. Some Arabs in Judea and Samaria would certainly prefer to

leave voluntarily, rather than suffer the unpleasantness of pledging allegiance to Israel. I am willing to help them. The ones who remain will be a minority that can be lived with, on condition, of course, that there is aliya. It's the same gamble we took in 1948.

TIKKUN: Do you consider it a reasonable gamble?

BEN-SHLOMO: I consider it less risky than the pragmatic rationale. Furthermore, your gamble involves the erosion of the whole Zionist idea.

TIKKUN: Your gamble involves the erosion of the values of ethics and democracy.

BEN-SHLOMO: Please, argue with *me*, and do not mistake me for Kahane. I, like M. K. Geula Cohen (of the right-wing "Tehiya" party), favor suffrage for the Arabs in the territories. Then there's no ethical problem in pledging allegiance. The plan is obviously part of an overall rubric including a Palestinian state in Jordan. I am the one who is considering the Palestinian problem, and it is clear to me that it won't be solved with Hussein. If so, the idea that we'll augur peace by making a concession to Hussein is irrational. The gamble on Sinai was justified not only because the security risk was less, but mainly because there are no Palestinians in Sinai, and the dispute is with Egypt. Giving up Sinai was admittedly a security risk, but Judea and Samaria are a historical risk.

I am aware that the issue here is one of basic faith and a gamble. Both of us are gambling. Do not depict me as a gambler and yourself as standing on solid ground. That's not how it is. I can argue with Hazan (the venerable leader of the Zionist Left), who says, sure, Hebron is Eretz Israel, my heart bleeds, but I'm willing to give it up for peace. But Abba Eban in his latest article (in *Tikkun* Vol. 1, No. 2) doesn't discuss Eretz Israel at all. He doesn't even argue with human beings, but with imbeciles in need of medical care. I am no imbecile, and in terms of philosophy I'm no less erudite than he is. This is my claim: I'm definitely capable of seeing myself on your side, but you are unwilling to see yourselves on mine; you dehumanize me. Of course Gush Emunim has its primitive types, but you have them too, and the Bolshevik Revolution is judged by Lenin, not Stalin. You [the Left] are in error by not dealing with Gush Emunim's stance at its best; it's a stance that deserves deliberation on its own merits. You of all people, who try so hard to see things through the other side's eyes, who are capable of identifying even with Arafat, are not prepared to consider our side—and it's a great pity. □

Torah Versus Gush Emunim: The Impact of Occupation on the Heart of Judaism

Moshe Halbertal

Religious politics underwent a great change in the years following the Six Day War. Until the war, religious Zionism's leaders were considered partners in an historic covenant with the Labor movement—to a large degree with the movement's dovish wing. Haim Moshe Shapira, National Religious Party (NRP) leader during those years, worked closely with Moshe Sharett in the latter's struggle against Ben-Gurion's tougher positions and definitely reflected the moderate line in Israeli politics.

Today, after a protracted process, religious Zionism is politically an inseparable part of the rightist camp. It was the NRP's support of the Right that tipped the scales in 1981 and permitted the Right to form a coalition, and the NRP's rightward tilt today keeps the Alignment (the Labor Party coalition) from building a narrow-based government without the Right.

It is not my wish to trace the twists and turns of national religious politics in the last ten years. The political propensities of the Right indicate that something profound has occurred within the religious camp. No one reacts as quickly as a politician to new developments affecting his potential voters. My major concern is the profound change in the way Israel's religious camp understands Judaism. What has happened to Judaism during the occupation? How has it coped with the piercing questions the occupation raises for Israeli society?

To understand the deepest levels of the historical process unfolding in our very midst, we must understand this central fact: the sovereign State of Israel has put Judaism in a new situation. After two thousand years, an organized Jewish community has a monopoly on the use of force in a defined geographical space.

Nevertheless, it is not true that Zionism marks the Jews' re-entry into history. Rosenzweig was wrong in his claim that Diaspora Jews were above and beyond the dimension of time. Diaspora Jews, throughout their history, participated in political struggles, negotiated, organized their communities, distributed funds, and collected taxes. They contended with each other for

positions of power in the communities; their leaders formulated "foreign policy" toward the surrounding powers, displaying no small measure of sagacity and political cunning. Their religious judges and legalists drew up ground rules of legitimacy and illegitimacy in distributing economic resources, sharing the burden, and internal political struggle. They also attempted to define the community's relationship with the dominant gentile authorities: Were their laws valid? May a Jew apply to their courts, and, if so, when? What must a Jew do when suing or being sued by a non-Jew? The claim that the Jews have no political tradition because the Jews' politics were conducted by others is a manifest distortion of history which expresses either an idealization of Diaspora Jewish existence for those who extol apolitical existence, or an attempt to belittle Jewish existence in the Diaspora. Many Zionist thinkers minimized the Jews' actual power in the Diaspora, suggesting that the Zionist revolution would revitalize the Jews as flesh-and-blood actors in history rather than them being silhouettes lurking in the dark corners of human activity.

So the new situation facing Judaism, particularly after the Six Day War, does not suddenly create the first opportunity for Jews to embark on political activity. Its uniqueness is in creating the possibility of being politically active from a position of strength, with available means of using it. In the balance of power between Jew and gentile, the tables have been turned. How do religious Jews in Israel describe this situation from the point of view of Jewish tradition? How do the bearers of this tradition respond to it?

Judaism is not an atemporal system of values. It is not immune to historical changes. The interpretive question is not necessarily which new concepts one should adopt in order to face the reality of the present. More importantly, and even before new concepts are adopted, one should determine what in the rich body of traditional concepts and values has become central—which concepts have been invested with new meanings and which ones marginalized. We are dealing with an orthodox religious consciousness that introduces change only through interpretation, without breaking with the tradition in face of changing realities.

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Interpretive work, however, may be a vehicle of change much more radical than what publicly purports to be a revolution. Jewish religious consciousness never gets rid of the old but calls upon it in order to authorize and legitimize the new. It is in this spirit that I will present and criticize the religious Right in Israel and advocate an alternative leftist view.

One of the important changes affecting religious Zionists since the Six Day War—particularly after the Yom Kippur War—is their transition from a minority defending their own interests to a group that sees itself as providing leadership for the whole nation. Prior to these wars the religious public had been on the defensive, with a political arm that functioned as a pressure group for the protection of the minority rights of the religious community. The religious were not interested in great national questions such as foreign and defense policy, they did not aspire to leave any special religiously oriented imprint on these issues, and certainly they did not view themselves as pioneers and trailblazers.

The . . . danger of this kind of ideological position is . . . the excessive confidence that stems from the actor's conviction that the wheels of history move by a predetermined plan—his own.

After the Yom Kippur War—to no small extent because of disappointment with the inability of the non-religious to register an easy victory as it had in 1967—the religious Zionists began to present themselves as potential leaders in all areas of life. They set for themselves the mission of settlement, established Gush Emunim, and launched a struggle aimed not at religious dietary and marriage laws but at shaping Israel's foreign and defense policy. The clearest indication of this was the establishment of the Tehiya Party, the first to bring rabbis and nonreligious Knesset members together to work toward objectives other than those of the narrowly religious lobby. The religious lobby's willingness to take responsibility for national concerns was a positive development in and of itself, although, in my opinion, the specific policies advocated went in the wrong direction. The turnabout forced National Religious thinkers and politicians to frame a Jewish policy in more inclusive terms and generated a significant internal dispute over political ideologies that emerged from alternative readings of Judaism. This major controversy was argued out between the religious Right—Gush Emunim—and the

religious Left—Netivot Shalom. The dispute was most clearly focused around three philosophical issues: messianism and the use of power and its politic, the sanctity of Eretz Israel, and relations of Jews and gentiles in the State of Israel.

The Six Day War and the occupation of territories led to an awakening of a messianic view of Zionism among the National Religious. In this view Zionism, the establishment of Israel, and the liberation of Jerusalem, Judea, and Samaria are perceived as pivotal stages in an inexorable, deliberate process ending in a final Redemption. Thus understood, the establishment of Israel and the Six Day War are religiously significant because they signify stages in an inexorable cosmic historic process leading to an impending Redemption. The participants in this religious process are doing its bidding, though they may not be aware of this and may even have meant originally to act against the very process. For this reason, even the secular *halutzim* who rebelled against Jewish tradition were—unknowingly and dialectically—part of the process. Such a point of view legitimizes cooperation with secular Zionist actors, since they, too, however unknowingly and unwillingly, are instruments by which a great messianic future will be brought about. Although Jewish tradition is imbued with messianic tension, phrasings such as those of A. I. Kook, which were adopted by the ideologues of the religious Right, represent an innovation in messianic doctrine originating in the Hegelian school of thought which espouses the intrinsic wisdom of the dialectical progression of history.

The State of Israel in the eyes of these messianists is important neither because it offers Jews a safe haven nor because it permits independent Jewish prosperity and development. The State is significant because it is part of the Redemption process. This stance does not preclude ordinary political activity; it rejects the Neturei Karta argument that forbids a mass immigration into Eretz Israel until the Redeemer comes. On the contrary: Because it is not a matter of a continuity of supernatural processes but one of real history, the practitioners of political action are sure that history is marching with them. Thus political activity is not paralyzed but spurred, as we see in the Marxist counterparts of deterministic historical messianism.

The intrinsic danger of this kind of ideological position is not the passivity it induces but rather the excessive confidence that stems from the actor's conviction that the wheels of history move by a predetermined plan—his own. Messianic politics of this type lack the existential sense of danger that sometimes motivates people to recognize the need for compromise. When Israel signed its peace treaty with Egypt, many Israelis who identified with the religious Right viewed the treaty as a retreat from the process of Redemption.

Yielding territories meant abandoning the fruits of the Six Day War and setting the wheels of Redemption several years backward. To those who believed, as Gush Emunim adherents did, that present-day history is by necessity the beginning of Redemption, anxieties about unending wars that lead to a peace treaty with the largest Arab state had no impact. They were protected by "insurance" from a different world, because they knew the secret of the Master of History, who had given them a promise from which there is no retreat.

A stark example of Gush Emunim messianism was the underground's attempt to blow up the mosques on the Temple Mount, with the conscious intent of provoking Armageddon—to advance Redemption by force. Two elements in this messianic escapade are conspicuous: willingness to bring the danger of war upon an entire people in certainty that the secret of history is one's own and the all-or-nothing mentality typical of messianic movements. This underground action was an outburst of the sublime passion to advance Redemption speedily in the belief that a partial human effort that fails to resolve all the questions is pointless.

The messianic motif is not new to Judaism. What is new, for religious Jews, is the attempt to actualize that messianism through political action. Messianism becomes a force that directs the political actions and practical world view of religious Jews. The sober element in Judaism, the halachic view of life, has taken a back seat as the Messianists have escalated their search for Redemption. As a result, our ability to assess our real situation coldly and clearly has been gravely undermined.

Judaism itself may be said to bring two contradictory temperaments to the whole issue of great historical processes: the restrained and ironic halachic temperament and the messianic temperament in which various signs arouse great hope. The following story illustrates the differences between them. Just after the Six Day War, a pupil of one of the great halachic authorities of our time asked his rabbi for a religious response to the Six Day War: Why not abolish Tisha B'Av (the fast mourning the destruction of the First and Second Temples)? The rabbi answered by citing the *baraita* (para-Mishnaic dictum) describing the miracle of the vial of oil and establishing Chanukah as a universal Jewish holiday. The *baraita* ends as follows: "The next year (i. e., a year after the miracle) they designated these days as days of feast and praise." Why did they not commemorate the miracle immediately? Why wait a year? The reason, the rabbi continued, was that one should not exult over tremendous historical events immediately; one should wait a year to see what comes of

them. Thus this master of halacha dampened his pupil's messianic fervor.

Rabban Yohanan Ben-Zakkai said something similar: "If you're told the Messiah has come and you have a sapling in your hand, plant the sapling and then greet the Messiah." To the rabbi of our anecdote, the State of Israel is religiously significant not because of the messianic future it augurs, as it were, but because of its present-day contribution to the lives of flesh-and-blood Jews. History, to him, is not a collection of signs announcing the progress of inexorable processes. This is not his concern. His concern is the present, the here-and-now, and if the State of Israel provides a place of refuge for persecuted Jews, that's quite enough.

"If you're told the Messiah has come and you have a sapling in your hand, plant the sapling and then greet the Messiah."

Rabbi Hayyim Brikser once said that saving lives takes precedence even over the advent of the Messiah. Human life is not grease for the wheels of the Revolution, even if the Revolution makes big promises. Great historical processes should be monitored constantly by routine, prosaic, ethical judgment. Even if the withdrawal from Yamit was a retreat in the process of Redemption, the possibility of saving lives by preventing war is important enough to keep the Redeemer waiting.

In the post-1967 Religious Zionist camp, however, the messianic temperament overcame the halachic one. Judaism is increasingly perceived not only in terms of anticipating the Messiah but of life in a messianic epoch. Religious Zionism's struggle for a perspective on Judaism in this context is a tug-of-war between two historiosophical outlooks concerning the meaning of the State of Israel and between two attitudes toward Redemption as it applies to the significance of Israel in the overall progression of history—and the ramifications of both in shaping Israel's foreign and defense policy.

Messianic politics also undermines traditional Jewish attitudes toward the use of force. Victory in war, the necessary use of force in the Six Day War, expansion of the territory held by Israel, and the national pride accompanying all these were converted by resurgent messianic consciousness into clear indications of imminent Redemption. National achievements were identified with cosmic processes. Generals and war heroes became saviors and harbingers of the Messiah.

The religious Right does not view the use of force as a necessity thrust upon the country and justified only for reasons of survival. Gush Emunim, which imputed religious significance to military victory, cannot relate to that victory functionally—as an accomplishment that doubles as a bargaining card to be played, in due course, in pursuit of other objectives. Nor can Gush Emunim engage in deep, pointed criticism of the deleterious effects of the use of force. If the army belongs to King Messiah, who propels the juggernaut of history to its final destination, how can anyone question its ethics? (After Sabra and Shatilla one of Gush Emunim's spiritual leaders said that Arik Sharon should not be subjected to investigation because he is a "savior" of Israel.) It is precisely on the issue of force, the central one for post-1967 Israeli society, that Judaism can and should perform a restraining function.

Biblical political thought at every stage fears the hauteur of force. In restricting the king's prerogatives, Deuteronomy 17 means to prevent his "act[ing] haughtily toward his fellows . . ." (v. 17). The tradition of clashes between prophets and kings abounds with paradigms of piercing criticism of wielders of authority, and, at times, inveighs against so-called "national interest" in its narrow sense. Nothing compares with the Prophet Nathan's rebuke of David after Uriah's death in undermining national morale, but national morale is not Judaism's major concern, as many on the religious Right believe. Yannai out-performed all other Hasmonaean kings in expanding the borders of the Jewish commonwealth, but the Sages never considered him and his success the beginnings of Redemption—and the criticism leveled at him by Shimon Ben-Shatah is well known.

The religious politicians' reluctance to investigate matters like the Shin Bet affair (when two Arab bus hijackers were summarily executed) because of "national security" ironically clashes with the traditional Jewish suspicion of unrestrained power and unwillingness to make pragmatic compromise with its use. Conferring a messianic dimension upon the state's institutions and representatives mitigates the traditional Jewish tendency to monitor the use of force. Politics built on a Jewish foundation had good cause to take up a critical, restraining, and even suspicious position vis-a-vis the bastions of power, thereby carrying on a long and glorious tradition of Prophets and Sages. Instead, the messianic wave has sanctified those bastions of power as instruments of Redemption.

I now proceed to the second axis of the dispute—the question of the nature and consequences of the traditional Jewish belief in the sanctity of Eretz Israel and Greater Israel. The minimalist approach views the

land's sanctity as a fact that commits a Jew living in Israel to additional commandments, i. e. those in effect only there. When the Talmud says, for example, that sanctity is "suspended" from a plot of land belonging to a gentile, it means that priestly portions and tithes are not taken from fruit and vegetables grown on that land. To sanctify an object in this restricted sense is to say that special duties accrue to a Jew with regard to it, just as a synagogue is holy because one may not use it as a shortcut. The sanctity derives from these special obligations, not from metaphysical essence present there.

There is another interpretation of the sanctity of Eretz Israel, a broader one that attributes a special metaphysical status to the land. It says that the Divine presence is stronger in Eretz Israel than elsewhere. Rabbi Judah Halevi, one of the outstanding exponents of this approach, holds that prophecy can be given only in Eretz Israel because only Eretz Israel is imbued with the Divine presence. Interestingly in this context, Maimonides disagrees: The People Israel has no prophets in exile because the conditions of subjugation in exile prevent proper spiritual development, not because of any metaphysical change in the quality of the venue. This is a functional explanation, free of reliance on assumptions about the geographical presence of God.

Rabbi A. I. Kook is the successor to the metaphysical tradition with regard to Eretz Israel, although he adds many concepts from the world of modern romanticism—chiefly German Romanticism, especially the Volkist stream. In his view, a people and its land are organically related. In such a relationship, a confluence of nationality and the special nature of the geographical location shape the nation's correct development. Romanticism's rebellion against the Enlightenment for having detached man and nation from organic natural life now undergoes a Jewish reincarnation in the form of the innate, spiritual attachment of the people and land of Israel. This attachment is built not on mere accumulated historical memory, but on natural intrinsic associations that catalyze a great revival of national life once the nation returns to its land.

With this as a backdrop, ideological circles in the religious Right relate to the withdrawal from the West Bank as to the amputation of a limb, an assault on the living flesh. The metaphors of the relationship of individual and collective are organic, as are those of the relationship of people and land. The importance of the size of Israel's landholdings is measured neither by defense advantages nor potential in future negotiations. Eretz Israel is not negotiable, just as people do not offer their hands in negotiating the repayment of a debt. The question of whether the land is

settled by Jews or Arabs with different national identities is immaterial, for we are speaking of inner, spiritual attachments beyond the empirical and the visible.

The occupation elevated the romantic-organic attitude toward land to the center of religious consciousness. Halachically, settling and possessing Eretz Israel have become imperatives for which death is preferable to betrayal. Land is something one does not hand over, because the people's collective psyche and essence depend on possessing it. Something new has entered the relationship of the people and land of Israel: a recent halachic innovation by which relinquishing territories is forbidden *even* where lives are on the line.

The spiritual question is not how much land is held but how well and how ethically the community lives.

The halachic roots of this premise are dubious in the extreme. The Talmud rules that only three prohibitions must be honored at the price of death: idolatry, familial sex, and murder. Neither the Talmud nor the halachic authorities mention yielding up territory in this context.

The dispute within religious Zionism between Gush Emunim and Netivot Shalom begins at the level of normative halachic jurisprudence. At this level, Netivot Shalom asserts unequivocally that life is more sacred than Eretz Israel. Faced with the bitter reality of the occupation as it corrupts the nation's collective soul, it claims that Israel must jettison romantic fantasies of an innate harmony of people and homeland. The spiritual question is not how much land is held but how well and how ethically the community lives. Turning Greater Israel into an end that sanctifies all means is an enslaving, dangerous form of geographic idol-worship. In view of Gush Emunim's metaphysical-romantic attitude toward land, Netivot Shalom adheres to a theological stance that regards the attribution of intrinsic sanctity to inanimate objects, including Eretz Israel, as idolatry.

The third and most important axis on which the occupation is making an impact on Judaism is the issue of relations between Jews and gentiles. The fact of ruling a large non-Jewish population places the question in a new and painful light. The traditional halachic question of whether a Jew may live in non-Jewish surroundings has been turned on its head. In today's Jerusalem, rabbis frequently rule on whether non-Jews may live in a Jewish neighborhood. The inverted question reflects a similar reversal in the historical situation. As with many questions, we search Judaism in vain for

a uniform, clear attitude toward the non-Jew. The literature is rife with contradictions and inconsistencies. We read that "Man is beloved, for he was created in the image of God." Hence the absolute worth of all persons, Jewish or not. Then we read: "When a person dies in a tent ... (Numbers 19:14) you [Jews] are called 'person,' and the other nations are not called 'person.'" Here the concept of "person" is restricted to Jews alone.

One view holds that a Jew may freely lay claim to property stolen from a gentile, and another view considers theft from a gentile worse than theft from a Jew. In contrast to the universal proscription of murder in Genesis 9:6—"Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed ..." R. Shimon Ben-Yohai said it was permissible to kill gentiles. Against the attitude eschewing neighborly relations with gentiles for reasons of separatism, the Mishna rules that "[Jews] should furnish the needs of destitute gentiles with destitute Jews, should console gentile mourners with Jewish mourners, and should visit ill gentiles with ill Jews, for reasons of peaceful relations." The contradictions persist in other fields as well, wherever relations of Jews and non-Jews are concerned.

The internal tension within tradition on the question of relations with gentiles places the burden on the interpreter who must rule on the practical questions. He cannot hide behind quotations, for every quote has its counter-quote. One can find broad justification in Judaism for discrimination against gentiles, especially when dominated by Jews.

However, conversion of halachic discourse shaped by a Jewish community *under occupation* into the language of an *occupying* Jewish community is very risky business. Kahanism and parts of Gush Emunim have put tradition to this kind of use, sometimes with malice and distortion. The argument for driving Arabs off their land because Joshua was ordered to expel non-Jews from Eretz Israel turns the struggle against idol-worship into a national struggle between Jews and Arabs. Bear in mind that no account regards Muslims as idol-worshippers. The biblical command to expel the "seven peoples" from Eretz Israel rests on their being idol-worshippers. According to the Bible, Eretz Israel cannot tolerate idol-worship, including that of Jews. Mutating the struggle against idol-worship into a war on non-Jews in Israel is an example of a nationalist reading of the biblical account.

The existing tension within tradition shifts the question from the traditional halachic statement to the halachic authority's conscience and the values that guide him in choosing among the available texts—a selection he must make in any case. The occupation has provided the practical possibility of dredging up the

entire demonic element in Jewish tradition with respect to the *goy*, such as the prohibition set by certain halachic authorities against renting apartments in Jewish neighborhoods to non-Jews. But the occupation also provides the possibility of invoking and expanding the opposite motif in Judaism itself. To recast the face of Judaism along such lines at this time of trial, we need courageous, ethical halachic jurisprudence.

We must broaden the theme that the image of God is in every person and establish that as the basis for the attitude halacha takes toward the non-Jew. We need halachic judgment audacious enough to use meta-halachic concepts, because the existing concepts in tradition cannot adequately address the ethical difficulties thrust upon us by the new situation. Such a move, too, has a precedent in tradition. The Palestinian Talmud tells of pupils of Shimon Ben-Shatah who sought to further their rabbi's livelihood by buying him a donkey from a non-Jew. A precious diamond was found on the donkey, whose former owner did not realize the jewel was missing. Shimon Ben-Shatah instructed his pupils, who were jubilant over the find, to return the diamond. The pupils resisted: "We learned that even one who forbids the possession by Jews of property stolen from a gentile allows us to possess something the gentile has lost, with no obligation to return it. Halachically, then, we do not have to return the diamond." Shimon Ben-Shatah's terse reply: "Do you think I'm a *barbarian*?" Shimon Ben-Shatah rejected the halachic norm by resorting to a non-halachic concept—the idea that he might be a "barbarian." When we launch into halachic discussion of relations with gentiles today, we dare not forget Shimon Ben-Shatah's rhetorical question.

The State of Israel and the Six Day War created a new situation for Judaism. Judaism was caught unprepared; it had no well-formed, clear tradition by which it might cope with the attendant problems. This means that the questions are unresolved, and that the Jewish

norms to contend with them are in fact being created almost out of thin air in this very generation. The question is not only how post-occupation Israeli society will look; an equally important ideological struggle is taking place among the religious that will determine the spiritual face of Judaism. The fact that we are in a new historical situation with respect to a tradition largely fashioned in the Diaspora and under foreign domination, and the fact that tradition has many faces—notwithstanding the attempt to present it as monolithic—makes interpretation the decisive issue. The dispute is not over what Judaism has and has not got, what is authentic and what is "imported," but—within its abundance of inner tensions and contradictions—which motif will take over as the dominant and normative one.

The leftist religious outlook can be accused of the sin generally attributed to humanistic and liberal traditions: that it dispossesses the faith of its radical, passionate nature, replacing dedication to a great vision with a compromising, rounded-off stance. Indeed, in the dispute between the religious Right and the religious Left, the Left relinquishes the great historical myth of messianism and the essential organic relationship between the people and land of Israel. As captivating and enchanting as the great historical dramas and fantasies produced by this messianic myth may be, their translation into political coin claims a price in blood and in ethical self-destruction. The religious Left, manifested in Netivot Shalom, embodies a proposal for a radical Jewish politics built primarily on Jewish tradition: critical of the use of force and uncompromising toward any worship of force or soil. At the level of Jewish intellectual creativity, the religious Left offers an opportunity for a renaissance of interpretation in Jewish political thought, which has rested on its laurels for years. Finally, in political terms, it presents a religious challenge in the never-ending struggle for the vision of Israeli society as "a kingdom of priests and a holy nation." □

An Extra Pair of Eyes: Hebrew Poetry under Occupation

Hannan Hever

1.

I came upon the following lines in a recent poem by the Israeli poet Uzi Bahar:

*A land where you need an extra pair of eyes
To see beyond this everyday.*

Writing about Hebrew poetry within the context of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip demands that one find an extra pair of eyes able to see beyond the concealing blur of daily routine to the deeper structures of an occupying culture. The experience of the occupation, its terminology and symbols, have become part of the Israeli landscape, not only for those who, like Meron Benvenisti, see it as an irreversible process, but even for those who still hope for the day when Israeli society will free itself from the burden of the occupation.

The closing of a college, the imposition of Draconian punishments on children for the crime of rock-throwing, the destruction of the homes of those suspected of throwing grenades, the banning of hundreds of books in the occupied territories, the arrest of an artist for using the forbidden colors of the Palestinian flag: such everyday news items, if they appear at all, are reported under the separate category of "news from the territories" and buried in the inside pages of the newspaper. If one steps out of the flow of events to look at daily life in Israel from a more distant perspective, one discovers that the ideology of occupation has almost completely penetrated Israeli society.

As long as we stick to the Jewish elements of the Israeli population, all the actors seem to be playing their roles quite nicely in a wonderfully regulated system. The Israeli public has grown accustomed to hearing the strongest protests against the occupation with patience and indifference. Many have learned that such words, even when spoken by government officials or Knesset members, have no practical implications, for no one intends to pay a real political price for them.

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Membership in organizations that passionately condemn the occupation, or participation in illegal and violent demonstrations are acts that do not usually entail extraordinary risks. On the other side of the coin we have the continued oppression of the Palestinians, the lawlessness of Jewish settlers on the rampage in private militias, and the moral legitimization of the Jewish terrorists now gradually being released from prison with the tacit agreement and encouragement of most political elements in Israel.

Economic considerations lead many opponents of the occupation to purchase lower-priced apartments offered in areas beyond the Green Line. And this is only one of the ways in which most Israelis, regardless of their political views, have benefited from the changes in the economic and social structure of the State of Israel brought about by the occupation. For some time Israeli public discourse has adopted and taken for granted a kind of congruence between distinctions of class and of nationality; the Arabs, of course, comprise the major source of low-income manual labor in Israel. The economic interest in perpetuating the status quo is thus another factor contributing to a discourse which sustains and is sustained by the ideology of occupation.

That such statements have already come to sound hackneyed, like stale axioms engraved on rhetorical coins worn thin from use, is but another sign that Israeli public discourse has already absorbed a wide variety of political and ethical possibilities. This flexibility has allowed it to remain true to its own hidden assumptions while maintaining a balance between the exigencies of a harsh reality and the persistent Israeli yearning for normal existence.

The Lebanon war sought a way out of the stalemate over the future of our political relations with the Palestinians through overt military aggression. In doing so, it revealed some of the linguistic defense mechanisms intended to soften and cover up the contradictions threatening the peace and integrity of Israeli society. A complex "Orwellian" language was invented to lend an aura of legitimacy to the well-known plan for changing the geopolitical structure of the region by putting an end to the political existence of the Palestinians. A good example is the label "Peace in Galilee," the official government name of the war. The fight against this

slogan was one action in a more general campaign waged, with varying degrees of success, against a program of ideological deceit and the manipulative slogans which served it. This was undoubtedly a crucial hour for Israeli discourse, which drew critical counterfire from the Israeli media.

2.

It was during the Lebanon war that Hebrew culture undertook a major offensive, with broad-based support, in an effort to develop a poetry of protest against the war. This poetry can be characterized as a campaign of sanctions to counter the governmental distortions of the collective symbology of the nation.

Because the Lebanon war was a highwater mark of the era of occupation, the poetry written at that time can be seen as a touchstone for the culture of the occupation. Yet, the common tendency to identify Israeli protest poetry with the poetry of the Lebanon war is a kind of optical illusion. For example, Zvi Atzmon's poem "Yizkor" (the name of the traditional prayer for the dead) was published at the height of the Lebanon war, but was written about half a year earlier, in the spring of 1982, at a period of maximum repression in the West Bank and Gaza under the direction of then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. In his poem, Atzmon tries to restore the original value, distorted by recent history, of some of the most fundamental political and cultural symbols of Israel:

*In the Land of Israel the Jewish people arose
Who had been exiled from their land by armed force
and made into plunder
And were persecuted, and suffered, and were sold into
slavery, and expelled from France, Portugal, and
Britain,
And wandered north and south, to Yemen and the
Ukraine; Morocco and China and Iraq, Greece and
Poland and Germany;
Raped and beaten, burnt with fire, drowned, they
sanctified their religion.*

*And the revenge of each little boy shall cry out to them
And suddenly
They got up in the morning and saw
They got up in the morning and saw
Children shot as the sun rose
And real blood this week, not a story,
Arab children, with no half-consolation.
In the Land of Israel the Jewish people arose
From their two-thousand-year history
And as long as I have a soul in my inmost heart: I stand
accused!*

(This poem abounds with ironical allusions to national symbols; the beginning of the last line, for example, echoes verbatim the opening line of the Israeli national anthem.)

Many people, to be sure, felt that bluntness, hyperbole, irony, and sarcasm, as seen, for example, in the poetry of Atzmon, were unavoidable in a situation where the written word, no matter how biting and corrosive, is ultimately helpless to confront the horror of reality. There was an urgent need, given the systematicity with which the occupation wove its ideological web, for biting and corrosive language even at the cost of some injudiciousness. But irony, when applied to ideology or to the day-to-day aspects of the occupation, may itself fall victim to what it set out to oppose, and violate the very prohibitions it imposed on others.

As partial compensation for a certain deterioration in the fabric of daily life under the culture of occupation, we can observe in Israeli poetry an intensive utilization of the possibilities and rhetorical material inherent in the critical moral situation of the war. A. Eli's poem "Palestinians" will serve as an instructive illustration of this duality:

*He returned to the hill where once stood
His village, 34 years after its destruction.
"Here was the well ... here they came to draw water ...
There the house ... the fig tree ..."
And I thought of Ein Shemer where I was born and
raised
And where my children were born. Thirty years from
now
My son will come here, a refugee, diseased,
Droning: "Here stood the children's dormitory ...
Here the dining hall ... on the sidewalk I used to walk
Hand in hand with Daddy ... there was the great lawn
Where we played, until darkness enveloped us."
Where has all this vanished?
Where have they all disappeared?*

It was during the Lebanon war that this poem was at the peak of popularity. First printed in a periodical of the Kibbutz Ha'Artzi, it was later anthologized in two collections of protest poetry. The political context in which it was published gave it topical relevance, and it has been singled out more than once as an especially poignant expression of sensitivity to the suffering of the Palestinians during the Lebanon war. The choice of the word *hurban* (destruction) in describing the Palestinian perspective on the War of Independence (thirty-four years earlier) dips into the standard lexicon of Jewish history. This structural and linguistic analogy drawn between the suffering of the Palestinian and Jewish

martyrdom exposes *inter alia* the one-sidedness of official Israeli rhetoric, which trumpets forth the suffering of the Jews even as it reacts with deaf indifference when confronted with the Israeli role in the suffering of the Palestinians.

But Eli achieves something further in the poem: In drawing the analogy between the fate of the Jewish and Palestinian peoples, he inverts the arrow of time and points it at an apocalyptic future. The suffering we have caused the Palestinians will boomerang, returning to us in the form of a new wave of Jewish refugees. Even we, children of the Zionist renaissance, may one day find ourselves trapped once again in the endless round of Jewish martyrdom. The estrangement and baring of hidden assumptions suggested by the poem is in large measure weakened by the poet's attempt to take the consciousness of each nation at a particular historical moment and to present it as the eternal reality. As a warning against deafness in the face of the suffering of the Palestinians, both present (the Lebanon war) and past (the War of Independence), the poem recalls the past suffering of the Jews as well, and the possible return of that suffering within the foreseeable future (in only thirty years).

The sense of moral solidarity with the Palestinians includes a strong component of universalism, a potent and highly effective argument in the dark days of the Lebanon war. This reminder of the common humanity uniting Jews and Palestinians was without doubt a signal of fundamental importance at a time when the Israeli government, with the blessing of the majority of the Israeli public, considered a concern for the fate of the Jews to be the single acceptable criterion of "humanness." The Sabra and Shatilla massacres were, in Menachem Begin's words, only "Gentiles killing Gentiles." This phrase, and all the events underlying it, bespeak a profound corruption of language and conscience. Indeed, for a long time few Israelis could or wished to understand why it should be that the foundations were crumbling under them when nothing more was involved than "Gentiles killing Gentiles," with the Israeli army charged "only" with the responsibility of ignorance or passive semi-acquiescence.

But there is a cost inherent in answering this self-centered Jewish particularism with a universalism which equates a Palestinian refugee with a future Jewish refugee from Ein Shemer; the symmetry has a price which may have to be paid elsewhere. Both the total solidarity with the Palestinians expressed by the Left, and the total indifference of those who would slaughter Palestinians indiscriminately, rest ultimately on a universalization based on the *Jewish* condition; they ignore the role of Jewish responsibility in the *Israeli* condition. For all its

universalism, the speaker's voice in this poem cannot shake off the simple and decisive fact that he belongs to Israel, to the nation and culture of the conqueror.

The poem also illustrates the contradiction inherent in a people which continues to conduct its public discourse as if it were still a national minority, and yet conducts its life and public policy as the conquering majority which it is, in actual fact. To be an Israeli is not merely to be righteous or self-righteous about the suffering of one's forefathers, or the conspiratorial plots of the enemy. To be an Israeli is also to assume responsibility for the suffering inflicted on others by virtue of one's own political ascendancy over them.

The closing of a college, the imposition of Draconian punishments on children for the crime of rock-throwing . . . the banning of hundreds of books in the occupied territories, the arrest of an artist for using the forbidden colors of the Palestinian flag: such everyday news items are buried in the inside pages of the newspaper.

Unfortunately, to survive today as a Jewish state with a Jewish majority, while avoiding a revolutionary change in the geopolitical status quo, Israel has been driven to suppress the national aspirations of the Palestinian people. The Israeli is thus caught in a blatant and growing contradiction between his *Israeli* identity as citizen, and his *Jewish* identity as conqueror. But Hebrew culture must pay the price for this suppression of the Palestinians: alienation from its own authentic identity.

Despite the utterly different moral intentions involved, there is a structural similarity between Menachem Begin's facile comparison of Yasser Arafat and Hitler, with its indiscriminate equation "murder = murder," and the rhetoric of this protest poem with its comparison of the Palestinian victim and the Jewish victim. In both cases, the rhetorical appeal to the destiny of the Jews blurs the distinction between conqueror and conquered. In Eli's poem, the conqueror is portrayed ultimately as a suffering victim storing up sympathy for his own future suffering. He appears in the poem only as a mirror in which the conqueror contemplates his own face. In the final analysis, the poem succeeds in empathizing with the fate of the Palestinians only through empathy with the Jewish occupiers.

All through the poems of protest there is a vast wind blowing, a gale of moral pessimism—a pessimism made manifest in the cynicism and irony pervading the poems. And it seems, with only a few exceptions, that the sharper its expressions of political and moral condemnation, the further Israeli literature withdraws from any real dialectical confrontation with the identity of the Israeli as he actually is today. There is little doubt that a close connection exists between the pervasive tone of despair regarding Israel's future as an occupying power, and the relative lack of such introspection. A more dialectical representation of the "I" emerging in these poems would require a less emotional stance, a detached sobriety all too likely to undercut the speaker's confidence and feeling of well-being in his own moral position. Still another example of this can be seen in the political poetry of Yitzhak Laor, which includes some of the sharpest and most effective expressions of literary opposition to the war. At times it seems that Laor's relentless devotion, his zeal for the debate over the occupation, makes the poetry itself an important case study in coming to understand the price paid by a nation and culture of conquerors.

A straight line leads from the persona in the political poetry of Laor to Laor himself, who in one of his poetic-political articles labeled himself as a *samed*, the Palestinian Arabic word expressing a stubborn clinging to the land. This was the "third way" advocated by Raje Shahada, the Palestinian lawyer and leader, a middle way between the path of complete surrender and that of violent struggle.

There was an urgent need, given the systematicity with which the occupation wove its ideological web, for biting and corrosive language even at the cost of some injudiciousness.

Laor's alienation from himself is likely to alienate him also from his natural reading public: His total identification with the vanquished cancels the effectiveness of his poetry as an "inside" critique of Israeli public discourse, rendering it unlikely to influence public opinion at home.

This is appropriate background on which to consider Laor's poem "Ptui! I say to you, Ptui," one of the most piercing indictments coming from Laor's pen. Not coincidentally, the occupation and the Lebanon war are portrayed as components of a single continuum:

*In the cellars around Marmorek, as if guarding
"Ha-Bima," in the darkness until morning,
Twenty sleep in a cave the little Arabs the couch-grass of
Palestine
Refuses to shrivel. Every evening they wash the dishes
behind the restaurant
They sit on the sidewalk to rest you don't even see
them, the Tel Aviv air the evenings and the soot
They are out of place; let them go to the villages then
you'll see them*

*And in Berdichevsky St. too on Erev Pesach grandpa-
grandpa make the Passover Seder
In the modest guestroom under the electric light the
gold of the kingdom of Passover spills out
As in every generation one must so must they
With all the light and all the leisure and all of Jewish
history on the thin shoulders
Of the received text and the Zionist conclusion; and
their daughter comes too with the grandchildren
from the north of the city
In the North live the cousins of Muhammad from the
roof in Berdichevsky in Ein Al-Hilwa like flies
On a wound they have been gathering for ten months
already with no roof (and until this poem gets pub-
lished, if it gets published, a full year
Crowded like flies on a wound) with no house nor bed
nor garment nor holiday nor fighting man they sleep
The children right next to the mosque in which were
massacred 500 perhaps only 400 perhaps only 300
In the gunfire of this or that battalion Ptui! I say to you,
Ptui! battalion shmattalion
And the newspaper in brief reported how there was no
choice, and Hebrew literature from there to Hulda
said
Let's wait and see.
Now the mosque has become crumbs on crumbs, and
the children in the dust of Ein Al-Hilwa are match-
sticks on matchsticks, like cartoon characters.
...*

Perhaps surprisingly, this poem aroused the fury of Avot Yeshurun, one of the old guard of modern Hebrew poetry and one of the first to address in his poetry with real sensitivity and empathy the fate of the Arabs living in Israel. A short time after Laor's poem was published, Yeshurun responded with a sharply worded poem of his own, which was later included in his most recent book, *Homograph*. Laor had modeled his poem on Yeshurun's poem "Passover on Caves," written as far back as 1952. In this poem Yeshurun, with superlative caution and sensitivity, developed a blueprint for cooperation between the two nations occupying the same

(Continued on p. 122)

The Repair Shop

E.M. Broner

This selection is a chapter of The Repair Shop, a novel in progress which has just won a National Endowment for the Arts Award for 1987.

A young rabbi in a white caftan is walking uptown. It is a long walk from the hospital, one-hundred-and-fifty-blocks. When the rabbi has performed the Sabbath duties, the long trek commences, for from sundown to sundown the rabbi neither rides nor writes.

The rabbi is walking and singing.

No one notices the caftan or the shine of the satin yarmulke. It is another costume along the avenue. In the warm October air, the masqueraders are there: the Punk with miniskirt and Mohawk hair; the Poor, like corn husks in layers of clothing; the Chic, so thin they've lost their shadow.

Because there is a wake of thunder behind the garbage truck, because there is the bounce and boom of traffic over potholes, because a mad person is delivering a monologue, no one hears the rabbi's *nigun*.

Bi-dee-bi-bi-bi

Ai-yi-yi-yi-yi.

I lie down in peace

and I rise in peace

May the day of rest

be blessed by You.

On Park Avenue the rabbi discovers her horizon is cut off. There is only the Pan Am building, blocks of walking towards its entrance. The rabbi turns west on 23rd Street. On the corner of Sixth Avenue the rabbi, in horror, sees that a new high-rise is being built.

The rabbi says, "They're taking the Empire State Building away from us. They are removing it from view. They are removing the sun from midtown Manhattan. There will be no Northern constellations, no North Star. Flying towards the southern tip of the city, Santa Claus will slam his forehead against concrete and glass."

Uptown the rabbi's apartment is awaiting. Holiday has preceded the rabbi. The holiday dinner, *cholent*, has been simmering in the crock pot. There is a com-

mingling, a conjuring of liquid and juice, onions leaking onto the carrots, carrots softening in the juice of the brisket. When the rabbi will lift the lid of the pot, carrots will be pirouetting, onions twirling, a stringbean entangled in another.

So the rabbi has reason for song. And reflection on the day.

Working on an explication of text, on a *midrash*, the rabbi was looking out of the study window in the early afternoon, when a face appeared on the other side of the glass. The rabbi, deep in thought on the poetry of praising, looked into this face without surprise. Is it an angel? Who has a better right to peer in a window to see if all is in order?

It is a worker, caulking the windows of the building and painting the wooden window frame a bright green.

The worker is standing on his platform, homey in its conveniences. He has his can of Pepsi, a towel, his jacket hanging from a metal support, wire mesh to protect him, his brush, can of paint, caulking gun and pail of caulk.

"This too is wondrous," thinks the young rabbi. "All things are elevated. A workman has floated up to me or has floated down from the roof."

The worker taps, and the rabbi unlocks the window and raises it. The worker shoves the window up all the way, wipes his hands on an old shirt and steps over the new green sill.

Around the rabbi's neck hangs a magnifying glass. Through it the insignificant becomes significant. The eyes of the workman are enlarged, bulging. The hairs of his moustache and beard bristle.

The rabbi takes a step backward.

"Don't be afraid," says the worker. "I have news for you."

The rabbi has been filled with the news of the psalms. Recent tidings are of no interest.

"You will achieve greatness," says the workman.

The rabbi laughs. The rabbi's nose leaks. The rabbi is damp with laughter, eyes, nose, moist mouth.

The workman leans over and kisses the little rabbi on the mouth.

"You will be the founder of nations," says the dark-bearded workman.

"Out, out of here," says the rabbi, pointing in confusion to the door, then to the window.

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"I have something for you," says the window caulker.

He pulls a pomegranate from his pocket, flicks open a pocket knife and cuts into the fruit, into the crimson pulp which bleeds onto his hand, stains his hands as if he were a butcher. Startled, the rabbi receives the tropical fruit.

The worker departs across the sill, dragging his leg through the wet paint. He stands on his platform and signals. There is a whirr of mechanism and the platform is lowered a floor.

The rabbi places the pomegranate onto the desk. There are the perfect kernels, the grains of seed that leave a track, a trickle of blood across the rabbi's note pad.

"A *meshuganeh*," thinks the rabbi.

The *meshuganim* are nesting in doorways, stretched out at subway entrances as the rabbi buses downtown. The *meshuganim* are sleeping near public telephones as if they were in line to call in a message.

The rabbi arrives at the hospital. There are two post-ops to attend, a hysterectomy and a mastectomy. The rabbi attends the hysterectomy at her awakening.

The room is quiet, almost bare. A friend is there, a flower or two. This is not a well-known, a popular, a beloved patient.

The patient wakes up in pain more from life than from the knife.

"Who's here? Who's here for me?" cries Gladys.

"I'm here," says her old friend Peshel.

"Peshel? You're only a friend. Where's my family?"

"She doesn't mean it," says the rabbi to Peshel.

Gladys, under the influence of pain killer, sees the frocked figure.

"My God, it's a priest," she says, "come to give me last rites."

"No, no. I'm a rabbi."

"A freak. They sent me a circus freak," cries Gladys. "A woman dressed like a man."

"She doesn't mean it," says Peshel to the rabbi.

"They take away my babies. Now they cut out my womb. Next they'll slice off my breasts," says Gladys. She's beginning to be a kvetch.

"You've still got your tongue," says Peshel.

"So you think she'll want to light candles?" asks the rabbi. "It's Shabbos."

"Get out of here," yells Gladys. "Now she wants to set the room on fire."

The young rabbi sighs. It's a new box of candles, not one taken out. All the flames of souls are unlit, lying, waxy, in the box.

"She's on my list," says the rabbi, "so I'll see her again before she leaves."

"If you think you're drumming up trade for my funeral, forget it," says Gladys. "A hello at the bedside, a coffin, a Kaddish."

"She doesn't mean it," says Peshel, seeing the rabbi to the door.

It is a curious floor, obstetrics at one end and, at the other end, hysterectomies, the beginnings and endings.

On another floor there are the mastectomies, room after room of one-breasted women.

Mira is on the rabbi's list, a woman older than the hysterectomy. Mira's arms are folded across her chest, warming, cradling.

"What have we here?" Mira asks as the rabbi knocks and enters. "A hermaphrodite?"

"I'm the rabbi of the hospital."

"Well, you're something new," says Mira. "But you should know that, from long-standing and great reading, I'm not only a free-thinker but I'm a fundamentalist atheist."

"Oh," says the young rabbi.

"But if you want to state your business before you leave, please do," says Mira.

"Do you want to light Shabbos candles?" asks the rabbi.

"You light them, and I'll extinguish them," says Mira. "I don't hold with superstition."

Then, like a drawn shade, there is darkness across Mira's face. She turns away from the rabbi. Her hand gropes, wrinkles the hospital spread, grabs the corner of her pillow.

"Are you in pain?" whispers the rabbi. "Should I call the nurse?"

"They gave me the pills already," says Mira. "They'll take effect." She turns back to face the rabbi. "I'm too old to whine. I got to set an example."

The rabbi wipes Mira's perspiring brow. The rabbi smooths the cover. She smooths the back of Mira's hand. They are holding hands, Mira's big hand held in the rabbi's small one. They sit like this as dusk comes.

The rabbi wonders about her own life in the dusk of the day, if freelancing is the best way, with a part-time hospital job, the occasional bar- or bat-mitzvah, a wedding. Conversions are the most desirable, for, like piano lessons, they provide a regular income for a while.

She has gone for interviews with congregations.

"Why be a rabbi? Marry one," members of the Board of Trustees have advised her.

"Don't worry," says her supporter and mentor, Yohanan. "You're waiting for something special."

He should talk. He started out with a congregation in the Pokonos.

At an interview with a Dallas Temple, the rabbi was

asked, "Can you be rough? Tough? Act like a man?"

"What do you want," the rabbi asked, "a rabbi or a cowboy?"

The rabbi sighs. Mira releases her hand.

"What is it, child?" asks Mira.

At which, to the shame of the rabbi and the startlement of Mira, the most inappropriate action occurs. The rabbi lies her head across Mira's chest and weeps. Mira moves the rabbi's head gently off the incision, cradles her head, curls the end of the long braid around her finger.

"I thought you rabbis had nothing to cry about," says Mira, when the young rabbi has apologized and is wiping her eyes on a box of hospital tissues. "I thought rabbis danced all the time, like the Shakers, like the Whirling Dervishes. Dance and Sing. Natural rhythm. Al Jolson, the Jazz Singer, right? The *freilache*, singing Jews."

The little rabbi starts to laugh.

"Bobby Breen," says Mira, "Eddie Cantor, Dinah Shore, the lively Jews of my radio years."

"Bob Dylan, Simon and Garfunkle, Carly Simon," adds the rabbi.

"So what's the problem, maidel?" asks Mira.

"I have no effect," says the rabbi. "All that training for nothing."

"Oh, oh," says Mira. The pain again.

It subsides.

"Tell me one thing," says the patient. "What's the purpose of having a breast removed? Not that I need it. No one's suckled, no one caresses for a long time now. It wasn't so gorgeous but it was mine. Now I'm lop-sided, like one ear lobe, one nostril, one eye. What's the purpose?"

What can the rabbi answer?

"Rebbele," says Mira, "They're getting us in our tender places."



"Then we have to fight back," says the rabbi.

"Now you're talking," says Mira.

In that hospital, along the corridors, in the closets of towels and bedpans, at the desk with complicated bookkeeping, among the caps of different institutes of training, nobody realizes what is happening. This is not understood by the kvetch some floors down or her bed-sitting friend, not by Mira with the single breast, not by the little rabbi sitting on the edge of the hospital bed. They are all training to be Amazons. □

Potok on Roth

Chaim Potok

The Counterlife by Philip Roth. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1987, 324 pp.

Just when we thought we had seen the last of Nathan Zuckerman—the lode mined clean; the artist's anguished flesh raked to the bone—along comes *The Counterlife*, yet another addition by Philip Roth to the Zuckerman saga. And what a work it is—a jerking roller-coaster ride through the carnival landscape and distorting mirrors of a literary imagination on an apparent post-modernist romp, the air relentlessly pierced by those shrill and by now all too familiar Rothian voices.

Quite different from the basically realist mode Roth has written in before, this book at key points simply comes to a dead stop, contradicts itself, goes off in different directions, doubles back, shifts voices and tenses, comments on itself, and comments on the comments. Different, too, is the way Roth deals, for the first time, with specifically religious Jewish issues that are woven into the work and become part of its intrinsic form. *The Counterlife* is meta-fiction with a vengeance, and I was surprised at the pleasure it gave me, for I am not a fan of this brand of fiction. Reading it, I thought at times that Roth was gleefully engaged in a send up of Lawrence Sterne, Vladimir Nabokov, and that crowd. Readers of "normal" fiction take heed: hold tightly to your minds and hearts as you enter the startling upside-down world of counterlives.

A counterlife is the life you might have lived if you were a character in a work of fiction and the author had abruptly decided to change directions, reverse the plot, send you on a Pacific cruise in chapter two after having you decide you will remain faithfully in Nebraska with your wife and kids in

chapter one; return you to life in chapter four after killing you off in chapter three; or if you were someone in real life and you decided one day to leave the stifling ordinariness of family existence and take off for Switzerland with your hot, blond German-speaking mistress. A counterlife is a life lived counter to the life lived now, in fiction or in reality (the two realms are blurred in this book, as they are in much of modernist fiction, for don't most of us in real life constantly invent and reinvent ourselves much as authors shape characters). An author who deliberately cuts short a story before it is completed, contradicts it, leads it in a direction very different from where it was going earlier—that author is creating a counterlife.

In the first chapter, "Basel," Nathan Zuckerman's younger brother, Henry, a highly successful, respectable, philandering New Jersey dentist, has been rendered impotent by the beta-blocking medication he is taking for his bad heart. (In an earlier Roth story, "Salad Days," Zuckerman has an older brother.) Henry is advised by his physician that the only road back to sexual potency runs through the operating room. But the surgery might kill him. Is sex worth that sort of risk? It is for Henry, whose memories of past sexual dalliances with his dental assistant and a blond-haired beauty are vivid and remorseless. He takes the risk, and dies. The chapter ends with Nathan and various members of his family—some of them ranging from caricatures to grotesques—in attendance at Henry's funeral.

In "Judea," the chapter that follows, Roth abruptly alters his story line. Nathan Zuckerman is in Israel. For a while we are mystified as to the reason for his presence there. Then we learn that he has flown in from England, where he had gone to live with the lovely gentile English woman he had met and married in New York, and that he is going to try to talk his brother Henry out of his decision to

live in a West Bank religious nationalist Kibbutz and persuade him to return to his wife and family in New Jersey. Henry, it appears, survived the bypass surgery, experienced an arduous period of recovery marred by deep depression, and then astonishingly and to the consternation of all decided abruptly to remake his life by going off to Israel. Nathan Zuckerman's effort to extract his brother from his new world—his counterlife—proves unsuccessful.

A jerking roller-coaster ride through the carnival landscape and distorting mirrors of a literary imagination on an apparent post-modernist romp.

In the ensuing chapter, "Aloft," Nathan is returning to England in an El Al jet when he becomes involved in an absurdist, black-comedic, and futile hijacking attempt staged by a demented fan of his who claims that Zuckerman the novelist is his spiritual father. The aircraft security guards who foil the hijacking assume that Nathan, who was sitting next to the would-be hijacker, is an accomplice. Bound and stripped, he lies in a seat awaiting further interrogation as the aircraft, having been ordered back by Israeli security—they want to know how a gun and a grenade got on board—is returning to Tel Aviv.

In chapter four, "Gloucestershire," it is Nathan who is incapable of sex because of beta-blockers given him for his heart condition; it is Nathan who chooses to undergo heart surgery after meeting and falling in love with a married gentile English woman about twenty years his junior; it is Nathan who dies on the operating table; and it is Nathan's funeral that his brother Henry attends. And in the final chapter, "Christendom," Nathan's flight

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from Tel Aviv lands without incident in London (the hijacking never having taken place) and Nathan returns to his pregnant Gentile bride and her family. Then, apparently for the first time in his life, he discovers the brutal realities of overt anti-Semitism when he comes up against the xenophobic medieval English hatred of the Jews, almost always uttered in delicately soft-spoken and meticulously cultivated tones. In the end, Nathan Zuckerman, secularist *par excellence*, a man dedicated solely to his art, a Jew only by the sheer accident of birth, Zuckerman the universalist, Zuckerman the lifelong puncturer of traditional Jewish commitments and concerns—Nathan Zuckerman decided that he will have his future son circumcised. And there the book ends.

What are we to make of all this? And what, especially, are the specifically Jewish elements of the book—Israel, Zionist nationalism, gun-toting jingoistic Israeli rabbis, a lengthy argument for circumcision—all about?

All the standard ingredients of the Roth recipe are here: Jewish New Jersey in its stultifying bourgeois vacuousness; the artist hoist by the consequences of his art; obliging Gentile women; the obsessive preoccupation with sex; the flippant use of abrasive terms as commonplace language; familial loathing of the writer-relative whose stock-in-trade consists of the members of his family and their antic behavior. Nathan Zuckerman states, "As a writer I'd mined my past to its limits, exhausted my private culture and personal memories, and could no longer even warm to squabbling over my work." Yet the book shows no sign at all of exhaustion on Roth's part.

Roth's control is splendid. He manipulates the narrative so that we get to care about his people, and after each chapter he yanks his people away from us by an authorial sleight of hand. There appears to be no covenant here for consistency and coherence between writer and reader; with this book, you pay your money and you take your chances. The pace is frenetic; there is a lot of talk, whole blocks of talk; ideas are at times paraded before us in near essay form. What little dramatic action there is takes place somewhere offstage. There is something perverse about the structure of

this work, about the deliberately distorting way Roth is handling his material. Nathan Zuckerman urges us to believe that imaginative distortion is the heart and soul of fiction. In a recent interview, Roth argued that there was nothing modernist or post-modernist about this technique. That may be so; but there is certainly nothing traditional about the use to which it is put here. Repeatedly we are reminded that it is all merely a story—as if as modernists we did not know that; and that life, too, jerks us around all over the place—as if we did not know *that*. It all becomes a little too precious after a while—especially when Nathan Zuckerman's English wife decides to write herself out of the book. In the end it can be argued that Roth has committed the artistic fallacy of imitation.

And yet the book has a pervasive charm—in parts, an elegiac loveliness—that is quite surprising for Roth, whose cool, terse, efficient prose has not in the past—save in certain places in *The Ghost Writer*—given itself over to lyricism. Quite simply put, the writing in *The Counterlife* is remarkable. There is a keen sense of people, place, and dress; dialogue is exquisitely rendered; sentences are carefully rhythmized and densely textured; paragraphs are meticulously shaped; chapters are sculpted with care—the book is Roth wrought. Indeed, the book itself is as much about Roth writing as it is about the writing *angst* of Nathan Zuckerman. It is, sentence by sentence, a tour de force. And it is precisely the writing that saves it from being merely another modernist exercise in literary onanism suited more for academics who like their literature in the form of puzzles than for readers who want to be engaged by what they read and not merely titillated.

* * *

Few contemporary writers have been so intimately linked with their creations as Roth has been and few have been so virulently attacked for their writing. Asked about this some time ago, Roth replied, "Though some readers may have trouble disentangling my life from Zuckerman's, *The Ghost Writer*—along with the rest of *Zuckerman Bound* and *The Counterlife*—is imaginary biography, an invention stimulated by themes in my experience to which I've given considerable thought but the result of a writing

process a long way from the methods, let alone the purposes, of autobiography." John Updike once made the point that Roth was "inventing what looks like a *roman à clef* but is not." That genre easily encourages the reader to fuse (or confuse) author and book.

Much of the early furor about Roth and his supposed Jewish self-hatred appears to have diminished; the current generation of young Jews takes self-mockery with a greater measure of ease than did its wounded parents whose memories of Europe were still vivid and whose knee-jerk outrage over Roth's startlingly abrasive and comical manner was all too understandable.

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That same abrasiveness is present in *The Counterlife*, yet it seems somehow no longer to have its old cutting edge. Perhaps we've simply grown accustomed to it; perhaps it's the unusually fine writing; more likely, it's because it is balanced here by other elements: intelligent talk; serious issues involving Israel; the sudden experience of rabid, old-fashioned, Christian anti-Semitism (is England really as anti-Semitic as Zuckerman makes it out to be, or are we seeing Roth turn his dark eye upon the Christian world for a change?); and here and there touches of deep concern about family life, the raising of children, and commitments to old values. No serious writer can successfully make the long marathon run involved in the writing of a novel and not have in him at least some of the major elements of his main characters. It is wrong to think that Roth is Zuckerman. It is equally wrong to think that nothing of Zuckerman is in Roth.

Having made this point, we are not left with much, because the very structure of this work makes it more than

difficult to find in it an authorial voice. Indeed, we may well have here in a sort of perverse way an example of the perfect Joycean aesthetic: the artist distancing himself from his creation, paring his nails, and surveying his work in demiurgic fashion—cool, in control, giving equal time to all sides, molding and shaping with supreme objectivity his work of art.

Still, it is curious that Roth chose precisely this kind of work, with its highly quixotic mandarin structure, in which to introduce, for the first time in his writing, charged Jewish material. (Some of Roth's readers will no doubt be put off by that element in the work.) It is precisely this Jewishness that hints at the possibility that there may well be a hidden structure here, a scaffolding that undergirds the novelist's apparent tergiversations. The peak Jewish events in the book are Henry Zuckerman's decision, just before the middle of the book, to settle on a religious kibbutz in the West Bank, and, at the end of the book, the decision by Nathan Zuckerman to have his son circumcised. (Does Zuckerman/Roth know that a child by a gentile wife is not Jewish according to Jewish law and that circumcision in such an instance is of no religious significance? The book has many errors of this sort; small, niggling errors that set the careful Jewish reader's teeth on edge.) These events represent acts of an ultimate sort: a linking on the part of the brothers Zuckerman with the past and future of the Jewish people.

The Jewish material that Roth has chosen to write about here tells us something about him as a writer and thinker. The comedic mode works best on material that lies at the extremes of the human spectrum; it works with darks and lights and finds it difficult to deal with nuances.

Zuckerman can be placed on the stark moonscape of a West Bank religious kibbutz because there is Rothian grist in such a region for the way he, Zuckerman, is made to see the world. Interestingly enough, Zuckerman returns to his normal acerbic self (there is nothing sweet about Nathan Zuckerman [= Sugarman]; another Rothian joke) in green and merry Eng-

land only when he discovers its anti-Semitism; the lovely lyrical swath in the writing until that point is decidedly non-comedic and I don't know how

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land only when he discovers its anti-Semitism; the lovely lyrical swath in the writing until that point is decidedly non-comedic and I don't know how long it could have been convincingly sustained. (Is it really plausible that Zuckerman never encountered anti-Semitism in America? What are we to make of the anti-Semitic Army officer in "Salad Days"?) There is no way of knowing from this book whether Roth chose to present extremes of Jewish life because of formal literary reasons or because he is simply unaware that subtle, rich, life-enhancing nuances really exist outside those two ends of this novel's Jewish world: fanatic Arab-hating Israelis and the sudden desire by a totally assimilated Jew (in an unconvincing argument that reads like an essay in anthropology) to have his son by a gentile wife undergo circumcision. Those two Jewish events are integral to the book in that they are embedded in past and projected counterlives: Henry's on the kibbutz and Nathan's in England. For it seems as certain as anything can be in this Nabokovian whirlwind of a novel that Nathan Zuckerman will probably be a different sort of Jew after his son's circumcision from the utterly vacuous sort he has been before. "Circumcision confirms that there is an us . . . England's made a Jew of me in only eight weeks, which, on reflection, might be the least painful method. A Jew without Jews, without Judaism, without Zionism, without Jewishness,

without a temple or an army or even a pistol, a Jew clearly without a home, just the object itself, like a glass or an apple." One might reasonably ask what sort of Jew Zuckerman was before, if he is going to be this sort of Jew now. In any event, he appears to be heading at the end of the book for a new and heretofore unexpected counterlife: some sort of involvement with matters Jewish. But, given the peculiar twists and turns of this novel, one can hardly be sure even of that.

Roth has succeeded until now in disturbing us through the *content* of his work; now he disturbs through its *form*. The book is Jewishly naive and set at the edges of the Jewish spectrum, probably for purposes of comedic effect and possibly because Roth is insufficiently acquainted with other more subtle forms of Jewish life. It is not that Roth is self-hating, for he does not in this work objectify a projection of any particularly hateful sort of Jew. It's that he is unaware that there exists in the contemporary Jewish tradition a passion for moral acuteness and ethical sensitivity that is not the sole possession of its particularist Gush Emunim adherents on the one side, or Jewishly attenuated universalists on the other. Judaism is far more than nationalist religious Zionism, and clearly far more than intermarried universalists who are suddenly in love with both a Gainsborough England and ancient rites of circumcision.

I am left with a feeling of admiration for Roth's use of language and with a sense of bewilderment as to the book's *aboutness*. I have the distinct impression of having been taken for a ride, of having been fed the author's brain, and, in the words of Henry Zuckerman as he ransacked his dead brother's notebooks in order to remove from them any maleficent references to himself and his affairs, learned that "raw it tastes like poison." I am reminded of a comment once made by Jorge Luis Borges to the Puerto Rican artist Francisco Rodón in response to a question concerning his feelings about certain writers: "Contemporary literature is full of writers that know their craft very well, but that is all; in content they contribute very little." □

The New Protestant Ethic

Alan Wolfe

Mayflower Madam by Sydney Biddle Barrows with William Novak. Arbor House, 1986, 291 pp.

The Triumph of Politics by David A. Stockman. Harper and Row, 1986, 422 pp.

Trading Secrets by R. Foster Winans. St. Martins, 1986, 320 pp.

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism by Max Weber. George Allen Unwin, 1976. Originally published 1930, 292 pp.

Sociology, Robert Nisbet once wrote, is really an art form. Like Franz Hals or Honoré de Balzac, the great sociological theorists, he continued, were portrait artists. Max Weber, in particular, should be credited with implanting in our minds the ideal picture of the modern capitalist: sober, dour, hard-working, pious, respectable, in short, the Puritan divine writ large.

Something has happened to the Protestant Ethic. If recent autobiography is our medium, we find that the descendants of Weber's Puritans run prostitution services, lie to the American public, trade "insider" secrets on Wall Street in return for cash, have difficulty understanding the difference between right and wrong, are incapable of delaying gratification for long-term reward, and prefer simple rationalization for their misdeeds to complicated feelings of sin and guilt. Like capitalism, which once made things but now prefers to sell them, the Protestant Ethic that supports capitalism has changed.

The theme of Protestant uniqueness runs throughout these diverse accounts of politics, escort services, and Wall Street customs. Sydney Biddle Barrows, more commonly known as the *Mayflower Madam*, is a descendant of Elder William Brewster, one of the

religious leaders of the Mayflower expedition. Among her forebears were Peter Ballantine, of the beer business, and, on her father's side, The Philadelphia Biddles (one of whom fought Andrew Jackson over the Second National Bank and another of whom served as the liberal Attorney General during the New Deal). Although she grew up anything but rich, Sydney did have all the trappings of Philadelphia society: country day schools, a debutante ball, and a career in the fashion industry—until she found other work.

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R. Foster Winans grew up in Doylestown, Pennsylvania, attending Germantown Academy, getting into trouble, dropping out of college. Winans speaks very little of his heritage, implying in a number of places that he is Jewish, while at other times talking about his boat-building ancestors on Long Island. One of the main figures in his stock-selling scheme, David Clark, is a descendant of Windsors and Congers, married to a debutante, and listed in *Who's Who*. Another, Peter Brant, was

born Bornstein but, as his name change suggests, was desperate to be viewed as a WASP. The Wall Street world of Foster Winans is a world of appearance and image; wanting to be a WASP was sometimes more important than actually being one. Brant/Bornstein, it turns out, became a prototype of the insider trader recently indicted on Wall Street: Jews struggling to succeed in what had been a Protestant world.

David Stockman is the only one of our subjects who took his Protestant heritage seriously. Descended from Germans, Stockman has sharp memories of his grandfather, a fundamentalist Republican of remarkably strict moral views. Even when he was active against the war in Vietnam, Stockman's views were more religious than political; "our goal," he writes, "was not political revolution but social and personal redemption." Through the Rev. Truman Morrison of Michigan State University, Stockman imbibed Neibuhran ideals, learning how man is filled with sin that cannot be removed through ideological correctness. A tour at the Harvard Divinity School enabled him to merge the religious notions of Boston with the political connections of Harvard, a somewhat unusual, but in retrospect understandable, jumping off point to Washington and fame.

What unites these stories is the utter inability of Protestant morality to constitute moral guidelines in the realities of twentieth century American business and politics. Protestantism was matched to capitalism, Weber wrote, because investment activity depended upon saving, which in turn required delayed gratification. Of all the world's religions, Protestantism had the unique advantages of disdaining luxury, respecting hard work, and orienting its members toward future rewards. "The theatre was obnoxious to Puritans," he wrote, because of the Puritan "strict exclusion of the erotic and of nudity from the realm of toleration." All art was frowned upon. "This was especially true in the case of the decoration

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of the person, for instance, clothing." The Puritans dressed plainly because for them the worth of a person was internal faith, not external appearance.

Exactly the reverse seems to be true of the new Protestant Ethic, where clothing takes on fabulous significance. "I wanted our girls to look like business executives," Barrows writes, "and I was always on the lookout for too much eye makeup, seamed stockings, or anything that might suggest a stereotypical call-girl." Of course, Barrows' employees were call-girls, but that is not the point. Since she was providing a service, not manufacturing a commodity, how something appeared was far more important than how it was, so to speak, made. In a world of wealth without production, people judge each other by how they look. Foster Winans refused to tell the truth to one lawyer because he did not like his clothes and trusted another because he had no sun tan, "which meant he took his work seriously." When on trial, Winans chose to wear a blue suit because someone had once told him that this color symbolizes sincerity and integrity. David Stockman's glasses were an important component of his efforts to appear technical and scientific; when a group of elderly people demonstrated against his plans to cut social security, their placards carried caricatures of his face showing him with enormous lenses.

Those who provide a service are, in a sense, prisoners of other people's expectations of what they appear to be. "As a responsible businesswoman, I had no choice but to respond to obvious market demand," Barrows writes. When she worked at Abraham and Strauss, she learned the "importance of trusting the customer's tastes rather than my own, which is why I never had more than one redhead on staff at any time." If this seems unfair to a second redhead, think of what it means for Blacks or Brooklynites. Barrows did not want to hire Blacks for her escort service, not because she was prejudiced, but because her customers associated them with hookers. (The nature of her business gave her a certain exemption from equal opportunity regulations.) She would not allow anyone with a Brooklyn accent to answer the phone at Cachet (the name of her business) and turned down many other beautiful women because their language conveyed the

image of that unfortunate borough. "To me," she recalled, "certain names have always suggested specific images," which is why her employees called themselves Camille, Brea, Ariana, Gabriella, Shevaun, Wren, Margot, Mila, Raviana, Severine, and other names that, at least to me, sound like, well, hookers. Reality mattered little in all this, for "the name of the game was service."

Wall Street seems even more attracted to appearance than the high-class prostitution business. None of Foster Winans' accomplices traded in well-known stocks of established companies; that is not how fast money is made. Fortunes were to be had by buying Digital Switch, American Surgery Centers, or TIE/Communications. If these companies were not household words, that is because they often did not make anything. When a company is not actually engaged in production, its stock will rise and fall, not because of internal strength, but because of external perception. Yet people look for signals about the worth of such companies from the very brokers trading in their stock. Hence, when Peter Brant, the broker who gave Foster Winans money in return for advance news of what would be in his column, bought stock, he could not sell in large amounts because that would be interpreted as declining faith in the company. The prison house of image can be powerful indeed.

No administration has mastered the art of imagery better than the Reagan administration, yet it, too, became a victim of its refusal to believe that reality mattered. Supply-side economics, which started all the trouble, was premised upon a theory of expectations; if people believed that growth was around the corner, they would invest, thereby reducing the fiscal imbalances that began the process. The way decisions were made under Stockman's leadership was roughly the same; Rosy Scenarios, as he called them, could be cooked up in the hopes that they would become self-fulfilling prophesies. What was not true today, in short, could become true in the future, but only if everyone accepted the common untruth about the present.

As the Stockman experience shows, the main problem with substituting

images for reality is that doing so blurs the line between truth and falsity. All business, including the business of government, has to touch base with reality at some point. That is one of the reasons why Max Weber stressed the necessity of honesty to the Puritan tradition. According to Weber, the fiber of trust that makes any cooperative venture possible is to be found in the Protestant maxim "Honesty is the best policy." Honesty may be important for trade and manufacturing, but it plays little role in a service economy. "I hate to lie," Sydney Barrows assures her readers many times. Unfortunately for her moral stance, the nature of her business left her no choice. All clients were scrupulously informed that the girls they were spending time with saw no other clients that night. Actually they were hopping from one hotel to another as fast as their internal clocks could carry them. Her girls did not work just three nights a week, as she told their patrons. She created a second firm, hiding its connection with Cachet. Gabriella, who was unfortunately five feet one, was always described over the phone as three inches taller. Such "creative accounting," as she appropriately called it, was a regular part of the business, involving waistlines, busts, hair color, and other product specifications. Surely honesty must take a back seat when "there were never enough busty girls to go around."

The line between respectability and criminality is extremely thin in America these days. The new Protestant Ethic operates in a new spirit of capitalism, where anything that helps make money is morally justifiable, if not always legal.

Dishonesty toward clients was an outgrowth of Sydney Barrows' remarkable dishonesty toward herself. "I'm not running this business for people who just want to get laid," she would tell clients, evidently believing it. Her objective, she tells the reader, was to help lonely people by giving them

companionship, and at the same time help her employees make a little money on the side while they were studying to be scholars or lawyers. Clients spent their hour mostly talking, unburdening themselves of the troubles that rich and powerful men have but cannot speak to their wives about. Only at the end of the hour might they "get happy" (they were entitled to do this, without extra charge, twice an hour) and then not all the time. And even if they did, so what? These girls were not whores; an employee of Sydney Barrows "gives the client access to her body for a certain period of time and at a certain price, just as a consultant gives a client access to his mind and his experience on an hourly basis." On the one hand, she was not providing sex; on the other, "sex is a commodity like anything else."

One would think that descendants of the Puritan tradition would at least feel a certain guilt about being dishonest. Yet complicated rituals of confessional purging are not part of the contemporary Protestant Ethic. When Peter Brant proposed his clearly unethical scheme, Winans "gave ethical questions short shrift." Stockman, caught up in the whirl of Washington politics, began to doctor his figures, all part of politics as usual. Barrows, feeling she might be caught, moves directly into practical action, hiring a private detective, hiding her records, changing her methods. There is no epiphany at all in these books, no moment of revelation of wrong doing. Constraint, as always, lies in the external world of the law, not the internal world of conscience.

Moreover, all three writers are experts in rationalization. Stockman blames the failure of the Reagan Revolution on everyone but himself. Winans insists that because his employer, *The Wall Street Journal*, never provided him with a copy of its code of ethics, he could not have legally violated it. He knows he acted unethically, but he still manages to see himself as a victim, sentenced to jail to protect the integrity of the *Journal* and to help the Securities and Exchange Commission look tough. The money he received from Brant was profit sharing; he would not, he insisted, take bribes. He would tell Brant what he put into his column, but he would not allow Brant to dictate his topics: "It was the only way I could continue doing my job and living with my son. I had whored myself. But I

wasn't prepared to whore my writing as well."

Barrows, unlike Winans, pleaded guilty, yet in spite of her legal conviction, she interprets such an outcome as "a significant victory." Indeed, Barrows sees herself not as a criminal, but as a reformer. "Our society still needs to learn to tolerate the idea of women making a living by being intimate with men," she opines. It matters not a whit to her that her girls were intimate with each other, against their own sexual inclinations, so that men could watch. "We permitted verbal abuse and light bondage," she writes, but since it was toward a higher goal, entrepreneurialism, there is evidently nothing wrong with it. Marriages may have broken up because wives discovered their husbands using her escort service, but wives can be shrewish. Her girls used drugs, but of course in a "socially responsible manner." Barrows may have lied, hid evidence, tolerated (and in a sense encouraged) abuse, but, as she puts it, "Yes, I might have done something illegal, but I certainly hadn't done anything *bad*."

Guilt is one thing, shame another. One is based on internal introspection, the other on external disapproval. The world of service provision is run with mirrors. (Barrows, for example, would inspect the naked bodies of prospective employees through a mirror.) Given the importance of images in the service environment, these writers, to the extent they feel remiss at all, experience shame, rarely guilt. Winans writes of the "shame I will live with the rest of my life—having failed to uphold that [ethical] standard and, in the process, having misled and let down a lot of newspeople, sources, readers, and friends."

The torturous path to confession we associate with earlier Protestantism has been eased by, of all things, confession itself. In a narcissistic culture, confession becomes so easy that one announces that one was wrong and simply goes on to other things. The most interesting account of the role that confession plays in the new Protestant Ethic is provided by David Stockman. Politically, Stockman's decision to pour out his real feelings to journalist William Grieder makes little sense, but from what Weber called "the fear of damnation" it fits together. Grieder

was Stockman's conscience, his internal superego transformed into an external source. For example, Stockman spoke to Grieder about his idea that the failure of the Reagan Revolution was not due to economic theology, which was sound, but to politics, which was self-interested and corrupt. Stockman's sessions with Grieder were necessary for him so that he could continue to believe in a doctrine which he increasingly came to realize had little to do with reality. It was only once the meetings with Grieder had ended that Stockman could become, in his own words, the "Trotsky" of the supply-side revolution. And when his confessions to Grieder eventually saw the light of day, Stockman could be punished for his sins and sent to the proverbial wood pile (a metaphor that Winans also uses in his book).

It is hard to belong to a moral majority when the path to wealth takes one through sin.

Further evidence of the need to confess comes from the decision of all three of these wrong-doers to publish books. This is most clearly revealed in Winans' case. He seems the most repentant of the three, and even if we recognize how terribly self-serving his account is (and therefore how little it can be trusted), we are still moved by his decision to work in an AIDS clinic as a volunteer. Barrows writes not to confess but to enjoy the limelight. Being an ex-madam seems to suit her well. She carefully picked out a pink taffeta strapless gown for her Mayflower Defense Fund Ball, realized that she had a public, and hired William Novak of Iacocca fame to write her book. (Lots of people wanted her story, she tells us, but each of them, presumably in contrast to Novak and herself, "had his or her own agenda.") Barrows, following in a long tradition of ex-cons, will no doubt be the celebrity she was cut out to be.

David Stockman, as the world knows, wound up on the very Wall Street that expunged itself of Foster Winans. There is a certain continuity in all this, for as all these books make abundantly clear, the line between respectability and criminality is ex-

tremely thin in America these days. (New York and Washington, so competitive in so many ways, are now trying to outdo each other in the number of criminals their respective seats of power can accommodate.) By the internal strictness of the Puritans, all three of these people would be condemned to perpetual hell. But the new Protestant Ethic operates in a new spirit of capitalism, where anything that helps make money is morally justifiable, if not always legal.

Consider the investment banking house from which Peter Brant obtained his inside information from Foster Winans. Kidder Peabody is the perfect symbol of the upright world of Protestant integrity that dominates, say, the fiction of Louis Auchincloss. Auchincloss wrote of illegalities on the street; his novel *The Embezzler*, for example, has a contemporary ring despite old-fashioned characters. But in the old days, crooks operated within a system that had a certain integrity. Now the system is what is crooked. Kidder Peabody, facing Wall Street's brutal competition instead of the old gentlemanly understanding, was well aware of the illegalities taking place in its halls and let them continue. Kidder had all kinds of practices that were ethically dubious, from squeezing out profits by delaying the reporting of deals to generating needless business in order to gain extra commissions. The company, at least according to Winans' account, also told wrongdoers that they were not necessarily acting illegally, but wrote confidential files showing, for the eventual record, that they knew the men were. Institutional loyalty exists nowhere in Winans' book, not at investment banking houses, and even less so at *The Wall Street Journal*.

When competition is rampant, trust and loyalty are devalued, which is why Weber saw Protestant sects such as Methodism, within which people trusted each other implicitly, as ideal for the rise of capitalism. Sydney Bidle Barrows, in her own way, has discovered a fundamental truth about capitalism: Extend the market to all areas of life and there can be no moral limits on any conduct whatsoever. "Al-

though commercial sex was never discussed when I was growing up," she writes, "I was certainly aware that most people considered it to be wrong." Later, however, she came to "a more informed position." This new piece of wisdom, almost like a revelation, is spelled out in these terms: "If some men are willing to pay for sex, and some women are willing to provide it at a price they consider fair, and if nobody is being taken advantage of or coerced, then why is it wrong?"

The hedonistic culture of the New Left effectively broke down a system of internal self-restraint, only to have the spirit of enterprise rush in and fill the vacuum.

The moral lessons taught by these books are uncomfortable for just about everyone. The new Right, for example, preaches the efficacy of the market, yet if these books are any indication, those with certain entrepreneurial skills, such as Peter Brant and Sydney Barrows, are anything but conservative. Here are people living the way George Gilder and the Heritage Foundation say that people should live, all the while heavily into prostitution and drugs. It is hard to belong to a moral majority when the path to wealth takes one through sin.

Both Winans and Barrows are writing about business, surely a reflection of the age of Reagan. But the true inspiration for their entrepreneurial tendencies may not be the market but the "do your own thing" legacy of the 1960s. One of the more surprising common points of these three authors is that they all had brief flirtations with the New Left or the counter-culture. Stockman was influenced by liberal theology. Winans tells us how idealistic he had been, and, even while working for the *Journal*, he is anything but a typical button-down collar type. Not only is he gay, tying him to one dissi-

dent subculture, but he lives in the East Village, dresses rather casually (given his lousy pay, he probably had to), and relies on drugs (Valium) when the going gets rough. Barrows was oblivious to the larger world of politics, but considering her background, she was something of a beatnik. In 1973, "when the spirit of the 1960s was still alive," she hiked around Europe with her Jewish boyfriend, doing hash on houseboats and that sort of thing. Even William Novak, who wrote Barrows' book, once wrote a book called *High Culture* about marijuana use.

The sources of the new Protestant Ethic, in short, are as diverse as America itself. The hedonistic culture of the New Left effectively broke down a system of internal self-restraint, only to have the spirit of enterprise rush in and fill the vacuum. We live, in short, in a Jerry Rubin world. That is why, for all their duplicity and thinness, it is difficult for me to denounce these people very vehemently; they remind me too much of people I know.

"I sometimes wonder what my Mayflower ancestors would have made of my situation," Sydney Barrows concludes. "Granted, they were not exactly famous for their enlightened sexual attitudes. On the other hand, having escaped from religious persecution, they were genuinely passionate on the subject of freedom. Had they lived in a more enlightened era, they would have understood that the private behavior of consenting adults is not the business of the state." We do not necessarily expect good history from our madams; instead of taking Umberto Eco's *The Name of the Rose* to jail, as Barrows tells us she did, she might have considered *The Scarlet Letter*. Her ignorance about her own ancestors reminds us that the new spirit of capitalism has little place for memory and tradition.

Karl Marx once wrote that history repeats itself, the first time as tragedy and the second as farce. The new spirit of capitalism is all tragedy and farce. That each of these writers, with the exception of Winans, is an outlaw and a celebrity at the same time depicts a form of capitalism that commands Groucho, not Karl, as its prophet. □

Gays and the Holocaust

Martin Gilbert

The Pink Triangle by Richard Plant.
Holt and Co., 1986, 288pp.

In just over two hundred pages of text, Richard Plant has provided a powerful and painful account of what he calls "The Nazi War Against Homosexuals." In statistical terms, sixty percent of all homosexuals sent to German concentration camps were murdered: Plant estimates the total death toll at between 5,000 and 15,000.

It is clear from this work that homosexuals were marked out for discrimination from the earliest days of the Nazi regime. Within four weeks of Hitler coming to power, all homosexual-rights groups were proscribed, together with "pornography." But it was two years later, in January 1935, that the Nazis amended and reinforced paragraph 175 of the Penal Code of 1871, a paragraph which stated in its opening sentence that any male who "indulges in criminally indecent activities will be punished with jail."

On the basis of this notorious paragraph 175, first the incarceration, then the humiliation, and finally the murder of homosexuals was given the veil of legality.

I describe paragraph 175 as "notorious" because a reading of this book makes clear just how systematically and in the end barbarically, its ruling was interpreted. Richard Plant is indignant, however, that all too few historians of Nazi Germany or of the Holocaust have referred to paragraph 175 or its aftermath. In this I sympathize. My own map showing the countries of origin of homosexuals murdered in Mauthausen was criticized (when first published in 1982 in the *Macmillan Atlas of the Holocaust*) as having nothing to do with the

Holocaust and mass murder. It was argued that although the murder of homosexuals was odious, it was neither systematic nor comprehensive.

Each reader of this book will have to make up his or her own mind as to how far the murder of homosexuals by the Third Reich was or was not an aspect of genocide. As Plant shows, the anti-homosexual drive in Nazism ran parallel with and was consistently linked with the anti-Jewish drive. When, in 1929, four years before Hitler came to power, a Parliamentary Committee of the Weimar Assembly voted in favor of abolishing paragraph 175, the official Nazi newspapers wrote: "Among the many evil instincts that characterize the Jewish race, one that is especially pernicious has to do with sexual relationships. The Jews are forever trying to propagandize sexual relations between siblings, men and animals, and men and men. We National Socialists will soon unmask and condemn them by law. These efforts are nothing but vulgar, perverted crimes and we will punish them by banishment or hanging."

The anti-homosexual drive in Nazism ran parallel with and was consistently linked with the anti-Jewish drive.

In a speech to SS trainees in February 1937, Himmler linked homosexual practice with the demographic decline of a Germany obviously weakened numerically by the slaughter of World War I. As to homosexuals, he declared, "like stinging nettles we will rip them out, throw them on a heap, and burn them. Otherwise, if we continue to have this vice predominant in Germany without being able to fight it, we'll see the end of Germany, the end of the Germanic world."

The language used to denounce homosexuals was as cruel as that used in abusing the Jews. The results were also cruel: German and Dutch homosexuals were, when they could be identified, sent to concentration camps. In March 1942, a directive issued by the Gestapo declared that it was "necessary to proceed against homosexuals ... even if these are Poles and have sexually interacted with Poles only." Plant does not tell us how, or even if, this instruction was carried out. Likewise, when Heydrich, in Prague, ordered the expulsion of non-German homosexuals from the territory of the Reich that same month, it is not clear to what extent this order was carried out. Insofar as deportation was the essential preliminary to incarceration and death, Heydrich's order was however, in concept at least, a link between homosexuals born outside the Germany of 1937 and Jews. But whereas the Jews murdered in Mauthausen came from at least twenty countries and the Gypsies from twelve, the homosexuals came from only three (Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland).

For the Nazis, both in Greater Germany and in the conquered lands, the principal problem was one of identification. Other than subscription lists to some thirty homosexual magazines or membership of certain clubs, no lists existed that could in any way identify homosexuals. Jews, by contrast, were well identified in the membership lists of their communities, as well as in their political, literary, charitable and Zionist organizations. The only formal registration of homosexuals in Germany had taken place before World War I, in 1897, when more than 20,000 had been registered.

This problem of identification must have saved tens of thousands of homosexuals. A Jew could be ordered to wear a yellow star while going about his daily urban life, and could be severely punished if he was found without it. A homosexual, not readily

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identifiable in any street or communal setting, did not wear the pink triangle after he had been sent to the concentration camp.

It is clear, and Plant gives considerable eyewitness testimony to this, that once in camp, homosexuals were often singled out for particularly violent assault by camp guards. Many were subjected to medical experiments. Others were sent to some of the most harsh labor tasks in quarries and underground factories. At Sachsenhausen, of 300 homosexuals selected to work

in a cement quarry in June 1942, only 50 were still alive two months later.

This is certainly persecution of a racial or group sort, but in this reviewer's opinion it is not easily described as genocide. Homosexuals were not deported to those camps where the sole and immediate end was death, as it was for all Jews deported to Chelmno, Treblinka, Sobibor, Belzec and Maly Trostenets. No attempt was made to persecute the parents or siblings, or to find those who would betray them, certainly not beyond the

confines of the Reich. The slave labor system and the camps to which homosexuals were sent were not specifically geared to their torment as a group, but to their destruction primarily as individuals. When all is argued, however, on both sides of this debate, the truth remains that the treatment of the homosexuals at camps such as Flossenburg, Sachsenhausen and Mittelbau-Dora was abominable by any standards of human behavior. □

BOOK REVIEW

Cuba and the Romance of Revolution

Steve Wasserman

Fidel: A Critical Portrait by Tad Szulc. William Morrow, 1986, 703 pp.

Diary of the Cuban Revolution by Carlos Franqui, Viking, 1980, 546 pp.

Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961 by Richard E. Welch Jr. The University of North Carolina Press, 1985, 243 pp.

Seventeen years ago, I went to Cuba with nearly 700 other young Americans—most of us of the political persuasion then termed the New Left—to cut sugarcane and to travel about the island on an eight-week tour. It was to be the first of three trips to Cuba for me. I was seventeen at the time, had just graduated from high school, and, like most of those visiting Cuba then, I tended to romanticize Castro's revolution.

It was the idea of Cuba, even more than the reality, that was seductive. Cuba's revolution seemed relatively untainted by the sort of repressiveness that Eastern European Communism displayed. Castro's flamboyant leadership appeared almost bohemian; he was given to unorthodox social experiments—such as schools in the country-

side that combined work and study—and was apparently blessed with a spontaneity of spirit. To young American leftists like myself, Castro was a welcome alternative to representatives of the corrupt bureaucracy and stale ideology of the Soviet Union. Cuba had a glamour that many of my generation—myself included—found irresistible.

At home, meanwhile, the moral landscape of the United States then seemed to many of us to have been shattered beyond repair: an unconscionable war raged in Indochina, class and racial divisions seemed to be widening in the country, and our economic system seemed bent on wasting the world's resources as fast as America's multinational companies could devour them. To all this the political system offered neither a new vision nor fundamental solutions.

Cuba seemed different. While power in the United States was in the hands of the old, in Cuba it was wielded by the young. Castro himself was just thirty-two years old when his plucky rebellion triumphed in 1959, and nearly half of Cuba's population of ten million were born after the revolution. Cuba had a history worth admiring and a future worth building, apparently having renounced materialism for spartan idealism. (In this regard it bore a kinship to the kibbutzim of Israel, then widely admired by the New Left and, indeed, by Castro as well.) For many

in the New Left, visiting Cuba was an opportunity to glimpse the liberated future and then return to the battlelines at home spiritually and politically replenished.

It was with such expectations that I boarded the *Luis Arcos Bergnes*—a former cattle ship hastily converted by the Cubans for our trip—on a wintry day in St. John, New Brunswick. (Since the United States had severed relations with Cuba in 1961, traveling to Havana was difficult—one could fly there from Mexico City, Madrid, Prague, or Moscow, or go there as we did, by boat from Canada.) The voyage was filled with endless political debate during the day and movies—*The Battle of Algiers* and *Witness for the Prosecution*—at night. The trip from Canada to Cuba seemed to mirror our feelings about the United States. Out of the icy capitalist north we were traveling to a tropical socialist paradise busily creating what Che Guevara had called "the new man"—a man free of egotism, chauvinism, and racism.

We arrived in Havana at six o'clock in the morning after six days at sea to the cheers and applause of hundreds of Cubans snake-dancing on the docks. We were the largest group of Americans to visit the island since the United States had cut off relations and imposed a blockade nearly a decade before. We were

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trundled off in British-made buses to a camp forty miles outside Havana, where we would cut cane for the next six weeks alongside young Cubans. Later we would tour the island for two weeks. As we sped through the countryside, peasants stood up from their labors, raised their right arms and gave us clenched-fist salutes.

For most of us, Cuba was our first introduction to both a socialist country and an underdeveloped nation—and it was a surprise. Cuba boasted of enormous progress in little more than a decade since the overthrow of the Batista dictatorship: the eradication of illiteracy, land reform, free medical care. But manifestations of continued poverty could readily be seen. Many of Cuba's *campesinos*, or peasants, still lived in traditional thatched-roof huts called *bohios*. And though no one appeared to be underfed or inadequately clothed, a major achievement in itself, it was possible to come away with an impression of substantial economic difficulty. What visitors like ourselves from the developed world were likely to overlook, of course (since we tended to take such things for granted) were the new electrical power lines threading their way through villages once completely cut off from the rest of the nation.

To young American leftists like myself, Castro was a welcome alternative to representatives of the corrupt bureaucracy and stale ideology of the Soviet Union.

Cuba in 1970 seemed to be gripped by fever—the fever of Castro's attempt to free the island's economy from dependence on the Soviet Union by cutting ten million tons of sugar, the largest harvest in Cuba's history. Castro intended to use the profits from its sale to help diversify the country's economy. The entire population had been mobilized for the task. We Americans were sure Castro would make it. Later we learned that his effort to save the economy had nearly wrecked it. It came as a shock. For many months Castro had delivered countless speeches, stuffed with a bewildering array of statistics,

trying to convince his people—and himself—that the giant, almost superhuman, undertaking was possible to achieve. He seemed supremely confident that Nature itself would bend to his will. After all, hadn't History already succumbed to his tenacious blandishments?

We admired Castro almost less for his politics, which were often quite mercurial, than for the sheer force of his personality. We didn't doubt that the revolution Castro had made was of enormous moment. But it was the man himself that had seemed so utterly refreshing. He was, as Marshall Frady has written, "an almost Tolstoyan figure in the profusion of his exuberance and imagination.... Among all the premiers and statesmen over the globe, he was at least the one figure who seemed unquestionably, tumultuously alive." And yet we, who in our arrogance prided ourselves on our political sophistication, knew little about him other than the obvious fact that he was a bearded character with a fondness for long cigars and longer speeches who had led a triumphant revolt. Like most Americans, we had bought the "golden legend," as Régis Debray once called it, that had arisen around Castro, a legend that reduced the Cuban revolution to a romantic fable of the charismatic Fidel and his twelve apostles, whose numbers multiplied faster than a pyramid game, and who, in only twenty-four months succeeded in toppling the Batista tyranny. Piercing that myth—partly of Castro's own making—is the challenge that confronts any serious biographer of Cuba's "Maximum Leader."

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Tad Szulc's *Fidel: A Critical Portrait* concentrates much of its hefty bulk (it weighs almost three pounds) on an extremely detailed account of how Castro went from university firebrand to an increasingly radical guerrilla leader. Szulc, a former *New York Times* reporter who first met Castro in 1959 and who later broke the Bay of Pigs story, draws on letters, radio bulletins, war communiqués, transcripts of about 125 hours of taped interviews, memoirs, and excerpts from manifestos written by Castro and other leaders of the revolution. His tome largely confirms such previous and invaluable contributions as Carlos Franqui's *Diary of the*

Cuban Revolution. Szulc helps us understand the roots of the first socialist revolution to have been made without the help or leadership of a Communist party. He throws light on the remarkable personality of Fidel Castro and demolishes the stereotype of Castro as the Latin American macho revolutionary Woody Allen lampooned so memorably in *Bananas*.

Szulc also clarifies the old debate over whether Castro was an opportunist with a hidden communist agenda or a radical *caudillo* and Cuban patriot forced by the enmity of the United States into accepting the Soviet Union's help as the price of the revolution's survival. On the basis of Szulc's meticulous (almost day-to-day) reconstruction of the unfolding of Castro's revolt, it is clear that for much of the revolutionary war, Castro regarded himself as a radical visionary and nationalist, whose politics were shaped more by the writings of Martí and Bolívar than by Marx and Lenin. To be sure, as Szulc and Franqui both remind us, Castro was familiar with and admired Marx and Lenin. "Marx and Lenin each had a weighty polemical spirit, and I have to laugh," he wrote while in prison on the Isle of Pines, serving a fifteen-year sentence for his failed attack on the Moncada, a Cuban army garrison, on July 26, 1953. (Batista would free him in an amnesty after less than two years.) "It is fun, and I have a good time reading them. They would not give an inch, and they were dreaded by their enemies." Castro was enthralled by "the magnificent spectacle offered by the great revolutions of history: they have always meant the victory of the huge majority's aspirations for a decent life and happiness over the interests of a small group." He longed to revolutionize Cuba "from one end to the other."

Castro read voraciously in prison, often as much as fourteen hours a day. Enamored of history's radical reformers, he was particularly taken with Napoleon ("How generous Napoleon was with his enemies! I have read many books about him and I never get bored"), Kant, and Marx ("After breaking my head over Kant for a while, Marx seems easier to read than the Lord's Prayer"), and Robespierre, whom he considered an honest idealist:

The [French] Revolution was in

danger, the frontiers surrounded by enemies on all sides, traitors ready to plunge a dagger into one's back, the fence sitters were blocking the way—one had to be harsh, inflexible, tough—it was better to go too far than not go far enough, because everything might have been lost. The few months of the Terror were necessary to do away with a terror that had lasted for centuries. In Cuba, we need more Robespierres.

Yet later, in both private letters and public pronouncements, Castro disavowed terrorism as a tactic of revolutionary war. He was not a nihilist, and he deliberately eschewed, indeed condemned, terrorism for its disregard of human life. In a letter rebuking his brother Raúl for his reckless kidnapping of a group of US citizens (subsequently released unharmed), Castro said: "It is essential to declare categorically that we do not utilize the system of hostages, however justified our indignation may be against the political attitudes of any government." He went on to say that "such tactics would turn international opinion against us. . . ." In a radio speech to Batista's soldiers, Castro called on them to surrender, pledging that "No prisoner will be interrogated, mistreated, or humiliated in word or deed, and all will receive the generous and humane treatment military prisoners have always received from us." By most accounts, Szulc's included, Castro's practice—during the guerrilla war at least—was as good as his promise.

While Szulc treats Castro's war in the Sierra Maestra at exhaustive length, he gives short shrift to the struggle against Batista in the cities. (The best single account of the urban resistance movement remains *The Cuban Insurrection, 1952–1957* by Ramón L. Bonachea and Marta San Martín [Transaction Books, 1974]. It seems to have been entirely overlooked by Szulc.) This neglect skews the book badly by overemphasizing the military importance of Castro's rebel army. In fact, the urban resistance was extraordinarily significant and its leadership exceedingly vulnerable: Only ten percent survived to see Castro spoil Batista's 1959 New Year's Eve party. Nevertheless, Szulc makes it clear that Batista fell because of the collapse of the army's morale, the physical expansion of territory occupied by the rebel army, a general strike supported by a majority of Cubans, and,

of course, Castro's skill in uniting the ideological differences within the movement. Those differences were typified by such men as, on the one hand, Che Guevara, who insisted that "the solution of the world's problems lies behind the so-called iron curtain," and, on the other hand, René Ramos Latour, a leader of the movement's urban underground, who castigated Guevara for thinking it possible "to free ourselves from the noxious 'Yankee' domination by means of a no less noxious 'Soviet' domination." These divisions were anchored in the different strategies and priorities of those who fought in the mountains and in the cities. The seeds of future defections—and counterrevolution—were rooted in the contradictions of class. The urban wing was composed mostly of middle-class moderates, many of whom felt betrayed by Castro when he embraced socialism in 1961. The guerrilla army, on the other hand, drew upon the peasantry, the revolution's chief beneficiaries and its most vigorous defenders. What bound the movement together was the force of Castro's personality, his untainted past, and his demonstrated willingness to risk his life in the fight against the dictatorship.

Castro has clung tenaciously to his youthful desire to lead . . . continental revolution. . . . Washington insists on doing Castro the honor of taking him seriously.

The Communist Party, for its part, considered Castro a dangerous extremist—it had condemned him as a "petit bourgeois adventurer"—and refused to have anything to do with him until Batista's downfall was imminent. Che Guevara, too, originally regarded Castro's movement as bourgeois, although he conceded that it was led by a man whose "image is enhanced by personal qualities of extraordinary brilliance." He was convinced that after Batista was kicked out, the movement inevitably would veer to the right, at which point he was prepared to take up the cause of socialism elsewhere. But Castro's willingness to embrace more radical solutions when necessary

continually surprised and pleased Guevara, as much as it dismayed the movement's moderates.

Castro's growing radicalization as the war dragged on had less to do with the writings of Marx than with the American bombs being dropped on his men. In a letter (cited by Szulc and quoted in full by Franqui) to the late Celia Sánchez, a dentist's daughter and Castro's confidante and courier between the rebel army and the city underground, Castro wrote of his anger over the arms the United States supplied to Batista:

When I saw the rockets that they fired on Mario's house, I swore that the Americans are going to pay dearly for what they're doing. When this war is over, I'll start a much longer and bigger war of my own: the war I'm going to fight against them.

Szulc is convinced that Castro's embrace of communism (and of the Soviet Union) was inevitable, that within days of his triumph he secretly set up a "parallel" government to carry out his radical restructuring of Cuban society unencumbered by the timidity and reluctance of his more moderate anti-communist allies in the anti-Batista coalition. To be sure, Szulc concedes that Castro's welcoming of such stalwart "old" Communists as Carlos Rafael Rodríguez was quite selective. Their induction into the inner circle was based more on their demonstrated personal allegiance to Castro than on any particular command of Marxist theory. Indeed, Castro didn't declare his revolution to be socialist until he was certain that the Communist Party could be dismantled, its Moscow loyalists isolated, and then recreated under his leadership. Szulc nevertheless insists that Castro "knew exactly what he was doing all along, that his apparent improvisations had been carefully thought out, and that nothing was left to chance." And, further, that "it is demonstrably incorrect to believe that American actions pushed Castro toward communism or that, conversely, the United States resolved to try to oust him only after he had molded his revolution into an anti-American and pro-Communist instrument."

Szulc overstates Castro's talents by a considerable margin. His chronology is scrupulous, but his conclusion is weakened by crediting Castro with an

ability to shape history that he simply did not possess. A closer examination of the record reveals that Castro was too absorbed by the dizzying welter of events to follow a preconceived plan. He took one step; so did Washington. The next steps followed from that. Szulc relies too heavily upon the recollections of aging Communists in Havana who have a stake in exaggerating their role as midwives to Castro's revolution. As A. J. P. Taylor has observed, "men must be judged by what they do, not by what they say afterwards." The balanced conclusion reached by Richard E. Welch, Jr. in his penetrating study, *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961* and curiously neglected by Szulc, is more convincing:

It is possible to accept two seemingly contradictory propositions: (1) Castro's revolution probably would have turned leftward whatever the United States did or did not do. (2) Although United States policy did not force Castro to establish a revolutionary dictatorship, a socialized economy, or a communist state, it did have a very real influence on the evolution of the Cuban Revolution. Actions by the United States ... facilitated its radical transformation.

The blame for the collision between Washington and Havana cannot be put entirely on Castro's shoulders. And Machiavellian conspiracy theories won't wash. Human blunders have more to do with shaping history than human intentions.

★ ★ ★

Any discussion of Cuba risks a battle of clichés, and separating fact from fiction is a daunting task. What is certain is that Fidel Castro occupies a special place in the American imagination. While Cold War demonology has cast Castro as this hemisphere's devil, his spell seems to have mesmerized Washington's policy-makers more than Latin America's impoverished masses. Revolution, unlike rum, is difficult to export, as Che Guevara's ill-fated venture in Bolivia twenty years ago proved. But dreams die hard, and Castro has clung tenaciously to his youthful desire to lead, like a latter-day Bolívar, a continental revolution. Or so Ronald Reagan

would have us believe. The record exposes that hope as more rhetorical than real; yet Washington insists on doing Castro the honor of taking him seriously.

America's persistent efforts to topple Castro from his island perch have been an embarrassing failure. The United States continues to brand Castro as a revolutionary brigand; American enmity, of course, benefits him enormously by permitting Castro to rationalize his repressive rule as necessary for national defense. If Washington considers Castro a mercenary in Moscow's pay, Castro misses no opportunity to taunt his imperious neighbor to the north. By now, however, the history of US-Cuba relations reads like stale fiction—the plot threadbare, the characters caricatures.

One of the ironies that is lost on Washington is the fact that as Castro's dependence on the Soviet Union has grown (Moscow now pumps an estimated four billion dollars annually into Cuba), the more his radicalism has been weakened. For example, Castro's original goal of an egalitarian and moral version of socialism is nowhere in sight. In the aftermath of the débâcle of the sugar harvest of 1970, Castro was compelled to adopt the Soviet model of development. A point system was devised for punctuality, attendance, and quantity and quality of production. Prizes ranged from medals and diplomas to paid vacations and salary increases. Particularly diligent workers were given the right to buy scarce consumer goods like televisions, refrigerators, and pressure cookers. In an effort to eliminate widespread worker absenteeism, a law was passed in 1971 that stipulated that workers who were absent for more than fifteen days without explanation would be considered predisposed toward laziness. If convicted of "loafing," a worker could be confined to a "re-education center" for up to two years. Today, Castro publicly speculates on "the shortcomings of our system, of our socialism," and he wonders what "levers," "methods," and "techniques" will produce for socialism an economy as efficient as that which existed under capitalism.

By abolishing what Max Weber called "the whip of hunger," Castro has been forced to reinvent an ethic of productivity which in certain respects resembles the ethic of the Puritan bourgeoisie

in the heroic age of capitalism—namely, an ethic of self-denial, frugality, austerity, unremitting labor, and self-discipline. But nothing has worked; neither incessant moral hectoring nor harsh laws. Cuba remains hostage to a one-crop economy which has so deformed its prospects that Havana has been forced for several years to suffer the humiliation of having to buy hundreds of thousands of tons of sugar from other producers, such as the

Washington's refusal to award Cuba the relations it is willing to accord other Communist countries ... is simply petulance raised to the level of policy.

Dominican Republic, to cover promised sales to foreign customers. Tens of thousands of young Cubans have been fighting for more than a decade in distant wars in other hemispheres. Recent efforts by farm workers in Oriente province to organize an independent labor union have resulted, according to Amnesty International, in arrests and executions. Prison conditions are abysmal. Religious life is constricted: Jehovah's Witnesses, for instance, have been banned since 1975, while Jewish life in Havana—never very strong before the revolution—is nearly nonexistent. Rabbi Solomon Suss of Chevat Ahun, one of the capital's three surviving Jewish congregations, spoke recently with a *New York Times* reporter in his second-floor, walk-up Sephardic temple near the docks of Old Havana. The rabbi told the reporter that while some Jews remain in Cuba, Judaism is not publicly discussed. Nevertheless, "When it's here in your heart," he said, thumping his chest with a closed fist, "it stays there forever." Even Cuba's much praised medical progress has taken a statistical beating in recent years. Cuba now boasts one of the highest suicide rates in the world. Some of the more striking suicides have been among Castro's closest comrades, most notably that of Haydée Santamaría, who joined Castro in his attack on the Moncada in 1953. On July 26, 1980, the anniversary of the assault that catapulted Castro to national fame,

she chose to shoot herself through the mouth with a Colt .45. Civil rights are severely restricted, dissent is ruthlessly repressed, and a free press is unknown. Castro has now been in power longer than any other leader in the western hemisphere, apart from Paraguay's Generalissimo Alfredo Stroessner. His grip is firm, capricious, and unchallenged.

★ ★ ★

When I first visited Cuba in 1970, I went predisposed to see through many of the familiar anti-communist clichés of the Cold War. I also found that I had to penetrate a mystique of Cuba's own making—that of singing *barbudos*, machetes in hand, cutting sugarcane as they had once attacked Batista's troops. Neither set of stereotypes captures

Cuba's essence. The reality is more complex, too contradictory and impermanent to be so neatly pigeonholed. My romantic notions of a super-people, led by a super-leader who together were creating an island utopia have been replaced by a sober recognition of a nation laboring under an aging rebel who refuses to relinquish or share power with ordinary men and women. And it is their creative energies that must be freed if Cuba is ever to overcome its economic and political underdevelopment.

I remain convinced that Washington's refusal to award Cuba the relations it is willing to accord other communist countries such as the Soviet Union and China is simply petulance raised to the level of policy. Ideology, after all, has not prevented us from granting most-favored-nation trading status to communist Rumania, perhaps the most

internally Stalinist Soviet satellite. Cuba's heresy is of a different order, and the danger it presents does not rest on Castro's communist conceits. Rather, it rests on its unwillingness to accept America's hemispheric hegemony. Cuba is neither the revolutionary specter of Havana's hyperbole nor the subversive hobgoblin of White House propaganda. Castro's threat does not lie in his fealty to Marxist dogma but rather in the delusions suffered by ideologues on the National Security Council. As recently as 1979, the Cuban leader declared in Berlin, to the embarrassment of his East German hosts: "I still don't know to what extent I'm still a utopian and to what extent I've become a Marxist-Leninist—perhaps I may even be a bit of a dreamer." Today those dreams fire only the fevered fantasies of Elliot Abrams and Ronald Reagan. □

BOOK REVIEW

Right Turn?

Thomas Byrne Edsall

Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics by Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers. Hill and Wang, 1986.

Over the past decade, two issues have been central to political conflict in the United States: taxes and the power of business. The rise of conservatism in the late 1970s and early 1980s coincided with the mobilization and unification of the corporate lobbying community and with the emergence of anti-tax movements in various states across the country. The role of business in the structures of the Democratic and Republican parties is one of the more complex and unexplored areas of political analysis. The distributional consequences of taxes are far better known than the intricate politics of taxation, despite the fact that taxes have become

a key part of the debate between the two major parties.

In *Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics*, Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers of the University of Texas and the University of Miami, respectively, have produced a provocative and illuminating examination of public opinion and of the political influence of business elites. Their exploration of extensive poll data raises serious questions about the ideological assessment of American politics in the 1980s made by columnists, consultants and politicians. Ferguson and Rogers's study of the relationship between key business leaders and officials of the Democratic Party, and of policy decisions tied to these relationships, sheds new light on the dark side of democracy, where money determines public policy.

At the same time, however, some of the arguments in *Right Turn* oversimplify recent political developments. Ferguson and Rogers are determined to make not only the legitimate argument that there remains a strong base of pub-

lic support for a liberal welfare state, but also to make the far more tenuous claim that there was no conservative shift in the electorate during the years immediately prior to the 1980 election. Instead, according to the Ferguson and Rogers's thesis, the electorate has remained firmly wedded to the liberal welfare state, and the primary, if not exclusive, force pushing politics to the right is a powerful set of business interests controlling the policies of the Democratic Party.

In effect, the authors have given primacy to two facts—that business exerts significant influence on the Democratic Party, and that public support for basic government services remains strong—and dismissed the destructive consequences to the Democrats of internal party developments. Ferguson and Rogers reject or disregard arguments that the Democratic Party splintered along a number of fault lines during the two decades preceding the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980; that the party was fractured by social, racial, cultural and

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economic class antagonisms; that the Left itself was divided over Vietnam, civil rights, trade unionism, the women's movement, inflation, sexual liberation, homosexual rights, urban riots, abortion, court-ordered busing, affirmative action and hiring quotas. The list of schisms within the overall Democratic constituency—responsibility for which cannot all be laid at the feet of big business—is long.

Ferguson's and Rogers's focus on the political role of business within the Democratic Party and the interpretation of poll data produces some highly valuable information and insight. But their larger analysis produces a set of conclusions giving false comfort to advocates of the Left agenda they seek to promote.

Their most dangerous assertion is that taxes are not really that important to the vast majority of people: "It is important to emphasize that among the general public (as opposed to business elites) the salience of the tax issue has never been great.... On balance, then, it seems reasonable to conclude that increased burdens on average Americans, and especially increased unfairness in the tax system, made the public more resistant to tax hikes and more receptive to promises to cut taxes. It did not, however, set off a groundswell of public clamor for the reduction of taxes."

Ferguson and Rogers reach this conclusion despite the fact that they include in their book extensive evidence to the contrary. At one point they cite a 1978 Harris poll showing that sixty-nine percent of the respondents felt their tax burden had "reached the breaking point." In addition, they cite data showing how the tax system had, over the past twenty years, become increasingly regressive: The corporate tax had been steadily replaced by the highly regressive Social Security payroll tax as a basic source of federal revenues, while the progressivity of the federal income tax was eroded by the addition of exemptions and deductions available largely to the affluent. As a demonstration of the strong anger over tax burdens, one need look no further than the overwhelming passage of anti-tax referenda on both sides of the continent, Proposition 13 in California in 1978 and Proposition 2½ in 1980 in Massachusetts; or to the presidential victory on an anti-tax plat-

form of Ronald Reagan in 1980.

I believe it is far more productive to recognize the deep anger of an electorate facing not only rising tax burdens but stagnant incomes, and then to explore how business and other conservative interests successfully exploited this political mood, while liberals in general and the Democratic Party in particular failed to respond. There is no question that the business community and the affluent manipulated public discontent with tax burdens in the late 1970s so that local, state and federal tax reduction legislation would bring about regressive redistributions of income.

One of the central failures of liberals and of the American Left during the past twenty years, however, has been the inability to recognize the basic, legitimate economic self-interest of the voter. Strategists for the Mondale campaign made this mistake when they calculated that voters would not object to paying another one hundred dollars a year in taxes to lessen the federal deficit. Ferguson and Rogers argue that poll data which shows many voters in support of Reagan while personally in disagreement with specific conservative policies demonstrates the continuing presence of a liberal consensus "that there is little or nothing in the public opinion data to support the claim that the American public moved to the right." An equally logical conclusion that can be drawn from the same poll data is that many voters were willing to support a conservative president because, as the poll data shows, they believed that they would "do better financially" under Reagan. If voters are willing to make that choice, it suggests that the liberal consensus is fragile, rather than strong, particularly when put to a means test.

Ferguson and Rogers, however, conclude that "public attitudes toward major policy questions have remained programmatically liberal," which then leads them to pose the question: "How does one account for America's right turn in the 1970s?" For Ferguson and Rogers, race, class, and cultural tensions within the Democratic Party over the past generation are largely irrelevant. Equally unimportant is the very real difficulty facing Democratic liberalism at a time when the economy has not produced increases in family income since 1973, and when wages for the hourly worker have declined.

Instead, the authors of *Right Turn* find that the shift to the right lies in a series of disastrous decisions by a power bloc that actually controls the Democratic Party: "principally capital-intensive and multinationally-oriented big business and its allies among real estate magnates, military contractors, and portions of the media. As we have sought to show, all the crucial decisions that have brought the Democrats to where they are today were made by actors who either had close ties to this bloc or were—as in all Democratic cabinets from Kennedy through Carter, or the principal economic and foreign policy advisers to Mondale in 1983–84—themselves prominent members of it."

Ferguson and Rogers contend that this "power bloc of capital intensive industries, investment banks and internationally oriented commercial banks" had its roots in the formation of the New Deal coalition. "Although this bloc represented only a small part of the business community in the 1930s, it was immensely powerful. It included many of the largest and most rapidly growing corporations in the economy—including such firms as General Electric, IBM, Pan Am, and R. J. Reynolds; many major oil concerns, including Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of California, Cities Service, and Shell; and major commercial and investment banks, including Bank of America, Chase National Bank, Brown Brothers Harriman, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers and Dillon Read." Their evidence cited for this is a forthcoming book by Ferguson. It is unfortunate that more specific information from this forthcoming book could not have been included here.

Other studies of campaign finance, however, do not provide support for the Ferguson-Rogers thesis. Alexander Heard, in his seminal 1960 study, *The Costs of Democracy*, showed that throughout the New Deal years from 1932 to 1952, Democratic support from "Bankers, brokers, manufacturers, oil, mining, utilities, transportation, real estate and insurance"—which covers a large part of the "new power bloc"—steadily declined, while Republicans remained overwhelmingly favored by these interests. In that period, oil and mining interests favored the Republican National Committee by a six-to-one margin, the same margin as bankers and brokers. Herbert Alexander, in his 1972 book, *Money in Politics*, found

that members of twelve prominent families—the Fields, duPonts, Fords, Harrimans, Lehmans, Mellons, Olins, Pews, Reynolds, Rockefellers, Vanderbilts and Whitneys—many of whom are tied to the multinational interests cited by Ferguson and Rogers, gave overwhelmingly to the Republican Party between 1956 and 1968. In the four elections of those years, these families gave \$4,620,000 to the GOP and just \$470,000 to the Democratic Party. In 1968, Alexander found that officers and directors of the American Petroleum Institute gave \$431,000 to Republicans and just \$30,000 to Democrats. Similarly, military contractors that year gave \$664,000 to GOP committees and candidates, and just \$110,000 to Democratic counterparts.

All this is not to minimize business influence in the Democratic Party. Instead, the study of business strength in both parties requires far more research and documentation than Ferguson and Rogers have included in *Right Turn*, a book that touches on themes critically important to the balance of power in the United States. Whenever a political party or movement becomes ascendant—as the Democratic Party did in the Great Depression and the GOP did briefly at the start of the 1980s—a host of interests seek to gain control in order to direct the flow of benefits; and in this competition, varying segments of the business community have consistently been the most successful participants.

As the nation now enters what appears likely to be a period of sustained trench warfare between the two parties, each struggling with minority status, the exercise of special interest influence will become increasingly subtle. In this environment, proponents of both the Left and Right will be forced to conduct tough, exhaustive studies of the forces at work in the electorate, in campaign finance and in the management of policy, both during campaigns and while in office.

At the moment, the Iran/Contra affair as well as the 1986 Democratic takeover of the Senate indicate that the Republican Party has lost the momentum it had from 1978 through 1984, and the likelihood that the GOP will win majority party status has, for the moment, receded. As a result, the Democratic Party has gained breathing room in the extraordinarily difficult process of reassembling a working coalition. Ferguson and Rogers, whose goal is a revived party of the Left, have over the years often broken new intellectual ground and will most likely continue to do so. A central strength of their adversaries on the Right, however, has been an assiduous commitment to exhaustive research, a commitment, as documented in *Right Turn*, reflected in the explosion of financial support provided in the 1970s to such conservative think tanks as the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute and the Hoover Institution.

While no political analyst or theoretician can be expected to cover with equal thoroughness every aspect of political life, and while *Right Turn* provides a wealth of highly detailed and extremely useful poll data, a persistent weakness of the Left, demonstrated once again in this book has been a kind of broad vilification of powerful interests, a process which allows the actual forces at work to escape accurate characterization and analysis. The result has been a series of defeats for the Left in presidential elections. For both Democrats and Republicans seeking to formulate effective campaign as well as policy strategies, the more precise and grounded the information available, the more likely that election day results will not come as an unwelcome surprise.

The value of *Right Turn* and of Roger's and Ferguson's work in general is the willingness to challenge accepted wisdom and to suggest that political outcomes are determined by forces not routinely reported upon in newspapers and on television. Their work has obliged others to explore new

terrain and has functioned to widen the scope of political analysis. More detailed information would add strength to one of their basic, fundamentally accurate, conclusions:

The Democratic Party could, after all, put forward a broad popular program of manifest appeal and benefit. They could mobilize those vast reaches of the electorate (poorer, younger, blacker than the rest) who now abstain from voting altogether. The reason they do not do this is not because they do not know how, but because they do not want to. And they do not want to because such a mobilization would require that the people mobilized actually be offered something, and elite Democrats have very little that they want to give. While they would like to defeat the Republicans, they are not about to subsidize a broad popular coalition inimical to their own economic interests."

While it is certainly true that a drive to rebuild a Left coalition through full employment, higher wages, workplace protection, unemployment insurance, expanded health care and so on would incur the enmity of the business elite and the corporations which undergird them, the most vital task facing committed scholars like Ferguson and Rogers is to address the contemporary conflict between those in the bottom third of the income distribution who feel that they need and will profit from such government programs, and those in the middle-third who feel their own standard of living eroding, who resent and fear the less privileged, who no longer trust the federal government, and who balk with all their strength at paying with their tax dollars for government expansion. It is on this humble terrain, as well as in the boardrooms and clubs of the rich and powerful, that political parties are built and shattered, and that crucial elections are won and lost. □

A Universal Language

Kathryn Hellerstein

Orange bulbs code the take-off. We expect
Some turbulence in the midwest. Before me
In the air line magazine, is Margaret Mead's
"A Universal Language for the World!"
The runway lights make pictures like the stars'
Old points of reference, forms recognized.

"A universal language would bring out
The commonality of all mankind."
Fishwives and kings could gossip naturally.
A universal language would permit
The ministers of governments at war
To chat with ease about their hostages.
Abstract beyond particulars of place,
Time, culture, class, or sex—translation's Ur—
A universal language is the Word.

All alphabets take form in human mouths:
The Hebrew and Phoenician "A" is not
Vowel, but breathing. English sounds twelve "A"s
As tongues in damp warmth settle front or round.
Land-locked, alphabets were written first
As hieroglyphs in caves and cuneiform
Pressed into clay. Some Neolithic scratched
Symbols on bones. The Greeks fired letters on
Amphora, kylix, krater, lekythos,
And molded words on bronze, much-fingered coins.

From calloused palm to palm, this currency
Traversed the criss-crossed, narrowing blue sea.
But throat and tongue cannot transform the sea:
"The water never formed to mind or voice,"
Though scooped up glistening by a mute jug
And poured still shining down an open throat,
Though wavelets like an alphabet with gulls'
Accents against an aging blue, would spell
The changing and the constant distances.
We share in common only distant shores.

"Chinese written characters are ideographs.
Depicting things in action as ideas,"
E. Fenollosa comments from the West
Upon the East (its image: sun behind bare trees).
Enchanted by these new discoveries,
The earnest ear goes deaf as speakers yell,
Whisper and sing, and rising sun-shafts gild
And flicker on bare branches swelled with buds.

A budding student, confident with text
And tape, when listening, seeks a cognate root
And thinks he understands a poem droned
By natives, while he's making up his own.

A Russian boy hears puns of "list" and "lust"
In Thomas Wyatt's "Whoso list to hunt,"
And argues with a nice American girl
He's parked with in a sidestreet summer storm
That puns are signs for action: "Let's make sex."
No sense is made. His hands stroke breast and thigh.
"Let's make it." Thunder crackles overhead.
Sheet-lightening, flashing by, makes spectacle
Of rooftops in relief against wild trees.
A gust. Spread knees. The rain encloses rain.

Learning a language, one learns more than words:
To a young translator, the old man said,
"You study Yiddish hard, all day, all night,
But you must learn the spirit," stared at her,
"You have a *shikeses* nose." A language is
Composed of grammar, spirit, shapes of a nose.

The family nose, a heritage of bones
In the hollow architecture of our race,
Passes from branch to branch of the flowering tree,
Yet peoples speaking in proximity
Their sibling languages are enemies,
Hiss sibilants in common face-to-face,
And crush bones in their murderous embrace.

A universal language, beacon, source,
Blazes across the molded metal seams
Of engines jetting our craft through the storms.
Unlike the gibberish of towns and stars
(Dark space between) it is a flash that stills
The roiling clouds for miles till dark resumes.
The pulse reveals its presence to airplanes,
Strange beings, night-birds flying, sleepless men
At windows, lovers making love in cars.

Anna Margolin translated from the Yiddish by Kathryn Hellerstein

Song to the End

Peter Viereck

This poem is the postscript to the “Auschwitz” section of the book.

If blossoms could blossom
One petal of petals
To whom all other blooms are
As leaves are to flowers,
It would be to the others
As you are, my daughter,
To all other daughters
Whom songs are adoring.
For what am I here for
If not to make love-songs
Of all the world's beauty
Whose birthday we share?
...
When storms replace breezes,
No hurt can have healing.
Then the love I now sing you
Can pillow your fading.
For what am I here for
If not to link fingers
With daughters whose wistfulness
Worlds never answer?
For what is a song for
If not to stretch hands out
To signal the falling,
"You're never alone"?

When the Camp says: "Dig graves now,
We're coming to shoot you,"
I'll help with your shovel
—(I'll know and be with you)—
To give you more seconds
To look up from digging
To look at the sun while
I pillow the sand out.
For what is love here for
If not to smooth ditches
For all the world's daughters
Whose dying we share?

107

LETTERS

emotionally distressed to learn how deeply the rabbinic tradition has been impacted by anti-Semitism, and how the emotional life and psyche of Jewish men over the generations has been shaped and distorted by an "affective program" which evolved in response to conditions of oppression....

... Over the years the sages came to elevate *themselves* to the status of Torah, came to see "the sage (w)as Torah incarnate." From a purely logical perspective, such an elevation of the status of self would seem to stand in direct contradiction to the rabbinic injunctions about self-abnegation and humility. From a psychological perspective, however, they are intimately related.

Feeling totally debased and helpless to change conditions of external oppression, the self compensates for the pain and humiliation suffered on the outside by elevating itself to almost God-like status in the inner world. Psychotherapists see this phenomenon daily in their practices: people who have suffered severe emotional and/or physical abuse at the hands of a stronger person, usually a parent or parent surrogate, who repress their anger, come to have a deep experience of the self as evil, and experience extreme fluctuations in feelings of self-esteem, as grandiose fantasies of supreme power and goodness are created to compensate for and defend against feelings of self-loathing and self-contempt. The psychotic individual is only the most obvious and extreme form of the injured self—expressing the belief, and often having an internal experience, that s/he is God while simultaneously feeling totally incompetent and unable to perform even the menial tasks of daily living. There are many more people who can function more successfully, but who have distorted images of self and wildly fluctuating feelings of self-worth. In all cases, as with the rabbis, these distortions represent psychological strategies for survival by powerless people, usually children, under impossible circumstances.

It would appear that one way the sages dealt with the debasement of anti-Semitic oppression imposed from without was by compensating from within, by developing a theology, indeed a Judaism, based on their own near-divinity as "Torah incarnate." In

order to compensate for the profound feelings of humiliation and degradation suffered under centuries of oppression, Jewish men compensated by creating a belief system which elevated their own words, their own thoughts, their own feelings to as near-divine status as possible, without declaring the unspeakable, that they themselves were God. Understanding this connection between anti-Semitism and the theology of Rabbinic Judaism, I had a fresh insight into the nature of the resistance Jewish women encounter as we make changes within Judaism. We are not only encountering 2,000 or more years of treasured, sacred tradition. We are tampering with a belief and symbol system which, whatever its other virtues and liabilities, embodies the grandiose fantasy of self that has enabled Jewish men to survive psychologically when they could not defend themselves directly against their non-Jewish male oppressors. We are up against one of the most powerful forms of resistance the psyche (individual or collective) can muster—those defenses created for the preservation of the self in the face of destruction. As we engage in a feminist tikkun of Judaism, our strategies for change will need to take this into account.

When I work with individuals in therapy, I try to proceed with a deep respect for all productions of the self, even those which in the adult are no longer effective and need to be discarded, because they represent the defensive productions of a wounded child trying to survive under impossible conditions of parental abuse or neglect. While proceeding tenderly to talk with the wounded child inside the adult, I must nevertheless maintain an unfailing commitment to uncovering the truth, however painful, of the reality of the oppressive childhood, so the true self can reemerge and continue to grow. As the adult clings to the world view of the injured child and the distorted view of self created in response to pain, s/he cannot continue to grow and live in the real world with health and security. I am not sure how to translate that process into a strategy for change that could enable Jewish men to look at themselves and the tradition they created over the centuries with an eye for separating out what is the product of their oppression as Jewish men and what is the word of the Living God. But I know that to

ensure the future survival of a vital Judaism with roots in the past and an openness to feminist transformation, such an enterprise is crucial.

It is possible to believe that the Living God did speak through our sages, but that speaking through the mouths of people who were, after all, fallible, mortal men living under conditions of oppression, the tradition we are heir to sometimes embodies the words of God and sometimes the words, not only of men, but of oppressed men. Understanding that our sages were oppressed men is all the more crucial as we learn more about how social and political oppression interferes in healthy relationships between the sexes. The attempt to survive anti-Semitism not only shaped the rabbis' "affective program," their politics, and their theology as being Torah incarnate, it shaped their views of Jewish women, the Jewish family, and the halacha that applies to both....

In the final section of his article, Neusner acknowledges there have been "enormous costs of the rabbis' prescription for the life of moderated emotions, unstated feelings, restrained affections." I wish he had pointed out more. Unfortunately, he may not see the most insidious one—the enormous cost to the inner life of the Jewish family, the mental health and status of Jewish women in the community, and the mental health of Jewish men themselves down the generations.

Neusner is quite right when he says "If a person cannot express anger one way, he or she will find some other." The unconscious has a complex repertoire of such ways, all of which are destructive to the self or the other. An extremely prevalent mechanism is to disown one's rage and aggression by projecting it onto someone else, and then experiencing the other person as the bearer of the hated emotion, while the self remains a pure, suffering victim. This is what Jewish men have done to Jewish women through their affective program for survival. Jewish men have sustained an image of themselves through the generations as humble, submissive, holy servants of God, devoid of negative emotions like anger, by projecting all their rage and aggression generated by social oppression onto Jewish women. And Jewish women have, to a great extent, taken in the projection.

The characterization of the Jewish

man as the long-suffering, passive wimp and the Jewish woman as the aggressive, castrating bitch is not merely the "comic" stuff of a Philip Roth novel. Everyday in my office at a Jewish Family Service in a major eastern city, I see Jewish women in therapy who hate themselves because they feel, deep down, they are dangerous, murderous, aggressive bitches undeserving of love. I see Jewish men who suffer enormous guilt about their anger and rage, who are unable to express their true feelings, who are self-controlled to the point of emotional paralysis, and who also believe, deep down, they are

evil beings undeserving of love. I see Jewish couples, the women angry, hurt, sometimes screaming, crying out for a response from Jewish men who sit silently, passively stuttering, intellectual, unable to express feelings or respond lovingly to women who embody the hated part of themselves. These are not people who are dysfunctional in the world. They are often competent people suffering great pain in their intimate, inner lives. They are single Jewish women and men who are not giving birth to the next generation, though they often want to. They are the Jewish families shaping the chil-

dren of our future.

Neusner concludes: "A genuine desire to accommodate the other can turn a human being into a true Mensch (sic), in God's image, in God's likeness." May I live to see the day when "the other" within Judaism, the woman, is seen in God's image, and is celebrated in all places where Jews worship with new God language, ritual, and prayer unheard of in our Rabbinic tradition. Amen.

Barbara Breitman
Skipack, Pennsylvania

Plastic Dreams

James Boyle

Credit card commercials are fascinating—frequently cramming an entire mythology into a thirty-second spot. One of the most popular series of advertisements features people whose names are more famous than their faces. "You know me," they say—tantalizing us because we don't think that we do. We might even feel that they were boasting to us about their fame, but no, it turns out that people don't recognize them when they travel. "That's why I carry the American Express Card." Well, what do you know. Even Joe Famous has that feeling of being alone, unrecognized, lost among strangers and far from home. We can feel a tiny spark of community—united in our common alienation. Gee, wouldn't it be nice if we all knew and trusted one another? But those golden days are gone. We must square our shoulders, put the golden days behind us and take the next best thing to mutual trust and recognition—which turns out to be a small rectangle of plastic and a supply of ready cash. Don't leave your haven-in-a-heartless-world without it.

The advertisements do not stop here. It's simple enough to encode a thirty-second piece of videotape with the subliminal messages I have been describing. Functional utility, kinship with the unrecognized celebrity, nostalgia for an imaginary world of trust and neighborliness—the advertisements have all of that. But there is one thing missing. Power.

The idea that you are what you buy is not a new one. The brilliance of the American Express Gold Card is that it introduces a more sophisticated notion. You are what you buy with. "A Gold Card Commands Respect."

Note the key words—"Gold," "Command," "Respect." Nasty, threatening, foreign waiters are instantly transformed into snivelling models of fawning obedience. Worldly-wise European sophisticates raise an eyebrow as they take the card, impressed, despite themselves, by this glinting symbol of American capital. Doe-eyed hostesses smile as they pluck the plastic from the masterful fingers of its owner. Strange restaurants serving bizarre foods are suddenly made familiar, re-ordered around the Cartesian point of the card. "The Gold Card says something about who you are." Yes, indeed. But what does it say?

British people won't boast directly about how much they earn but they will boast about how much tax they pay. "Of course, in the tax-bracket I'm in, there's really no point." The Gold Card functions in something of the same way—if a trifle more obviously. The Gold Card Is Not For Everyone. This is our first hint about what the Gold Card says about "who you are." Does it say more than "I'm rich! I'm rich! I'm rich!"? Why, of course it does. Look at the advertising. The Gold Card soothes wounded egos, tames savage waiters, makes foreign things safe, and domestic things sophisticated. It infuses the act of buying with new meaning and prestige. It charms women when used by men and (occasionally) charms men when used by women. It overmatches the savoir faire of worldly foreigners and gives its owner that dry-armpits/money-in-the-bank feeling of confidence and self-satisfaction. How can one say these advertisements are offensive? They are apparently addressed to people who are insecure, unhappy in a world of anomic distrust, concerned about their status, and in need of reassurance, extra charm, and sexual potency. This isn't a credit card. It's a course of psychotherapy. □

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BENEATH THE STARS

On railways or roadways well known to American war-planners, the location of Soviet mobile missiles is usually visible to satellites that can relay it instantly to those planners. Though the missiles' location would change in the fifteen or twenty minutes that a D-5 flight lasts, the ICBMs are far more vulnerable to blast damage than they would be if they were in silos. A D-5 missile carrying 14 smaller (W 76) warheads could release them in a barrage along a track or road with a calculable probability of catching the missile or missiles moving on it. Additional D-5s could be dedicated to the tracks and roads until high confidence of destruction is achieved.

TARGET C: SOVIET AIRFIELDS AND SUBMARINE BASES

The Soviet Union has only four bases for ballistic-missile submarines, two on the Kola Peninsula near Finland, one on the Kamchatka Peninsula north of Japan, and one near Vladivostok. They are easy targets even for our older, less accurate Minuteman missiles, except for a small number of submarine tunnels, that would require a hard-target warhead such as the MX or D-5. In warm weather, at least, when pack ice does not surround them, they could be struck by sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) launched from a hundred miles away. At that distance even the slow-flying cruises would arrive sooner than a ballistic missile could. A far smaller proportion of Soviet missile submarines are at sea (perhaps only ten or twelve) than American submarines, so strikes against the ports would cripple the bulk of the fleet.

The Soviet Union has about a dozen bomber bases, and most of its bombers are concentrated in three airfields. These are also easy targets for Minuteman missiles. Soviet bombers, in any case, do not constitute a major retaliatory threat to the United States.

TARGET D: SOVIET BALLISTIC-MISSILE SUBMARINES

Although submarines are still generally considered to be invulnerable, Soviet leaders will not be able to take the safety of their fleet for granted much longer. The US Navy will spend over \$25 billion in FY 1987 on anti-submarine warfare (ASW). (By comparison, SDI will get \$3.5 billion.) The money will go to develop and operate a variety of underwater detection and surveillance systems used by surface ships, ASW aircraft, and nuclear-powered attack submarines. These forces are equipped with depth charges, underwater mines, torpedoes, and rockets.

When pressed about the necessity of such extensive ASW capabilities, Defense officials often note the need for "tactical" weaponry—to protect sea lanes or naval task forces from marauding Soviet submarines. They conjure up images of the German U-boats of the two world wars. The same officials, however, also cite their plans to destroy the Soviet ballistic-missile submarine fleet. In 1976, a Defense official revealed in congressional testimony that the Navy's maritime strategy calls "for the destruction of ballistic missile launching submarines." In the May 13, 1985, issue of *Defense Week* Navy Secretary John Lehman said that US submarines would attack Soviet missile submarines "in the first five minutes of the war." The Navy has 97 attack submarines, and there is no reason to believe that any of them are intended for tactical support missions. The Pentagon recently released photographs taken in May of 1986 showing three attack submarines surfacing together at the North Pole. They were not rehearsing their tactical mission of protecting US sea lanes, which do not cross the Arctic ice cap. But the Arctic Ocean is the home ocean of the Soviet Union.

Geography does not help the USSR. From the four bases there are "choke points" through which submarines must pass, and these are monitored by US ships, submarines, and underwater hydrophones. Each Soviet submarine has a unique "sound signature," and its location can be determined to accuracies sufficient to send attack submarines or P-3C Orion airplanes after it (there are 400 Orions in service).

TARGET E: SOVIET COMMAND COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL CENTERS

If the United States could eliminate every strategic weapon in the Soviet arsenal in one fell swoop, it would not need to attack the military command structure or the communication systems. As a precaution, however, it would try to destroy them at the earliest point in the war. Then, even if some Soviet weapons survived a first strike, the lines of command and channels of communication would be thrown into such chaos that a coordinated response, and perhaps any response, would be impossible.

This seems to be the main purpose of the 108 Pershing II missiles America recently installed in West Germany, despite enormous protests by German citizens. They carry one small nuclear warhead, but they are fast and extremely accurate. With a range of nearly 1,500 miles they could destroy command bunkers and other vital centers in the Western part of the Soviet Union within ten minutes of launch. The US Army wants several hundred more of them, possibly to station in Alaska.

The D-5, MX, and sea-launched cruise missiles, of course, could also be aimed at command centers.

Soviet Targets	US Weapons Aimed at Soviet Targets by about 1996*
1400 ICBMs:	
in silos, 1000?	2000 D-5 (W88) warheads 500 MX warheads 500 SICBM warheads 500(?) cruises
mobile, 400?	2000 D-5 (W 76) warheads
airfields and submarine ports	a few Minuteman III warheads a few MX or D-5 warheads a few SCLMs
missile-carrying submarines	attack submarines 400 P-3C Orion airplanes S-3 Viking jets SH-3 Seaking helicopters CAPTOR undersea mines
command/com- munication centers:	
western USSR	108 Pershing II warheads (Germany)
eastern USSR	a few D-5 warheads a few Pershing II warheads (Alaska?)
near coasts	a few SCLMs

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FIRST-STRIKE

There are several good reasons to think that neither side could ever get away with launching a first-strike against the other without enormous retaliatory damage. Technical glitches and gremlins, incorrect intelligence, bad weather, solar flares (affecting guidance systems over the North Pole), even conscientious refusals to obey orders—the leaders of neither side could be sure they had these under control. America has never even tried to launch an ICBM from an operational silo since the 1960s, and the early tests were all failures. And even if one side could destroy every retaliatory weapon the other possessed, Mother Nature might retaliate devastatingly with radioactive fallout and (according to recent theories) a long nuclear winter. Pentagon planners must be aware of these problems, though they seldom sound as if they are.

A cold blooded, bolt-from-the-blue first-strike, in any case, may not be the main threat. Much more likely is a situation of rising tension and confusion where

each side doubts the other's intentions, where defensive moves that look like offensive moves prompt new moves again, until a crisis is reached and the leaders on one or both sides stare into a fact: If the war must come, then striking first, even if it cannot eliminate retaliation, is infinitely preferable to striking second. Whichever side waits to go second will lose most if not all of its strategic weapons and will suffer far worse casualties than if it went first. With time at a premium, it may be the more "rational" decision to choose the preprogrammed "option" to go first.

No matter what the original intentions of either side, such a desperate situation grows more likely to happen the more either side adds accurate counter-force weapons to its arsenal. If the Russians build first-strike weapons it does not help matters for the Americans to do the same, and *vice versa*. By the logic of deterrence, with strictly retaliatory weapons, it does not matter much if new weapons are added to the arsenals (other than their being a waste of money, a source of accidents, and so on). By the strange new laws of first-strike readiness, each new missile, whatever the motive behind acquiring it, subtracts a measurable quantity of security. As more and more weapons are added, a threshold will be crossed (for the US arsenal, perhaps around 1996), after which the old logic gives way to the new, and a pre-emptive strike by one side or the other is only a question of time.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

Any steps to keep the arsenals below the first-strike thresholds are steps in the right direction, whether they are taken unilaterally by either side or bilaterally through agreements. It is in America's security interests to cancel the Trident D-5 missile without further ado, as well as the MX and the Midgetman, and start removing the Pershing II from Germany. Even if we did this unilaterally we would be more secure afterward.

But Congress is not likely to do most of these things. It will nibble at the edges of the first-strike build-up—maintaining the cap on MX missiles and perhaps cutting the Midgetman which even the Pentagon does not seem to want—while looking hopefully toward an agreement between Reagan and Gorbachev. But with little debate it will endorse the core of the first-strike arsenal, the Trident D-5, this year as it has in years past. The only limitation of the D-5 on the political horizon is a measure that would forbid the retrofitting of the existing eight Trident submarines, now carrying the C-4, so they would carry the D-5. The Congressional Budget Office has singled out this idea as a way to save eight billion dollars over the next ten years. Yet even so modest a compromise has been avoided by liberal

*assuming SALT II ceilings are not violated but allowing Midgetman and SS-25 SICBMs

Senators, who worry about their "credibility" if they sponsor it.

The new proposal by the Soviets, which would separate SDI from intermediate-range nuclear missile reductions in Europe, is an important development. Such an agreement would be the first reduction, as opposed to stabilization, in the numbers of nuclear weapons deployed in the world, and the momentum it started might lead to much more important agreements. We have already heard, however, the alarmed voices of Kissinger and others in the foreign-policy establishment, and it is likely that they could throw up enough obstacles to prevent the zero-option at least during the remainder of the Reagan tenure.

If an agreement were reached it would remove one component of the first-strike arsenal, the 108 Pershing IIs in Germany, and that is reason enough to support it wholeheartedly. It is also reason enough for the arms-race-as-usual crowd to try to defeat it. The agreement, of course, would not affect the strategic (long-range) forces on either side, including the Trident systems. If the Reykjavik proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles in ten years were revived, and SDI separated from it, then the first-strike threat would be drastically reduced; the D-5 would be cancelled. If, on the other hand, the more likely agreement on a fifty percent cut is ever arrived at, it will have little effect on the first-strike threat. Indeed, it might make matters worse. For if the Soviets eliminate half their ICBM silos and the US eliminates half its warheads (the older and less accurate ones), the same ratio of US warheads to Soviet silos will remain, and the absolute number of Soviet silos that might elude destruction will drop. The problem of first-strike vulnerability would hover over the negotiations and provide dozens of stumbling blocks as long as the US insisted that its "modernized" weapons be exempted from reductions.

So we have every reason to keep pressuring Congress to take steps to reduce or eliminate the various first-strike weapons. It could pass binding legislation on arms-control measures, not only on a comprehensive explosion test ban (which will not, alas, affect the arms race much), but on a missile-flight-test ban or on ocean sanctuaries for each side's missile submarines. A missile flight-test ban would freeze missile development where it is, so the Soviet SS-24 and SS-25 as well as the American D-5 and Midgetman could not be properly tested, and deployed weapons such as the SS-18 and MX would "degrade" in reliability since their ongoing testing programs would cease. Or we could have a ban on new MIRVed missiles. Indeed, it may be time to revive the Comprehensive Freeze idea, to which Congress once gave lip service but never teeth. Ocean

sanctuaries have been proposed by the USSR several times and rejected by the US, which wanted to continue enjoying its lead in anti-submarine warfare; it would be in our interest to keep Soviet submarines out of the western North Atlantic in return for our avoiding the eastern. We could then drop some of our anti-submarine arsenal and save a large amount of money.

To accomplish any of these measures, however, the peace movement and its congressional supporters will have to spend less time and energy on Star Wars. There are good reasons to oppose it, of course, and to protect the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty, but if we continue to neglect the build-up of new strategic forces that have nothing to do with SDI it will not mean much, at least for the next two or three decades, even if we eliminate SDI altogether.

It would help if the peace movement could break itself of an understandable but unproductive habit. Under pressure from its Washington lobbyists each year to concentrate on winning the winnable votes, the peace movement tends to lobby only on the "mainstream" issues packaged in ways to appeal to the middle five or ten percent of the Congress, the moderate "swing" votes. It neglects issues that are not winnable each year, and that only assures that they will remain unwinnable from year to year. The largest national peace groups have pointedly ignored the Trident D-5, since amendments to stop it only get about a hundred votes in the House; and a hundred votes is all they will get until the largest peace groups change course.

About three-fourths of the peace activists in the country, unfortunately, live in Congressional Districts whose Representatives are much better on arms-control issues than the middle tenth. It is seldom necessary to press them to vote for a CTB, to cut SDI, or to protect the SALT and ABMT; they only have to be thanked. For Washington offices of the peace movement to rally their grassroots in these districts around the mainstream winnable issues is largely a waste of time, except for lobbying Senators (in some states), and it misleads local activists about what they could usefully be doing. It would be much more efficient, and more interesting for these activists, to divide the country into at least five categories or "quintiles" based on the voting records of the Representatives. The eighty or ninety best Representatives would be urged to try new ideas, like some of those I have just mentioned, even though they would not win this year. The second fifth, who are reliable on the MX, CTB, SDI, and so on, would be pressed to vote against the Trident D-5. Most of the middle fifth would be lobbied as they always have been, on issues on the verge of success. The fourth quintile might be lobbied along the same lines as the third, for we sometimes pick up votes from this group when it looks like

an issue will win anyway. The fifth quintile could be ignored, or it could be pressed to cut wasteful Pentagon spending. A handful from this last group voted with the bulk of the first quintile last year on the Schroeder amendment to withdraw US overseas troops—an interesting possible alliance.

The point is that, while some parts of the peace movement work on SDI and the ABM Treaty, the bulk of it should turn its attention to the new first-strike strategic arsenal. Then, in two or three years, we might have a chance of stopping the real arms race here below. □

(Continued from p. 34)

DR. SEUSS

The chaos ends when the Sneetches all run out of money, and McBean, with capitalist complacency, laughs as he leaves, noting, "*They never will learn. No, you can't teach a Sneetch!*"

Nevertheless, *The Sneetches* ends on a note that is at least slightly hopeful. Having been so fully and relentlessly exploited, the Sneetches manage to achieve a consciousness breakthrough that obliterates the racism of their culture:

*But McBean was quite wrong. I'm quite happy to say
That the Sneetches got really quite smart on that day,
The day they decided that Sneetches are Sneetches
And no kind of Sneetch is the best on the beaches.*

That Sneetch recognition of shared victimization, however, came only after the complete economic destruction of Sneetch society. Having been reduced to common economic powerlessness, the Sneetches finally realize a unitary class consciousness.

Dr. Seuss's book about environmental destruction, *The Lorax*, is more dark and despairing in mood, with only the slightest glimmer of hope at the end. As in *The Sneetches*, a prevailing and destructive ideology takes hold and becomes utterly totalizing. In *The Lorax*, visual imagery intensifies the bleakness of mood, as even the once proud capitalist, now a miserable and guilty hermit, despairs at the wasteland produced by his own pursuit of gain. Colors are dark blues, grays, purples, and browns, and the only visible vegetation is an occasional thin strand of stiff Grickle-grass.

The ideological mainstay demolished by *The Lorax* is a basic one: Market Freedom. According to conventional wisdom, in a free economy bright entrepreneurs discover novel techniques for fashioning from raw materials new products for the satisfaction of authentic

human needs, which are expressed through choice and exchange on a free market. In Seuss's account the extraction of raw materials becomes the rape of the natural world, as an entire species of trees (the Truffula Trees) is destroyed, along with the fragile ecosystem of birds, animals, and fish that once depended on it. This destruction is accompanied by the pollution which is the inevitable by-product of manufacture.

Meanwhile, the product whose manufacture requires this wholesale devastation of the environment makes a mockery of the market ideologies of both need and utility. The Thneed, claiming to be everything useful, is in fact nothing but a representation of the artificiality of consumer demand as created and manipulated by the greedy producer. The capitalist at first defensively claims universal utility for his new product ("*A Thneed's a Fine Something-That-All-People-Need / It's a shirt. It's a sock. It's a glove. It's a hat . . . You can use it for carpets. For pillows! For sheets! / Or curtains! Or covers or bicycle seats!*") Nevertheless, even he wryly observes after his first sale: "*You never can tell what some people will buy.*"

Despite this early self-awareness, the capitalist is quickly captured by his own ideological role as acquisitive accumulator, to the point where production, which at least in theory should be a function of rational economic planning, becomes an obsessive and irrational felt necessity. Thus, he at first "*felt sad*" when the frolicsome, little bear-like creatures, the Bar-ba-loots, were forced to leave because they could not live without Truffula Fruit, although he quickly convinces himself:

*"But . . . business is business
And business must grow . . . I meant no harm.
I most truly did not.
But I had to grow bigger. So bigger I got.
I biggered my factory. I biggered my roads.
I biggered my wagons. I biggered the loads
Of the Thneeds I shipped out, I was shipping them
forth
to the South! To the East! To the West! To the North!
I went right on biggering . . . selling more Thneeds.
And I biggered my money, which everyone needs."*

With capitalist and consumer alike caught up in the totalizing culture of greed, acquisition, and gratification, the possibility of critique from within is remote if not lost. The sole critical voice is that of the Lorax, a wizened elfish being who seems to antedate Judeo-Christian culture and take us back to a world where nature could speak for itself and be heard. Akin to a Druidic spirit, he emerges from a tree to scold the foolish capitalist and by extension any culture which in its self-importance thinks it can stand apart from its

immersion in the interconnectedness of the natural world.

Unlike the capitalist, who uses the traditionally masculine mode of rational analysis to distance himself from his own feelings, the Lorax is unfailingly emotional, engaged and sympathetic. The discourse he uses, while fretful and even angry, is always one of empathy, not logic ("My poor swomee swans, why they can't sing a note. / No one can sing who has smog in his throat."); and he consistently speaks not for himself, but for others, for those who are unheard ("I speak for the trees, for the trees have no tongues . . .") Similarly, the capitalist defines his responsibilities legalistically, in terms of individual *mens rea* ("I meant no harm. I most truly did not") and by reference to a protected sphere of private conduct ("Well, I have my rights, sir, and I'm telling you / I intend to go on doing just what I do.") By contrast, the Lorax defines responsibility by the consequences that acts have on others, on the whole interconnected community of nature, and he tries to force the capitalist to take personal responsibility for the harm he does when exercising his "rights."

Nevertheless, the Lorax is ignored, and the scene at the end is one of bleak despair. The Lorax departs, leaving nothing but desolation behind him. Even the capitalist retreats into isolation, in a bizarre, aerial, Dickensian hovel, to reflect on the Lorax's last word: "Unless."

That final word represents the core of Seuss's message: There is always choice. No matter how heavy the weight of the past, the possibility of existential, committed action remains. Thus, the final point is one of freedom, not necessity. Even conditions of seeming oppression can be transformed into empowering moral statements and become expressions of genuine commitment. Also, in *The Lorax*, as in most of Dr. Seuss's work, it is a child, with some link to a natural innocence which can never be completely regained, who is given the final opportunity to act. The capitalist tosses a small seed to a young boy, with the urgent instruction:

*"You're in charge of the last of the Truffula Seeds.
And Truffula Trees are what everyone needs.
Plant a new Truffula. Treat it with care.
Give it clean water. And feed it fresh air.
Grow a forest. Protect it from axes that hack.
Then the Lorax and all of his friends may come
back."*

Dr. Seuss's most pessimistic story is the recent *Butter Battle Book*, in which Seuss once again uses his favorite political weapon (his "bat," to use the imagery of *Solla Sollew*), which is mockery. *The Butter Battle Book* is a bitterly sarcastic history of the arms race, which takes

us to the present moment of uncertain dread caused by the threat of nuclear warfare. Dr. Seuss refuses to relieve the tension of that uncertainty: At the end of the story, a boy, afraid of the bomb, shouts out to his bomb-carrying warrior grandfather, "*Be careful! Oh Gee! Who's going to drop it? / Will you . . . ? Or will he . . . ?*" Grandfather's only answer is the terrible, "*Be patient . . . We'll see/We will see . . .*"

Equally terrifying is the extent to which the ideology that justifies the arms race—the ideology of hysterical national moral superiority and contempt for cultural difference—pervades society. With fierce, Swiftian satire Seuss describes that ideology as transparently foolish at its core. The great difference between the Yooks and the enemy Zooks is the way they spread their butter on their bread, yet this trivial difference forms the basis for a hatred which dominates national life. At the start of the story, the young narrator is carefully instructed by his grandfather:

*"It's high time that you know of the terribly horrible
thing that Zooks do
In every Zook house and in every Zook town
every Zook eats his bread with the butter side
down! . . ."
Grandpa gritted his teeth.
"So you can't trust a Zook who spreads bread under-
neath!
Every Zook must be watched! He has kinks in his
soul!"*

As the Yooks and Zooks absurdly wage war with each other to the point of mutual extinction, the citizens uncritically participate in the patriotic frenzy. The Butter-up Band and the Right-Side-Up Song Girls, singing "*Oh be faithful! / Believe in thy butter!*" urge the soldiers on. Then, in an especially bleak scene, the Yook citizens are all ordered underground to prepare for war. They dutifully do as they are told, still deeply believing in their country's moral supremacy:

*I noticed that every last Yook in our land
was obeying the Chief Yookeroo's grim command
They were all bravely marching with banners aflutter,
down a hole! For their country! And Right-Side-Up
Butter!*

Closely linked to the ideology of patriotism is the celebration of technological advance, which Seuss exposes as nothing but destructive absurdity. Each new Yook weapon is matched by an equally powerful Zook weapon, as military inventiveness becomes ever more elegantly ridiculous. Thus sling shots are rapidly replaced by elaborate weapons like the Eight-Nozzled, Elephant-Toted Boom Blitz, until finally the bomb—

the Bitsy Big-Boy Boomeroo—renders all other weaponry obsolete.

While the Yook citizens cheer this process on, the pervasiveness of the nationalist ideology has rendered them essentially passive and unreflecting. The real architects of the arms race are the militarist Chief Yookeroo and his technocratic "*Boys in the Back Room*." In their dark closet labeled Top-est Secret-est Brain Nest they perform all the seemingly unquestionable, rational mathematic calculations that lead to the most irrational outcome of all—the threat of annihilation. Under the pressure of militarist ideology, political choice has become nothing but passive complicity in this cult of Scientific Expertise and National Superiority.

The terrifying uncertainty at the end of *The Butter Battle Book* can be interpreted as a call for *real* choice, a plea for self-willed human action taken to challenge a suffocating and absurdly destructive amoral technocratic society. As other Seuss books illustrate, however, choice is not just defiance and opposition. While Seuss's most obviously political books expose evil, others, ultimately no less political, also explore the meaning of virtue, especially in the form of lived choice in the world. Seuss's early and still popular stories, *Horton Hatches the Egg* and *Thidwick the Big-Hearted Moose*, provide well-known examples. In each, a routine request for a social favor is transformed into a powerful act of moral choice.

In *Horton Hatches the Egg* the lazy Mayzie Bird asks Horton the elephant to take a turn sitting on her egg. Horton reluctantly agrees, and while Mayzie flippantly sings out "Toodle-oo" and flies off to Palm Beach, Horton totally commits himself to the transformative task he has undertaken, as expressed in the familiar refrain "I meant what I said and I said what I meant, / An elephant's faithful one hundred per cent."

This commitment proves to be no idle one, as evidenced by the series of trials Horton endures. First is physical pain, as the rains and snows beat down on him; then comes the mockery of his friends, who jeer at the absurdity of an elephant sitting in a tree and trying to hatch an egg. After his friends desert him, Horton must even stare death in the face, when hunters aim their rifles at Horton and he still stays with the nest. Finally comes the harshest trial of all: Horton is turned into a commodity, sold to a circus that hauls him across the country so that crowds of people can pay ten cents apiece to laugh at him.

With Horton, Seuss thus takes the convention of promise keeping and then explores what it would mean if it were taken seriously, as moral obligation. Promises are usually associated with social nicety or self-interested bargaining. Operating within either of those realms,

Horton would never be expected to follow through on his promise. Mazie herself defies social norms by never returning, which should relieve Horton of all further obligation; nor could Horton ever be supposed to have foreseen the difficulties he would encounter. To use conventional contract vocabulary, if he were a rational self-maximizer on the market, he would never have assumed the risk that a simple promise to help out could become a mission that would inform every moment of his life.

Promising and contracting always play upon our genuine impulses of niceness and commitment, yet we are never obliged to stake ourselves to the ultimate follow-through. In the ideological realms of both politeness and contracting, there is always an excuse. Horton, however, in the purity of his vision, discovers and seizes the core niceness of promising, making it the basis for an ultimate act of self-realization.

Significantly, that act of self-realization also requires that Horton appropriate a role and identity which, by all conventional assumptions, is utterly female. He must be the nurturing mother. The ridicule of his friends is doubtless directed not just at his size in relation to the tiny nest but also at his womanish behavior. According to the norms of the 1940s and 1950s, only wimpish nerds would act like Horton.

Horton's seeming passivity is intensified by the fact that he must not leave the nest; therefore he stolidly remains in the tree, while others abuse him in the process of acting out their stereotypically masculine roles as hunters and successful entrepreneurs. Paradoxically, however, it is really Horton who has made the active choice, the choice to defy norms in the quest for a virtue rooted in freedom rather than convention.

That Horton has a happy ending is irrelevant, for that ending is wonderfully outside the scope of all rational expectation: As it turns out, the egg hatches and the child within has magically become Horton's own ("It had ears and a tail and a trunk just like his!") Children rejoice at the outcome, yet they and we know that the purity of Horton's commitment was such that results were never the issue.

In *Thidwick the Big-Hearted Moose* Dr. Seuss once again takes niceness beyond the hypocritical realm of politeness, to the point of a seemingly absurd and also burdensome—indeed, life-threatening—commitment. In *Thidwick the Big-Hearted Moose* a variety of pesky, selfish creatures take up residence in Thidwick's antlers. Thidwick longs to be rid of the self-indulgent pests, but that would be wrong. The resident creatures, like yuppie real-estate developers in a gentrified neighborhood, make a mockery of communitarianism when they keep urging others to join them at Thidwick's expense. Then, when Thidwick must swim across the

lake for the moose-moss on which his survival depends, his guests all foolishly vote to keep him on shore, thereby reducing participatory democracy to the mere expression of trivial, short-sighted, self-interest. Even in the face of this destructive pettiness, however, Thidwick feels bound to the obligation (here again a traditionally feminine virtue—hospitality) he has assumed and stays ashore.

As in *Horton Hatches the Egg*, the ending is utterly appropriate, yet wholly outside the scope of Thidwick's expectation. He sheds his antlers, a natural event he did not anticipate, and the oppressively selfish guests confront an equally petty, self-important selfishness, but one that is vastly more powerful: Still on Thidwick's discarded antlers, they end up stuffed and mounted on the Harvard Club wall.

Thus Thidwick, like Horton, makes a powerful statement about the revolutionary possibility of empowerment. Thidwick seizes the very tools of his oppression—i. e., the burden of conventional obligation—and transforms that burden into a self-willed act of moral choice. By the purity of their commitment, both Horton and Thidwick become active, living subjects, not mere playthings of their petty oppressors.

The residents of Thidwick's antlers typify the alienated community of the selfish, atomistic, and self-important. An alternative, the possibility of true community, is offered to us by Dr. Seuss in *Horton Hears a Who*. Unfortunately, within orthodox society the voice of true community can barely be heard. When the ever attentive and protective Horton listens to a faint voice, coming from a mere speck of dust, the other animals start to ridicule him. Passing onto her child the received conventional wisdom, a mother kangaroo announces: "*Why, that speck is as small as the head of a pin. / A person on that ... Why, there never has been!*"

Thus Horton, whose innocence of spirit gives him access to alternative possibilities, must once again confront the suffocating oppression of orthodoxy, in this case parading as scientific truth about Objective Reality. The orthodoxy is so pervasive that it rules out and denies any alternative discourses, or, as Foucault would call them, "subjugated knowledges." Thus Horton finds he must stake his epistemological ground against mockery, humiliation, and physical abuse in order to save what he has started to recognize as a voice of real community.

At the end, Horton must call upon the Whos to save themselves by making their collective voice heard. This requires that all the Whos call out together in one loud voice. Nevertheless, one "*young twerp of a Who*" is found self-indulgently bouncing a yo-yo and ignoring the collective effort. Seized by the angry mayor of Whoville, he is forced to give up his individualized pleasure and to join the others in shouting from the

highest tower. That one extra shout is the margin of victory for Whoville ("*Their voices were heard! / They rang out clear and clean*"), and the authentic voice of the fully participating community captures and transforms even the mean-spirited mother kangaroo. Horton then cries out triumphantly ... "*They've proved they ARE persons, no matter how small. / And their whole world was saved by the smallest of All!*"

In his Christmas story, *The Grinch*, Seuss once again takes up the possibility of authentic community trying to realize itself in a setting of ideological contradiction. The Grinch, a cynical and bitter fifty-three-year-old (notably, Seuss was fifty-three when the book was published) is disgusted with Christmas in all of its crass and materialistic trappings. From the Grinch perspective this materialism is so pervasive as to constitute the whole social meaning of Christmas, and that perception might be said to validate the Grinch's terroristic approach, which is the critical negation of Christmas through theft: Pretending to be Santa Claus, the Grinch sweeps down into Whoville and carries away all the food, presents and decorations associated with Christmas. In this guise of critical negator, the Grinch is a revolutionary hero.

As it turns out, however, the Whos prove themselves to be something other than soulless bearers of social form, for they have fashioned for themselves a Christmas experience that accords with true community life, one that is ultimately indifferent to the commercialized version seized by the Grinch. Thus, even though the Grinch successfully carries away all the material goodies of Christmas and leaves Whoville quite bare, the Whos nevertheless come together to experience Christmas as genuine fellowship, something the Grinch's sneering thievery could not take away from them:

*He HADN'T stopped Christmas from coming!
IT CAME!*

*It came without ribbons! It came without tags!
It came without packages, boxes or Bags! ...*

From the Who perspective, the Grinch, in his mode of critical negation, has been neither hero nor villain, simply a sad and lonely creature cut off by his own cynicism from authentic social being. When the Grinch begins to witness the real fellowship which remains at the core of an otherwise conventionalized and commercialized cultural ceremony, a moment of transformation occurs: He becomes, like Thidwick, big-hearted rather than small-hearted ("*... the Grinch's small heart / Grew three sizes that day!*") and can then join the Whos for their Christmas feast. Notably, this represents no change in the Grinch's rational, intellectual analysis (something the radical religious tradition has always

understood to be ultimately irrelevant), but rather a transformation of spirit and feeling, a new way of perceiving the world which in turn leads to the possibility of community unmediated by social form and category.

With this goal of transformation in mind, it is appropriate to return to the question posed in the last two lines of the *Cat in the Hat* ("What would you do if your mother asked you?"), for that question poses once again the dilemma of virtue's relation to authority. This question is profoundly disturbing to children, for good reason. To choose conventional morality in alliance with authority is to surrender all possibility of existential realization. To be for no other reason than that they tell you to be is not to be at all. On the other hand, children rightly understand the reality of power in the world: Individualized, direct confrontation with authority will surely fail. The child who would defiantly celebrate the cat's visit is doomed to awesome punishment, yet the child who contritely tells the truth forestalls punishment at the price of self-respect. The other choice is to abandon the search for virtue altogether, making a pact with powerful satanic forces in an orgy of joyful self-gratification that will ultimately lead to empty despair.

As starkly presented, those choices are no choices at all. As children instinctively know, what is first needed is some distance, some space—to get authority off one's back long enough to begin to fashion oneself as moral actor in the world, without having to be either a clone of authority and conventional morality or its equally objectified negative mirror image. Books like *Yertle the Turtle*, *The Butter Battle Book*, and *The Lorax* are about the necessity of reclaiming some space in the world, of opening up the way for new possibilities.

But space alone is not enough. So long as that space is filled with selves as we now know them, oppressive hierarchy and orthodoxy will reassert themselves. Other Dr. Seuss books suggest a different kind of self—a self that without intellectual reflection is caring (Horton), sharing (Thidwick)—or, finally, open to spiritual transformation (Grinch). Children cannot articulate or intellectualize the choice for a different kind of self, but Seuss directs his question to them because, of all people, they alone in their accessibility may be most able to make it. As a writer, with his mocking spirit, Seuss has, in effect, aligned himself with the anti-authoritarian cat, in order to give children the space they need to make more morally affirmative choices. □

(Continued from p. 46)

WOMEN IN PARADISE

hymns and praises, and study Torah. (Emphasis added)

After describing the chamber of Jocheved and Deborah, the passage concludes:

And the chambers of the Matriarchs cannot be described; no one can come into their chambers. Now, dear women, when the souls are together in Paradise, how much joy there is! Therefore, I pray you to praise God with great devotion, and to say your prayers, that you may be worthy to be there with our Mothers.

This remarkable passage differs in a number of significant ways from the original. Three of these changes, in particular, bespeak a different view of women's spiritual status. First, there is no mention of women's inferior garments; the whole discussion of garments is simply omitted. Second, the subject matter of women's study is changed. No longer are women studying the reasons for the commandments they could not perform on earth, and are thus, somehow, still repairing or compensating for the disabilities they suffered as earthly women. Rather, they are simply, in the Yiddish phrase, *lernen Toyre*. This phrase denotes "studying Torah," which is, of course, the primary religious duty of Jewish men, from which women were excused or excluded. But in Paradise, at least according to "The Three Gates," women engage in this most holy of activities.⁸ (The Yiddish "tales" about the women's Paradise, incidentally, make this even more explicit. They state that women study Torah "just like men.") The assertion that women could study Torah, even if only in Paradise, must have seemed quite revolutionary; it was expunged from some later editions of the text, which simply say that Joseph studied Torah in an upper chamber, while the women sang God's praises below. Third, and perhaps the most striking feature of this text, Bithia and Serah boldly proclaim their strength and their spiritual power. They express a sense of their own worth in this passage, not just their good fortune in having been the agents of events concerning important men. A fourth change, the expunging of the erotic element from the conclusion of the description, seems characteristic of the popularization of kabbalistic texts. This raises issues I cannot pursue here; however, this passage will be important in establishing the chain of literary transmission between the *Zohar* and the *tkhine*.

All of these changes occur in a text in Yiddish which was explicitly addressed to women. It makes a certain amount of sense that a work intended for women would portray women as powerful figures, although

8. Part of the reason for the change in terminology may be a simplification for a popular audience. It is possible that women (or non-learned men) could not be assumed to know what the study of *ta'amei ha-mitsvot* was.

not all works intended for women did so. Yet one may also ask if these changes suggest that a woman was the *author* of this text. The fact that this description derives from the *Zohar* seemed to pose a difficulty: Could a woman actually have read the original *Zohar* text? Only a few women even acquired full competence in Hebrew, let alone Aramaic, and an esoteric text like the *Zohar* was not a likely one for a woman to study.⁹ This problem set me looking for an intermediate source in Yiddish, and in the course of this search I discovered all the versions of the description mentioned at the outset. On the other hand, the fact that the changes in the text expanded women's spiritual horizons made a female author seem very plausible.

I still don't know whether or not "The Three Gates" was written by a woman. But when I hypothesized that these changes must have been introduced by a woman, I was wrong, as I discovered when I found the intermediate source. As will become apparent, the author of "The Three Gates" based her (or his) text on the *Sefer Ma'asei Adonai*, the "Book of the Deeds [or Tales] of the Lord," in which the description of the women's Paradise forms part of a Yiddish paraphrase of a long section of the *Zohar*.

The author of this work, Simon Akiva Ben ben Joseph, lived in Germany and Bohemia in the 17th century. He spent much of his life wandering, teaching Talmud and preaching. In addition to two works in Hebrew, a mystical commentary on the daily prayers, and an encyclopedia of Midrash Rabba (a compilation of rabbinic legends), he composed two works in Yiddish, both of which were very popular. These were the *Avir Yaakov* ("Protector of Jacob"), a collection of legends from medieval mystical sources about the biblical Patriarchs, and the "Book of the Deeds of the Lord," which contains stories collected, translated and adapted from various mystical works. Part 1 first appeared in 1691, Part 2 in 1694, and a revised combination of the two in 1708.¹⁰ Thus, he was an author actively engaged in the popularization of mystical literature. Interestingly enough, his works, while in Yiddish, were not primarily directed to a female audience, but to non-scholarly men.

There is no need to go into all the technical details which prove that this work is in fact the source used by the author of "The Three Gates." It is, indeed, even possible to show that it was the revised, combined version of 1708, rather than the versions based on the 1694 edition, which was used. The clincher is that

strange detail about the "upper chamber" in which, according to the *tkhine*, Joseph studies Torah. This "upper chamber" first appears in the 1708 edition. In any case, let me quote the passages comparable to those cited for the other two texts:

... Dear Rabbi, there are six chambers in which there are women. And there is a curtain spread out in Paradise, past which no man can go. And in the first chamber sit several thousands and myriads of women none of whom have suffered the pains of Hell, and Bithia daughter of Pharaoh is their queen. And every day there comes a cry that says that the image of Moses is coming. Now there is a place in that chamber where Bithia can open a curtain and see the image of Moses. As soon as she sees him, she bows down to him and says, *How worthy is my power* that I brought up such a light! This happens three times a day.

Now in the next chamber there are thousands of myriads of women, and Serah, daughter of Asher, is their queen. And every day it is called out three times, Here comes the image of Joseph the Righteous! She bows down to him, and says also, *Praised is my power, and how beautiful is my strength*, that I was worthy to tell the good news to my lord Jacob that my uncle Joseph was still alive. *And in the upper chamber* [in the 1694 version: in the first chamber] *they study Torah, and in this next chamber they sing praises and hymns and also study Torah.* (Emphasis added.)

After describing Jocheved's and Deborah's chambers, the description concludes:

And in the chambers where our Matriarchs are, it is not to be described what joy and purity there are, and no one is privileged to see their purity. Now, dear Rabbi, when the souls in Paradise come together, they have great delights, and they rejoice fully in Paradise. And a great light is created from their joy, and from this light are created the souls from which come the converts to Judaism ...

To run briefly through the comparison: "The Book of the Deeds of the Lord" omits mention of the inferior garments. Second, women study Torah, and we can see that the introduction into the *tkhine* of Joseph studying Torah in the "upper chamber"

and 2 was first noted by Sarah Zfatman; see her annotated bibliography, *Yiddish Narrative Prose from its Beginnings to 'Shivbei ha-Besht' (1514-1814)* (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1985), p. 92. I am indebted to Dr. Zfatman and to her bibliography for assistance in locating the versions of the "women in Paradise" motif.

9. I have subsequently discovered that at least one 18th century Ashkenazic woman, Sarah Rebecca Rachel Leah bat Jacob Jokel Horowitz (b. ca. 1720), could read the *Zohar*, and incorporated quotations from it into her trilingual (Hebrew, Aramaic, and Yiddish) work, "The *Tkhine* of the Matriarchs."

10. The fact that the 1708 edition was a combination of Parts 1

is both a watering down of the original force of the statement, and an attempt to explain a typographical error or misreading. The earlier edition, referring to the fact that Torah study went on in Bithia's chamber as well as Serah's, referred to the *first* (*ershtn*) chamber; the later edition erroneously substitutes the word *eybershtn* (upper) for *ershtn*. A later reader could have reasoned, What upper chamber could have been meant? It must have been a segregated spot in which a man could study. Which man appears in the text? Joseph. Third, Bithia and Serah proclaim their power. Fourth, the conclusion seems just about half-way between the original text and the *tkhines's* complete exclusion of erotic elements. Further, the wording of the final address to Simeon bar Yohai is clearly the literary model for the author of the *tkhine's* appeal to women to be good girls and say their prayers.

Despite my exhilaration at having discovered the intermediate source between the *tkhine* and the *Zohar*, when I realized that Akiva Ber, a man, had introduced all of the key changes, I was at first somewhat disappointed. But when I realized that the "Book of the Deeds of the Lord" was not only written *by* a man, but also addressed primarily *to* men, as the introduction makes clear, I was intrigued. Whatever his reasons for making these changes, Akiva could not simply be accused of pandering to his audience. Indeed, this positive portrayal of women for a male audience becomes one of the most interesting features of this array of materials concerning the fate of women in Paradise. Non-learned men could read about women who said things like "Praised is my power, and how beautiful is my strength."

In the analysis of all these texts, we may seem to have descended from spiritual heights to a morass of details. So let us ask again, how high could women's souls reach? How were women's religious aspirations imagined by Ashkenazic Jews? I admit that the study of a single motif, however widespread, is only a slight foundation on which to base an answer to this question. But it can at least point us in some interesting directions.

The evidence of the texts we have examined suggests that the answer to these questions depends on whom you ask. The most restricted view of women's spiritual prospects was that available to the intellectual elite, to those who could read the *Zohar* in the original, and who did not need to resort to—and perhaps would not stoop to—Akiva Ber's popularizations in Yiddish. For this audience, women, even in Paradise, retained a distinctly subordinate status. Non-learned men and women, by contrast, were presented with versions of this motif which asserted that, at least in Paradise, women could become like men, having their own spiritual worth, and attaining unambiguously to the paramount male religious activity, Torah study. It is, to

say the least, of interest that there seems to have been more sympathy for, or appreciation of, women among (or conveyed to) the uneducated than among the learned. Another important point here is that in the process of the popularization of this motif, the mystical material was not watered down, but intensified. (This is with regard to women's religious potential; erotic elements and, in other texts, technical kabbalistic materials were reduced or suppressed.)

In addition, these texts suggest that the answers to these questions about women's spirituality also depend on *when* you ask—at what historical period. This can be seen most clearly in the changes which take place in this passage in successive editions of "The Three Gates." During the first half of the 19th century, the text developed in one of two ways: Either it eliminated the reference to Joseph studying Torah in the upper chamber, or it eliminated the mention of women studying Torah. It thus eliminated the ambiguity, and came out either for or against the full-fledged and self-sufficient study of Torah by women. By the late 19th century, however, the reference to women's study was often omitted, whether or not Joseph's study was retained. In addition, one late (1894) version of this description (which was, incidentally, pirated from "The Three Gates" and incorporated into a completely different *tkhine*) also removed Bithia's and Serah's exclamations of power, perhaps revising the text to bring it back into line with the original. Thus, the affirmation of women's spiritual power and worth, and the assertion that women can aspire, at least in Paradise, to something like equality with men, found in early editions of this text, fades somewhat by the end of the 19th century.

At this point, it is difficult to be certain of the reasons for this change. I would speculate that one factor may have been the desire of certain modernizing Jewish intellectuals to transform the traditional Jewish household into a model middle-class family along 19th century Western European lines. This involved restricting women to the role of housewife, and removing them from their traditional economic and other activities outside the home. It has been shown that some of these *maskilim* ("enlightened" intellectuals) used the vehicle of Yiddish popular literature, including the *tkhines*, to convey their views to a female audience. It is also well known that they did not hold this audience in high regard.

While the great classics of Jewish literature remain crucial to an understanding of Jewish religious life, the analysis of these descriptions of the women's Paradise suggests that popular Yiddish religious literature holds important resources for those who seek to recover a broader

Jewish history, one that includes women's experience as well as men's, and the religious concerns of ordinary Jews along with those of the scholarly elite. There is no reason to regard this literature as less legitimate a source for the Jewish past—or for our own connections to it—than the classic sources which have received so much more scholarly attention. Nor should the classics be cast in the role of villain: The point is that, as a complex and many-levelled religious system, Ashkenazic Judaism contained multiple visions of women's religious life, and that all of these visions should be available to those who wish to reclaim them. It is worth remembering that *all* of the texts examined, from the *Zohar* to the *tkhine*, were, in varying degrees, liberating: They enabled men and women to imagine a Paradise filled with thousands of myriads of righteous women, unencumbered by their roles as wives and mothers, freed from at least some of their earthly limitations, devoting themselves to studying Torah and praising God. □

(Continued from p. 50)

THE POISONED HEART

ruary 1, 1943 and June 1, 1945. Of this sum, the yishuv's own fund-raising drive for mobilization and rescue provided 647,000 Palestine pounds, the JDC gave 512,000, and the other communities in the free world contributed 170,000. Dina Porat's computations lead her to assess rescue expenditures at about one-fourth of all the Jewish Agency's outlays. "These figures are rather surprising," Porat writes, "considering the fierce criticism which both the Histadrut and the Rescue Committee levelled at the Jewish Agency." Just the same, they certainly do not bespeak a mighty and sweeping effort on the yishuv's part to save European Jewry. On the contrary, they indicate that had a special financial institution devoted to rescue been established, and had systematic, constant action been taken to raise funds for this endeavor, it would have been possible to solicit much greater sums from the public during the Holocaust years—"boom years" for the yishuv—and allocate them exclusively to rescue. This was never done. Had more money been allocated, more lives could have been saved, even if the total picture of devastation would have remained essentially unchanged.

Because the Jewish Agency Executive acted slowly and hesitantly, and because it was not directly responsible for the yishuv's rescue operations, the emissaries bypassed it in their appeals for money, in favor of the Histadrut's Executive Committee. As a result, this more activist institution, under the leadership of David Remez and Golda Myerson, served as a conduit for

many of the yishuv's clandestine activities vis-à-vis Great Britain, which could not be performed under Jewish Agency Executive auspices. It also spurred the Jewish Agency Executive to be more active. "The Jewish Agency Executive made a great mistake," said Remez in late 1943, "by not allocating unlimited funds to the rescue cause from the beginning of the operation. Had the Executive obtained a million Palestine pounds credit for this activity for ten years, the whole Jewish world would have known that no rescue opportunity was being passed up."

The yishuv's formal leadership, however, was not the only actor whose operations were marred by shortsightedness, insensitivity, and—insofar as it acted at all—relegation of this matter to a status secondary to yishuv-centered, Zionist interests.

For example, Berl Katznelson, a spiritual father and guiding light of the Labor Movement—a dominant force in the yishuv—spent the critical years preoccupied with establishing and consolidating the Histadrut's "Am Oved" publishing house. He also spent days and nights in attempts to bridge gaps among rival factions within Mapai, though his personal status in the party was already on the wane. Yitzhak Tabenkin, leader of Ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuchad—always the first body to harness itself to any task involving settlement and Jewish causes—and a friend and partner of Ben-Gurion and Katznelson, was almost totally immersed in the cauldron of intra-party strife.

More amazing still was the nearly total silence of the yishuv's important authors and poets. Wouldn't their utterances and human sensitivities be much sharper than the politicians'? Yet, Uri Zvi Greenberg and S. Y. Agnon were silent as the Holocaust raged. Martin Buber, addressing a conference of writers in July, 1942, said that the major danger facing the yishuv and the Jewish people was not the menace from without but disintegration from within. Omitting all mention of the fate of the Jews of Europe, he spoke of the phenomena of corruption and speculation. Natan Alterman, a poet without equal in his attentive ear to current events, wrote hundreds of weekly columns during the war, but dedicated a mere eleven poems to the annihilation of the Jews in Europe. Alongside them, he continued to write about daily life, routine affairs, the theater, and the town of Tel Aviv. His attitude was mirrored by the entire yishuv; not only did it hardly stray from its routine pattern of life, but it flourished and blossomed as never before. Once Rommel's defeat at Al-Alamein in late 1942 lifted the German threat from the yishuv itself—and just as reports about the Germans' planned and systematic murder of the Jews of Europe reached a stage at which they

could no longer be ignored by the free world and the Palestinian yishuv—the Jews of Palestine enjoyed a rare surge of cosmopolitan life, fueled by an economic boom which pulled the entire yishuv in its wake. Palestine was a transit station for thousands of Allied soldiers. In the large towns, cafes and taverns opened their doors, while theaters staged performances virtually every evening. University students threw Purim parties. At Kibbutz Dalia, the national dance gathering resumed. If the yishuv had 17,400 unemployed in 1939, their number diminished by 1944 to a mere 490. Palestine was a safe, placid, and enjoyable place to live.

Expressions of guilt for the yishuv's island-in-the-storm ambience, and its reluctance to take extreme measures to help its fellow Jews of Europe, also turned into a routine of sorts, a sidekick-ritual of the routine life itself.

"We all eat and drink," someone wrote in the newspaper *Davar*, in February, 1943—"sleep and enjoy it, read for pleasure, attend concerts, visit the theater, and frequent the coffeehouses. It is not the type of amusements that is terrible, but rather the empty hearts thirsting for the amusements, which are so puzzling and hair-raising."

That very month, Ben-Gurion wrote to his secretary in Washington about a meeting he had with a young girl, a member of Hehalutz in Poland, who had succeeded in reaching Palestine: "I cannot free myself of the nightmare which has again been brought to us ... I heard stories of atrocity and suffering that no Dante or Poe could concoct in his imagination; you feel totally helpless, and you cannot even go out of your mind—the sun rises and you, too, have to go on with your regular work ... and it's not easy."

Yes, protest meetings were held and mass assemblies convened. Speeches were delivered in lofty rhetoric, and the public attended ceremonies of mourning. In synagogues there were special prayers for the Jews of Europe. The greatest effect of these ceremonies, however, was not their contribution to helping or rescuing the Jews, but their palliative, compensating, and purging aspects. After them, one could return to routine with greater verve.

Remarks uttered before the Zionist Executive Committee in May, 1943 by Yitzhak Gruenbaum, of all people—words so direct as to be brutal—arouse more than a trace of sympathy today. At least they are free of pretense, and avoid blind bereavement rituals unaccompanied by a genuine mobilization of local resources for action. Gruenbaum told his colleagues, "I do not think it our task to call a halt to normal life in a corner of the world in the Old Continent where there is normal life. And I am neither envious nor heartless that I cannot see that the Jews are a little happy with their

lives. It's good that there is one corner of the world where a Jew feels himself free and also a little happy with his life. And I do not know why I've got to put an end to happiness in life. What would that achieve? Nothing but self-satisfaction for people who'd say, 'Look, we've cried for five minutes, and something's going to change because of that.'"

No doubt. An abyss—part psychological and part real—had opened between devastated European Jewry and the living, flourishing Jewish community in Palestine. Zion-based, self-fulfilling Zionism had turned its back on the Jewish people. Negation of the Diaspora, refusal to acquiesce to the image of passive reaction of Diaspora Jews to the attacker's blows, the strong, natural will to live of people who found themselves out of the Nazis' grasp and considered themselves lucky, and the psychic mechanisms which people employ in their subconscious to defend themselves against harsh experiences, trauma, and intolerable reality which threaten to upset their psychic equilibrium—the Jews in Palestine, and elsewhere, harbored them all. What makes this so surprising is that this community was a branch from the trunk of European Jewry. Everyone in Palestine had relatives in Europe—parents, brothers, grandparents, uncles, and aunts. Nevertheless, and perhaps for this very reason, those repression mechanisms were hard at work.

Neither was the abyss purely psychological. It had its real, actual side, in historical circumstances independent of the yishuv's attitude to European Jewry. The routes to the Nazi-occupied territories were totally obstructed. The yishuv itself had no political sovereignty, and depended for almost all its operations on the mercies of Great Britain.

The Nazis could be fought only within the British framework, and the British were not eager to permit Palestinian Jews to mobilize out of very well-placed apprehension that such a Jewish force would later come into play in the Zionists' struggle against the British for Palestine. It is also worth noting that the Zionist leadership regarded a Jewish army as a Zionist instrument first of all, a phase in amassing might toward the establishment of a state, and an important card to play in the political bargaining which would follow the war. However, once the British did permit the yishuv to enlist, about thirty-thousand men signed up and went. Some were young, others less young. Many of them did not have long-term Zionist considerations in mind. They wanted to reach the Diaspora by any route. After all is said and done, some even got there in time to fight the Nazis, rescue Jews, and provide the surviving remnant some succor.

As early as the end of 1942, Eliahu Golomb, a yishuv

leader and one of the founders of the Haganah, suggested that a regiment of paratroopers be sent into the ghettos of Europe, for the purpose of fomenting uprisings and arousing the Jews to act against the Germans. Though approaching fifty, Golomb sought to place himself at the head of the force and to parachute himself into Europe. The idea, which sounded fantastic at the time, underwent various metamorphoses. The British first rejected it and then toyed with it until the closing stages of the war. Finally, in late 1943 and 1944, thirty-two Palestinian paratroopers in British uniforms set out for the occupied territories. It was too late, and they were too few. They were neither properly trained nor suitably equipped. Their duties were poorly defined. It was a suicide mission. But they went, knowing they were almost certainly going to their deaths. Their heart-throbbing letters attest to this. They could have backed off, reconsidered at the last moment, and not gone. Some did, and their names have been blotted out from history. But most did not back off. They left young families, friends, and a tranquil and relatively secure homeland in favor of a blind landing in occupied Europe. Seven of them died and became heroes, parts of the national myth. Others, who landed alive and succeeded in eluding the Nazis, even managed to do something. If they did not actually save anyone, they did organize the survivors, and after the end of the war, bring them to Eretz Israel.

Then there were the yishuv's emissaries in Geneva and Istanbul. These delegations, manning the front-line posts with regard to the occupied countries, wallowed in partisan squabbles and wasted tremendous energy on political disputes and questions of representation. They worked almost empty-handed; the leadership in Palestine provided them nothing by way of massive and significant backing. Some of them, however, did everything they could—they sent letters signed "my homeland," dispatched parcels of food and money to the ghettos ("poured a glass of water on a burning city" as one of them said), and tried to shake the yishuv out of its lassitude by decibel power. They sent signals in both directions—into the murk which blanketed the occupied lands, and toward Palestine. In both cases, the signals reached targets and were picked up. It later became clear that every letter and parcel sent from Istanbul or Geneva which reached its destination had the effect of granting more life and more meaning to life.

There is no doubt that the emissaries' ceaseless demands for greater mobilization and more action were the factors which ultimately provoked the yishuv to step up its rescue efforts—which, in the end, were not altogether meaningless. The total effort—the humane, fair, elementary acts of individuals and groups—could

not, as stated, reverse the course of history. They did not reduce the magnitude of the slaughter by any significant measure. But the efforts were detected and recorded on both ends, in Europe and in Palestine, and set standards of human behavior at a time of great disaster. They became the substance without which historical memory and consciousness cannot exist.

At the same time that the yishuv was continuing with daily life its leadership was enslaved to long-obsolete ideological concepts and involved in drawing up its long-term political plans. As historian Yehuda Bauer put it, they were so preoccupied with planning the postwar world that they could not see what was happening before their eyes in Europe. Against all this, there were modest "workers of the present" at work—volunteers in the British Army, representatives in Istanbul, and above all the parachutists. These men and women of the yishuv, neither leaders, visionaries, nor idealogues, were free of the commitment to a great Zionist design. Thus they were free to help, to rescue, to rehabilitate, to succor—i.e., to do the immediate, vital "work of the present," in its new context of the Holocaust period.

Like Albert Camus' heroes in *The Plague*, like Dr. Rieux, Tarrou, Rambert, and the others who mounted a hopeless struggle against an all-consuming plague threatening the city, these Palestinian Jews—not many—went out and hurled their human emotions, their mercies, their determination, and their wisdom against the tyranny of death and passivity, because "the only means of fighting a plague is common decency." Or as Dr. Rieux put it, "There is no question of heroism in all this. It's a matter of common decency." □

(Continued from p. 87)

HEBREW POETRY

soil. Yeshurun demonstrated both a special awareness of the historical memory of the Jews, and the human price paid on account of the Arab inhabitants of the land.

Yeshurun's barbed dissent from Laor's poem is undoubtedly also connected with the ad hominem tone of the poem, which includes direct references to Yeshurun's family and his neighborhood in Tel Aviv. His venom was just as strongly aroused by the up-dated reworking Laor accorded to his "Passover on Caves." Angered by this, and by the moral slipperiness he perceived in Laor's poetic "I," Yeshurun heaped unreserved scorn on the poem:

*This shallow lamentation:
Our hands spilled [blood]—no.
But we wash our hands in it—yes.*

I ask you, keep your spit to yourself.
Boy-Zionist.
Boy-cynic.
Boy-Jew.
Boy-Canaanite.

This poetic counterthrust of Yeshurun's seethes with outrage at the kind of moral argumentation found in Laor's poem—an argumentation divorced from its own historical and moral context. Running through Yeshurun's poetry is a recurrent lamentation for Krasnistav, the poet's birthplace in Poland. In Laor's poem the lamentation is stripped of any absolute validity; its moral force is made conditional on a reciprocal acknowledgment of the slaughter of Palestinians at Ein Al-Hilwa during the Lebanon war and of the fate of the refugees from Jaffa in 1948. The reason for Yeshurun's anger is clear. Laor had seized on Yeshurun's reputation as a man who understood and empathized with the Palestinians and exploited it uncritically for his own political purposes.

Yeshurun does not shrink from a penetrating and even brutal examination of the limits and possibilities inherent in his own moral discourse. In assessing the nondialectical universalism of Laor, he uses particularistic language of exceptional harshness:

*In an eyeball there is room for a single drop. If there are two,
 two,
 One remains, one breaks.*

Laor was attempting in his poem to imitate the unique stylistic conglomerate characteristic of Yeshurun's poetry, and, like Yeshurun, to maneuver in and among Hebrew, Yiddish, and Arabic. His intention was thus to create, in his own poem, the kind of multinational resonance so vital to his political views. In his response Yeshurun attacks Laor's imitation as a distortion of the original spiritual authenticity of his own poetic language. Above all he dissociates himself from a political discourse carried on in a kind of self-amnesia. After castigating Laor as a "kidnapper of words from Yiddish," he responds to Laor's description of the living conditions of the Palestinians with a "balanced" account of his own personal history of suffering as a pioneer and settler in Israel at the time of the Mandate.

Yeshurun's intensely irritated response to Laor might be taken, on the face of it, as yet another variation on a common theme, a rebuke of Leftists for their apparent self-hatred and indifference to the fate of their nation. But a more careful reading of Yeshurun's poem, taken within the context of his poetic corpus as a whole, shows that the debate with Laor is part of a progression toward something more complex and enigmatic. The

confrontation seems headed for some abstract culmination whereby, as Yeshurun sees it, any linguistic or literary communication whatsoever contains a kind of universal objectivity which distorts the precarious and fragile reality of things.

There is an obvious paradox in the attitude of Yeshurun the poet to the very fact of poetic communication. The poetic dialogue carried on by Yeshurun in response to reactions to his poetry is an attempt to clarify and correct whatever may have "misfired" in the original attempt at communication. These attempts at a poetic response emerge, in light of the communicative difficulties so integral to his poetry, as an organic component of Yeshurun's poetics.

Yeshurun's development toward a poetics of solipsism can also be taken as a reaction to a certain politicization currently sweeping Israeli culture, whereby any discussion of the suffering of the Palestinians must *ipso facto* be couched in universal political terms. The absolutism to which Yeshurun pushes his poetry is an important reminder that national stereotyping is not necessarily the exclusive property of supporters of the occupation. The politicization of the dispute may often be necessary and even inevitable; but we must not forget the human and spiritual price it demands of us.

The two options depicted in the above literary confrontation represent two polar extremes in the Israeli debate among those sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, revealing the fundamental limitations of Israeli public discourse within the on-going context of the occupation. The poetic discourse serves to map out, in a deep and critical way, the range of possibilities and limitations inherent in Israeli discourse as a whole. On the one hand is the type of poem which may be termed a "political poster," and here the moral results are immediate and undeniable. But this option can be criticized for its lack of sensitivity to the dialectical situation of those who preach against the occupation from within the language and culture of the occupiers. On the other hand, and lying at the opposite extreme of a long and richly variegated spectrum, are the strivings of Avot Yeshurun for fidelity to himself and a brutal authenticity verging ultimately on solipsism. The extreme difficulty of communication, long a hallmark of this poetry, now takes on a principled value of its own in the context of the culture of occupation. Here Yeshurun's poetry becomes, *inter alia*, a warning against the dangerous inauthenticity inherent in the kind of objectification and universalization now current in Israeli moral and political discourse.

Treading the thin edge of paradox, no moral statement can help taking on an element of self-criticism, a certain disclaimer in the very act of stating. In an

exceptionally powerful interview given by Yeshurun a number of years ago to his daughter, the poet Hilit Yeshurun, and published in the journal she edits, he comments: "The poems I have written on the Arab question, I like a great deal, and I believe with all my heart, now perhaps more than ever, that they will have an influence." Later, however, remarking that poetry influences not politics but people, he focuses on the need to take a particularist view on the conflict between the two nations, emphasizing: "I would want very much, for the sake of our honor, that we should above all be beautiful [in spirit]." Yeshurun's statement confirms his daughter's assertion that he once perceived the fate of the Palestinians as an extension of the fate of the Jews. But he dissociates himself from her universalist ethical tone.

Yeshurun's response to his daughter's accusation "Atrocities are being committed today, and you do not resist?" is, in the last analysis, "I am not opposed to your viewpoint"; but "I am not able to say what you say."

4.

There is a central dividing line in this poetry, demarcating the possibilities from the limitations inherent in Hebrew poetry written during the occupation. This line delineates a dual picture, where hope alternates with condemnation. To the extent that hope is forthcoming at all, it derives for the most part from a dispassionate awareness of the poet's own limitations in his capacity as conqueror. The striving for undistorted insight into reality, coupled with the willingness to pay the price for such insight, can itself constitute a seductive option for a literature caught in the kind of complex and oppressive situation typified by the occupation. There are Hebrew poets who come to terms with these limitations by making their poems into meta-poetry, examining the hidden assumptions implicit in the discourse within which and for which they are being written. Thus, for example, it was Laor who published, even before the Lebanon war, a poem which directly addressed the tension between Israeli empathy for the Palestinians and Israeli responsibility for what was done under the occupation:

*The poem about Leena Hassan Nabulsi seven-
Teen years old from Nablus who fled from the armed
soldiers as if from
A bear, managed to climb the stairs up to the third story,
Was shot with a single bullet right in the head and
dropped dead on the stairs
—Writing this poem is pointless.
What the children in Leena's class need is not a poem.*

Laor has created here the model for a meta-poetry intended to undermine Israeli expectations for some kind of catharsis of conscience through vicarious participation in the suffering of the Palestinians.

One of the most sophisticated expressions of the struggle between moral empathy and responsibility can be found in the poem "While Hovering at Low Altitudes," by Dalia Raikovitch. She describes a small shepherd girl who dies cruelly in "*wild and terrible mountain ranges / To the East.*" The speaker's fixed, measured distance from the horror of the event evoked the following remarks from the critic Nissim Kalderon: "For she writes, over and over again, '*I am not here.*' All of her is *there*, beside the victims. But not together with them. Near them; but not treading the same ground as they, with no expectation of the evils which befell them." She is not there; but in fact she is also *here*, in her Israeli homeland. Dalia Rabikovitch has crafted a poetic voice which, suspended between heaven and earth, is both intimate and remote, thus mirroring the multifaceted ambiguity of daily life in Israel. And the ambiguity extends to Israeli political ideology as well: a closeness to the culture which produced the war, and a distancing through a disguising of this closeness.

Rabikovitch's poem includes closeness as much as distance. Through the insistent and troubled refrain, "*I am not here,*" the speaker in the poem reveals her closeness to the "here" she denies so strongly. A similar effect is achieved in the poem through litotes, in the descriptions of the shepherd girl: She does *not* turn to God for help in Jewish formulaic language, she does *not* have the cosmetic beauty of the women of Jerusalem condemned by the Prophets. As a litotes, this formulation of the central opposition between *here* and *there* gives at least as much weight to the familiar Israeli homeland as to the distant danger zone "to the East":

*And the little girl awakened thus, to go out to the pasture
Her neck is not outstretched
Her eyes are not painted with mascara, they do not flirt
She does not ask, Whence cometh my help.
I am not here.
I have already been many days in the mountains
Sunlight will not burn me. Frost shall not touch me.
Nor again have I reason to be smitten with dismay.
I have seen in my life worse things than these.*

Rabikovitch stresses that her moral sensitivity is bounded by her own history of suffering. It is important to distinguish here between the unsentimental commentary of the realist who has seen worse things in her life, and the stinging criticism which appears later:

*I can leave, and say within myself
I didn't see a thing.*

There is an instructive lesson to be learned from all of these poets: Almost any literary-spiritual stance adopted by a Hebrew poet writing on the occupation can be evaluated in terms of its degree of distancing or estrangement from the occupiers. Both universalization and a solipsistic particularization are characterized by the salient loss of any feeling of national identity as something continuous and tangible. The poem by A. Eli cited earlier is an example of a noncritical appeal to the category of continuous Jewish nationhood. Yet many poets turn to political and ethical poetry precisely in an attempt to formulate their uneasy ambivalence toward their identity as Israelis.

"Cities on Their Mounds," a poem written by Meir Wieseltier at the beginning of 1982, before the evacuation of Yamit and the outbreak of the Lebanon war, is an instructive example. The ambiguous title indicates both the might of the Zionist construction industry, building on its own mound (a Biblical reference), and the denial of the existence of earlier strata upon which the new building goes on. Wieseltier takes the typical Israeli town as his starting point for an exploration of the hidden spiritual roots of Israel:

*Come let us go back thirty years: the hill of sand
At the end of the fields was called a mountain. Bushes,
Strong and hard, fortified it.
No one referred to them by name.
... my heart
Was torn between the tractor and the mountain.
I wanted to see what the tractor would do, and I wanted
the mountain to stand firm in place
In the end, it turned out this way. The tractor removed
half a mountain.
The remaining half grew taller still in my eyes.
The vertical cut made it into a cliff.
From within the cliff chopped-off root tendrils jerked
and quivered in the air.
From under the soft sand emerged the hardened sand.*

This poem was first published at the height of the war, and the poet even added a note urging a political interpretation. The ambiguity of a divided heart thus addresses and resolves the issue of the continuity of Jewish tradition by leaving it an open question. It is ultimately a solution which distills the dialectical stand-off into a final and even conciliatory resolution:

*There is no building like building on mounds. To erect
on the once-used,
On the broken-down, on the ruins*

*Which come to light again. Every bond
Bound by your predecessors speaks to you
In the language of binding. If you have consolation
enough, if you are mature enough.
If so, you can have once again the rest and the restlessness
of the builder.
A city being built builds both itself and you.*

Here is an example of a genuine challenge facing Israeli public discourse in the light of the continuing adherence to a tradition of Zionist cultural renewal. The fact of the occupation has created many stumbling blocks for this ideal of national renaissance as a return to and renewal of one's origins. Instead of stubbornly linking himself to a single diachronic continuum of national identity, Wieseltier, and with him other Hebrew poets, builds a certain tension into his poetic discourse. The tangled thread weaving the implications of the occupation into the fabric of Israeli life creates a literary form where the conquered determine the identity of the conquerors. Well-known cases of mutual dependence of this kind have been analyzed in the twentieth century in the works of such writers as Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Memmi, and George Orwell. But the ultra-rapid transition of Hebrew culture, paralleling the political transformation of the Jews from an oppressed and persecuted people to a nation of conquerors, is a special case. To repeat: A special effort is required today to look dispassionately at our status as a ruling majority stubbornly clinging to the discourse habits of a minority.

And so Natan Zach returns to the past, to his childhood in Israel under the Mandate, in order to write about Israel after the Lebanon war:

*In those bad times
Before the truly bad times.*

These lines are taken from Zach's poem "No Choice," which is included in his most recent book *Hard to Remember*. In this book Zach transforms the concept of memory into an almost metaphysical regulatory principle for assimilating the meaning of modern-day Israeli existence. But in his search for a spiritual reference point in the past which may impart meaning to the events of the present, Zach ultimately only replaces one dilemma with another.

Zach's book also contains the poetic cycle "Poem in Time of War," which was modeled on the poetry of the British poets Alan Rook and Laurence Whistler. In these poems Zach demonstrates how the history of modern Israel is too new, has unfolded too rapidly, to yield any kind of stable criterion for understanding the deeper meaning of the events of the war:

*And the closed face of the goddess of memory
Will bear witness: the poetry of weakness
—The poetry of our history and origins—
Has become for us a poetry of the times, an excuse and
a recompense. And there neither is nor was
Anything else. And it contained no answer; but this was
its answer.
And it spoke to us, and sometimes also sang:
Its song was lovely. But unlovely
Was the poetry of weakness. And so we lived.*

In order to confront and undermine the legitimacy of the ideology created by the occupation, it is not sufficient just to challenge the ideology superficially. The primarily *reactive* nature of Israeli protest poetry comes through all too clearly in the fact that the bulk of its efforts have been aimed at preserving the traditional meaning of collective symbols. Only rarely have attempts been made to create an alternative symbolic vocabulary capable of proposing workable answers or suggesting directions for a counterculture which could truly come to grips with the contradictions enmeshing Israeli society. Only rarely have there been attempts to go beyond a surface attack on Israeli public discourse, and confront its underlying assumptions. It is clear that poetry for the most part cannot effect any direct or dramatic change in political reality. Nonetheless it *can* help to uncover contradictions and distortions inherent in the public discourse which sustains and to some extent reflects that reality. The dual character of this discourse, with its alternation between distancing ("neutral" objectivity) and closeness ("uncritical" subjectivity), presents a genuine challenge to Hebrew poetry.

One of the lessons to be learned from the debate between Avot Yeshurun and Yitzhak Laor is the need to take history into account in building an authentic counterculture having a measure of long-range effectiveness. Zach's "Poem in Time of War," like others, draws on the Jewish past to develop a critical interpretation of the present. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that an examination of the semantic legacy and symbology of the past which confuses past with present and future has its own dangers, and in terms of actual results may not differ very much from an approach which strives to wipe out the past completely. The Israeli slogan "The territories as a bargaining chip" embodies a view of the present as *borrowed time*, rather than a deeply rooted human reality. This distorted perspective on time is a kind of narcotic, a screen which conceals the need for something more drastic than mere moral condemnation if any real progress is to be made. Here again we see the many and

varied paths taken by Hebrew culture in an attempt to deny its *present* and the living reality of the occupation. Yet by preserving a continual tension between the past and its meaning in the present, and by fostering a sober awareness of one's own position on the continuum, the culture of protest may finally attain the depth and complexity it so desperately needs.

The Israeli occupation is now nearing its twentieth anniversary. For most of its history as an independent nation, the State of Israel has been an occupying power, and its national life and culture can no longer be considered apart from this fact. The semi-permanent state of occupation has exposed Israeli society to tensions and contradictions which have prevented intellectuals from acting in accord with any clear sense of their own cultural identity. Jean-Paul Sartre characterized the intellectual as one who is doomed to an "unhappy consciousness," an awareness of the contradiction between the universal value of his work and the particularist interests it serves. This applies very aptly to Israeli culture under the cloud of an on-going and seemingly endless occupation. Indeed, it represents one source of hope that *is* available to Israeli culture as it seeks to preserve its authenticity: a constant dialectic struggle between the culture's responsibility for events committed in the name of its own particular nationality, and its stubborn allegiance to a world of universal values. □

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Do you Believe in Magic? The Second Coming of the Sixties Generation by Annie Gottlieb (Times Books, 1987). A homage to the 1960s spirit via encounters with aging veterans of its byways—radicals, hippies, acid heads, sexual revolutionaries and spiritual seekers. Nostalgia to go with the Beatles on CDs. The darker side of utopian quick-fixes of the era are acknowledged and its survivors not claim to be able to separate the wheat from the chaff.

Journey into Sexuality: An Exploratory Voyage by Ira L. Reiss (Prentice-Hall, 1986). AIDS may be forcing sex into the dustbin of history, but Reiss' effort will be of enormous value to those seeking to make sense of it before the memories fade. The systematic analysis of cross-cultural data on sexual patterns illuminates our understanding of everything from the universality of sexual jealousy to the unanticipated links between machismo and homosexuality.

Mirror, Mirror: The Importance of Looks in Everyday Life by Elaine Hatfield and Susan Sprecher (State Univer-

sity of New York Press, 1986). A scholarly yet lively compendium of nearly everything we want (or dread) to know regarding the myriad perceptions people have of those designated "good looking" or "homely" and how such designations affect the resident psychological, social and economic lives. The one hope is that standards of beauty vary cross-culturally and over-time. The disfavored who can't wait for beauty standards to evolve had best hop a plane.

Confronting Crime: An American Challenge by Elliot Currie (Pantheon, 1986). An antidote to the much overpublicized *Crime and Human Nature* by James O. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein. Currie assembles a vast array of evidence, including studies of crime abroad, which discredit biological theories of crime causation. He also provides invaluable empirical assessments of the relative ineffectiveness of imprisonment compared to less punitive rehabilitative programs in reducing recidivism.

Eve's Journey: Feminine Images in Hebraic Literary Tradition by Nehama Aschkenasy (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986). A subtle and skillful charting of the metamorphosis that the female figure has experienced in her literary odyssey from biblical writings to modern Hebraic literature.

From A Broken Web: Separation, Sexism, and Self by Catherine Keller (Beacon Press, 1986). A boldly creative feminist challenge to the Western conception of what it means to be a self. Keller analyzes Freudian and Jungian

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