

PLEASE NOTE: The following is a much-expanded (and slightly updated) version of a talk the author first gave in the spring of 2008 at the Center for Jewish Life on the Princeton University campus to a Princeton student group, the "Tigers for Israel." The enthusiastic student response to that talk prompted the greater elaboration of the present statement, which, it is hoped, might stimulate productive thinking among a younger generation of Jews and Arabs not bound by the restricted vision and failed policies of the past.

Toward a Permanent Palestinian/Israeli Peace—the Case for Two-State Condominialism

By Russell Nieli

The Middle East is one of those agonizing cases where both sides have an overwhelming moral case.

James R. Flynn¹

The Land of Israel [i.e., historical. Palestine] belongs to two peoples, and these peoples need to find a way to live together ... and to work for a common future.

Gershom Scholem²

I am a Hebrew nationalist, and I want to deal with [Palestinian] Arab nationalists. ... It is my deepest belief, and perhaps the point at which my friends and I differ from other people who aspire to peace in the [Mideast] region, that such a peace cannot and must not contradict the national aspirations of both Hebrews and [Palestinian] Arabs. Nationalism will reign supreme in our generation in all the countries of the region, and nothing will stop it. Any idea, inspiring as it may be, which runs counter to the national feelings of the people concerned, will be by-passed by history.

Uri Avnery³

A binational state? There is no such thing. Simply put: nowhere in the world has a conflict between two national movements been resolved by squeezing two national movements [that are] at each other's throats into the boiling pot of a binational state.

Shlomo Avineri⁴

"The Palestinian Question" -- a Personal Odyssey

First off, I want to thank all of you for coming here this evening and for inviting me to give a talk on what is surely the most enduring -- and tragic -- source of instability in the Mideast today, the ongoing conflict between Palestinians and Jews. This conflict long pre-dates the creation of the Jewish state in 1948 and goes back at least as far as the Balfour Declaration of 1917, when the British government, under Zionist prodding,^{*} officially committed itself to the creation in Palestine of a Jewish "national home." What strikes the historically minded observer perhaps most is just how little has changed in the relation between Arabs and Jews in the more than 90 years since Lord Balfour issued his famous decree. Regardless of what various moderate spokesmen may say for public consumption in the West, most Palestinian Arabs have never been able to accept a dominant Jewish demographic or political presence in what they see as *their* land, a land, they believe, that was wrongfully taken from them by British-backed Zionists who later became Israelis.

It is important at the very outset to get clear on this. In their heart of hearts, in their soul of souls, most Palestinian Arabs do not now, have never, and unless there is a fundamental change in the relationship between the two peoples, will never accept the justice or legitimacy of an ethno-religiously defined Jewish state -- a state that was created against their intense opposition from the earliest stirrings of the Zionist idea. While the creation of the Jewish state in Jewish eyes is seen as a glorious -- indeed miraculous -- "War of Independence," that same Fourth-of-July event in Palestinian memory is viewed as the darkest hour of their collective history, al-Nakba in Arabic, "The Great Catastrophe."⁵ In the Arab view this catastrophe -- i.e., the humiliating military defeat and expulsion of the Palestinian Arab people by victorious Jewish armies and the take-over of the land of their forbears by what they see as foreign and hostile settler-colonialist intruders -- is understood as the major source of their present discontent and of their ongoing victimization by the state of Israel and its world-wide Zionist supporters.

But I am getting ahead of myself. I want to say something first about the development of my own views on this seemingly intractable conflict. I am a third generation Italian-American (mostly) who grew up on Long Island in a town with a large second and third generation Ashkenazic Jewish population. A majority of my classmates in high school and junior high school were Jews, as were many of my friends and neighbors. My closest and oldest friend is a Jew -- a real "jewish Jew" as Alan Dershowitz would say, supremely proud of his Jewish cultural heritage and of Jewish intellectual achievements more generally (and, truth be told, somewhat contemptuous of the *goyim*). He is also very proud of what he sees as the beauty and nuanced

^{*} Actually Balfour himself needed little prodding. By conviction he was an enthusiastic Zionist, enormously impressed both by the Jews' ability to survive as a people through centuries of Christian persecution and by the outstanding scientific and cultural achievement of modern Jews in the era of Jewish Emancipation. At a dinner commemorating the 10th anniversary (1927) of the declaration bearing his name he aptly described himself as "one of the oldest of British Zionists" (*Speeches on Zionism by the Earl of Balfour*, Israel Cohen, Arrowsmith, London, 1971, p. 118).

expressiveness of the Yiddish language, which he learned as a boy at his grandmother's knee. On my mother's side my family has had a long association with Jews going back to the time the family lived in or near various Jewish neighborhoods in the Bronx. "Go where the Jews go," my maternal grandmother used to say -- "You'll find the best public schools and the best restaurants." Grandma was very upwardly mobile.

Both my mother, whose best friend was also a Jew, and my older brother, who like me attended secondary schools with mostly Jewish classmates and was active in Christian-Jewish dialogue, have had long association with Jews in the New York City-Long Island area. And my younger sister, while she didn't have as many Jewish schoolmates growing up as my brother and myself, has a life-long Jewish best friend who she speaks to on her cell phone three times a day. Jews in my family were greatly admired for their upwardly mobile ways, their capacity for friendship, their emphasis on the cultivation of the intellect and the arts, their typical candor and outspokenness, their concern for the downtrodden, and their great charitableness. They were disliked, however, for their tendency to be drawn up into far-left politics and for what was perceived as a general lack of patriotism or gratitude towards America.

Growing up in such a milieu I naturally assimilated what is sometimes called the "Jewish narrative" on Israel and its Arab opponents. That narrative struck a resonant chord in me that in some ways has never left. Like many others in the early Sixties, I was deeply moved by the Otto Preminger movie *Exodus*, based on the novel by Leon Uris, which told of the struggles of Holocaust-surviving Jews immediately after World War II to gain entry into Palestine against the often violent opposition of both British soldiers and the Arabs. I can also remember participating in a rally during this period protesting Soviet anti-Semitism and the unwillingness of the Soviet Communist regime to let Jews emigrate to Israel or the U.S.

While I had at this time some vague understanding of why Arab Palestinians were so hostile to Jewish settlers in Israel, like most casual American observers of the conflict, I believed much of the problem had to do with Cold War politics, and with the Soviets stirring up trouble in the Mideast and transforming what would otherwise have been a manageable problem into a violent and intractable dilemma. I can remember well the elation I felt after Israel's stunning victory in the Six-Day War. Not only had the Hebrew David slew the menacing Arab Goliath, but the Soviets and their proxies had gotten their comeuppance and gone down to humiliating defeat.

I didn't really begin to think seriously about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict until I was a graduate student here in Princeton in the early and mid-1970s. I don't know what the reason was -- perhaps it was the 1973 Yom Kippur war and the ensuing oil crisis, or the influence of the year I spent on a Fulbright grant studying in Europe -- but it was at this time that I felt that I just wasn't well enough informed about the Mideast conflict and that I needed to learn more. Not surprisingly given my background, the first place I turned was to the scholarly survey articles on Israel and Palestine in the *Encyclopedia Judaica*, an excellent reference work which had just recently been published. Perhaps it was ironic but it was because of my initial historical readings in this source that I first

became not only more knowledgeable of the history of Zionism and the creation of the state of Israel, but more understanding of -- and more sympathetic towards -- the Palestinian Arab viewpoint.

From my further reading in various sources -- Walter Lacquer's *A History of Zionism*⁶ stands out in my mind as among the more memorable -- I came to see the Palestinian-Israeli struggle not as a manifestation of Cold War polarities and the Soviets stirring up trouble, nor as a manifestation of Western colonialism or imperialism, nor as a simple case of hate-filled anti-Semites irrationally denying to Jews what was unquestionably theirs. Rather, I came to see the struggle as a case of two very powerful national movements, both going back to the late 19th century, which were in conflict over the same very small parcel of land to which both sides could make a reasonably strong moral and historical claim. It was sometime during the mid-1970s that I attended a most informative lecture on the sources of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute by the distinguished Israeli political theorist and member of Israel's Foreign Ministry, Shlomo Avineri, that reinforced the various conclusions I had reached by my own readings on the topic.⁷

Gradually I was coming to adopt the "Palestinian narrative" just as eagerly as I had earlier adopted the "Jewish narrative," without, however, ever losing my sympathy for the latter. It is very difficult for most of us to keep to two very contrasting viewpoints, both of which may contain important elements of truth and justice, together in our minds without sliding into one position to the rejection of the other. Perhaps it was my status as neither Palestinian nor Jew that I was able to do this a little more easily than others who have grappled with this dilemma. But I was still very uncomfortable intellectually with the tension in my mind between two seemingly conflicting -- and in many ways captivating and appealing -- national narratives that meant so much to the two peoples involved, both of whom have experienced more than their share of historical suffering and travail.

It was with this conflict in mind that I first came upon the writings on the Arab-Jewish confrontation of the philosopher Martin Buber and other members of the liberal Zionist group, Brith Shalom (Covenant of Peace) and its successor organization, the Ihud. I was immediately captivated by the high-mindedness and uncommon decency of the Brith Shalom group, which included some of the most distinguished members of the most intellectually advanced community of Europe, i.e., German Jews. Its members included, besides Buber, the Judaica scholar Gershom Scholem, the journalist Robert Weltsch, the philosopher Hugo Bergmann, and the great theorist of nationalism Hans Kohn. Another influential figure that later joined the group and became in many ways its most active and influential member was the American Rabbi Judah Magnes, the head of an influential German-Jewish congregation in New York City, who would later become the first Chancellor of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The group had membership worldwide and included among the supporters of its basic goals, if not actual members, no lesser Jewish luminaries than the physicist Albert Einstein, the political theorist Hannah Arendt, and the British diplomat Herbert Samuel.

I found in the writings of the Brith Shalomists, and those in their successor groups, a certain moral power and humanity that is rare in anyone, and certainly in those caught up in violent political conflicts with their often competing propaganda claims.⁸ People like Magnes, Buber, and Weltsch each struck me as the kind of individual that my Jewish friends would call "a real *mensch*" -- Yiddish meaning a genuine and uncommonly decent human being. What especially attracted me to their views was their acknowledgment that Palestinian Arabs and Jews had national aspirations in historical Palestine that were equally valid, and that some kind of arrangement had to be worked out that would satisfy the needs and aspirations of both parties. While the single-state, binationalist project that they proposed is, in my view, no longer feasible -- its current resurgence notwithstanding -- their belief that the communal aspirations of Jews and Arabs in Palestine could somehow be reconciled struck me as an ideal worthy of serious consideration today on both moral and pragmatic grounds.

It was with this general idea in mind that in the late 1980s I began seriously thinking of alternatives to what had become by that time the standard solution proposed to "the Palestinian problem": two states for two peoples lying side by side and peacefully coexisting with each other. The result of my thoughts at this time was an article that was published in the *International Journal on World Peace*, which argued for an arrangement that I called "two-state binationalism."⁹ As the years have gone by and we have seen the failure of the Oslo peace process -- and witnessed what seems to be a perpetual war between Palestinians and Jews -- I have become more convinced than ever that only something like the proposals I made in that peace journal article have any chance of producing a genuine reconciliation and lasting peace between the two warring peoples. I now call those proposals "two-state condominiumism," a term which I think better captures their overall structure and content.

This evening I want to set out for you an outline of those proposals, but before I do, I want to present to you in a fair and comprehensive manner the major existing proposals for peace in the Mideast and the reasons why I feel they are all doomed to failure.

Past Proposals (and Why They Won't Work)

The Earliest One-State Proposal: Brith Shalom Binationalism

I'll begin with the earliest version of the one-state solution as proposed by the Brith Shalom group and its immediate successor, the Ihud. The Brith Shalomists were deeply troubled by the Balfour Declaration, which they saw as a survival of the older style of colonialism and imperialism that had brought such suffering and misery to the native peoples of the globe. Zionism, they believed, must develop a higher understanding of what it means to be a Jew than that typical of Western colonialism and the various types of national chauvinisms that had led to the devastating chaos of the recent world war. Most Brith Shalom members would have agreed with the satirical characterization of Lord Balfour's decree famously uttered by the Viennese journalist and science writer

Arthur Koestler: "one nation solemnly promising to a second nation the country of a third."

Like all fervent Zionists the Brith Shalom members believed that Jews should return to, and settle upon the land of, historical Palestine -- Eretz Israel -- but they believed that settlement of the ancient Holy Land was only the outward part of the Zionist project. More important than sheer physical settlement, they believed, was the imperative for Jews to become a more moral and culturally awakened people, a people who would draw its sustenance from the noblest and highest callings of the Jewish religious and prophetic traditions, as well as from the humanistic tradition of the European Enlightenment. Brith Shalom members were often enthusiastic supporters of the communal values of the Kibbutz movement and other forms of communitarian socialism, and found the reigning militarism, chauvinism, and commercial materialism of the European Great Powers, which had recently managed to slaughter ten million of their own kind during the First World War, thoroughly repugnant and anathema.

They were in effect "renewal Zionists" as much as -- or more than -- "political Zionists" in so far as they believed that Jews in many parts of Europe faced not only the danger of anti-Semitism and political marginalization but the dangers of cultural atrophy and the ever-present allure of *assimilation* -- assimilation to the values of a Western culture that, in their view, had become increasingly materialistic, militaristic, and alien to the higher moral and spiritual values of Judaism. Bringing together diaspora Jews to establish among themselves a distinctly Jewish community in Palestine was seen as a way not only of providing a place of refuge for the persecuted Jewish minorities of Europe but the opportunity to create a society in which Jewish values and higher spiritual aspirations could flourish. The Jewish community they envisioned in Palestine would create a model society that would provide inspirational moral leadership to Jews around the world.

Martin Buber's sentiments in this regard were typical. Like others inspired by the Jewish prophetic tradition -- particularly the writings of Amos and Isaiah -- Buber took seriously the idea that Jews should be "a light unto the nations" and must not become another power-and-money worshipping ethno-national group. As early as February, 1918, just three months after the Balfour Declaration, Buber expressed his deep forebodings about the direction the Zionist movement was taking in a letter to his friend, the philosopher Hugo Bergman: "We must face the fact," Buber wrote, "that most leading Zionists ... today are thoroughly unrestrained nationalists, following the European example, imperialists, even unconscious mercantilists and idolaters of success. ... If we do not succeed to erect an authoritative [Zionist] opposition, the soul of the movement will be corrupted, maybe forever. I for my part am determined to commit myself totally to this cause, even if this should affect my personal plans."¹⁰

The idea of using the military might of an imperial power like Great Britain to force Jewish settlement upon the native inhabitants of Palestine was particularly troubling to those close to the Brith Shalom movement. Judah Magnes, for instance, while still in America, expressed his deep reservations with the manner in which the Zionist project

was being carried out under imperial British sponsorship and believed Jews had to take more seriously the genuine interests of Palestine's native Arab population. Jews, he believed, should be the first to sympathize with the plight of oppressed nationalities wherever they lived, and should be in the forefront of supporters of the Wilsonian principle of the self-determination of indigenous peoples. It is wrong, Magnes thought, to allow third parties, even international bodies like the Allied Peace Conference, to give away the lands of others except on the basis of the wishes and interests of the indigenous peoples themselves.

"The new Jewish Palestine," Magnes wrote in May of 1919, just as the Allied Powers were starting to implement the promises of the Balfour Declaration, "begins under a great disadvantage. Palestine is, so they say, to be 'given' to the Jewish people. To my mind, no Peace Conference has the right to give any land to any people. ... As I look at it, the Peace Conference has no more right to give Palestine to the Jewish people than it has to give, let us say, Tyrol to Italy, or certain parts of Germany to Poland, or other territories to other peoples, except upon the principles of self-determination. If we are to be true democrats, we must be true democrats in Jewish life as well. Our new beginnings in Palestine are burdened by this gift. [From the perspective of the Arabs of the region] we stand ... as interlopers, as people seeking favors at the hands of the powerful governments, of the imperialist forces of the world. This is a handicap that the Jewish people in Palestine will have to contend with for at least a generation."¹¹

Robert Weltch, the German-Jewish journalist, was similarly troubled by what he saw as the early Zionist disregard for the legitimate interests of the Arabs of Palestine, and like all the Brith Shalomists and their sympathizers, believed that those interests would be most seriously compromised by the creation of an ethnically-exclusive Jewish state. Palestine -- the land of Biblical Israel -- should be seen, he believed, as the shared homeland of two peoples, Jews and Palestinian Arabs, and both peoples should view the other in terms of parity without either group threatening or dominating the other.

In a front page editorial in the influential Berlin Zionist newspaper, *Die Juedische Rundschau* (August 14, 1925), Weltch took some of his fellow Zionists to task for their neglect of the legitimate concerns of Palestine's indigenous population. "A land without a people for a people without a land" -- that was Theodore Herzl's formula, Weltch wrote, but it was an abstract formula not related to concrete realities. "The abstract formula does not help us anymore," he went on: "There exists a people without a land but there is no land without a people." Palestine, he said, "has a population of 700,000 inhabitants, a people who have lived in the land for centuries and rightly consider it to be their fatherland and homeland. ... Palestine will always be inhabited by two peoples, by the Jews and by the Arabs. ... The future of Palestine, its peaceful development and welfare can only be assured when a political system exists in which *both* peoples live side by side as equals bound together through the natural ties of commerce and industry and cultural interchange. The land can only thrive when a relationship of mutual trust exists between the two peoples. Such a relationship, however, can only exist when those who are the newcomers -- and in this case, that is us -- come with the noble and honest intention to live together with the other people upon the basis of mutual respect and free

acknowledgment of all human and national rights. We, therefore, do not want a Jewish state but a binational Palestinian community."¹²

Opposition to a specifically Jewish ethno-national state, one that would necessarily subordinate other groups and their national identities, was also expressed in the inter-war period by Albert Einstein, who, as I have said, held views very close to the Brith Shalomists without ever being a member of their internationally extended network. Einstein believed that the creation of a Jewish nation-state would all too easily fall prey to the many corruptions that seemed so endemic to modern nation-state building and the spirit of chauvinistic nationalism that typically went along with it. The latter spirit, Einstein believed, contradicted core values of Judaism and its higher ethical and moral traditions.

"I would much rather see reasonable agreement with the Arabs on the basis of living together than the creation of a Jewish State," Einstein wrote in 1938. "My awareness of the essential nature of Judaism," he went on, "resists the idea of a Jewish State with borders, an army and a measure of temporal power, no matter how modest. I am afraid of the inner damage Judaism will suffer -- especially from the development of narrow nationalism within our ranks."¹³

The Brith Shalomists sought some kind of unified binational state in which Arabs and Jews would each view the other as co-equal partners in a political federation governed by the principle of parity and by guarantees that neither group would dominate the other culturally or politically. Palestine would become neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state but a country in which the legitimate national aspirations of both peoples would be respected and reconciled. Neither group would have to fear the political or numerical ascendancy of the other.

While the Brith Shalomists were often short on particulars regarding the contours of the federated state they envisioned, ironically it was David Ben-Gurion, that wily pragmatist and no great sympathizer with Arab concerns, who drew up the most detailed plan for a possible unified binational state. Although Ben-Gurion would later come to see Jewish-Arab cooperation within a unified state as impossible given the growing hostility between the two peoples, throughout the 1920s and well into the 1930s Ben-Gurion was quite sympathetic to the binationalist idea, largely, it would seem, on pragmatic grounds. In 1929 he proposed a unified binational state to govern a future independent Palestine that would ensure the protection of both Jewish and Arab communal rights.

Ben-Gurion's proposed constitution envisioned a great deal of local autonomy, with Jewish towns and villages governing themselves much as Swiss cantons had done, and with Arab towns and villages enjoying similar privileges. At the level of the central government, Ben-Gurion proposed a two-chambered parliament, with one chamber, a Chamber of Citizens, apportioned according to population figures, while the other, a Chamber of Nations, apportioned according to the principle of equal group rights for both the Palestinian and Jewish peoples. Since passage of legislation would require approval of both chambers of parliament, each of the two national groups would in effect exercise

a veto power over legislation it strongly opposed.¹⁴ Chaim Weizmann, the head of the Jewish Agency, as late as 1937 proposed a similar binational Legislative Council whereby Jews and Arabs would be guaranteed equal numbers of seats "whatever the future ratio between the Arabs and Jewish population [of Palestine] might become."¹⁵

However high-minded and even pragmatically hopeful the idea of a unitary binational state may have seemed in the 1920s, in the end, of course, the efforts on behalf of such an arrangement by Brith Shalom and other binationalist supporters ultimately failed. The failure was due to a number of factors among which were the inability of the unitary state binationalists to win significant support among the Zionist majority, and their even greater failure to win over to their cause even a token number of Arabs. It seemed as if there were just too few Jews and too few Arabs in Palestine who wanted to live together in a joint polity. As the British-Lebanese scholar Albert Hourani explained in his testimony before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946, "a [unitary] binational state of the kind that Dr. [Judah] Magnes suggests can only work if a certain spirit of cooperation and trust exists and if there is an underlying sense of unity to neutralize communal differences. But that spirit does not exist in Palestine."¹⁶

In the 1930s the binationalist movement found itself overwhelmed by the events of European history, particularly Hitler's rise to power in 1933, and the subsequent failure of the Western nations to open their doors to the masses of Jewish refugees fleeing the ravages of Nazi persecution. The large-scale immigration of Central and Western European Jews into Palestine from 1933 to 1936 touched off the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939, which crippled all efforts at Jewish-Arab rapprochement. Brith Shalom itself was to disband in 1933, owing to a lack of funds and the defection of some of its members, and although the binationalist spirit was kept alive into the late 1940s by such Jewish organizations as the Ihud, the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation, and the labor group Hashomer Hatzair, unitary-state binationalism was fighting a losing battle against both the tragic events of current history and the nationalistic spirit of the age. However noble and even common-sensical an ideal it may have seemed to its supporters, the Brith Shalom style of binationalism was powerless to combat the developments that engulfed Europe and the Mideast from the Nazi ascendancy onward. Whether or not unitary-state binationalism is a viable alternative today -- as a growing chorus of intellectuals seem to believe -- is a topic I will address in due course.

Two-State Separationism

Married couples who can't get along despite repeated attempts at reconciliation often decide to separate. No longer capable of living together under the same roof they go their separate ways, trying as best they can to avoid personal contact with one another. Such is the logic and rationale behind the various partition schemes that have been recommended to deal with the Jewish/Arab conflict in the Mideast since at least the time of the Peel Commission Report in 1937. A general characteristic of these schemes is that they have usually drawn mixed reviews from the Jewish side, with some Jews, including early Zionist leaders like Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, eagerly supporting them, but much

less enthusiastic -- and indeed often hostile and enraged receptions --from the Arab-Palestinian side. In recent years things have changed but not as much as one might suppose.

The response to the 1947 UN partition plan is instructive. Although some Jews, following the maximalist spirit of the famous Biltmore Program hammered out during the Second World War at the international Zionist conference in New York City, sought to create a Jewish state in all of Mandate Palestine, for the majority of Zionists the decision of the UN General Assembly in November of 1947 to approve the creation of a Jewish state in roughly half of the Mandate territory was received with jubilation, many seeing it as a miracle of deliverance. For these Jews it was a way for the Jewish people, after centuries of exile, finally to have an internationally recognize strip of land in historical Palestine upon which to construct a state of their own -- a state which, however small, would be a true *Jewish* state, where Jews could develop their own national culture, control their own immigration policy, and serve as a refuge for Jews around the world facing anti-Semitic violence and persecution.

This last function would prove enormously important as Israel in the first ten years of its existence went on to absorb masses of immigrant refugees fleeing not only the ravages of a war-torn and unwelcoming Europe but the hostility and expulsions of Arab regimes inflamed by the creation of Israel itself. Israel's great success in this regard, taking in hundreds of thousands of desperate Jews driven from their far-flung residences and integrating them into a modern, economically progressive and stable nation-state is an achievement that is often forgotten today, but it was one of truly momentous proportions.

Even those Jews with maximalist designs who yearned for a Jewish state in all of historical Palestine had reason to support the UN partition. Despite the fact that Jews were temporarily restricted to just a little over half of the Mandate territory, there was always the hope -- and for many the expectation -- that as the Jewish state became stronger economically and militarily, it would eventually be able to break out of its narrow confines and expand beyond the territory allotted to it by the UN resolution. This was certainly the view of Revisionist Zionists like Menachem Begin and his militant Irgun group that would play such an important role in terrorizing Palestinian Arabs and forcing them to flee Israel during the 1948 war. Much later, as the elected prime minister, Begin and his Likud party would greatly expand Jewish settlements in the conquered territories of the West Bank and Gaza -- territories that internationally are not recognized as part of Israel but in the case of the West Bank have deep resonance among religious Jews as the site of Biblical Judea and Samaria.

While Jews had good reasons in 1947 for supporting the UN's partition resolution, the Palestinian Arabs at the time had even stronger reasons for rejecting it. Indeed, from the Palestinian perspective the partition plan was an outrage that completely disregarded their basic rights and interests. From the start Palestinian Arabs had protested the large-scale immigration of European Jews into Palestine that began in the 1920s and accelerated at a quickened pace in the 1930s. No one had ever solicited their opinion

when the British government declared its intention to establish a Jewish national home in what they considered to be their land. The section of Palestine set aside to be an Arab state by the partition plan encompassed less than half (45%) of the Mandate territory despite the fact that Arabs outnumbered Jews in the Mandate territory by a ratio of almost two to one. Moreover, the sectors set aside for the Jewish state contained a population over 40% Arab, and over 60% in the two major port cities of Jaffa and Haifa. These native Palestinians would have to live as a minority in a Jewish-dominated state or be forced to flee to the section of the Mandate territory set aside for Arab settlement. By contrast the territory set aside for the Arab state contained a population less than 2% Jewish. Few Jews would have to move as a result of the UN partition plan or accept minority rule under an Arab regime. Palestine's Arabs clearly saw themselves as having to make much greater sacrifices than the Jews, whose presence, in any case, they saw as illegitimate, at least in the large numbers that had come since the British became the Mandatory power.

But even if the UN's partition plan had been much more generous to the Arabs than its roughly 45/55 split in territory, it is doubtful that the Arabs would have accepted it. The Arabs saw the Jews as alien refugees and settler-colonialists, who had no recent connection to Palestine, spoke strange Eastern European languages like Polish, Yiddish, and Russian, and had customs and folkways completely at odds with the Arab world and the Mideast more generally. From the Palestinian standpoint Zionism and the creation of a Jewish state in their backyard could only seem as an attempt by European imperialists to solve a European problem -- i.e., the problem of Ashkenazic Jewish statelessness and persecution -- at their expense. They were being made to pay for Europe's inhospitality and persecution of the Jews by relinquishing their country to culturally, linguistically, and religiously alien outsiders who couldn't possibly have their own best interests at heart.¹⁷

With the stunning Israeli victory in the 1948 war, which resulted in the expansion in the size of Israel's borders from roughly 55% to 78% of the territory of Mandate Palestine, together with the expulsion of approximately 700,000 Palestinian Arabs from the enlarged territory of Israel, Arab hostility to the Jewish state and the partitionist scheme that created it grew even more intense. While much has transpired in the more than 60 years that separate us today from the period of Israel's creation through partition and war, it is important to realize that for the Palestinian Arabs it is the events of the 1948 war period -- the period of the Great Catastrophe -- that still form a major part of their collective self-understanding and an unending source of their historical grievance and pain.

To Palestinians these historical events are roughly equivalent to what the Holocaust period is to the Jews. And it is because of this indelible historical memory that so many Palestinians -- let's be honest about this -- really do not accept even today the legitimacy of the Jewish state regardless of what they might say for public consumption. As Benny Morris, a professor of Middle Eastern history at Ben-Gurion University and one of Israel's most perceptive political commentators, has recently observed: "The Arab and wider Islamic worlds, despite Israeli hopes since 1948 and notwithstanding the peace treaties signed by Egypt and Jordan, ... have never truly accepted the legitimacy of

Israel's creation and continue to oppose its existence."¹⁸ This is the stark reality: most Palestinian Arabs do not accept the legitimacy of the Jewish state, at least as it is presently constituted.

The Jerusalem-born, British-reared Palestinian activist Ghada Karmi well captures the pathos of many Palestinians, particularly those and their descendants forced to flee Mandate Palestine during the 1948 war, when she challenges the view that pre-1967 Israeli territory is sacrosanct and off-limits to renegotiation or Palestinian return. Two-state separationist proposals that would create a tiny, West Bank-Gaza Palestinian mini-state but preclude a right of return to those areas of Mandate Palestine from which Palestinians were forced to flee during the 1948 war, are attempts to erase from memory the Palestinian past, says Karmi. They are predicated on the view that "there had been no Palestinian history before 1967 and Israel had always been a natural part of the landscape." Such a view, she says, "may be superficially convincing, even comforting, for Israel and the West. It implies that Palestinians can delete the past and their own grievances, that they can be content with a small portion of their original homeland and that the refugees and other displaced people who are currently lodging in various countries will altruistically and unilaterally give up on their hopes of repatriation." "It is only possible to think in this way," she concludes, "if one entirely disregards the feelings and reactions of the people in whose midst the Jewish state was created."¹⁹

Karmi is an impassioned advocate for Palestinian interests and favors a dismantling of the special Jewish character of the state of Israel and its replacement with some kind of binational state, or a de-ethnicized, one-person-one-vote civic democracy. Her views, of course, are not representative of all Palestinians, some of whom, including many long-time residents of West Bank cities like Ramallah, would probably accept gracefully the standard two-state solution calling for Israel to pull back to its pre-1967 borders and allow Palestinians to create a tiny rump state in the remaining territory. But Karmi's views do reflect the continued salience in the minds of most Palestinians of the events of 1948 and the symbolic importance of securing the right of the 1948 refugees and their descendants to return to their original home territories if they so choose even if those areas have long been part of what is now the state of Israel. While surveys show that only about 10% of Palestinians living in the frontline refugee camps of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan would choose to return to live in Israel were such an option available, the existence of such an option is of paramount importance symbolically and otherwise to most diaspora Palestinians. No major change in the general Palestinian and greater Arab and Muslim hostility to Israel is likely to come about without such a right-of-return. And it is for this reason that the standard two-state proposals are not likely to be seen by most Palestinians as anything other than interim measures, which can hardly be counted on to quell irredentist aspirations -- aspirations Israelis rightly fear will likely lead to continued Arab terrorism.

What is perhaps most galling to diaspora Palestinians with two-state models that confine the Palestinian right-of-return to a small Palestinian state but not to the much larger territory of Israel is that under Israeli's Law of Return all diaspora Jews, even those not facing any kind of persecution and living comfortable middle-class lives in lands far

removed geographically from the Mideast, have an absolute right to emigrate to the state of Israel, automatically becoming Israeli citizens upon their arrival, while Palestinians with family histories in Israeli towns like Jaffa and Acre that may go back centuries are not even permitted to return to their ancestral homeland as non-citizen residents. "We Palestinians," the Palestinian-American activist Edward Said once remarked, "ask why a Jew born in Warsaw or New York has the right to settle [in Israel] according to Israel's Law of Return whereas we, the people who lived here for centuries, cannot?"²⁰ Diaspora Palestinians living in cramped refugee camps in the countries bordering Israel probably share such feelings even more intensely than Said, who died a few years ago after a long career as a Columbia university humanities professor.

It was the lack of any serious discussion or agreement on a Palestinian right-of-return that helped to sabotage the Oslo peace process and rendered impotent the efforts of Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton at Camp David in 2000 to get better cooperation on a two-state proposal from Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. Without some meaningful provision for a right-of-return one cannot imagine broad Palestinian acceptance of any two-state solution. While some West Bank Palestinians might accept such an arrangement (however reluctantly), one can hardly imagine the 2.5 million Palestinians living in the frontline refugee camps, or those living in Gaza (most of whom are descendants of refugees from the 1948 war), accepting as a final arrangement a solution that gives to the Arabs less than half of what they could have had, without all the intervening misery and hardship, under the UN partition plan of 1947. Were Palestinians to accept such a solution, it would only be seen in their eyes as an interim measure looking forward to the time in which Mandate Palestine is again united and Palestinians can settle anywhere in what they continue to view as their homeland. Without a right-of-return most Palestinians would continue to view the Jewish state as an anti-Arab colonialist enterprise -- one created with the help of imperialist Western powers at the cost of their ongoing misery.

Curiously, even Israelis who favor a two-state separationist arrangement, with Jews and Arabs living "side by side" in their own well-demarcated territorial state, seem to realize that a West Bank-Gaza Palestinian state, one that granted to the Arabs only about 22% of Mandate Palestine, would not satisfy Palestinian demands, end irredentist feelings, or likely aid in achieving any serious reconciliation between the two peoples. A recent survey of public opinion in Israel concludes that "at no time [between 2003 and 2007] do a majority of Israelis perceive the ultimate goal of the Arabs as limited to recovering the territories conquered by Israel in 1967. ... The majority [of Israeli Jews] believed that the Arabs aspire to destroy the State of Israel and over a third were convinced that this would include the killing of a large part of the Jewish population. ... The conviction that the Arabs remain committed to the destruction of Israel in stages (the 'stages plan') is deeply engrained in the Israeli psyche."²¹

Granting to diaspora Palestinians a right-of-return to Israel -- one comparable to the right of diaspora Jews to return -- would, of course, be well received in Arab quarters and would likely lead to at least some substantial decline in the level of hatred Palestinians harbor toward Israeli Jews. But from the Israeli perspective it is a complete

non-starter, with no sane Israeli regime ever likely even to contemplate it, at least not within the context of the usual proposals made along these lines. Polls show that four in five Jews in Israel oppose the return of even a very limited number of Palestinian Arabs to Israel, and they have the most compelling reasons for doing so. Israeli Arabs have never felt at home in the Jewish state, a state that has meant so much suffering for their people, and one whose Jewish flag, Jewish anthem, and policies favoring Jews over Arabs hardly evoke Arab loyalty. More and more Israeli Jews have come to see the existing Israeli Arabs as a potentially disloyal fifth column, a view born out when young Arabs in their midst praise suicide bombers who attack Jewish targets and cheer when Hezbollah and Hamas rockets slam into Israeli territory. Not surprisingly, in polls six out of ten Israelis favor offering economic and other incentives for Israeli Arabs to emigrate to other lands. It is because of their questionable loyalty that Arabs are discouraged from serving in the Israeli military (and unlike Jews are not subject to Israel's general conscription laws) and are almost never chosen either to be part of governing coalitions or to serve in cabinet posts where sensitive security information is discussed.

At least insofar as Arab "return" implies the possibility of future citizenship in Israel, no non-suicidal Israeli government will ever accept it, and it is useless even to talk about it. Israeli Arabs already comprise almost 20% of the Israeli population and have a birth rate substantially higher than those of Israeli Jews, with Arabs typically having four or five children per family as opposed to two or three for the Jews. The fear that this alienated and unassimilated population will substantially grow in proportion to the Jewish population is universal among Israeli Jews and explains why all but the most extreme left in Israeli politics passionately oppose any arrangement, two-state or otherwise, that would allow diaspora Palestinians to return to their former homeland if this implied some claim to future citizenship rights.

While two-state separationism is opposed by many Palestinian nationalists, who seek a politically unified historical Palestine and a right-of-return of the 1948 refugees to Israeli territory, its strongest opponents come from the ranks of the powerful religious-right in Israel, particularly those among the more zealous contingent of the settler movement. For many of the more religiously committed Jews in Israel the Jewish people are believed to possess a God-given divine right to establish sovereignty over all of Biblical Palestine, which they interpret to include all of the West Bank, the original home of the kingdoms of David and Solomon. Some would even go further and include territory in present day Jordan, Lebanon and Syria among the territory given by God to the Jewish people. For these Jews the thought of removing Jewish settlements from ancient Judea and Samaria to make room for a Palestinian Arab state is blasphemous, and the more zealous among them, who are already heavily armed, would likely stand and fight against anyone, including members of the Israeli Defense Forces, who forcefully tried to evict them.²²

The fact that Israel thought it prudent to dispatch 40,000 soldiers and policemen in 2005 to remove just 8,000 Jewish settlers from Gaza -- a region with far less Biblical resonance for the religious than historical Judea and Samaria -- suggests just how difficult it would be to get many in the settler movement to accept a Palestinian state on

the West Bank if that involved, as under most two-state models it probably would, the dismantling of many Jewish settlements and the removal of Jewish settlers. A minor civil war would likely erupt between Israeli soldiers and settlers, a prospect that no Israeli government would want to tackle and for that reason none is likely to provoke. With the decline in Labor Zionism and the growing strength of both the religious and nationalist right in Israeli politics it is unlikely that the kind of two-state solution envisioned at Camp David in 2000 or at Taba in January of 2001 -- where most of the West Bank is given up by Israel to form a sovereign Palestinian state -- will ever be approved. Even if it were, it would cause bitter resentment among substantial portions of the Israeli population, and without a Palestinian right-of-return to Israeli territory would gain few friends for Israel among the huge diaspora Palestinian population and their Arab and Muslim sympathizers. Such an arrangement would hardly usher in a new age of peace and reconciliation or do anything to alter the polarized mentalities that have existed in the region for almost a century.

Many Israelis who favor a two-state solution do so with great reluctance, in part because even the non-religious often believe that Jews should be allowed to settle in what was once the heart of Biblical Israel. More important still, many Israeli Jews suspect that Palestinian Arabs will not be satisfied by a state confined to the territory of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, but will seek to continue their warfare against Israel, this time from a more secure territorial base. The Palestinians would only have more convenient platforms to fire their rockets into a more territorially vulnerable Israel. A Palestinian state encompassing under the most generous two-state plans little more than a fifth of Mandate Palestine, would, they believe, hardly assuage the deep Palestinian sense of historical grievance. Trading "land for peace," many Israelis believe -- even some who reluctantly support such a policy -- is a chancy affair that may mean giving up land but getting little peace.

Even the mechanics of a two-state separationist agreement at this stage in the development of the two peoples is problematic. Many former supporters of a two-state solution, including perhaps most prominently Meron Benvenisti, the former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, have concluded that two-state separationism is no longer either economically, infrastructurally, or politically feasible. The vast settlement network in the West Bank, with its extensive system of roads, water and electric grids, administrative structures and the like, all of which are integrated into the larger Israeli political and economic system, would make any systematic disengagement of Israelis from the West Bank enormously costly and surely traumatic for the settlers themselves, these former two-state supporters argue.

Benvenisti, for instance, says that Israel's settlement policy on the West Bank long ago passed the point of no return with the huge sums of money spent in developing the settlements, the huge number of settlers involved, the political clout of the settlers and their supporters, and the intricate economic and infrastructural interdependence of the settlements and the Jewish state being of such salience that no future government of Israel is ever likely to be able, either practically or politically, to effect a radical pull-back. And a one-for-one territorial swap, as some propose, would only partially alleviate

the problem and leave the West Bank a fragmented hulk. Like the Brith Shalomists, Benvenisti favors some kind of unitary-state solution, though he is uncertain about its contours.²³ What he is certain of is that the kind of two-state separationist arrangement with something like the 1967 Green Line being the border is not likely to come about, and will not, in any event, produce any permanent peace between Israel and its Palestinian and Muslim neighbors.

Ethnic Cleansing -- Jewish Version

Throughout history territorial disputes between peoples have often been settled simply by the militarily stronger group forcing the militarily weaker one to flee. Those who didn't move away would typically be killed, enslaved, or if they were young, fertile females, taken as concubines or additional wives. "Ethnic cleansing" is a term that first appeared in the late 20th century after the breakup of Yugoslavia but the situation to which it applies can be traced back by anthropologists to the earliest societies of which we have record.²⁴ It is what the European colonists did to the Native American tribes when they first arrived in the New World; what the Native American tribes themselves did to one another for millennia before the Europeans came; what the ancient Babylonians and later Romans did to the ancient Jews of Palestine; what, in earlier times, the Jews themselves did to the ancient Canaanites, Amorites, and other indigenous peoples of Palestine; and throughout human history what powerful and aggressive peoples have almost always done to weaker ones whose land or hunting ground they wanted as their own. Ethnic cleansing -- or attempts to achieve ethnic cleansing, whether or not successful -- has been so ubiquitous in human history that one is tempted to trace its roots to something very much ingrained in human nature, as contemporary evolutionary psychologists do.

For this reason it is not surprising that some observers of the Arab-Israeli conflict who style themselves "realists" rather than sentimentalists or moralists have proposed some version of the ethnic cleansing scenario as the most natural way to deal with the problem at hand and the only way to bring about peace. Rival tribes rarely get along with one another, they say, and it is only natural and not to be resisted that the more powerful seize the available land for their own use. Of course, the Arab and Israeli versions of ethnic cleansing come to different conclusions of who should cleanse whom, but structurally they are identical.

Surely the clearest, most articulate, most outspoken, and for many the most engaging proponent of the Jewish version of the ethnic cleansing scenario was the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, the founder of the Brooklyn-based Jewish Defense League, and later the leader in Israel of the anti-Arab Kach party. I remember seeing Kahane often on New York City television when I was growing up. He had a genuine knack for inspiring young Jewish males in the necessity to fight back against anti-Semites and all who would try to push Jews around. "Never Again!" was his recruiting slogan for members of the JDL, with the recollection of Jewish passivity and slaughter in the Holocaust striking a responsive chord in those who were determined that this time Jews would fight back --

and fight back and win. Though most Jews in the Long Island area where I lived were politically liberal and thought Kahane a dangerous extremist -- a fascist Jew clearly beyond the pale -- to me what he said about Israel and the Jews possessed a certain rationality and logic that I didn't think could be passed off so lightly.

"The Arabs of Israel will never accept the idea of Israel as a Jewish state," Kahane would later proclaim after moving to Israel. (I paraphrase him here.) "They believe that Jews are thieves who stole *their* land in our War of Independence, and even those Arabs who are Israeli citizens feel no connection or emotional ties to a state that proudly proclaims its Jewishness. Not only is Israel surrounded by Arab enemies in bordering countries and in ancient Judea and Samaria -- enemies that loathe us and want to destroy us -- but the Arabs in Israel itself are an even greater danger, a fifth-column that threatens the very existence and long-term security of the Jewish state." (I am paraphrasing him here again)

"The Arab of Israel sits in a land in which he was once the majority, which he controlled, which was Arab, which was his." (Here I quote Kahane directly and at length.) "The Jew came -- from Russia, Poland, Morocco, and Brooklyn -- and took it from him. *That is how the Arab sees it.* That is *his* reality. How do we expect him to feel and react, this man who feels robbed and bitter and alienated? That is the source of the problem, and it is insoluble. ... Let the Jew never forget the utter and complete hatred of the Arabs for Israel and their determination to destroy her."²⁵

"[It is true that] the Arab of Israel can enjoy full religious and cultural freedoms, can say and write what he feels, can exercise political rights in the sense of voting for the party of his choice, just like a Jew. But to think that this makes the Arab of Israel feel that the state is his and that his national destiny there is the same as that of the Jews is to fail to understand the reality of being an Arab in what is *de jure* a Jewish state. It is to fail to understand that not by bread alone does the Arab live, and that a man needs to dwell in and feel part of his own land, where the state represents his national and cultural aspirations, where the majority of the people -- those who control the state -- are *his* people. But when 'his' state is one whose national roots, majority, language, religion, culture, holidays, and very destiny are different from his -- what do we expect of the Arabs? What do we think? That he is a fool who does not understand, or worse, a knave who can be bought with social and economic progress?"²⁶

"The points I raise are so brutally plain and painful that people shrink from them. Better, for them, sugary delusions than bitter reality. And so, during all the years of the existence of Israel, and for all the decades of pre-Israel political Zionism, Zionist leaders eagerly, desperately, clung to a myth, which they fed, as an article of faith, to the Jewish masses. That myth proclaimed: The way to peaceful coexistence between Arab and Jew in the Land of Israel is to raise the standard of living and to create a new generation of educated Arabs. ... It should be obvious by now, as the result of scores of examples in other countries, that one does not buy the national aspirations of a people with indoor toilets. The Arabs of Israel ... will not be bought off with material goods, electricity, or higher education. Indeed, it is clear that the more social, economic, and political progress

is made and the more educated the Arabs become, the less satisfied they will be and the more extreme, nationalistic, and antagonistic to the Jewish state."²⁷

There is only one solution, Kahane proclaimed. "*They must go!*" They have 22 Arab states in which to live in, he said, the Jews have only one. And it is a very tiny one at that. However long Jews may continue to delude themselves and try to avoid the conclusion, Kahane intoned, there is only one permanent answer: "*They must go!*" Never again will Jews let themselves be victimized by those who despise them. Never again will Jews cower before those who want to annihilate them or who want to prevent them from living in that tiny plot of ground that is Eretz Israel which God himself has given to the Jews as a sacred trust. We must proclaim from every hilltop and every valley in our ancient homeland that between Arab and Jew there can be no peace. There is only one way out: "*They must go!*"

I have spent considerable time quoting and paraphrasing Kahane and explaining his views because for many Jews -- many more perhaps than willingly acknowledge it, even to themselves -- there is a compelling logic to his pronouncements, and he represents the purest case of a Jewish call for ethnic cleansing. I must confess that as a young man I found his "Never Again!" slogan, and his in-your-face, you're-not-going-to-push-the-Jews-around-this-time rhetoric powerfully alluring. Some of my liberal Jewish friends found Kahane an embarrassment, if not a joke, but I never experienced the Kahane phenomenon in this manner. In his time Kahane represented a resurgence of the spirit of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising -- European Jewry's finest hour during the darkest days of Nazi persecution -- and successfully translated that spirit into a rousing, muscular English prose that if you were young, male, and Jewish, and if you came from a working class community in New York City, you might very likely find strikingly resonant. Had I been raised a Jew in Brooklyn rather than a Gentile on Long Island, I might well have become a charter member of Kahane's Jewish Defense League.

It is easy to pass off Kahane's call for the ethnic cleansing of the Arabs as the voice of an extremist with little support among mainstream Israelis. After all, Kahane's Kach party never received even 2% of the vote in an Israel election, it was later outlawed for its overtly anti-Arab stance, and Kahane himself was put in jail by Israeli authorities for racial incitement. It would be a mistake, however, to take so simple a view. Kahane's ideas continue to have significant resonance even among many Israelis who would be disinclined to admit it publicly. As already mentioned, six in ten Israeli Jews admit to pollsters that they support using economic incentives to induce Arab Israelis to emigrate, and one can be sure that a substantial portion of these would not be above using more coercive means to effect ethnic transfer, especially if the "fifth-column threat" became more real. "The truth is," says the Israeli peace activist and critic of Zionism, Ilan Pappé, "that what lies in the deepest layers of the Israeli national consciousness is far worse from what appears on the surface."²⁸ After a hundred years of unremitting conflict with the surrounding Arab population, one can well imagine the sorts of things that lie in those deepest layers -- which Kahane, while he was alive, clearly tapped.

Benny Morris shocked many of his previous supporters, who had wrongly supposed he was close to Israel's "peace camp," when in a 2004 interview in the newspaper *Haaretz* he defended the 1948 ethnic cleansing of Israel's Arabs and suggested that things would have been much better had Ben Gurion completed the job and not left so many Palestinians remaining within Israeli territory. Israel's Arabs today are a continuing threat, Morris believes, and in any future confrontation with bordering Arab states ethnic cleansing may be necessary just as it was during Israel's War of Independence. "The Israeli Arabs are a time bomb," Morris said in the *Haaretz* interview. "Their slide into complete Palestinization has made them an emissary of the enemy that is among us. They are a potential fifth column. In both demographic and security terms they are liable to undermine the state. So that if Israel again finds itself in a situation of existential threat, as in 1948, it may be forced to act as it did then. It could happen. If the threat to Israel is existential, expulsion will be justified. ... There are circumstances in history that justify ethnic cleansing."²⁹

Supporters of ethnic cleansing in Israel are to be found among the right wing of the Likud party, among members of the increasingly influential Russian-immigrant Yisrael Beitenu party, among the National Religious Party, and among a number of smaller parties including Tehiya, Tsomet, and Moledet. "Kahane Was Right," written in Hebrew, is, I am told, currently among some of the more popular graffiti scrawled on Israeli walls. The staunchest supporters of Kahanist ideas are to be found among the more militant members of the settler community and particularly among the more politicized orthodox and neo-Zionist factions. Many of the more messianic religious elements in Israel hope for a regional war with the surrounding Arab states so that Israel can complete the ethnic cleansing carried out in response to a similar situation in 1948, with some believing that it will help usher in a new messianic age.

One of the leading Chabad intellectuals in Israel, Rabbi Yitzhak Ginzburgh, was for many years an impassioned proponent of the Kahanist-style of ethnic cleansing, and like Kahane himself was arrested for racial incitement. He went so far as to publish a book in 1998, *Baruch the Man* (in Hebrew) defending the deranged killer Baruch Goldstein, who, in February of 1994, entered the crowded Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, and as it filled with Muslim worshippers, continued to fire his assault rifle until 29 people were dead and over 100 wounded. Mainstream Israeli public opinion is certainly outraged by this kind of extremism, but Ginzburgh continued to enjoy the support of the influential Chabad-Lubavitch community, both in Israel and America.³⁰ While it may be true as some claim that ethnic cleansing is opposed by a large centrist group in Israel -- some speak of an Israeli "silent majority"³¹ -- at the same time the "forced transfer" option, as it is known in Israel, is not beyond the realm of possibility. As the example of Benny Morris shows, one need not be an extremist or religious zealot to support it, at least under certain circumstances.

While one can imagine situations in which ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian Arabs might become a real possibility for the Israeli state, and while it would certainly be militarily doable given Israel's overwhelming military superiority in the Mideast region, were such a development to come about it would be a disaster for Israel and the Mideast

region in almost everyway. Not only would Israel become an ultra pariah state among nations -- exponentially more so than it is today and much greater than South Africa ever was -- but it would lose the support of its critical patron, the United States, in addition to a substantial portion of world Jewry. Such an ethnic cleansing would poison relations for generations to come between Israel and every Muslim state on the planet including those with future potential to pose substantial military threats to Israel including Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, and Syria. Third World countries and the European Union would be enraged and would likely support calls for boycotts, expulsion from the U.N., and other serious sanctions.

The greatest benefactors of such an ethnic cleansing would surely be the Jihadist extremists throughout the Mideast, who would reap a recruiting bonanza and be inspired to continue with the kind of protracted, multi-generational "clash of civilizations" that eventually led to the demise of the Christian Crusader state in the late 12th century. Religious zealotry would expand exponentially in the region, and the long-term strategic advantage would pass to those who think in multi-generational terms and are more concerned with their eternal reward in an afterlife than their shorter-term earthly comfort. Jewish religious zealots would no doubt match their Muslim counterparts in the degree of their religious commitment and zeal, just as the Christian crusaders did vis-à-vis Jerusalem's 12th century Muslims. But they would be swamped in numbers by Muslim Jihadists, and the long-range prospect for the existence of Israel, not to speak of the overall peace and repose of the Mideast region, would be permanently dashed.

For all these reasons, supporters of genuine peace and reconciliation between Arabs and Jews can only hope that Israel never goes down the ethnic cleansing road. It is a formula for regional chaos, if not Armageddon.

Ethnic Cleansing -- Arab Version

Though Kahane had an enthusiastic following among a subclass of Israeli Jews, he was anathema to most mainstream Israeli politicians, and his open espousal of ethnic cleansing was considered by Official Israel to be off-limits (hence the outlawing of his Kach party), even if many harbored a secret sympathy for his ideas. The same cannot be said, however, for Arab politicians in neighboring states in relation to the Arab version of ethnic cleansing. Indeed several Arab leaders from Egypt's Nasser in the 1950s to Iran's Ahmadinejad today have gained popularity among their people with promises to "drive the Zionists into the sea," or "wipe Israel off the map." Considering the deep sense of historical injustice and humiliation at the hands of Zionism that most Palestinians and their Muslim supporters feel, it is not surprising that in their more despairing moods they would be comforted by fantasies of revenge against Israeli Jews, the major source, as they see it, of continued Arab victimization and oppression. And since Arab political leaders have no need, like their Israeli counterparts, to guard their public statements to comport with the sensibilities of a powerful patron like the United States or other influential actors in the developed world, their statements often partake of a reckless abandon and over-the-top extremism.

But given the enormous military imbalance that exists today between Israel and its Muslim neighbors, talk of ethnic cleansing from the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli divide is sheer bluster. No neighboring Muslim state, either alone or in combination with others, currently has any chance of posing a credible military threat to the existence of the state of Israel, and consequently no ability to carry out a systematic ethnic cleansing. Israel not only has a superb conventional military force that is in a different league than its rivals, but the backing of a powerful U.S. sponsor, whose military ability to smash Arab armies was well displayed in two Iraqi wars. More important still, Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal estimated to contain as many as two-hundred combat-ready nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them by air to any hostile state in the region. If Israel felt its very existence threatened by outside forces seeking to cleanse it of Jews, it would no doubt use all the military power at its disposal including its nuclear arsenal. Israel currently has the capacity to deliver devastating nuclear destruction to any hostile Arab neighbor, a fact that would serve to deter all but the most insane religious fanatics from trying to "wipe the Zionist entity off the map."

Even if Iran gains nuclear weapons, as it seems intent on doing, and even if Pakistan with its significant nuclear arsenal were to come under the control of a radical Islamist regime, it is doubtful that either country would risk getting into a nuclear war with Israel absent the most extreme provocation, such as Israel launching a massive Arab expulsion from its occupied territories. Such a war, while it would certainly destroy Israel (together with most of its Arab inhabitants), would devastate Iran and Pakistan and lead to the death of perhaps tens of millions of Muslims.

But one never knows. Fanaticism, particularly of a dogmatic-religious or nationalistic kind, has many times in history overridden any sensible cost-benefit analysis or common-sense reasoning, so the possibility of a future nuclear war cannot be dismissed out of hand. This possibility should underscore the urgency and necessity of finding a solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict that leads at the very least to a "relaxation of tensions" between the antagonists if not a genuine peace settlement.

The Egyptian-Jordanian Handoff Solution

If the Brith Shalom type of binationalism is no longer feasible, two-state separationism defective on multiple grounds, and ethnic cleansing both grossly immoral and catastrophic in its practical implications, some on the neo-conservative right among Israel's supporters have concluded that a return to something like the *status quo ante* of the period between the conclusion of Israel's War of Independence in 1948 and the Six-Day War of June, 1967 might be the best practicable solution. We might call this the Egyptian-Jordanian handoff solution since it envisions convincing the Jordanians to take control of that portion of the West Bank that would be left after Israel pulled back behind its security-fence, and convincing the Egyptians to take control of the Gaza strip as it did after the 1948 war. In some versions the handoff would only be to Jordan, which would take control of both Gaza and a rump West Bank, with the two Palestinian territories connected by a limited-access rail or highway link.³²

Under this type of solution Palestinians would be denied a state of their own but would become part of the governing structures of their two more powerful -- and stable -- Muslim neighbors. In this way, it is said, Palestinian extremism could be contained, and the Palestinians, without their own state, could become part of an established national structure with people who speak their own language and dialect, share their own religion, reside near their geographic place of origin, and sympathize with their historical travail. In time, it is hoped, Palestinians will come to make a new home in their new countries, just as many Palestinians have already done in Jordan, the one Arab country to grant Palestinians something like normal citizenship.

Alas, such a proposal, while attractive to many of Israel's supporters, completely fails to grasp the changes in the Palestinian Arab psyche that have occurred over the past forty years and the ever snowballing power of Palestinian nationalism and its commitment to both the creation of an autonomous Palestinian state and a Palestinian "right of return" to pre-Nakba Palestine. Aside from the fact that, a) such a solution would do nothing to diminish the ongoing hatred and hostility towards Israel of most Palestinians including those in the frontline refugee camps as well as those in the West Bank and Gaza, it would, b) require the active cooperation of Jordan and Egypt, two nations that almost certainly would resist any pressure to take upon themselves the incorporation of a large, disruptive, radicalized Palestinian population.

The Hashemite monarchy and the Jordanian ruling class, which is of Bedouin ethnic origin, not Palestinian-Arab, well remembers how a radicalized Palestinian Liberation Organization in its midst in the late 1960s almost destroyed Jordan and had to be forcefully evicted by the Jordanian army in September of 1970 ("Black September" as the PLO remembers it). The Jordanian population is already more than half Palestinian in ethnic origin owing largely to the flight of 1948 and 1967 refugees, and the politically dominant Bedouin group is not likely to take kindly to the prospect of being displaced by a rival ethnic group that, while deeply pitied, is closely associated with ongoing violence, instability, and civil war in the Mideast. As one critic of the Jordanian handoff explains, it is pure fantasy to expect that "some three million highly politicized people" -- that is the West Bank and Jerusalem Palestinians -- will "readily dissolve the emotional and cultural attachments ... to their ancestral homes, lands, communities, and national affinity" and go off peacefully to a different country "seeking fulfillment under an alien monarchy." "A corollary fantasy," this critic continues, "is that the Jordanian monarchy would view that same prospect with anything but dread."³³

The Egyptian regime too is not likely to take kindly to the idea of absorbing Palestinians from Gaza. "Listen to me carefully," President Mubarak of Egypt told an interviewer in January, 2008. "Gaza is not part of Egypt, nor will it ever be." Like the regime in Amman, members of the Egyptian ruling class have good reason to fear Palestinian extremism. Egypt has had difficulty controlling its own homegrown Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist group from which Hamas has drawn much of its radical theological and political inspiration. Adding Gaza Palestinians to its homegrown radicals would invite further domestic turmoil and a strengthening in the Hamas-style of radical Islamism.

Even if Jordan or Egypt were willing to accept a Gaza/West Bank handoff, there is no reason to believe that the situation between Israel and its Muslim neighbors would improve. One can well imagine the possibility, in fact, in which a more radicalized Islamic population in each state successfully displaces the existing regimes, which have sought peaceful coexistence with Israel, and establishes something like an Iranian-style of Islamic republic. Bitter irredentist feelings on the part of their Palestinian populations and sympathy for such irredentism by radicalized Islamists might prove to be a much greater threat to Israel and to peace in the region than exists now with a stateless Palestinian population on the West Bank and Gaza. An anti-Israel coalition consisting of a more radicalized Jordan and Egypt, together with Syria, Iran, a future Islamist Pakistan, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and possibly a resurgent Iraq would be a future nightmare for Israel and end all prospects for reconciliation between Muslims and Jews in the Mideast. For all these reasons the handoff solution is a no-brainer.

The Revival of the Unitary-State Idea: Contemporary Post-Zionism and its Arab Equivalents

With the failure of the Oslo peace process and the two-state separationist ideology that lay behind it, the idea of a one-state solution like that of the original Brith Shalom group has reappeared among certain Jewish intellectuals as well as a growing number of Palestinians and others.³⁴ For some, who see themselves as pragmatists -- a group that includes Meron Benvenisti and the American political scientist Virginia Tilley -- the Jews and Palestinians in both Israel and the West Bank are simply too entangled, their geographic, economic, and natural-resource dependent lives too intertwined for a mutually beneficial or politically feasible separation of the two peoples to take place.³⁵

For others, including many Jewish intellectuals of the secular left -- a group that includes the Israelis Ilan Pappé, Ephraim Nimni, and Daniel Gavron, and the British-born NYU history professor Tony Judt -- Israel represents an outdated 19th century style ethno-national polity that continues to oppress Palestinians both in Israel proper and on the West Bank, and is thoroughly out of step with the more enlightened and progressive values of modern, multicultural nations. Ethno-national states of any kind, including a Palestinian state, are anathema to this group of thinkers.

Nimni, for instances, argues that Jews, wherever they live, should focus their energies on their local diaspora communities, not on Israel, and Israel itself should cease to be an ethno-national Jewish state and become a de-ethnicized, secular, multicultural nation representing equally all its citizens with no preference given to Jews or any other ethno-national or ethno-religious group. "The Zionist project," he writes, "severely underestimates the resilience and vitality of the Jewish diaspora and fossilizes a nineteenth-century model of the nation-state."³⁶ Appropriately, Nimni and others who share his views call themselves "post-Zionists," and believe that Zionism, whatever value it may have had in the past, cannot be a guide to the well-being of Jews either in Israel or elsewhere and certainly cannot bring about meaningful peace in the Mideast.

The post-Zionist view, which has been bandied about by small groups in Israel for quite some time now, first gained an audience among American Jews by a much discussed -- and much vilified -- article by Tony Judt in the October, 2003 issue of the *New York Review of Books* titled "Israel: The Alternative." The article provoked a blizzard of letters in response by American Jews, most of them soundly hostile. Among other things, Judt argued that Israel's ethnicity-based nationalist project was not only an anachronism and a source of great instability in the Mideast, but that it had a spill-over effect in causing increased hatred of Jews around the world. Simply put, the ethno-national state of Israel, Judt asserted, is bad for the Jews -- and not just the Jews of Israel. The increase in attacks on Jews in Europe and elsewhere, he said, "is primarily attributable to misdirected efforts, often by young Muslims, to get back at Israel." Judt favors some kind of unified, binational state, though he has been short on details as to how such a state would be structured or realized.

For many Palestinians and their supporters the one-state solution has become increasingly popular. Moving away from an "Algerian paradigm," where an indigenous Muslim group conducts a successful anti-colonialist war to oust a hated European settler community, to a "South African paradigm," where an indigenous population strikes up a peaceful accord with its former colonial-settler masters to form a multi-racial, multi-ethnic civic democracy, a one-state solution, it is claimed, offers the best chance for peace and reconciliation between Palestinians and Jews in Israel. Not only would it overcome all of the local problems inherent in a two-state separationist solution, its proponents say, but in providing a "right of return" for both diaspora Palestinians and diaspora Jews to a united Palestinian-Israeli state, it would overcome one of the major deal-breakers that have haunted all the two-state solutions of the past.

Arab supporters of a one-state solution have included the diaspora Palestinians Ghada Karmi, Ali Abunimah, and the late Edward Said, and more recently -- and more curiously -- the Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. For the last few years Qaddafi has been pushing a plan for a united Jewish-Palestinian state of "Isratine" where Jews and Arabs would enjoy equal political rights, and those in each diaspora community would enjoy an equal right of return to a land both consider sacred.³⁷ Said, in the years before his death, was particularly concerned with furthering a humanistic understanding of the legitimate rights of both peoples and believed that a one-state arrangement was the best way to achieve this goal. "It has been the failing of Oslo," Said wrote in 1997, "to plan in terms of separation, a clinical partition of peoples into individual, but unequal entities, rather than to grasp that the only way of rising beyond the endless back-and-forth violence and dehumanization is to admit the universality and integrity of the other's experience, and to begin to plan a common life together."³⁸

Post-Zionists and other supporters of a one-state solution differ in terms of the kind of unified state they envision. Some, who look toward the South African model, imagine a one-person-one-vote civic democracy governing a state encompassing all of Israel and the occupied territories with the rights of both diaspora communities enjoying an identical right of return. Others, who invoke models closer to practices in

Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada, envision some kind of collective power sharing arrangement, where Palestinians and Israelis are each accorded specific group rights, and institutional arrangements are forged such that neither group will politically or culturally be able to dominate the other. It must be said, however, that one-state advocates have not provided much in the way of concrete detail for how such a federated or power-sharing arrangement might be structured, usually saying that such details must be worked out in the future by the parties involved.³⁹

Advantages of a one-state solution, its supporters say, are vast. Besides providing the basis for a dual right-of-return, the single-state solution, it is claimed, will a) end Israel's pariah status in the Mideast and elsewhere; b) allow for the continued unification of Jerusalem in both its Arab and Jewish quarters; c) permit all the Jewish settlers on the West Bank to remain where they are and even expand if they choose; d) permit all the roads and other infrastructural developments on the West Bank also to remain in place and be open to all citizens; e) allow returning Palestinian refugees to have a sizable piece of territory to which they can return that is associated in their minds with the actual places from which they were expelled; f) give to the Palestinian people a cooperative partnership in an economically viable multi-national state that holds the promise of becoming a beacon of democracy and progressive commercial activity in the Mideast region; and g) provide the basis in fairness and goodwill for a genuine reconciliation between two formerly hostile peoples both of whom have a deep love and historical connection to the land of historical Palestine.

The list is impressive, and one can only wish that the one-staters' dream could come true (just as, in retrospect, one wishes the Brith Shalomists' dream had come true). But alas ... it's not going to happen. Indeed the obstacles to its realization are so insurmountable, the pre-conditions for its success so non-existent today or in the foreseeable future, that what support it has among Palestinians and a small group of left-leaning intellectuals must be seen more as a reflection on the failure of alternative solutions than any honest appraisal of the possibilities of its implementation. To state the matter bluntly: under current conditions of politics and history unitary-state binationalism is not a realizable dream but a utopian pipedream that is more the product of frustration and despair over the prospects for a just and viable two-state solution than any realistic assessment of the salient political and ideological forces currently at work in Israel and the Mideast. Unitary-state binationalism is a complete non-starter, and if it weren't for the creeping popularity that it seems to be acquiring within certain academic circles in Israel and America would warrant little further discussion. The impediments to its realization are immense so I can only outline a few of the more salient ones here.

To begin with there is the abysmal track record of multinational states that contain populations with strong ethno-religious or ethno-linguistic group-identities which draw sharp boundaries between "our kind" and "theirs." Even Canada and Belgium, often touted as successful examples and possible role models for the Mideast, are periodically threatened by separatist movements along ethno-linguistic lines. While they have endured, they have done so precariously, and their peoples have neither the

multigenerational history of warfare and enmity between them nor the religious and cultural distances between them as that between Israeli Jews and Arab Muslims.[†]

Regardless of what trendy commentators may say about multiculturalism being the wave of the future, the overriding general tendency among multinational states over the past sixty years has been to break up into separate ethno-national configurations. India-Pakistan broke up after gaining independence from Britain in the late 1940s, as did the subsequent confederation of East and West Pakistan. The break-up of India set the general pattern for post-WWII developments: Cyprus broke up. Yugoslavia broke up. The Soviet Union broke up. Czechoslovakia broke up. The list goes on and on, and reproduces the pattern seen in the earlier 20th century which witnessed the break up into a myriad of ethno-national entities of the vast territories of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. Even Sweden in the early years of the 20th century saw the congenial Norwegians living mostly in the northern part of the Swedish territory demand their own separate state -- a demand which the Swedes, to their great credit, eventually accepted without going to war.

Even in places like the Basque regions of Spain where ethnic minorities enjoy considerable federated autonomy separatist passions often run strong and can destabilize otherwise satisfactory political arrangements. The descent into chaos of Lebanon in the 1980s is certainly not the only possible trajectory for a multinational state, but it does suggest just how difficult it usually is to get people identifying with two very different ethno-religious or ethno-linguistic communities to cooperate together politically. The mere mention of places like Bosnia, Rwanda, the Sudan, Sri Lanka, and East Timor evoke images of inter-communal violence and bloodbaths reflecting the inability of multiethnic societies to form peaceful polities.

In his book on *Blood and Belonging*, written shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Canadian writer Michael Ignatieff trenchantly observed that at the close of the 20th century "most multinational, multi-ethnic nation-states are discovering that their populations are often more loyal to the ethnic units that compose them than to the federation and the laws that hold the state together." "Though we have passed into a post-imperial age," Ignatieff says, "we have not moved to a post-nationalist age, and I cannot see how we will ever do so."⁴⁰ Though multiculturalists and multinationalists typically obscure the fact, it is difficult to deny Ignatieff's observations here.

[†] The Jews and Arabs in Israel, writes the Israeli journalist Hillel Halkin, "ride the same trains and busses, frequent the same malls, buy in each other's shops, work in the same factories, attend the same universities, are treated in the same hospitals, and are occasionally invited to one another's weddings and celebrations." Nevertheless, he explains, "the two groups speak different languages, have different customs and values, live in separate towns, villages, and urban neighborhoods, study in different elementary schools and high schools, rarely socialize with each other, almost never intermarry, belong to societies in which religion and religious zealotry play major roles, and are heirs to a hundred years of bitter conflict." This, keep in mind is a description of the distance between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs. The distance between Israeli Jews and the Palestinian Arabs in the occupied territories and the frontline refugee camps, who would become part of a united, one-state Israel-Palestine, is no doubt much greater. Hillel Halkin, "The Jewish State and its Arabs," *Commentary*, January 2009, p. 32.

To be sure, success stories are not entirely absent. Switzerland is a multinational state consisting of different regionalized cultural-linguistic communities which have evinced long-term stability and a reasonable degree of civic peace at the national level for multiple generations now. This is attributable to a number of factors involving Switzerland's specific geography, history, geo-political position, wise statesmanship, and wise institutional set-ups. But Switzerland really is the outlier -- the rare exception, not the rule. It is hard to imagine that after a hundred years of intense rivalry and bloodshed between Jews and Palestinians, and hardening group-identities on both sides of the ethnic divide, that the two antagonists will suddenly become the Swiss of the Mideast and create a unitary binational state to which both peoples can feel some significant degree of attachment. An "Isratine" is not likely to evoke much loyalty or cooperative spirit from either the Jews or the Arabs, and it is difficult to see how its multi-ethnic population would not be, in Ignatieff's words, "more loyal to the ethnic units that compose [it] than to the federation and the laws that hold the state together." As one dyspeptic Israeli writer remarked about one-state proposals, "The notion that Palestinians and Jews, who can't even negotiate a two-state solution, could coexist in one happy state is so ludicrous that only the naïve or the malicious would fall for it."⁴¹

What one-state supporters fail to recognize is that many Palestinians and almost all Jews passionately want to be part of an ethnically restricted polity of their own, where they can celebrate their own heritage and culture, converse in their own native language, sing their own national anthem, revere their own national symbols, and at least in their political and religious affairs be amongst those whom they consider "their own kind." This is a truth so obvious to most that it seems that only a few cosmopolitan intellectuals living in isolated bubbles in places like Tel-Aviv and Manhattan have difficulty grasping it.

The anathema status of the one-state idea to almost all Israeli Jews is powerfully reinforced by many years of polling. Simply stated, the idea of sharing a polity, i.e., a political state, with the Arabs -- one in which Jews would not be the overwhelming majority, where Jews would have to share power and national symbols with Palestinian Muslims, and where the state would not be officially Jewish or Zionist -- is an idea that is anathema to all but a miniscule number of Israeli Jews. In one poll taken in late 2003 only 6% of Israeli Jews supported a one-state solution, with 89.5 % saying they either supported a two-state solution or did not think any solution was possible. In the same poll 85.5% of Israeli Jews said that an arrangement in which Jews and Palestinians enjoyed equal rights in the same unified state was almost impossible -- or totally impossible.⁴²

When asked to prioritize four competing values -- a) a country with a Jewish majority, b) a Greater Israel (larger territory), c) peace with the surrounding Arabs in the occupied territories, or d) a democratic country -- most Israeli Jews in polls taken in 2006 and 2007 rated the first item "most important." When Jews "have to choose between alternatives and prioritize their goals," explain the Israeli survey researchers Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked, "the need to preserve and maintain Israel as a Jewish state takes precedence over everything else."⁴³

One might be tempted to attribute such attitudes to temporary anti-Arab feelings following the failure of the Oslo peace process and the beginning of the second Intifada in 2000. Similar results, however, have been shown in polls going back to the early 1980s. In 1995, for instance, at the height of Israeli optimism over the Oslo Accords, more than 9 in 10 Israeli Jews said that they believed "the Jewish-Zionist character of the state of [Israeli]" should either be left as it is (35.6%), or strengthened (59.1%). Only a tiny 5.4% believed the Zionist-Jewish character of the state should be moderated in order to accommodate the wishes of Palestinian Arabs.⁴⁴

Not only do Jews not want to be part of a larger state that would include greater numbers of Palestinian Arabs on the West Bank and Gaza enjoying equal political rights with themselves, many believe that it is an unhealthy thing for the current Israeli state, as it exists within the Green Line borders, to have as many Arab citizens as it does now. In the 1995 poll more than a third of Jews (36.7%) agreed with the statement that "the state [of Israel] should search for and exploit every opportunity to encourage Israeli Arabs to emigrate in order to reduce their number in the population." Another third (35.0%) agreed with this statement, though holding some reservations. Only 28.3% clearly disagreed with the statement.⁴⁵

Israeli Jews have also expressed to pollsters their strong desire to maintain the specifically Jewish symbols of the Israeli state and to prevent Arabs from adding their own symbols or modifying existing ones. Summing up the results of extensive opinion polling during the 1980s and 1990s, Haifa University political scientist As'ad Ghanem writes that "with regard to [state] symbols and the Jewish hegemony over them, most Jews are unwilling to make any change in order to include the Arabs and give them representation on the symbolic level. A vast majority [of Jews] -- 91.1 per cent in [a] 1980 survey and 85.6 per cent in [a] 1995 survey -- is opposed to any change in the symbols of the state, such as the flag and anthem, to enable the Arabs to identify with and be included in them. These are Jewish symbols and derive from the Jewish heritage; the Jews in Israel consider them to be their own and are not willing to allow the Arabs a hand in shaping them." Along similar lines, Ghanem explains, these same polls indicate that "a majority of the Jews do not include the Arabs in their definition of 'Israel' ... and believe that the adjective 'Israeli' applies only to Jews and not to Arabs. A significant percentage of [Israeli Jews] are not pleased with the very presence of the Arabs [in Israel] and expressed a position in favour of the state's looking for and using every opportunity to encourage Palestinian citizens to emigrate in order to reduce their number in the population."⁴⁶

Ghanem also explains the strong suspicion Jews have of Arab loyalty towards Israel and the desire of significant portions of them to see Arab parties excluded from the Israeli parliament. Referring to the 1995 survey, he writes: "Many Jews support outlawing some Arab political parties and movements and forbidding others to be elected to the Knesset. A majority of the Jews (72.2 per cent) do not agree or tend not to agree that the Islamic Movement in Israel, which represents a significant sector of the Arabs in the country, be allowed to contest Knesset elections. In addition, a significant

number of Jews (30.9 per cent) believe that Arabs should not even be allowed to vote in Knesset elections. All in all it can be argued that a majority of Jews are not happy with the fact that 'Arab' parties that represent Arab interests participate in Knesset elections. Broad sectors of the Jewish population seem to believe that the Knesset is an institution that should include only Jewish parties that represent Jewish interests."⁴⁷

Keep in mind in interpreting these surveys, that they reflect the high level of Israeli Jews' opposition to the *current* level of the Arab presence in Israel. One can well imagine how much more intensely Israeli Jews would be opposed to a one-state arrangement in which an expanded Israeli-Palestinian polity had to take in another four or five million Palestinian Arabs from the West Bank, Gaza, and the frontline refugee communities and the Jews had to blend their own Zionist national symbols with the symbols of a people who often view Zionist symbols with an intense abhorrence born of painful personal and historical memories (memories not entirely unlike those evoked in Jews by the swastika, the Horst Wessel Lied, and other symbols of the German National Socialist state).

Many supporters of a one-state solution are well aware that almost all Israeli Jews oppose the idea, and usually with great vehemence. But they hope that outside pressure can force the Jews to establish a unified state and to incorporate returning Palestinian refugees into a single polity much the way the international community through boycotts and other pressures forced white South Africans to accept black South Africans into a one-person-one-vote civic democracy. The South African comparison, however, is not as close as one-state supporters usually suppose. By the 1980s, South Africa had virtually no friends in the international community, and its system of white supremacy and *Herrenvolk Demokratie* was almost universally condemned. Israel's policies, by contrast, while they are often censured in Europe, the Mideast, and much of the undeveloped world, are generally supported in the United States, the most powerful actor on the world stage, and enjoy the backing of important U.S. constituencies including American Jews and the large Zionist-supporting Evangelical and Christian Right communities.

And in the end it is the support of the United States that really counts. One can't imagine any American regime in the foreseeable future putting the kind of pressure on a resistant Israel as was brought to bear on white South Africa in the 1980s. While the Holocaust and the sympathy it gains for Jews may be fading from public memory, sympathy for Israel and the Jews is still strong in America while sympathy for Arabs and Muslims, never strong to begin with, has sunk precipitously since 9/11. Absent some extreme Israeli provocation, such as the expulsion of Arabs from the occupied territories or Israel proper, this situation is not likely to change in any dramatic way over the next generation.

But even if American opinion were to shift radically in an anti-Israel direction the outcome would most likely not be a white South African style of capitulation but resurgence of a kind of beleaguered, "the whole world is against us" mentality like that which first gave rise to political Zionism during the pogrom- and anti-Semitism-filled years of the later 19th century. The outcome of such a development among Israelis would

likely be a resurgence of an Irgun-style of radical-right militancy, probably with an enhanced religious and messianic flavor as befits the more religious temper of recent times. Only now the Irgunists would have nuclear weapons and face a more formidable constellation of Muslim forces on Israel's borders and beyond than in the 1940s, with some of the Muslims inspired by versions of Islamic Jihadism even more ethno-centric and aggressive than any 1940s-style Irgunist fascism. One can't imagine a scarier outcome for Israel, the Mideast, or the entire world.

The veteran peace activist Uri Avnery has been particularly emphatic in criticizing his fellow peace advocates for what he sees as the illusion of a unitary state that would peacefully combine two populations with the long-running hostility of Palestinians and Jews. "Anybody who is rooted in the Israeli-Jewish public knows," says Avnery, "that this public's deepest aspiration ... is to maintain a state with a Jewish majority, a state where Jews will be masters of their fate. This takes precedence over any other wish and aspiration." Even if this unwavering Jewish public could somehow be persuaded to enter into a unitary state with the Palestinian Arabs, such an arrangement, Avnery believes, would almost certainly fail. "All over the world," he writes, "the trend is ... [for] the division of states into national units." The former Soviet Union broke up into a myriad of ethno-national states; Yugoslavia underwent the same fate; Cyprus was partitioned; and the Basques and the Chechens continue to cry out for independence. "There is no example in the world," Avnery says, "of two different peoples voluntarily agreeing to live in one state." And aside from Switzerland, "there is no example in the world of a really functioning binational or multi-national state." To believe that the Palestinians and Jews, with such a long history of bitterness and enmity between them, would be the second great exception is pure fantasy. "After 120 years of conflict, after a fifth generation was born into this conflict on both sides, to move from total war to total peace in a Single Joint State, with a total renunciation of national independence," this, says Avnery, is total illusion.⁴⁸

Those who believe that Israeli Jews will willingly give up the idea of Israel as a Jewish state are just as oblivious to the power of ethnic nationalism -- and the central role it plays in the Jewish Israeli self-understanding -- as those who believe that diaspora Palestinians living in Gaza or the refugee camps of the frontline states will willingly renounce their right of return. As Avnery says in another context, "Nationalism will reign supreme in our generation in all the countries of the [Mideast] region, and nothing will stop it. Any idea, inspiring as it may be, which runs counter to the national feelings of the people concerned, will be by-passed by history."⁴⁹

Even Virginia Tilley, who supports a one-state solution in the face of the impracticability of a two-state separationist one, is forced to concede that de-Zionizing the Jewish state, as post-Zionist Jews and single-state supporters among Arabs demand, would involve a deep symbolic loss to most Jews, and not just to the most religious or most fervently Zionist, or to those in Israel alone. "Even non-Zionist secular Jews," she writes, "may retain a strong sense that some precious, ineffable, Jewish-spiritual quality or mission has at last found its free expression and realization in Israel. If Israel were converted to a binational state, chock full of Muslim and Christian Arabs, that spiritual

imagery would be swamped and dissolved -- a loss far more heart-wrenching to contemplate than the loss of political dominion alone."⁵⁰

The obvious difficulties with a one-state solution notwithstanding, some supporters argue that since a two-state separationist solution is no longer feasible, a one-state solution *must* be possible. Benvenisti at times comes close to this kind of reasoning, and it is at the heart of the argument in Tilley's otherwise excellent book, *The One-State Solution* -- a book that in many ways is the best introduction to the present state of the Palestinian/Israeli dilemma.[‡] But it is simply wrong to conclude, as Tilley and others do, that because "A" won't work, "B" must. The impossibility, impracticality, or immorality of a two-state separationist solution does not mean that a one-state solution is practical or achievable. All the indications are that a one-state solution is even more impractical and unachievable than the standard two-state solution. The truth is that neither two-state separationism nor single-state binationalism offers much promise for resolving this ongoing Mideast tragedy.

Down A Different Path -- The Case for Two-State Condominialism

It looks as if we've reached an impasse. If our long-term goal is a permanent, just, and peaceful settlement to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict none of the major proposed solutions seems to offer much hope. At its most basic the problem can be stated very simply: 1) as a final or end-game outcome, no solution to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict will be accepted by the Arab side that denies to the Palestinians, especially those who have suffered so long in Gaza and the refugee camps of the frontline states, a right of return to the land that is now Israel -- a land which, in their view, was callously and unjustly taken from them by the convergent activities of British imperialists, Jewish settler-colonialists, reactionary Arab leaders and collaborators, and an American-supported Zionist army; and 2) within present political structures and under present conditions of politics and history no Israeli government in its right mind would ever allow any sizable number of Zionist-hating Palestinians to reenter Israel and become citizens of a democratic Jewish state.

This is the stark reality of the current situation, and so stated one can see why so many observers, and not just those on the fringes of the Kahanist right, believe the situation to be unsolvable. Several years ago I was discussing this issue with Professor Robert Gilpin, who at the time was the chief international relations theorist here in Princeton's Politics Department. After surveying with skepticism some of the more common proposals for peace in the Mideast, Bob turned to me and said, "You know,

[‡] Renouncing one-sided partisanship, Tilley's book offers one of the fairest and most sympathetic treatments, not only of "both sides," but of the major factions on both sides, of this ongoing Palestinian-Israeli dispute. It offers the strongest presentation to date of why two-state separationism is increasingly impractical.

Russ, there just may not be a peaceful, long-term solution to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict." Bob's comment at the time struck me as terribly deflating and unduly pessimistic, but also, I must say, as possibly realistic given the track record of Palestinian/Jewish peace talks over the years.

Professor Gilpin is usually identified with the school of international relations associated with the term *Realpolitik* -- a school which stresses the dominant role in the relations between nation-states of military power, economic interests, self-promoting and self-aggrandizing behavior, and national security concerns. Those in this school see themselves as hard-headed "realists" who seek to view the world as it is -- not the way they might like it to be, or the way wishful thinking might conceive it to be. Such "realists" typically view their opponents as well-meaning but fuzzy-headed "liberals" or "idealists" ignorant of how the real world works.

Following Gilpin's "realist" line, but without embracing its "nothing will ever work" pessimism, we can say that there are persuasive reasons for believing that neither the two-state separationist solution, nor the current proposals for a one-state solution, nor the Egyptian-Jordanian handoff solution, nor any of the major variants on these or other commonly suggested peace proposals offer much promise for a just and lasting settlement to the conflict in the former lands of the British Mandate. The critics of each of these proposals, I believe, have a much more potent arsenal of facts and arguments on their side than supporters have on theirs. Upon critical examination, none of the major proposed solutions to the Palestinian problem offers a way out of the continued bitterness, suspicion, violence, and ill-will between the two parties. Saying this, however, does not mean that "nothing will work." It does mean though that if ever a just and lasting settlement is to be found we must look elsewhere than to the kinds of answers and the kinds of thinking that have been dominant so far.

As I explained previously, many years ago, in an international "peace journal," I outlined a series of radical proposals for settling the Arab/Israeli conflict that struck me at the time as vastly superior for all parties concerned than the two-state separationist arrangements that were first beginning to be discussed seriously by foreign policy specialists. The proposals required a bit of thinking outside the box but as time has passed I have become ever more convinced that only an outside-the-box solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict offers any hope of long-range success. As I also explained, I initially called the proposals "two-state binationalism," but realizing the possible confusion in this label I now use the more descriptive term "two-state condominiumism." Briefly stated, this is how it works:

The two-state condominium arrangement starts out with the creation of a democratic West-Bank-Gaza-East-Jerusalem Palestinian state much like that suggested in other two-state proposals with the boundaries of the Palestinian state roughly determined by the pre-1967 Green Line. The Palestinian state ("Palestine") would have most of the features of a democratic nation-state but from the outset it would be an ethnically-defined state, a state of the Palestinian people, whereby a close parallel was maintained to the definition of Israel as a state of the Jews. As part of the fundamental agreement all

current Israel Arabs would be required to transfer their citizenship, national identity, and national voting rights -- but not their residence -- to the new Palestinian state. Israeli Arabs would retain their permanent right to live in Israel and they would also retain their current benefits under the Jewish welfare state, but it would be required that they become citizens of -- and permanent voting members of -- the Palestinian state, not Israel.

Both Palestinians and Jews under the condominium proposal would be granted the right to settle anywhere within the territory of either of the two states, the two states thus forming a single, binational settlement community. Palestinians, that is, would have the right to settle anywhere within Israel just as Jews would have the right to settle anywhere within the territory of the Palestinian state. Regardless of which of the two states they lived in, all Palestinians would be citizens of the Palestinian state, all Jews citizens of Israel.

The states themselves, Israel and Palestine, would have the right -- and, indeed, the moral obligation --- to set up a dense network of support facilities to care for the economic, cultural, religious, and welfare needs of their citizen population living in the territory of the neighboring state. Each state, in other words, would have extensive extra-territorial rights and obligations vis-à-vis its citizens in the neighboring state. The arrangement would be something like that which the U.S. government routinely maintains towards many of its government employees and other citizens living in foreign countries with an extensive American military and diplomatic presence (e.g. West Germany during the Cold War). The Palestinian state would have the obligation to care for its citizen population living in Israel, just as the Jewish state would have the obligation to do the same for Israeli citizens living in the Palestinian state. In any event, Palestinians moving into Israel and Jews living within the Palestinian state would have no claim to any of the welfare and other benefits provided by the territorial state wherein they reside.

As part of the fundamental agreement, the Palestinian state would be required to acknowledge the special Jewish character of the state of Israel, and Israel would be required to acknowledge the special Palestinian-Arab identity of the state of Palestine, with both states acknowledging the right of all Palestinians and all Israelis to reside anywhere within the joint settlement community formed by the combined territories of the two states.

More elaborately, the two-state condominium proposal would involve the following developments:

- 1) Israeli Jews shall adopt a formal constitution that defines the state of Israel in the clearest of ethnicity-restrictive terms as a *Jewish* state --a state of the *Jewish* people. The constitution will make clear that Jews and only Jews can become citizens and voting rights members of the state of Israel. Exceptions to the Jewish-only citizenship and Jewish-only voting-rights rule, whether for individuals (such as Arab volunteers in the Israeli military), or groups (Christians, Druze, etc.) can be made only by special act of the Israeli Parliament at its own absolute discretion.

2) Palestinian Arabs shall establish an ethno-national state of their own ("Palestine") encompassing *all* the territory of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem as these territories existed in the period between the 1949 armistice lines and the Six-Day War of June 1967. The constitution of the Palestinian state shall make clear that Palestinian Arabs and only Palestinian Arabs can become citizens and voting rights members of the Palestinian state. Exceptions to this rule, whether for individuals or groups, can be made only by special act of the Palestinian Arab parliament. The Palestinian ethno-national state will thus closely parallel in structure the Jewish ethno-national state. In addition, just as the Israeli state has the absolute right to determine who is a Jew so the Palestinian state shall have the absolute right to determine who is a Palestinian Arab and thus eligible for state citizenship.

3) While retaining all the benefits they currently receive under the Israeli welfare state (and perhaps additional, "political severance" benefits as well), all Israeli Arabs shall be required to transfer their citizenship and national voting rights -- but not their residence -- to the Palestinian state. Thus all Palestinian Arabs will be citizens of the Palestinian state and all Jews citizens of the state of Israel except in those (relatively few) cases where exceptions have been made by the parliaments of the respective states.

4) The combined land areas of Israel and the Palestinian state shall be designated a unified Condominial Territory and Binational Homeland for all citizens of the two states. All citizens of both Israel and the Palestinian state shall have the right to move to and settle anywhere within the entire Condominial Territory, which shall serve as a binational homeland and the joint settlement venue for all Palestinian Arabs and Jews. The ensuing structure shall bear the template: "Two states and two flags for two peoples within one binational settlement community."⁵¹

5) While each state shall have the right to determine its own immigration and naturalization policies, both states shall have an obligation to their diaspora ethnic communities to provide a place of refuge and a "right of return" consistent with their economic and material capacity to fulfill such an obligation. Diaspora Palestinians shall stand in the same relation to the Palestinian ethno-national state as diaspora Jews currently stand in relation to the Jewish ethno-national state. Israel shall be *Der Judenstaat* (Herzl's "The State of the Jews"), Palestine *Der Palaestinerstaat* ("The State of the Palestinian Arabs"), and the Condominial Territory, *Das binationale Gemeinschaftsland* ("The Binational-Condominial Land of Settlement").

6) Except for those specific exceptions stipulated in advance and agreed to by both parties, all land used for residential, commercial, or agricultural purposes within the Condominial Territory, along with such legal instruments as building permits, variances, commercial licenses, etc. that are used to regulate or facilitate the use of such land, shall be open for acquisition to all Israeli and Palestinian citizens on the strictest (and most strictly enforced) non-discriminatory basis. The implementation of this principle will require the dismantling or radical modification in the mission of all agencies and organizations -- such as the Jewish National Fund and the Israeli Lands Authority -- that

currently prioritize Jews or discriminate against Palestinian Arabs in the acquisition and development of land and other real property. The final arbiter in all disputes over discrimination in these areas shall be entrusted to a special international court, whether under UN auspices or otherwise, whose authority is formally recognized through treaty obligation by both the Israeli and Palestinian governments.

7) The regulation of all water resources in the Condominial Territory shall be entrusted to a special commission of the United Nations set up specifically for that purpose. Its membership shall include equal parts of Palestinians, Israelis, and third-party nationals from countries without significant Muslim or Jewish populations.

8) Within the territory of their condominium partner state, the governments of both Israel and Palestine shall have the right -- as well as the moral responsibility -- to set up a dense network of support facilities such as schools, hospitals, recreational facilities, housing bureaus, old age homes, cultural centers, orphanages, substance abuse clinics, employment offices, homeless shelters, etc., to care for the welfare and other needs of their citizen population living in the neighboring territory. The welfare needs of all Jews living in Palestine and of all Palestinian Arabs residing in Israel (current Arab Israelis excepted) shall be the responsibility of their citizenship state not their state of residence. The basic principle shall be: "Jews and Arabs take care of their own."

9) In those Israeli towns and villages where Palestinian citizens are in the great majority, and in Palestinian villages where Israeli citizens are in the great majority, the expatriate communities under such circumstances shall be accorded a *de facto* form of local autonomy over such municipal concerns as zoning, traffic regulation, road construction, garbage collection, local policing, etc. Local, non-citizen advisory boards shall be elected whose decisions would be generally confirmed ("rubber-stamped") and officially authorized by the government of the respective nation-state in which the town or village lies (i.e., Israel or Palestine) thus providing *de facto* local autonomy in the civic sphere without compromising national sovereignty or granting formal political rights either to Palestinians living in Israel or to Israelis living within the state of Palestine. Helpful suggestions for this kind of arrangement might be drawn from the history of the pre-World War I *millet* system under Ottoman rule in which local ethno-religious minorities were granted substantial degrees of self-governing autonomy without compromising the political authority of the central state. Other helpful suggestions might be provided by the Jewish Agency's role in providing for the welfare and organizational needs of the Jewish communities in Palestine when it was under British Mandate rule.

10) There shall be free movement of peoples and goods across state boundaries between the two condominium partner states. A common labor, common trading, and common investment market shall be formed much like that which exists within the European Union today.

11) The state of Palestine will have almost all the features of a conventional nation state, including political control over its territory, a state flag and a national anthem, a national legislature and national court system, the right to send and receive ambassadors, the right

to seek a seat in the UN, a national army and national police force, a national currency and national passport, the right to tax its citizens, a right to fix immigration and naturalization policy, state control over its educational system, a right to determine its official national language, etc. In one crucial area, however, the Palestinian state will differ from most other nation states. Similar to the special arrangements in Finland and Austria instituted after the Second World War, the Palestinian state would be restricted by treaty obligation in terms of the size and capabilities of its armed forces so that it does not pose a serious military threat to the state of Israel. While it would be permitted to maintain a military of sufficient strength to put down domestic insurrection and terrorism, its armed forces would be restricted in terms of numbers and the kinds of weapons systems it could possess (e.g. advanced fighter jets, modern battle tanks, nuclear weapons) so as not to pose any serious offensive threat to the state of Israel. To further these ends, the Palestinian state would also be prohibited from entering into any military alliance with any other state without the explicit permission of the state of Israel, and must agree to grant to the Israeli government such reasonable military security measures that Israel deems necessary to its national survival. The latter might include a right to set up observation posts near the Jordan River to provide early warning of sudden invasion from hostile forces to the east, overflight privileges within Palestinian airspace for Israeli military aircraft to conduct air-reconnaissance and training operations, and a sharing of intelligence regarding domestic and foreign terrorism.

The Condominial Advantage: Two States within the Boundaries of a Shared Homeland

I know it takes a good deal of rethinking on a whole host of issues to imagine the arrangement I have just described, but I believe that only such a radical restructuring of the political and jurisdictional landscape of the former Mandate Territory has any possibility of bringing about a genuine transformation in the mind-sets of the two warring sides. The two-state condominium solution seems to me so far superior in so many ways to most of the proposals that are out there that you will indulge me in my listing of some of them.

In my judgement, the two-state condominium arrangement that I have just described, if put into place, will offer all of the following advantages:

- 1) It will enable both Palestinians and Jews to gain most of what they most want -- security in a state of their own, international recognition and legitimacy, the right of both Jews and Palestinians to settle anywhere within the joint condominium territory from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean sea. Diaspora Palestinians and diaspora Jews will both equally enjoy a right-of-return and a right to settle anywhere within the boundaries of Mandate Palestine.

2) It is the only proposed solution that can accommodate powerful ethno-national feelings and identities rather than suppressing or thwarting them without all the problems connected with traditional nation-states whose state activities are restricted to their own territorial boundaries and whose populations include large irredentist or stateless minorities.

3) It will undermine the extremist agendas (e.g. ethnic cleansing) of radicals on both sides of the ethnic divide and provide the underpinning of a win/win situation in which a genuine reconciliation between former enemies can take place.

4) It will cause minimal disruption to current populations and eliminate the need for any forced settlement evacuations, population exchanges, or land swaps, and will do so in conformity with the state boundaries internationally recognized since the end of the 1967 war.

5) It will provide the opportunity for both peoples to participate in a democratic political process within a polity of their own -- one with whose people, history, language, culture and national flag they can positively identify.

6) It will enable the current scale of entanglement between the two peoples -- economic, geographic, and infrastructural -- to remain intact, and indeed, to be expanded, while each of the two peoples are assured of a safe and secure territorial state of their own.

7) In addition to granting to both diaspora Palestinians and diaspora Jews a right-of-return, it will give to the vast majority of people within the two diasporas who choose to remain in countries outside the Condominial Territory the symbolic significance of a special relationship to a nation among nations of the earth that is distinct to their people, their culture, and their history. Even though surveys show that only about one in ten Palestinians who are descendants of 1948 refugees would choose to return to Israel,[§] the importance of this symbolic significance can hardly be underestimated, just as the right to

[§] A survey of over 4,500 Palestinian refugees from 1948 and their descendants living in Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza by the respected Ramallah-based Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that only about 10% of respondents expressed a desire to live inside Israel, though most wanted such an option. Journalist Orly Halpern found similar sentiment interviewing Palestinians in the Hussein Refugee Camp in Amman, Jordan and elsewhere. "In 10 days of traveling through Qatar, Baharain and Jordan and meeting with Palestinians in each place, the overwhelming impression was of individuals preferring to make lives in the places where they live. Their stories seemed to illustrate the evolving hopes of a people whose circumstances have changed in the decades since their families fled with only what they could carry on their backs. ... Estimates say that the survivors and descendants of the roughly 700,000 Palestinians who fled their homes during Israel's 1948 War of Independence now number 4.5 million. Although nearly all say that they want the right to return to their old homes -- that is, to choose whether or not they would like to return -- many are not interested in implementing that right. ... But while many refugees wouldn't return to their family homes, they repeatedly insist that they won't give up their theoretical right to do so." (Orly Halpern, "For Many Palestinians, Right of Return is Primarily Theoretical," *Forward.com*, April 13, 2007, pp. 1-2) One is reminded here of the old Jewish joke: (Q) What is a Zionist? (A) A Zionist is a Jew who gives money to a second Jew to enable a third Jew to settle in Israel.

immigrate to Israel is symbolically so important for so many diaspora Jews who choose not to exercise it.

8) It will put an end to the deep-seated sense of historical grievance that almost all Palestinians hold towards the creation of the state of Israel and its underlying Zionist ideology.

9) It unites in a creative synthesis the core tenets of the seemingly contradictory principles of democracy and ethnic nationalism for both Palestinian Arabs and Jews.

10) It is the only solution in which the absolute numbers and proportions of Jews and Arabs living in either state will not be perceived as a political threat to either ethnic group. It was the question of numbers which tore apart Mandate Palestine in the 1930s and again immediately after World War II, with Arabs insisting that Jewish immigration be ended and Jews insisting that it continue and accommodate the thousands of European Jews fleeing Nazi oppression and its consequences.⁵² Similarly, today it is the "demographic threat" of a growing Arab Israeli population that is perceived as so threatening to Israel's Jews. Under the two-state condominium arrangement such destructive political disputes cannot arise.

11) It is the only solution where diverging levels of economic development between the two peoples within the Condominial Territory will not be able to serve as the basis for ethno-class warfare of the kind that has wreaked such havoc in ethnically-divided nation-states around the world. Each ethno-national polity will be responsible for the welfare of its own people, Jews taking care of Jews, Palestinians of Palestinians.

12) It is the only solution with the possibility of bringing about a reconciliation between the liberal-humanitarian and the ethno-nationalist (and national-religious) strains in Zionism, which are increasingly at such loggerheads among both Israeli and diaspora Jews.

13) It is the only solution, other than a Kahanist-style of ethnic cleansing, that would provide for a long-term solution to the problem presented by a growing Israeli Arab population that is increasingly hostile to the Jewish state and its ethnically-exclusive Zionist symbols and mission. The dark forebodings of Israeli Jews about a growing "fifth column" demographic threat would be done away with without violence, coercion, or forced population transfers of any kind.

14) It is the only solution that pays due respect to each peoples' love of, and desire to settle in, all of historical Palestine, while at the same time accommodating both peoples' equally strong desire to be part of an ethnically defined polity based upon common historical memories, blood ties, and a shared sense of collective peoplehood.

15) It is the only solution that can guarantee the continuation of the Jewish character of the Jewish state, and the right of diaspora Jews to "return" to Israel and become its citizens, in a manner that does not inflame worldwide Arab and Muslim sensibilities

since ethnic rights and privileges of an exact parallel kind are extended to all Palestinians both those in the diaspora and those currently residing in the former Mandate territory.

16) It will give to Israeli Arab leaders, who currently exercise no real political power in Israel, the possibility of becoming parliamentary leaders in a Palestinian parliament where they can exercise real power and leadership, both in the Palestinian state and in its extra-territorial reach into Israel. Up until 2007 not a single Arab Israeli was ever permitted to hold a cabinet post in the Israeli government (the Labor party appointed Israel's first and only Arab cabinet minister in that year) because of the need to discuss sensitive state secrets at cabinet meetings and the (very realistic) Jewish concern over Arab loyalty.⁵³ A transfer of Arab voting rights to the Palestinian parliament, and the granting to that Parliament of important extra-territorial rights and obligations within Israeli territory, would fundamentally change this situation and greatly empower politically the Arabs living in Israel, both politicians and the general Arab electorate.

17) Since it is just as unreasonable to ask of Arab Israelis that they sing the Hatikva and pledge loyalty to the Star of David flag as it is to ask of Israeli Jews that they renounce these same cherished symbols of their national identity in order to accommodate Arab sensibilities, the two-state condominium arrangement envisioning a transfer of Palestinian Arab national identity and national citizenship to the Palestinian state solves the dilemma posed by this clash of symbolic loyalties.

18) Since two-state condominiumism will enable Palestinian Arabs to attain most of what they most want -- i.e., an internationally recognized state within all of its pre-1967 borders, a right of return and to settle anywhere within Mandate Palestine, East Jerusalem as its capital, the free movement of people and goods across Israel/Palestine borders, etc. -- the settlement will create a powerful incentive for ordinary Palestinians to police their ranks against terrorists and extremists who would jeopardize the condominium agreement and all its benefits by continued violence and hostilities directed against the state of Israel and its Jews.

19) With the establishment of the Condominial Territory as a unified settlement community, and the free movement of both Palestinian and Israeli citizens across state boundaries, the Jewish concern with maintaining a "united Jerusalem" and access to sacred Jewish shrines in Palestinian territory (e.g. the Cave of the Patriarchs, Rachel's Tomb, the Western Wall, etc.) will disappear. Citizens of both states will be allowed to live in, or visit, the territory, cities, and holy places throughout historical Palestine without fear of ethnic exclusion.

20) Since the Palestinian state, by treaty obligation, will have a restricted military, and will implicitly be protected by the state of Israel from invasion from hostile outside powers, the new Palestinian state will be free to devote most of its resources to domestic projects and the educational and social welfare needs of its people rather than huge military budgets.

21) As a win-win situation, two-state condominiumism will transform Israel's image in the Mideast region dramatically altering its pariah status among its Islamic neighbors. It will also reduce Israel's need for enormous military expenditures and for huge military aid from the United States and will provide the basis for both Israel and the Palestinian state to play an important public role in the economic and cultural life of the surrounding region.

22) For those -- like the post-Zionist Jews -- who are hostile on principle to ethno-nationalisms of any stripe and who yearn for a single, multiethnic state based on civic democracy and equal citizenship-rights regardless of group identities, two-state condominiumism offers the long-term prospect of a gradual reduction in ethno-nationalism itself and the emergence of political institutions that transcend nationalism. When Arabs and Jews have lived in peace with each other for a sufficient length of time in a shared settlement community as members of two ethnically secure nation states, and after they have become even more interdependent economically than they are currently and come to see each other more as joint cooperators than murderous rivals or genocidal enemies, the possibility will be opened for the development of institutions like those of the European Union that begin to transfer certain economic and political functions from the two ethno-national states into a more unified, civic-democratic set of arrangements.** A two-state condominium arrangement would almost certainly further the possibility of attaining such a long-term goal better than a two-state separatist arrangement in which a Jewish Israel feels perpetually threatened by the demographics of its growing Arab-citizen population and irredentist Palestinians feel cheated out of their basic human right to return to the land from which they and their forbears were so tragically expelled in the 1948 and 1967 wars. With both peoples secure, politically and psychologically, in their own separate nation-states, and each by right free to move about as workers or settlers in the territory of their former rivals, a wider circle of empathy and identity will have the opportunity to develop with ethno-national consciousness correspondingly receding in importance.

Shared Stewardship -- A Win/Win Situation and a More Inspiring Vision

Historical Palestine has been a tinderbox of violence and instability since British Mandate times. Arabs and Jews are still at each others throats, make little effort to understand each other's sensibilities or perspectives, and have often hardened into fixed

** Even Yasser Arafat, not known for his warmth toward Israel or its Jewish citizenry, suggested the long-range possibility of such a seemingly utopian development if more amicable relations could be obtained between Palestinians and Jews. In an interview in the late 1980s, the PLO chairman was asked whether he would ever consider some kind of political and economic confederation between a future, independent Palestinian state and the current state of Israel. "Why not?" Arafat answered. "Look at the EEC. The youth of Europe are living peacefully together, not killing each other the way their fathers did." See T.D. Allman, "On the Road with Arafat," *Vanity Fair*, February 1989, p. 180.

positions that do neither side much good. In perhaps no other arena of international politics has fresh, creative thinking been more in need -- and less in evidence.

It is with this as background that I offer these suggestions for what I think is a better way out of this interminable dilemma. Many, I know, will disagree with what I have said. Some will argue that good fences make good neighbors and that a clean divorce between battling couples who agree to discontinue any further contact or relationship with one another is often the best solution when mutual hatreds and recriminations are of long standing. Palestinians and Jews, according to this view, will never be able to get along with each other and should be encouraged to go their separate ways in a territorial state that restricts each to its own turf. This view, in my judgement, is myopic. For, barring large scale ethnic cleansing, the two peoples will continue to be closely intertwined with each other, certainly in Israel and most likely in any future Palestinian state as well. Their cooperative integration, not their segregation or separation, must be the goal of any successful future policy.

It is naïve to think that Palestinians are ever going to accept gracefully -- or even ungracefully -- a two state solution that gives them less than half the territory they could have had in 1947 when they rejected the UN partition plan as an outrageous injustice. Does anyone really think that after all the suffering, all the sacrifice, all the humiliation, all the bloodshed and trauma that Palestinians have endured since the 1948 war that they are really going to accept with equanimity a truncated Palestinian state on 22% of the land of former Mandate Palestine without a right of return to the territory from which they were forced to flee to make room for a Jewish state? As I explained previously, most Palestinians living in Gaza and the frontline refugee camps have their historical roots not on the West Bank or in East Jerusalem but in what is now the state of Israel. Human beings live by dreams, and for a defeated, humiliated, impoverished people like many of the Palestinians living on Israel's borders the prospect of returning to their former homeland, even if it is an option most never exercise, is one of the things that has kept their spirits alive and meant the difference between hope and despair. There are some things in life that are worth dying for, and for many Palestinian refugees a right of return to the territory that is now Israel is one of them.

One of the great advantages of the two-state condominium solution is that it pays due respect for both peoples love of, and desire to settle in, the whole expanse of Palestine/Eretz Israel, while at the same time accommodating both groups' equally strong desire to be part of an ethnically-defined political community based upon common history, common descent, and a shared sense of who they are and to whom they belong as a people. It offers what the popular management guru Stephen R. Covey calls a win/win outcome. Such an outcome, Covey says, is an alternative to a more polarized agreement in which there are winners and losers, or an agreement in which both sides feel they have had to make painful concessions that result in unhappiness all around.

"Win/Win," says Covey, "is a frame of mind and heart that constantly seeks mutual benefit in all human interactions. Win/Win means that agreements or solutions are mutually beneficial, mutually satisfying. With a Win/Win solution, all parties feel

good about the decision and feel committed to the action plan. Win/Win sees life as a cooperative, not a competitive arena. Most people tend to think in terms of dichotomies: strong or weak, hardball or softball, win or lose. But that kind of thinking is fundamentally flawed. It's based on power and position rather than on principle. Win/Win is based on the paradigm that there is plenty for everybody, that one person's success is not achieved at the expense or exclusion of the success of others. Win/Win is a belief in the Third Alternative. It's not your way or my way; it's a *better* way, a higher way. ... We're both committed to try to understand each other's point of view deeply and to work together for the Third Alternative, the synergistic solution, that will be a better answer for both of us."⁵⁴

The two-state condominium solution that I have proposed here is, in my opinion, just such a *better* way -- one that does not require the painful kinds of concessions from each side that two-state separationism clearly does, and is in every way a more inspiring vision that both peoples could feel good about implementing. Despite the continued international support for a two-state separationist solution, it is agreed by most, including most of its supporters, that it is not a very happy outcome for either side.

Let me give you some examples. For there to be peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Jews, says the former Israeli Labor chairman and reluctant two-state supporter Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, "both sides will have to make painful concessions and give up part of their historical dreams"⁵⁵ Similarly, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, for many years a member of the right-wing Likud party, has come to believe in recent times that peace can come about between Israelis and Palestinians only if Israel makes the heart-wrenching decision to relinquish control of both East Jerusalem and almost all of the West Bank. For Israeli Jews, says Olmert, such a decision "is difficult, terrible, a decision that contradicts our natural instincts, our innermost desires, our collective memories, the prayers of the Jewish people for 2,000 years." But it is a decision that must be made, he believes, if peace with the Palestinians is ever to be achieved.⁵⁶

The Israeli novelist Amos Oz finds similar attitudes among both Israeli and Palestinian supporters of the separationist solution. Public opinion polls show, says Oz, that "a clear majority on both sides ... favors the idea of a two-state solution, Israel next to Palestine." Nevertheless, he explains, "everyone is unhappy about those solutions, everybody is full of suspicions and mistrust, everybody who says 'yes' says so with clenched teeth."⁵⁷

Palestinian reluctance and disappointment over the prospects of a separationist solution is similarly stressed by many writers. Ghada Kharmi says that dividing the former Mandate Palestine into two states has been accepted by many of her fellow Palestinians not because of any belief that it is in itself "an ideal or even a desirable solution," but because it may be for many "the only way ... of saving what little was left of Palestine."⁵⁸ Similarly Ali Abunimah, a Palestinian writer whose parents fled from Palestine during the 1948 war, explains how, like many Palestinians, he "swallowed hard and accepted" when the PLO in 1993 formally recognized Israel and agreed to a two-state

solution. Such a separationist solution, he says, was accepted by Palestinians like himself only with great bitterness and regret.⁵⁹

Supporters of a one-state solution in which neither Palestinian Arabs nor Jews would have an ethnically-defined state of their own are often just as conflicted and ambivalent about the solution they propose as those supporting two-state separationism. "It is not easy for me to part with my father's dream of a Jewish nation-state," writes Meron Benvenisti, the former Jerusalem deputy mayor. "For most of my life that was my dream, too," he explains, as he describes the great sadness and misgivings that have attended his reluctant conclusion that two-state separationism is no longer feasible and must give way to a unified state which is not officially Jewish.⁶⁰ Similarly, Virginia Tilley says that the many Israeli and Palestinian journalists and intellectuals who have come to believe in the need for a unified Jewish/Arab state have done so for the most part only "with inner pain and moral turmoil," with "anguish and sorrow," most believing that something important will have been lost.⁶¹

What are the prospects for lasting peace when such painful concessions have to be made? A solution that contradicts "natural instincts," that is "terrible," that evokes great "bitterness," that must be accepted with "clenched teeth," that is embraced only with "inner pain and moral turmoil," with great "anguish and sorrow" -- what are the prospects of such a solution leading to an outcome with which anyone is happy and has a long-term prospect of reconciling former foes? The short answer is: Not very good!

It is the kind of solution that leads to an India-Pakistan type of outcome where ongoing enmity on both sides produces festering sores, mutual recriminations, periodic riots, terrorist raids, and continuing arms races (including nowadays one with nuclear weapons). The reality of the situation should remind us of how important a win/win kind of solution is, one which rejects the polarized, zero-sum kind of thinking inherent in the separationist logic which has been dominant in the Mideast since Mandate times.

"People will become more motivated to put their histories of bloody conflict behind them and try to forgive their former enemies," writes the social psychologist Michael E. McCullough, "when the benefits of cooperation are undeniably superior to the unforgiving, zero-sum status quo."⁶² McCullough has looked at many historical instances of former foes who have come together and found genuine reconciliation, and believes that human beings, far from being exclusively warlike and aggressive creatures, have a built in faculty for forgiveness and reconciliation under the right circumstances. He places this faculty within a framework of evolutionary psychology. The key factor to reconciliation, says McCullough, is the emergence of a positive-sum solution in which both parties feel they have arrived at an agreement that is both just and pragmatically better than the existing state of affairs. "When we design societies so that people's rights are protected, so that they experience justice, and so that they have incentives for cooperating with their former enemies," McCullough says, "then forgiveness arises as a natural consequence of how our minds evolved to operate."⁶³ This fact needs to be placed at the center of all attempts to resolve the Arab/Israeli conflict.

Truth and Reconciliation

There is a final element which I haven't mentioned -- an element that McCullough describes as "forgiveness requiring a strong dose of truth." Surveying some of the literature on how civil wars in South Africa and a number of Third World countries were brought to a peaceful conclusion, McCullough found that successful peace processes often involve "a process of truth telling through which the warring factions can reach consensus about how to understand the injustices they've suffered and the harms they've perpetrated upon each other."⁶⁴ A number of Jews prominent in the Israeli and American peace movements have made similar claims that a genuine reconciliation between Palestinians and Jews will ultimately require some kind of honest reckoning of what each group has done to the other in order to establish a new kind of relationship in which the evils of the past can be transcended without being either forgotten or denied.

Michael Lerner's *Tikkun* community has been particularly active in the call for an honest reckoning and reconciliation between the antagonistic parties. Believing as they do that "social change and inner change go hand in hand," Rabbi Lerner and his group have been in the forefront of the call for both Palestinians and Jews to acknowledge the wrongs that both sides have done to the other. This call for an honest accounting is done with the understanding that it is the only way to clear the historical ledgers and unburden both sides from the guilt, distortions, and psychic burdens of the past which now stand in the way of the peoples involved achieving genuine reconciliation and mutual forgiveness. In a full-page ad in *The New York Times* co-sponsored by the Network of Spiritual Progressives, the *Tikkun* group said that real justice and reconciliation in the Mideast ultimately requires "repentance and atonement for the long history of insensitivity and cruelty each side has shown toward the other side." This, they said, must take place "as a first step in healing the humiliations and huge psychic wounds suffered by Arabs and Jews throughout their histories." It is only through such honest reckoning, they believe, that a genuine change in consciousness can take place that would enable the two peoples to fundamentally alter the kinds of relationships they have had with one another in the past.⁶⁵

Similar views have been expressed in Israel by Uri Avnery's *Gush Shalom* peace group. Avnery, who as a teenager fought in the 1948 war, has been calling for a number of years for a South Africa-style Joint Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in which Palestinian, Israeli, and outside scholars produce an honest historical accounting of what really happened in the 1948 and 1967 wars, and what wrongs were done by each group to the other. Avnery believes that such truth-telling by both parties could contribute to an overcoming of the deep distrust that both peoples have of the other, which has been a continuing roadblock to peace.

At the very least what is needed in the former territory of the British Mandate is an acknowledgment by each side of the salient truths contained in each other's respective national narrative. From the Jewish side this would require acknowledgment that the Balfour Declaration -- a unilateral decree about the future of Palestine issued by a European imperialist power without the slightest consultation with the native inhabitants

of Palestine itself -- involved a fundamental injustice to the indigenous Palestinian Arabs, many of whom had ancestral roots in the territory going back centuries. Equally important, it would require acknowledgment that the Arabs who fled Israel during the 1948 war did so mainly because of legitimate fears for their physical safety at the hands of the Zionist army (Haganah) and Jewish terrorist groups (Irgun, Stern), and that, whatever the reasons for their flight, Israel's subsequent refusal to allow them to return to their homes and villages after the fighting had stopped was nothing less than an act of "ethnic cleansing" (to use the contemporary term) leading to untold suffering and hardship for the people involved.⁶⁶

From the side of the Palestinian Arabs, what is needed is a formal acknowledgment on their part of the deep spiritual and historical bond which has connected the Jewish people to the Land of Israel (Eretz Israel) in their many centuries of exile, as well as an acknowledgment of the extreme situation in which so many Jews found themselves in the face of the murderous anti-Semitism that arose in late 19th century Europe and the subsequent ascent to power of the Nazis in Germany. In addition, there should be a public acknowledgment of the great injustices that were done to Mideastern and North African Jews by various Arab governments following the creation of the Jewish state. These Jews must be acknowledged as victims of local Arab versions of ethnic cleansing just as cruel as that suffered by Palestinian Arabs at the hands of Israeli Jews in the Great Catastrophe of 1948. Israel's willingness to take in these desperate refugees in such huge numbers should be acknowledged as the great act of generosity and humanitarian national sacrifice that it was.

Such public truth telling is needed on both sides to clear the historical air and cut through the pattern of denials and evasions that typically characterize discussion of these issues when adversarial positions are assumed. An acknowledgment by both parties that the enmity and hostility that has existed for generations between them is more a product of history and of fate than of any intrinsic hatred of one people for the other would go a long way towards achieving the reconciliation and psychological transformation that a lasting peace requires. This means that Zionism must be understood by the Arab side as a form of historically-rooted Jewish nationalism, not a form of racism, just as the anti-Zionism of Palestinian Arabs must be understood by Jews not as a form of anti-Semitism but as a product of a rival Arab nationalism -- a nationalism that is just as historically grounded and valid as Jewish nationalism and not based on any intrinsic, anti-Semitic hatred of Jews.^{††} What is called the Palestinian/Arab conflict must be acknowledged by

^{††} An important distinction made by the theorist of nationalism Benedict Anderson is relevant here: "The fact of the matter is that nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations: outside of history." (Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, second edition, Verso, New York, 2006, p. 149). Using such terminology, the Arab/Israeli conflict should be seen as a tragic clash of historical destinies and incompatible nationalist projects, not two opposing racisms. Political scientist Virginia Tilley sets the record straight: "The origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict trace ... to a late nineteenth-century nationalist movement ... to create a Jewish-national state in a territory that, unluckily, already held an ancient and politicized indigenous Arab society. ... Although fear and loathing for Arabs concretizes popular Jewish-Zionist commitment to ethnic exclusion, the territorial exclusion central to Zionism was not born from fear or loathing of Arabs. Rather,

both sides for what it is and has always been -- a tragic confrontation by two peoples, both with powerful claims to the territory of a very small land, who, for a variety of historical and cultural reasons, have done a very poor job of creatively reconciling their differences and getting along with one another.⁶⁷

The fact that in the past they have done such a poor job of reconciliation does not, however, remove either the possibility or the moral imperative to get it right in the future. What the great scholar of Jewish mysticism, Gershom Sholem, said many decades ago is just as true today as when it was first uttered in the period between the two world wars (indeed, in a world of proliferating nuclear weapons it is even more true): "The Land of Israel" -- i.e., historical Palestine -- "belongs to two peoples, and these peoples need to find a way to live together ... and to work for a common future." An acknowledgment by both peoples of what is legitimate in the other side's claims and perspectives would go a long way toward reducing the poisonous enmity that exists between them. The enormous outpouring of Jewish goodwill on the occasion of Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November of 1977 showed just how responsive Israeli Jews can be to any Arab who makes the least effort to understand their situation.

While the Arab response in the 1940s to the sympathy and goodwill of Jews like Judah Magnes and Martin Buber, who tried as best they could to understand the Palestinian narrative, was not reciprocated, the prospects today for Arab reciprocity are much greater than in the chaos-strewn years of the 1940s. A rebirth of a Brith Shalom-type spirit of generosity and understanding, if carried out within the context of a final settlement that accords to Palestinians both the state they seek within pre-1967 borders and the right of return to the territory that is now the state of Israel, would almost certainly alter Arab attitudes and beliefs. Israelis would discover that there are a lot more Anwar Sadat-types out there than they now suppose. If both parties reach out to each other in generosity and understanding, and each gets materially much of what their respective national movements so ardently desire, the change in the psychology of the two peoples could prove more electrifying and transformative than anyone can now imagine. Swords will be beaten into plowshares and the two peoples will know war no more. At some very deep level of their psyche, I believe, all but the most fanatical and zealotized Palestinians and Jews yearn for some kind of just and lasting peace between the two peoples. The challenge for your generation will be to tap into that yearning and make its fulfillment a reality.

Concluding Remarks

In 1918, just a year after the Balfour Declaration, David Ben-Gurion set forth the core of the Jewish/Arab dispute over historical Palestine in terms whose conciseness and

antipathy toward Arabs is an accidental outgrowth of Zionists' fundamental nationalist premise ... Concomitantly, Palestinian antipathy toward Jews is not born of anti-Semitism ... but has arisen from the stated mission of Israel to transfer Palestinian land to Jews ..." Virginia Tilley, *The One-State Solution*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2004, pp. 180, 144.

understanding have never been surpassed. "I do not know what Arab will agree that Palestine should belong to the Jews," Ben-Gurion wrote. "We [Jews], as a nation, want this country to be *ours*; the Arabs, as a nation, want this country to be *theirs*."⁶⁸

Despite bouts of guarded optimism in the 1920s and early 1930s, Ben-Gurion remained a pessimist throughout most of his long life concluding that there could be no peaceful settlement to what divided Arabs and Jews in historical Palestine. To the seemingly intractable conundrum posed by Ben-Gurion we must today ask: "Is it possible to reach a settlement in historical Palestine in which both Arabs and Jews can proclaim, 'this land will be both *ours* and *theirs*'?"

I have given you reason to believe that the answer is "yes," but only if you are willingly to think creatively about Third Alternatives, about alternative solutions in which, as Covey says, all parties feel they have greatly gained and to which they can energetically commit themselves. You don't want a solution in which both sides have to make painful concessions and give up most of their historical dreams -- dreams for which they have sacrificed so much and which serve much of the unifying bonds of their collective existence.

Don't be intimidated by the fact that you are young and think the older generation has superior wisdom and experience on this issue that makes your own views suspect. As a Baby Boomer who has been following Israeli/Palestinian developments for more than forty years now, I can assure you that they do not have an answer. By "they" I mean the older generation of diplomats, politicians, military commanders, foreign policy specialists, lobbyists, think-tankers, op-ed page writers and the like. *They do not have an answer!*

None of the leading proposals for peace that such people have made, and nothing in the mind-frame within which most of them typically operate, is ever going to bring lasting peace and reconciliation between Palestinians and Jews. Neither the generations that came of age before the Second World War, nor the Baby Boomers that grew up in the decades after it and have provided many of the world's leaders over the past twenty years, have developed a viable solution to this never-ending psychodrama and murderous reality show. If we stick with their thinking my friend Bob Gilpin is clearly correct -- there is no peaceable solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and no way to get beyond unremitting enmity and hostility between Arabs and Jews.

"Our political elites [in Israel] are incompetent in the best case and corrupt in the worst in all that pertains to finding a solution to the [Palestinian-Israeli] conflict," says peace activist Ilan Pappé. He adds: "The elites which accompany us in the Western World and the Arab World are just as bad."⁶⁹ Although, for reasons given, I believe Pappé's one-state solution to be impossible, his indictment and salient challenge here is right on the mark. *They do not have an answer!*

Jews, it is said, believe in miracles -- not necessarily developments that contradict the physical laws of nature but developments in the communal and interpersonal realm

that seem so unlikely when they occur and so magnificent in their outcome that we are dumb-struck with wonder. It was a miracle in this sense that saw the Jews, after being expelled by the Romans from Ancient Israel, stick together as a people for almost two thousand years in a tightly-knit, worshipping community despite relentless persecution from the outside world. It was a similar miracle that saw the Jews in the 20th century, from their widespread dispersal throughout Europe and the Mideast, come together in the land of Biblical Israel, take in millions of fellow Jews fleeing oppression, make the desert bloom, and create a vibrant, progressive, modern democracy -- one that, despite all its sins and the misery it has caused the native Palestinian population, is surely one of the more decent societies on this planet.

The time has surely come for a third great miracle, one that will be no less momentous than the previous two -- a miracle in which Arabs and Jews join together in a cooperative union in which they not only abandon their former enmities but develop a genuine respect -- maybe even a love -- for one another, and their union becomes a beacon of peace and concord throughout the Mideast. Such a miracle would fulfill the Isaianic dream of Israel becoming "a light unto the nations," a model of ethnic reconciliation and goodwill that many other ethnically divided nations around the world might strive to emulate. It would also fulfill the dream of the most high-minded of the early Zionists -- men like A.D. Gordon, Martin Buber, and Judah Magnes -- who envisioned a pioneering Jewish settler community in which Jews would offer to the world an example of moral and spiritual renewal.

"Where there is no vision the people perish" it says in the Book of Ecclesiastes. This ancient saying from the Biblical wisdom literature was perhaps never more applicable than in the case of our modern, now century-long, conflict between Palestinians and Jews. If I leave you with nothing else this evening it is the call for a fresh vision. In speaking of "two-state condominiumism" I offer one example of such a vision. You may have others -- or significant modifications of what I have suggested -- that are much better. By all means pursue them. Use all your creativity, wise judgment, and sense of justice. But if you retain nothing else from what I have said so far tonight it should be this: You have to think win/win and you have to think outside the box. And you must engage your Palestinian counterparts who think likewise. There may be many more of them than you suppose.

You have to imagine some kind of political structure and cooperative arrangement that will enable both Jews and Arabs in the former territory of the British Mandate to realize collectively most of their respective national dreams. You have to think win-win, and that means thinking Third Alternatives because the alternatives usually presented -- all those inside the box -- will never work. Everything currently inside the box can only produce win/lose or lose/lose outcomes with attendant enmity and ongoing failure. ***You have to think win/win and you have to think outside the box!*** That is the one bit of assured wisdom I can leave you with tonight.

Thank you all, and thank you once again for inviting me.

¹ James R. Flynn, *Where Have all the Liberals Gone*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, p. 182.

² Cited in Paul Mendes-Flohr, editor, *A Land of Two Peoples*, Oxford University Press, London, England, 1983, p. 72.

³ Uri Avnery, *Israel Without Zionists*, Macmillan, New York, 1968, p. 210.

⁴ Shlomo Avineri, "A History of Conflicts," *Maariv Online*, September 19, 2003 [Hebrew], cited in Tamar Hermann, "The Bi-national Idea in Israel/Palestine: Past and Present," *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, Issue 3, pp. 381-401, published online, June 23, 2005, at www.intescience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext., p. 5.

⁵ As the distinguished Israeli historian (and sober student of *Realpolitik*) Benny Morris has recently written, "The Arab and wider Islamic worlds, despite Israeli hopes since 1948 and notwithstanding the peace treaties signed by Egypt and Jordan in 1979 and 1994, have never truly accepted the legitimacy of Israeli's creation and continue to oppose its existence." "Why Israel Feels Threatened," *The New York Times*, December 30, 2008, A25.

⁶ Walter Lacquer, *A History of Zionism*, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, New York, 1972.

⁷ Many years later I would read comments by the Israeli journalist Amos Elon that reaffirmed in print almost exactly what Avineri had stated in his lecture: "The clash in Palestine was not between natives and colonialists in the ordinary sense, but between two nationalist movements. Both were, in their own way, 'right' and 'natural.' The fault, if there was one, lay less with the men directly involved on both sides than with the new world of ferociously hostile nation-states in which they lived." Amos Elon, *The Israelis: Founders and Sons*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1971, p. 26.

⁸ I am certainly not alone in sensing in the position of the early bi-nationalists an extraordinary moral power and uncommon human decency. In the case of the more religiously-oriented binationalists like Buber and Magnes this seems to have derived largely from the influence of the Jewish prophetic tradition together with elements of modern liberalism. After completing his testimony before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (1946) in favor of a binational state and a genuine Jewish/Arab rapprochement in Palestine, Magnes was addressed shortly before the conclusion of the hearings by the presiding American chairman, Judge Joseph Hutcheson: "Dr. Magnes," said Hutcheson, "I am not ready to assess your proposals, but I am a fairly old man, and I recognize moral power when I see it." See Susan Lee Hattis, *The Bi-National Idea in Palestine During Mandatory Times*, Shikmona Publishing Company, Haifa, Israel, 1970, p. 290. Hutcheson's remark no doubt reflects Magnes' attempt to understand and be scrupulously fair to both sides in the conflict over Palestine despite a climate of ever widening polarization and deepening hostility between the contending camps. His remark on Magnes is particularly poignant in view of the fact that he was, in historian Howard M. Sachar's words, "a seventy-year-old ultra-conservative from Texas." Howard Sachar, *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, Second Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1996, p. 258. The non-religious members of the early binationalist coalition were usually driven by some combination of belief in democratic socialism and pacifism. Whether religious or non-religious, almost all of the early binationalists were united in their disdain for the kind of nationalistic chauvinism that had led to the catastrophe of the First World War and were determined that Zionism not duplicate its proven destructiveness.

⁹ Russell Nieli, "Two-State Binationalism in Palestine," *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. VII, No. 3, September 1990, pp. 9-28.

¹⁰ Paul Mendes-Flohr, editor, *A Land of Two Peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983, pp. 37-38. Buber's views are well captured in the draft resolution he wrote for the 12th Zionist Congress (1921) on the purpose of the Jewish migration to Palestine: "The strong nucleus of the Jewish people is determined to return to its old homeland and to build there a new life, based on independent work and which shall grow and last as an organic element of a new humanity. ... However, this national will is not directed against another nation. The Jewish people who have been an oppressed minority in all countries for two thousand years, are now, that they are again entering into world history as masters of their destiny, turning away with disgust from the methods of imperialistic nationalism whose victim they have been for so long. It is not in order to displace or to dominate another people that we strive to return into the country to which we are linked through everlasting historical and spiritual bonds. ... Our return to Eretz Israel ... is not intended to encroach upon the rights of others. In a just union with the Arab people we wish to make the common homeland an economically and culturally flourishing community

whose structure will guarantee each of its national groups an undisturbed autonomous development. Our colonization which is exclusively devoted to the saving and renewal of our ethnological existence, does not aim at the capitalistic exploitation of a territory, nor does it serve any imperialistic aim. Its sense is the constructive work of free people on a common soil. In this social character of our national ideal lies the powerful warrant for our confidence that between us and the working Arab people a deep and lasting solidarity or real interests will develop ..." Susan Lee Hattis, *The Bi-National Idea in Palestine During Mandatory Times*, Shikmona Publishing Company, Haifa, Israel, 1970, pp. 29n -31n.

¹¹ Judah Magnes, *Like All the Nations*, Herod's Gate, Jerusalem, 1930, p. 60.

¹² Robert Weltch, *Die Juedische Rundschau*, August 14, 1925, p.1.

¹³ Quoted in Ephraim Nimni, "From Galut to T'futoth: Post-Zionism and the Dislocation of Jewish Diasporas," in Ephraim Nimni, editor, *The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics*, Zed Books, London, 2003, chapter 6, p. 128.

¹⁴ Susan Lee Hattis, *The Bi-National Idea in Palestine During Mandatory Times*, Shikmona Publishing Company, Haifa, Israel, 1970, pp. 93-95. A similar proposal for a bicameral parliament within a unified binational federated state was made as late as 1947 in the minority report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which was endorsed by the delegates from India, Iran, and Yugoslavia.

¹⁵ Howard M. Sachar, *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, Second Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1996, p. 202.

¹⁶ Susan Lee Hattis, *The Bi-National Idea in Palestine During Mandatory Times*, Shikmona Publishing Company, Haifa, Israel, 1970, p. 292.

¹⁷ What the Jerusalem-born, British-Palestinian activist Ghada Karmi says about the Arab rejection of Brith Shalom binationalism in the 1920s is even more true of their rejection of the UN partition plan in 1947: "The Jewish binationalists ... were never anything more than a minority phenomenon [among Zionists], and their basic aim was still to establish a European Jewish settler community in an Arab land in the belief that the indigenous population could come to accept or even be grateful for it. That such men as Magnes and Buber had the foresight and decency to appreciate that the Arab majority in Palestine had legitimate rights and could not be disposed of cannot be denied. ... But this did not alter the fact of their unshakeable belief that European Jews like themselves, without a shred of connection to Palestine except what was inside their heads, had an equal right to the country. ... [The] Palestinians ... did not share these binationalist ideas, which they saw as a means of forcing them to accept that a bunch of foreign colonists had equal rights with them in their own land. ... Reading this history evokes for me memories of the European Jews I grew up with in Golders Green [in Britain] who seemed as alien as, say, the Chinese to my native land. The idea that the forebears of such people thought they belonged in Palestine during the 1920s when the country was overwhelmingly Arab and the Jewish state no more than a gleam in Chaim Weizmann's eye, must have struck my forbears as wholly preposterous." Ghada Karmi, *Married to Another Man: Israel's Dilemma in Palestine*, Pluto Press, London, 2007, pp. 233, 235.

¹⁸ Benny Morris, "Why Israel Feels Threatened," *The New York Times*, December 30, 2008, p. A25.

¹⁹ Ghada Karmi, *Married to Another Man: Israel's Dilemma in Palestine*, Pluto Press, London, 2007, p. 5.

²⁰ Edward Said, "Truth and Reconciliation," *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, Cairo, Egypt, 14-20 January, 1999, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/412/op2.htm>.

²¹ Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked, *The People Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2005-2007*, Institute for National Security Studies, Memorandum No. 90, May, 2007, pp. 73-74, available at [www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1188](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1188).

²² On this the survey researchers Meir and Shaked write: "For some segments of the Jewish population, namely, many of the Jewish settlers in Judea and Samaria ... and a large portion of the religious Zionist community, the issue [of withdrawal from the settlements] is one of ideology and religious belief. Their support for settling the Land of Israel, maintaining Israeli control of the areas conquered in 1967, and preventing the uprooting of any Jewish settlement is based on a strong ideological commitment, nationalistic fervor, and/or deep religious conviction. Many Israelis oppose territorial withdrawal and removing settlements for pragmatic reasons -- security considerations, deep suspicion of the true intentions of the Arabs, and other geo-political factors. For the ideologically and religiously motivated groups, however, such policies are not only heresy but the destruction of their life's work and dreams. The readiness of these groups to put up a tough fight was demonstrated during the disengagement from Gaza late in 2005. It took Israel 40,000 unarmed troops and policemen and months of preparation to remove

fewer than 8,000 settlers. Many Israelis are gravely concerned about the possibility of serious clashes and great internal strife should the Israeli government decide on a major withdrawal from the West Bank." Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked, *The People Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2005-2007*, Institute for National Security Studies, Memorandum No. 90, May, 2007, p. 84.

²³ Meron Benvenisti, *Intimate Enemies: Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995; by the same author, *Son of the Cypresses: Memories, Reflections, and Regrets from a Political Life*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2007; and Anthony Lewis, "Israel's Bitter West Bank Harvest," *The New York Times Magazine*, July 22, 1984, pp. 32ff.

²⁴ See, for instance, *War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage*, Lawrence H. Keeley, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996. The outlook represented in Deuteronomy is typical (and not, as some anti-Semitic websites would have it, a special predilection of the Jews): "When you advance to the attack on any [far-distant] town, first offer it terms of peace. If it accepts these and opens its gates to you, all the people to be found in it shall do forced labour for you and be subject to you. But if it refuses peace and offers resistance, you must lay siege to it. [The Lord] your God shall deliver it into your power and you are to put all its menfolk to the sword. But the women, the children, the livestock and all that the town contains, all its spoil, you may take for yourselves as booty. You will devour the spoil of your enemies which [the Lord] your God has delivered to you. ... When you go to war against your enemies and [the Lord] your God delivers them into your power and you take prisoners, if you see a beautiful woman among the prisoners and find her desirable, you may make her your wife and bring her to your home. ... She is to stay inside your house and must mourn her father and mother for a full month. Then you may go to her and be a husband to her, and she shall be your wife." (Deuteronomy 20:10-14; 21:10-13; JB)

²⁵ Meir Kahane, *They Must Go*, HaMeir L'David Publisher, Inwood, New York, 1981, pp. 59, 265.

²⁶ Meir Kahane, *They Must Go*, HaMeir L'David Publisher, Inwood, New York, 1981, p. 56.

²⁷ Meir Kahane, *They Must Go*, HaMeir L'David Publisher, Inwood, New York, 1981, pp. 59-60. Besides his many silent supporters, views similar to Kahane's are openly espoused by many of the more zealous West Bank settlers including the outspoken Chabad Rabbi Yitzhak Ginsburgh, who believes that Jews alone have a right to live in the Land of Israel (i.e. roughly Mandate Palestine), and that Arabs should be expelled. (See "Israeli Rabbi Indicted for Inciting Racism," *Forward*, June 6, 2003.)

²⁸ Ilan Pappé, "One State Solution [is] not Abortive and [not] Dangerous Illusions -- Answer to Uri Avnery," *Hagada Hasmalit*, April 24, 2007, p. 3, at <http://www.hagada.org>.

²⁹ Benny Morris (interview), "Survival of the Fittest," *Haaretz*, January 8, 2004.

³⁰ *Haaretz* and *Forward* staff, "Israeli Rabbi Indicted for Inciting Racism," *Forward*, June 6, 2003, p. 5.

³¹ On the strength of the Israeli center on national security issues, see Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked, *The People Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security, 2005-2007*, Institute for National Security Studies, Memorandum #90, May 2007, available at [www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1188](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1188).

³² See, for instance, the two articles by Daniel Pipes, "Solving the 'Palestinian Problem,'" *Jerusalem Post*, January 7, 2009, and "How to Turn Gaza Over to Egypt," *Jerusalem Post*, February 7, 2008; also Hillel Halkin, "The Peace Planners Strike Again," *Commentary*, January 2008.

³³ Virginia Tilley, *The One-State Solution*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2004, p. 9.

³⁴ On post-Zionism see Ephraim Nimni, "From Galut to T'futsoth: Post-Zionism and the Dislocation of Jewish Diasporas," in Ephraim Nimni, editor, *The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics*, Zed Books, London, 2003, chapter 6; in the same volume, Ilan Pappé, "The Square Circle: The Struggle for Survival of Traditional Zionism," chapter 3; Daniel Gavron, *The Other Side of Despair: Jews and Arabs in the Promised Land*, Rowman and Littlefield, New York, 2003; and Tony Judt, "Israel: The Alternative," *The New York Review of Books*, October 23, 2003. For an extensive historical survey and critique of post-Zionism and anti-Zionism from a traditional Zionist perspective see Yoram Hazony, *The Jewish State: The Struggle for Israel's Soul*, Basic Books, New York, 2001. For a more sympathetic survey, see Laurence J. Silberstein, *The Postzionism Debates: Knowledge and Power in Israeli Culture*, Routledge, New York, 1999.

³⁵ Like Benvenisti, Tilley argues that a large-scale Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank is something no Israeli government is likely to effect given the constellation of political forces in Israel and the continued backing of its compliant U.S. patron. Were such a withdrawal to take place, she says, it would still not lead to peace between Palestinians and Jews as the West Bank Palestinians would become increasingly radicalized. The Palestinian population today, she writes, "is too large and politicized, and the land remaining to Palestinian national culture is too fragmented and claustrophobic, to sustain the two-state

solution as Israel policy has framed it. Bounded by the wall in such grotesque fashion, the crippled Palestinian 'state' will foster bitter Palestinian resistance, endangering not only Israel but also -- as pan-Arab and Muslim outrage transduces into expanding global terror networks -- the entire international community." Virginia Tilley, *The One-State Solution*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2004, p. 86.

³⁶ Ephraim Nimni, "From Galut to T'futsoth: Post-Zionism and the Dislocation of Jewish Diasporas," in Ephraim Nimni, editor, *The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics*, Zed Books, London, 2003, chapter 6, p. 145.

³⁷ Muammar Qaddafi, "The One-State Solution," *The New York Times*, January 22, 2009, p. A33.

³⁸ Edward Said, *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After*, Vintage Books, New York, 2001, p. 208.

³⁹ Some Arab Israelis who favor a binational Israel, with Palestinians and Jews each accorded special group-rights, have made elaborate proposals for changing constitutional structures to bring about such a change. Their proposals, however, do not affect Gaza or the West Bank nor include means of incorporating all of historical Palestine in a single state. See, for instance, *The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel*, published by The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, 2006; *The Democratic Constitution*, produced by the Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, 2007, www.adalah.org; and Yousef T. Jabareen, *An Equal Constitution for All? On a Constitution and Collective Rights for Arab Citizens in Israel*; Mossawa Center, May 2007.

⁴⁰ Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York, 1993, pp. 13, 243.

⁴¹ Yossi Halevi, "Only the Naïve or the Malicious would Urge a Binational Israel," *Jewish World Review*, October 23, 2003.

⁴² Tamar Herman, "The Bi-National Idea in Israel/Palestine: Past and Present," *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, Issue 3, pp. 381-401, 400, published online, June 23, 2005, at www.intescience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext; Leslie Susser, "Israel: Preventing the Unthinkable," *Jerusalem Report*, December 15, 2003, p. 10.

⁴³ Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked, *The People Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2005-2007*, Institute for National Security Studies, Memorandum No. 90, May, 2007, available at [www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1188](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1188).

⁴⁴ Ephraim Nimni, "From Galut to T'futsoth: Post-Zionism and the Dislocation of Jewish Diasporas," in Ephraim Nimni, editor, *The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics*, Zed Books, London, 2003, chapter 6, p. 105.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.109.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

⁴⁸ "Two States or One State," by Uri Avnery and Illan Pappé, Gush Shalom newsletter, June 11, 2007, p 11, available at www.countercurrents.org/pappe110607.

⁴⁹ Uri Avnery, *Israel Without Zionists*, Macmillan, New York, 1968, p. 210.

⁵⁰ Virginia Tilley, *The One-State Solution*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2004, p. 177.

⁵¹ Although the idea of "two states within the boundaries of a shared homeland" may seem novel in terms of international law, it is not really so difficult to conceive through the simple treaty-making powers of cooperating states. As the international law specialist Gideon Gottlieb explains, "States rather than homelands have rights and duties under international law. ... However, it is entirely possible by treaty to give legal expression and legal status to the concept of homeland as distinct and separate from the concept of state. Such a juridical construct can be designed to overlap with or arise side by side with the concept of state while remaining distinct from it. A people may thus perceive that it has rights in a homeland that stretches across state boundaries." Gideon Gottlieb, "Israel and the Palestinians," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, 1988, pp.109-126, 118.

⁵² The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, set up in late 1945 to make recommendations about the future of Palestine, located the main source of the troubles in the fear of each side of being politically dominated by the other -- a fear driven largely by numbers. To avoid this source of conflict the Committee recommended not partition but some kind of unitary-state constitution (the details of which it did not specify) in which both Arabs and Jews would enjoy guaranteed communal rights not subject to a majority vote of the whole: "[The Committee recommends] that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State [but] a country in which the legitimate national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs can be

reconciled, without either side fearing the ascendancy of the other. In our view, this cannot be done under any form of constitution in which a mere numerical majority is decisive since it is precisely the struggle for a numerical majority which bedevils Arab-Jewish relations. To ensure genuine self-government for both the Arab and the Jewish communities, this struggle must be made purposeless by the constitution itself." If we were to fill in the details today, and adopt the realistic view that no unitary binational state is now possible, a two-state condominium arrangement of the kind recommended here would solve the difficulty posed by the Anglo-American Committee.

⁵³ A 2002 survey of Jewish Israelis, carried out in the wake of the failure of the Oslo peace process and the beginning of the second Intifada, showed 72% of Jews opposed to including Arab parties in any Knesset governing coalition and 80% opposed to allowing Arab Israelis to participate in critical matters related to determining the boundaries of the Jewish state. (See Asher Arian, "A Further Turn to the Right: Israeli Opinion on National Security, 2002," *Strategic Assessment*, June 2002, Vol. 5, No. 1; available online at www.inss.org.il.) Later surveys showed continuation of these attitudes. Summarizing the results of annual opinion sampling from 2004-2007, the survey researchers Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked write:

"When faced with specific questions involving equal rights for Israeli Arabs, the response [by Israeli Jews] is negative. A large majority oppose enabling Israeli Arabs to participate in crucial national decisions or including Arab ministers in the cabinet. Over 80 percent in 2004 and about three quarters of the sample in 2005, 2006, and 2007 opposed the former, while three quarters of the sample in 2004, 60 percent in 2005 and 2006, and 63 percent in 2007 opposed the latter. A majority of Jews were in favor of encouraging voluntary emigration of Israeli Arabs from Israel -- rising from 50 percent in 2001 to 63 percent in 2006 and 66 percent in 2007. Yet when faced with a general question on equal rights for Israeli Arabs, a strong majority of Jews expressed support. ... On the one hand, the majority of Israeli Jews believe in and are committed to the ideals and principles of equality and civil rights -- ideals engraved in the Israeli Declaration of Independence. On the other hand, they cannot overcome their deep suspicion as to the loyalty of the Arab citizens." (Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked, *The People Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2005-2007*, Institute for National Security Studies, Memorandum No. 90, May, 2007, p. 81, available at [www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1188](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1188).)

⁵⁴ Stephen R. Covey *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1989, pp. 207, 221.

⁵⁵ Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, "A Vision for Peace," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 25, 2002, A18.

⁵⁶ Ethnan Bronner, "Olmert Says Israel Must Leave West Bank," *The New York Times*, September 30, 2008, A6.

⁵⁷ Amos Oz, "The Two Cowards," *The New York Times*, August 19, 2003, A21.

⁵⁸ Ghada Karmi, *Married to Another Man: Israel's Dilemma in Palestine*, Pluto Press, London, 2007, p. 219.

⁵⁹ Ali Abunimah, *One Country*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2006, pp.11-12.

⁶⁰ Cited in Virginia Tilley, *The One-State Solution*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2004, pp. 185.

⁶¹ Virginia Tilley, *The One-State Solution*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2004, p. 193.

⁶² Michael E. McCullough, *Beyond Revenge: The Evolution of the Forgiveness Instinct*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2008, p. 192.

⁶³ Michael E. McCullough, *Beyond Revenge: The Evolution of the Forgiveness Instinct*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2008, p. 225.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 187. McCullough in this quotation is summarizing some of the material in W.J. Long and P. Brecke's *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2003.

⁶⁵ The *Tikkun*/Network of Spiritual Progressives' ad in *The New York Times* can be accessed on the web at www.spiritualprogressives.org/article.php/gaza/print.

⁶⁶ See Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004; Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1992; Zeev Sternhell, *The Founding Myths of Israel*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1998; and Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim, *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001.

⁶⁷ A lasting peace in the Mideast, writes the Palestinian author Ali Abunimah, "cannot require Palestinians to acquiesce to the denial of what was done to them. Neither can it require Israeli Jews to view their own

presence in Palestine as illegitimate or to change their belief in their right to live there because of ancient historical and spiritual ties." Ali Abunimah, *One Country*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2006, p. 8.

⁶⁸ Cited in Neil Caplan, *Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917-1925*, London, 1976, p. 42.

⁶⁹ "Two States or One State," by Uri Avnery and Ilan Pappé, Gush Shalom newsletter, June 11, 2007, available at www.countercurrents.org/pappe110607. What Pappé says about the need for alternative visions is worth quoting at length. In contrast to the standard two-state separationist proposal, he says: "We will find an alternative model. All of us, including the old settlers and the new -- even those who got here yesterday -- including the expellees with all their generations and those who were left after the expulsions - - we will ask all of them what political structure fits all of them, which would include principles of justice, reconciliation and coexistence. ... It's true, there are Palestinians in Ramallah who are willing to rest content with [the tiny rump territory accorded them in the standard two-state model]. We know [they exist] and they deserve to have their voice heard -- but it is utterly unacceptable to silence the voices of the Palestinian majority in the refugee camps, in the diasporas, in the Occupied Territories and among the internal refugees in Israel who want to be part of a state -- not a state erected on 20 percent of the land, but a future state which will include the whole of the country which was once Palestine. There will be neither reconciliation here, nor justice or a permanent solution, if we don't let these Palestinians have a share in solving the questions referring to reconciliation and to defining the sovereignty, the identity and the future of this country." Ibid. My only disagreement with Pappé here is in my belief that two-state condominiumism offers a much more hopeful and realistic way of achieving the inclusive consensus he desires than any of the existing one-state proposals.