Tikkun Magazine, May/June 2009

Healing and Reality in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

By Rafael Reuveny

In 1905, Naguib Azoury, an Ottoman official turned Arab nationalist, proclaimed: "Two important phenomena ... are emerging at this moment in Asiatic Turkey. They are the awakening of the Arab nation and the latent effort of the Jews to reconstitute on a very large scale the ancient kingdom of Israel.... [They] are destined to fight each other continually until one of them wins." Years later, the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin observed in the 1993 signing of the Oslo Accord in Washington, D.C., that Israelis and Palestinians had been traumatized by a "hundred-year war." The Oslo process, however, failed, and the fighting has continued.

Facing a conflict with no end, one can easily despair. Still, I believe there is hope. The Tikkun Community has also not lost hope. Facing the recent flare-up in violence in the Gaza Strip in January 2009, it published a one-page ad in the New York Times, asking President-elect Obama to call for an immediate cease-fire and convene an international peace conference. Can this resolve the conflict? I believe the conflict can be resolved, only the two sides have lost the ability to do so on their own; they need help. The United States can provide meaningful help, in light of its world status and its acceptance as a broker by both sides. But—given that all previous U.S. efforts since 1967 have led nowhere—if we are to reject Azoury's prediction that the conflict will not end until one side is defeated, then we must conclude that something critical has been missing in the previous attempts. This article outlines what I believe that missing element to be.

My thesis begins by referring to things as they are: Israel has been a colonialist state since 1967. Most readers will probably find this statement offensive and inflammatory, but please bear with me; this article is not about criticizing Israel per se, but rather about suggesting a way to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I grew up in Israel and served many years in the Israeli Defense Forces. I now live in the United States, but Israel commands a special place in my heart. My thesis is empirical, and my argument only applies to the period since 1967. I do not reject the existence of the state of Israel; nor do I see its creation in 1948 as a fundamentally colonial enterprise.

Aware of the status of Tikkun's editor in chief, Rabbi Michael Lerner, I discussed my thesis with him at length in 2008. He rejected it. Referring to his 2003 book Healing Israel/Palestine, he argued that Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution should emphasize healing wounded spirits on both sides. Would a peace movement, he asked, use the term "colonialism" to build support in Israel or the United States? How can blaming one side help resolve the current conflict? These are, of course, very important questions, and I will return to them in due course.

My article is motivated by and reflects our lengthy and stimulating discourse. I analyze the question of conflict resolution against a backdrop of historical colonialism. This methodology has rarely been used in the non-antagonistic manner I employ here. The benefit of my analytical approach is that, by placing the conflict in a historical comparative perspective, it reveals that the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not, after all, unique. The lessons from colonial history about how to bring freedom to a colony to the mutual benefit of both sides are actually applicable to Israel today. I admire the Tikkun Community's call for a mutual change in consciousness, repentance, atonement, and healing on both sides, but I believe that this fundamental and important spiritual change cannot begin before Israel decolonizes to its 1967 border. My thesis, as we shall see, will indicate how to bring about this tikkun olam.

From Inter-Communal Conflict to Colonialism

Because colonialism is a loaded term, a colonial interpretation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—in which the Palestinians are the colonial or native people, Israel is the metropole or colonial ruler, and the Territories are the colony—must be empirically substantiated. It is useful to first discuss whether historical Zionism was colonialist and whether Israel was, in its origins and pre-1967 actions, a colonialist state.

About 3,000 years ago, the Zionists' ancestors, the biblical Jews, conquered the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, also known as Palestine or biblical Israel. Years later, they lost control to Rome. In the first and second centuries CE, the Jews revolted; Rome prevailed and exiled them. In the seventh century, the Arabs conquered Palestine. When the Zionists began immigrating to Palestine in the 1880s, they met the ancestors of the Arabs and the local non-Jewish residents, the Palestinians, who inhabited this part of the Ottoman Empire.

The Zionists practiced colonization without colonialism, as they immigrated to Palestine as private individuals, not in the name of any state, and purchased land from Palestinians instead of forcefully seizing it. Within a few years, they began clashing with the Palestinians, but even then the conflict was not colonial; rather it was a clash between two communities claiming the same land. In 1918, the British took over, but the Zionist-Palestinian conflict continued.

The term "colonialism" is also not appropriate in describing the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. The Zionists accepted the United Nations-brokered two-state solution in 1947, but the Palestinians rejected it and demanded all of Palestine. By 1948, the conflict had escalated to an all-out war. As a result of that war, the Zionists won control over 78 percent of Palestine and formed the state of Israel. Jordan and Egypt won control over the remaining 22 percent and essentially ignored the Palestinian aspirations for independence. Some Palestinians became Israeli citizens, but most became refugees in Arab states.

After 1949, Israelis accepted the borders of their new state. Only a minority longed for the remaining 22 percent of biblical Israel, the Territories, and even their zeal for this land was fading. The young state of Israel discriminated against its Palestinian citizens in various ways, all in the name of national security, but it did not cancel their voting rights. This system, which resembled internal colonialism, was vanishing in the late 1950s and was dismantled by Israel in 1966. The next Israeli colonial drive would prove much more intense and resilient. (For empirical support and historical sources see my 2008 article in The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy, 12:325-374).

Historical colonialism typically involved states expanding intentionally beyond their borders. The Israeli case belongs to a smaller set, in which colonialism started almost accidentally, as a result of war. In 1967, facing threats by its Arab neighbors, Israel fought Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and occupied the Territories (and other lands). Israeli colonialism advanced incrementally until 1977, when Israel openly claimed the Territories, turning them into a settler colony.

In the last 500 years, there were several forms of settler colonies. In one form, settlers were a minority. Aided by the metropole, they heavily discriminated against natives and seized their lands and resources, as in French Algeria; Portuguese Angola and Mozambique; The Dutch East Indies (Indonesia); British South Africa, Rhodesia, and Kenya; German Southwest Africa (Namibia); and Italian Libya. This form of settler colonialism applies to Israel after 1967.

As with other colonial powers, the state of Israel promoted colonization in the Territories, providing its settlers benefits such as subsidies, loans, grants, housing, low taxes, transport, and land. The state also employed the settlers and developed their infrastructures, defended them, and fought their wars against the Palestinians. Historically, settlers typically came to colonies to find riches or promote metropolitan interests. Most Israeli settlers came to the Territories for similar reasons.

One particular group of settlers, the religious Zionists, came to the Territories in the name of God, believing God sent them to their promised land. This group is also not unique historically. Religious motivations for settlement were also observed among the early English settlers in North America, the Boers and the Afrikaners in South Africa, some of the Dutch settlers in the East Indies, the white settlers in Rhodesia, and the French settlers in Algeria and Tunisia. All of these settler societies said the land they colonized belonged to them in the name of God, and God had sent them there. Some identified the land with the biblical Promised Land. The French in North Africa saw themselves returning to reclaim lands held by Christians long ago.

Similar to other settlers throughout history, Israeli settlers have exerted high influence on Israeli politics. As in the case of French Algeria, they have voted and served as Knesset members and ministers in the metropole. Their population has grown over time, reaching about 500,000 today, on par with the number of settlers in Portuguese Africa. But as in all settler colonies in Asia and Africa, they have remained a small minority in the Territories.

The situation in the Territories has standard colonial attributes, including social segregation; separate laws for settlers and natives; settlers interacting with natives only economically, employing them in menial, low-paying jobs; settlers and other Israelis looking down on natives; and Palestinians having few rights, requiring Israeli permits for daily affairs. As with other colonial societies, there is a high settler-native income inequality in the Territories. Israeli settlers typically live in spacious villas or nice apartments and control disproportionally large shares of local waters and lands, while many Palestinians live in wretched conditions. There is also frequent settler-native violence in the Territories, where the two sides attack each other, and some settlers seize native lands and ruin local properties. The Israeli authorities generally employ a relatively soft hand against settler violations of Israeli law and offenses against Palestinians.

Like all metropoles, Israel has invested little in the local economy of its colony, which has evolved to serve Israel's needs and become dependent upon it. Seeking to reduce the cost of controlling their colonies, many metropoles offered colonized subjects a semblance of self-rule but promoted native leaders thought to be amenable to the metropole's influence. Israel has done so as well.

Unlike the historical Zionists who legally purchased land from Palestinians, Israel has turned primarily to seizure as a tool for acquiring land and water for the settlers in the Territories. Like most other colonial rulers, Israel has ruled the Territories as separate administrative units without formally annexing them. In time, the military administration set up in 1967 has turned into a civilian one, introducing the usual colonial routinization of daily life. While in 1947 the Zionists accepted a Palestinian state, between 1967 and 2003 Israel formally rejected the Palestinian right of political self-determination. Even now it is unclear whether the Palestinian entity that Israel has in mind will be fully sovereign. This too, we shall see next, has historical parallels.

Colonial Revolt and Partial Decolonization

Regardless of why they came to colonies, settlers throughout history tried to create a reality in which they, not the natives, would call the shots. Only a few colonial settler communities succeeded in meeting this goal (e.g., those in North America, Australia, and New Zealand), but all the native societies rejected the transformation and often revolted. Before 1945, colonial revolts were typically localized and were subdued relatively easily. After 1945, they turned into long and bitter general uprisings, which initially took metropoles by surprise. The Israel-Palestinian violence since 1967 has mirrored this pattern.

Before 1987, there were pockets of Palestinian anti-Israeli violence, but Israel easily subdued them. In 1987, the resentment felt by Palestinians exploded into a general revolt, surprising Israel. The violence has essentially continued since 1987. Through this, Israel has continued colonizing, as did most twentieth-century colonial powers, which continued expanding settlements until the last days of their control of settler colonies after 1945.

Historical colonial revolts exhibited common attributes. Facing a much stronger opponent, rebels resorted to guerrilla warfare against settlers and soldiers and, when feasible, attacked metropoles, as in the Irish and Algerian cases. Settlers demanded strong responses and attacked natives. From time to time, colonial rulers launched large military campaigns against rebels, who would then vanish into friendly local masses, preparing to fight another day. Seeking to stem the mass support, all rulers used collective punishments, including roadblocks, checkpoints, blockades, curfews, destroying properties, rough questioning, and fences. The Israel example also exhibits these attributes.

Colonial wars divided both the colonized and colonizer societies. Seeking to improve their lives, some natives became informers and even joined colonial armies, as in Algeria, Angola, British America, and Indonesia. The Palestinian example is similar. As the colonial revolt went on, the rulers faced a dilemma. Staying meant an endless war and inevitably crossing ethical lines. Settlers and their supporters rejected the option of leaving, while other citizens in the metropole pushed for decolonization. Ultimately, tensions grew, pushing metropoles to the brink of civil war. Israel has experienced similar social strife.

Historically, colonial conflicts in settler colonies ended in four ways. First, settlers killed many natives and seized most of their land and resources. With continued settler immigration and a shrinking native population, the settlers eventually became the majority and won statehood from the metropole, often following a war (e.g., Spanish and British America). Settler states continued to fight natives, but years later granted equal rights to the remaining few, forming a joint state controlled by the settlers (e.g., the United States). Second, the metropole annexed its colonies, but the new state eventually broke into many states (as in the former USSR). Third, settlers formed a state that excluded the native majority, as in South Africa and Rhodesia. The natives revolted, and the settlers gave up control, leading to a joint state controlled by the native majority. Fourth, the native majority rebelled. The metropoles and settler minorities resorted to the use of force but eventually decolonized, most settlers left, and the natives formed a state (e.g., Algeria, Indonesia).

Which of these end games applies here? Unlike the settlers in the first end game, Israeli settlers have not used extreme demographic methods against Palestinians, who have remained the large majority in the Territories. While some Israeli politicians have called to transfer the Palestinians to neighboring countries, the idea has never caught on. The Palestinians also own much of the land in the Territories, despite the Israeli land seizures. The options of forming a joint Israeli-Palestinian state, as in South Africa, or an Israeli-Palestinian federation dominated by Jerusalem, as in the USSR, are also not relevant, as both sides reject them. Thus we must consider the fourth end game: decolonization.

Decolonization was always the result of a huge, partly subconscious cost-benefit analysis. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the analysis was quite simple: metropolitan rulers were kicked out by settlers. After 1945, decolonization became complex. The natives demanded independence and revolted when rulers rejected their demand. In the metropoles, more people began to believe that colonialism was unethical and/or too expensive to sustain. Abroad, people came to reject colonial norms. In the end, metropolitan fatigue, defined as the sum of these forces, grew, leading to decolonization.

These forces are also evident in the current conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinians revolted in 1987 and 2000. The world community has called on Israel to cease the occupation. At home, many Israelis have called the occupation unethical and a waste of resources, and some even refused to serve as soldiers in the West Bank. Slowly, Israeli officials have begun taking steps to dismantle colonial control. In 1994, Israel formed a Palestinian Authority (PA) and granted it several enclaves. In December 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak agreed to withdraw from most of the Territories. In late 2003, Israeli and Palestinian officials signed an informal accord in Geneva, calling on Israel to leave the Territories. Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon called the occupation immoral and accepted the idea of Palestinian statehood, and in 2005, he dismantled four settlements in the West Bank and evacuated the Gaza Strip, all steps he had rejected in the past. The following government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert held talks with the PA, reportedly offering it most of the West Bank, and the largest Israeli political party, Kadima, supports a two-state solution.

Still, Israel has only partially decolonized, insistent on keeping a foothold in the Territories and the Palestinian entity, and this position seems to have hardened following the 2009 general elections. Israeli colonialism remains for three reasons: Palestinian fatigue, support from some Israelis, and, as we shall see shortly, implicit U.S. support.

In recent years, Palestinian fatigue seems to have grown after years of violent struggle, and their general revolt seems to have subsided. However, historic examples, the continuation of sporadic attacks in the West Bank and within Israel's pre-1967 borders, and the recent flaring of large-scale violence in the Gaza Strip suggest the Palestinians could revolt again.

Israelis have intensely debated the fate of the Territories since 1987. The debate intensified in the early 1990s, leading to the killing of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, and peaked again on the eves of the 2000 Camp David Summit and 2005 evacuation of the Gaza Strip. The settlers and their supporters have rejected a pullout from the Territories and, as occurred in other colonies, a few have threatened to use arms to prevent it. Haunted by an old claim attributing the loss of biblical Israel to disunity facing Rome, many Israelis fear that a pullout will break Israel, so they insist on maintaining a presence in the colony. This conduct too is not unique: some historic metropoles were also deeply attached to their colonies. For example, to the French people, Algeria was part and parcel of France; to the Portuguese, Angola was an overseas province; and to the Dutch, Indonesia was considered vital. Facing settler and right-wing domestic opposition to decolonization, these colonial rulers, like Israel, refused to fully let go, while the natives, like the Palestinians, rejected partial decolonization.

The readers of this article would probably accept the empirical essence of my analysis, but as Rabbi Lerner explains, the most important criterion in evaluating the usefulness of a certain framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be whether it contributes to conflict resolution. In the remainder of this article, I show how my analysis contributes to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, beginning with the tikkunish idea of healing.

Healing and Decolonization

It should now be clear that since 1967 the Israeli-Palestinian relationship has exhibited virtually all aspects of the settler colonialism witnessed previously in Africa and Asia. These colonial situations ended only following decolonization. Rabbi Lerner argues that the decision of a dominant society to let go requires healing wounded spirits on both sides. In letting go of power, the dominant society needs to feel secure that the formerly colonized will not attempt to wipe out their former colonizer. The changes in South Africa, he says, could not have occurred without Nelson Mandela, whose moral authority enabled blacks to emphasize healing and reconciliation, assuring the whites they would not be kicked off the land once the blacks gained power.

I agree that the willingness of the blacks to emphasize healing and reconciliation played a role in South Africa, but unlike their South African counterparts, large majorities of both Israelis and Palestinians reject a joint state, reducing the importance of healing and reconciliation in this case. In fact, after 1945 these forces played a minor role in decolonization in Asia and Africa, as colonizers and colonized parted. Even in South Africa, the healing and reconciliation came later, and it may not have ended the conflict yet.

By the 1960s, violent resistance by blacks intensified in South Africa, leading the white regime to declare a state of emergency in 1985. In 1986, the U.S. Congress imposed severe, compulsory sanctions over a presidential veto, overturning President Reagan's "constructive engagement." White South African fatigue grew, and many came to reject apartheid, forming the National Democratic Movement in 1987. Facing these pressures, South Africa began to remove restrictions even as violence continued. In 1990, the government released Mandela from his prison in South Africa, and the healing began.

Today, the large majority of blacks in South Africa still live in poverty. South Africa is the world's most economically unequal country, ridden by one of the highest crime rates. Whites still hold the majority of fertile land and wealth. Blacks press the government to seize lands whites took from blacks. In May 2008, the underlying rage led to black violence against black migrants, blaming them for taking jobs away from residents. If the healing model stumbles in South Africa, the one colonial case supporting it, taking this approach without fixing the colonial distortions seems futile in our case.

More broadly, consider the role of healing and reconciliation in addressing crime. Our system of law does not mandate the offended side to "make nice" so that the offender feels secure in stopping the offense; we force offenders to stop their offense. Healing and reconciliation sometimes come later.

Bringing about Conflict Resolution

Assuming my analysis is correct, how could a tikkunish American peace movement help to bring about conflict resolution? Colonial logic suggests Israel has not decolonized because the level of its metropolitan fatigue has not crossed a certain threshold. Thus, an American peace movement should work to promote Israeli metropolitan fatigue, but this raises questions surrounding how to promote fatigue. Recalling that after 1945 metropolitan fatigue was driven by colonial, domestic, and international forces, should our peace movement promote a new general Palestinian revolt? Should it attempt to foster Israeli support for decolonization? Should it attempt to foster international support?

Promoting a new Palestinian general revolt would defeat the purpose of conflict resolution. Fostering support for decolonization in Israel also is problematic. Israelis would likely reject any reference to what they do in the Territories as colonialism. In contrast, working from the outside might work. Israel is at the point where the colonial rulers facing revolts after 1945 were on the eve of their own decolonization. They too sought to keep a foot in the colony. What made the difference was yet another force: the United States.

When colonized societies revolted after 1945, the United States faced a dilemma. Colonialism negated its core values, but the colonizers were its allies in the Cold War. At first, the United States supported its allies, but then changed its policy, concluding that colonial rule did not serve its own interests. For example, the United States granted the Netherlands development aid after World War II and the Dutch used American-made weapons in Indonesia. When in 1948 it became apparent that the new Indonesian government would be anti-Communist, the United States forced the Dutch to decolonize, threatening to cut all Marshall Plan and military aid. By the early 1950s, the United States funded most of the French war effort in Indochina, but in 1954 the United States refused to answer the French cry for help to save France's stranded garrison in Dien Bien Phu, concluding that assisting the French in Vietnam was too risky and even unnecessary, thus effectively ending the French rule. As another example, the United States adopted a soft approach toward South Africa, but in 1986 it concluded the costs outweighed the benefits and enforced severe sanctions, essentially bringing about an end to apartheid.

Similar to its initial approach to the European colonialism and South African apartheid in the post-1945 era, the United States has shielded Israel from international pressures to leave the Territories, granted it more than $150 billion in aid since the late 1960s, and supplied most of its arms. The U.S. government plans to grant Israel $3 billion per year during the next decade, putting Israel at the top of the list, by far, of states receiving U.S. aid, excluding the special case of Iraq. This aid is effectively fungible. Had these funds not been available, Israel would have had to cut other expenses to finance the colonization, causing it difficulty and probably weakening domestic support for this project. Despite U.S. insistence that Israel not spend its aid in the Territories, the United States has essentially helped Israel to finance its colonial project.

If an American movement that seeks Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution will focus its effort on compelling Israeli decolonization, can it bring about a change in U.S. policy? I believe the answer is yes. To begin with, the history of colonialism suggests the United States may fundamentally change its approach to the West Bank. When the United States changed its policy in the past, it concluded that colonial rule no longer served its interests. Our case may be similar, for it is unclear whether the benefit to the United States from implicitly supporting the Israeli presence in the Territories outweighs the cost. Whereas the United States-Israel relationship seems special, I believe that many Americans are not fully aware of what the U.S. policy enables Israel to do in the Territories.

Equally important, many Americans may not be aware that the United States' implicit support of the Israeli colonial project is in fact putting Israel at risk. Today there are already almost as many Palestinians as Jews in the land lying between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. In a decade or two, there may well be more Palestinians than Jews, turning the land into a mini version of South Africa under apartheid, should the colonial status quo continue. From then on, pressures to form a joint Israeli-Palestinian state would become insurmountable. While in theory such a state could be stable and is in fact a noble idea, in practice it would likely exhibit endless intense bickering over land, property, retribution, and power sharing. Indeed, as noted, large majorities on both sides do not seek to form a joint state.

I believe a concerted and persistent effort to foster support in the United States for Israeli decolonization will contribute to conflict resolution. The effort I have in mind goes far beyond calling on the United States to affirm its support for the two-state solution or convene yet another peace conference. What we need is to bring about an American change of heart, recognizing the Israeli enterprise in the Territories as colonialist and employing a policy similar to that it employed after 1945 for other colonialists. In short, what I have in mind is tough American love that will literally force Israel to decolonize to the 1967 border, much along the lines of parents forcing their kid to stop an improper behavior.

Will Israel comply? There are ample examples of Israeli compliance with U.S. wishes. Nixon forced Israel to stop attacking the besieged Third Egyptian Army in the 1973 war. Nixon and Ford pushed Israel to leave parts of the Sinai Peninsula and Syria. Carter prevailed upon Israel to withdraw from the Sinai and admit that the Palestinians deserved political rights. Reagan convinced Israel to let PLO forces retreat from Beirut. George H.W. Bush prompted Israel to open talks with the Palestinians. Clinton compelled Prime Minister Netanyahu to sign agreements with the PA. George W. Bush compelled Prime Minister Sharon to accept a Palestinian state, and President-elect Barack Obama apparently pressed Israel to stop its recent military operation in the Gaza Strip before his inauguration. In each case, the Israeli government did as it was told.

Should the United States pressure Israel to decolonize, Israel would most likely comply. In fact, it might have no choice but to comply. A country that receives most of its arms, including virtually all of the planes of its celebrated air force, and approximately $3 billion a year from another country, which also shields it from international sanctions, is not truly free to make independent decisions.

While the conflict since 1967 is firmly grounded in the history of colonialism, it does have some unique features (like all conflicts). For example, geography presents the two sides with an option, which was much harder to implement in other colonial episodes. Since the colony and metropole are adjacent, the two sides might decide it is in their best interest to swap certain land areas. This exchange may provide Israel with a way to lessen settler opposition to decolonization by allowing some settlements to stay in place.

The issue of the Palestinian refugees provides another example. Although moral arguments favor their return to the areas they left, which are now within the pre-1967 Israeli borders, Israelis strongly reject it, in line with their rejection of a joint state. The issue lies outside our colonial perspective, for the war of 1948, which caused it, was not colonial. One practical solution seems to be that in return for Israeli decolonization and acceptance of some responsibility for the problem, the Palestinians would settle the issue by accepting financial compensation and returning to their own state. This could begin the process of healing, but, again, it is predicated on decolonization.

Can the settlers be brought home without a civil war? Public opinion polls suggest that the great majority will leave the settlements if offered compensation and assistance with relocation. The remaining religious and right-wing hard-liners may attempt some physical or even armed resistance, but they will be no match for the police and IDF. The polling data suggest they do not have the necessary numbers to prevail. There may be some deaths. But if the Israeli government pursues decolonization with great resolve, as Prime Minister Sharon's government did in the summer of 2005, there will probably be no deaths, or the deaths will be much fewer than many fear.

The idea of decolonization has considerable support in Israel, but all in all it seems that only the United States could make it happen. I believe that pro-Israel Americans are best positioned to bring this policy about by pressing the president and congress to do so. I know that this is not an easy thing to ask; we all feel a strong urge to assure that Masada will not fall again, but Israel is really not Masada—it is a militarily strong and advanced country, and decolonization does not threaten its existence. On the contrary, in the grand scheme of things, tough American love, forcing Israel to return to the 1967 border and accept a Palestinian state in the Territories, would be a much more valuable gift than the billions of dollars the United States grants Israel every year. It would consign Israel's colonial project to its final resting place in the annals of history and deliver the Sons of Israel to freedom.

Rafael (Rafi) Reuveny is a professor of political economy in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, Bloomington. He holds a dual Israeli-American citizenship, lived in Israel many years, and visits there frequently.

Source Citation

Reuveny, Rafael. Healing and Reality in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Tikkun 24(3): 46.