Tikkun Magazine, November/December 2008 

EDITORIAL

Elections in Israel

By Michael Lerner

Ehud Olmert was forced to resign as prime minister of Israel in October, in light of criminal charges against him for misusing his office for personal again. That, in itself, is one reason to applaud Israeli democracy, where the "fuck you" attitude of Vice President Cheney has not yet taken hold. Meanwhile, Olmert continues as interim prime minister until new elections can be held in a few months, because the governing Kadims Party's new leader, Tzipi Livni, was unable to form a new coalition government.

Livni has been hailed as the potential Barack Obama of Israel—a fresh face representing a new generation and ostensibly seeking peace with the Palestinians. While the shrinking Labor Party was happy to join her proposed new coalition government, Livni balked at the demands of another potential partner, the religious-dominated Sephardic Shas party, which exhorted Livni to refuse to engage in any negotiations with the Palestinian Authority about the final status of Jerusalem. Acceding to that demand, however, would have been tantamount to simply calling off negotiations permanently, since the Palestinians will never accept an agreement that does not give the 150,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem some degree of self-government inside a Palestinian state and does not recognize Jerusalem as the shared capital of two states, one of them Palestinian.

But did Livni really have to go to new elections as the only way to "save the peace process?" Not everyone thinks so. Some in the peace movement point to the fact that Livni never invited the ten Arab members of the Knesset to consider joining her potential coalition government, thus continuing the disgraceful and racist policy of treating Arab Israelis (full citizens of the State of Israel) as inferior or suspect beings whose votes are somehow illegitimate.

In fact, it is this racism that will certainly weaken the Kadima Party as it seeks to be an alternative to the even more militarist visions of Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud Party. Kadima came to power because it presented itself as a centrist coalition ready to make "painful concessions to the Palestinians in exchange for a lasting peace." (It was composed of Likudniks who supported Ariel Sharon's ploy of a withdrawal from Gaza, plus Labor Party centrists who joined Kadima's ruling coalition.)

As is usual in societies where the Strategy of Domination pre-dominates over the Strategy of Generosity, the strange bedfellows who created this supposedly moderate coalition felt that they had to establish credibility to make the "painful concessions." After Sharon's stroke and coma, the coalition members could no longer depend on the murderous legacy of Ariel Sharon to give them "street cred," so they picked another path—a war with Lebanon. They justified the war by pointing to a Hezbollah attack against uniformed Israeli soldiers, amazingly labeling that as an act of "terror" (thereby conflating terror with armed struggle among competing armies).

The result was a humiliating defeat that exposed as fantasy the lightning-quick victory expected by Israeli militarists. Hezbollah proved its capacity to shell northern Israel in response to Israel's massive bombing of southern Lebanon, and the was proved politically expensive in terms of Israeli lives lost and the insecurity experienced by half of the country. Kadima Prime Minister Ehud Olmert sought to minimize the political damage by replacing Amir Peretz—a Labor Party "dove" turned hawk for the sake of "credibility" so that maybe in the future he could negotiate peace with Palestinians—with Labor Party militarist extraordinaire Ehud Barak. But this did not prove sufficient to overcome "the shame" of military failure in Lebanon. And since Labor was bound into the same militarist logic as Kadima, public opinion shifted to ward right-wing extremist Netanyahu of Likud, proving once again an old Tikkun theory: If people want a militarist, they'll seek the real thing and not accept centrist who are just posing as militarists.

When Olmert was also exposed for allegedly illegal financial dealings, he was forced to resign. By a small plurality, Tzipi Livni became the candidate for prime minister in the subsequent elections. To prove her credibility as a hawk, Livni decided to reinstate in the second position on her list the super-militarist former IDF General Shaul Mofaz, whose hatred of Arabs and Palestinians might have made him more appropriate as a candidate of the far right.

With the two leading parties vying to be the toughest in negotiations with the Palestinians (and with Likud barely acknowledging that there would be a need for any agreement), the outcome is certain: The winner will be a party without a clear mandate to engage in peaceful reconciliation or the dismantling of West Bank checkpoint and roadblocks, and much less to make serious concessions on issues like Jerusalem and refugees.

Is this a perfect moment for Meretz to re-emerge as the peace party? It didn't look that way to Yossi Beilin, who resigned as chair of the party to return to private life and pursue a peace-oriented consulting firm. Perhaps more hopeful is news that some peace activists are considering creation of a peace-oriented Green party for the coming elections. Yet we doubt any political party has much of a chance as long as it plays on the terrain of what is considered "realistic" in the currently dominant Israeli way of thinking. Peace for Israel, like peace for the United States, requires the popularization of a different way of thinking—rejecting militarism as the core of foreign policy, and giving at least equal emphasis to a Strategy of Generosity and a Global Marshall Plan. While the American media may describe Livni as "the peace candidate," the truth is that no one can play that role without affirming the humanity of the Palestinian people and the centrality of a reconciliation of the heart between the two sides. Livni took a step in the wrong direction by refusing to consider Arabs as part of her coalition.

Source Citation

Lerner, Michael. 2008. Elections in Israel. Tikkun 23(6): 14.