It Takes Two to Tango: From Unilateral to Bilateral Plans   

Tikkun Magazine, November/December 2005

It Takes Two to Tango: From Unilateral to Bilateral Plans

by Shamai K. Leibowitz

Between August 15 and September 12, the Israeli government executed its hotly debated unilateral Disengagement plan, evacuating twenty-one Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip and four Jewish settlements in the West Bank, along with dismantling its regional military installations. Authorized by the Israeli government in June 2004, the Disengagement was the first official plan ever published by an Israeli government in which Israel explicitly agreed to dismantle Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. It is not surprising, therefore, that the international media was full of praise for Prime Minister Sharon and his government, hailing the Disengagement as a "historic moment" and a "turning point" in the violent history of Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

However, the Disengagement plan was harmful to the peace process for two basic reasons: (1) It does not effectively end the Israeli Occupation of the Gaza Strip, and (2) it announces Israel's plans to consolidate the Occupation and annex at least a significant part of the West Bank.

Moreover, the Disengagement plan was in clear violation of the Quartet-proposed Road Map For Peace, which set out a framework and timetable for establishing an "independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state, living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors" by 2005. With the Disengagement plan constituting the "only game in town" for nearly a year and a half, it became an excuse for Israel to frustrate the application and execution of the only existing—and mutually agreed upon—bilateral initiative to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The World's Largest Prison

According to the terms of the Disengagement, Israel retains exclusive control over Gaza's airspace and continues to guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, with the exception of its southernmost border. It seals off Gaza from the ocean by having granted security control of its coastline to the Israeli navy. The Disengagement plan similarly gave Israel control of Gaza's water supply, electricity, and communications infrastructure. According to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, by the standards of international law, even though Israeli forces are no longer present in the Gaza Strip, Israel still remains an Occupying Power.

Analyzing these elements of the Disengagement plan, the inescapable conclusion is that it was merely a restructuring of the Occupation. Instead of controlling the lives of Palestinians from within, Israel now controls Gaza from without. Effectively, Israel has turned Gaza into the world's largest open-air prison, with 1.3 million Palestinian inmates. Despite such facts, the Disengagement has created an undeniable precedent that can be construed as a first step towards a comprehensive withdrawal from the entirety of the Occupied Territories. In order to constructively embrace this possibility, it is necessary that we think through how this might be achieved by negotiation, rather than by unilateral decisions by the Israeli government.

A Three-Step Transformation Plan

STEP 1: NEGOTIATE. The Israeli government must officially convert its Disengagement initiative into a bilateral agreement that will call for both Israelis and Palestinians to take significant steps towards realizing the goals of the Road Map.

The desired result would be an initiative that would supersede all previous plans and agreements: a Comprehensive Bilateral Peacebuilding Plan. The aim of the CBPP would be to take the current Disengagement plan and transform it by setting out a detailed blueprint for achieving the goals set forth in the Road Map. The main guidelines of the Peacebuilding Plan should include achieving complete sovereignty for the Palestinians (and not chicaneries like Oslo), imposing an unequivocal obligation—on both Israelis and Palestinians—to comply fully with international human rights covenants, zero-tolerance policy toward killing or harming civilians, establishing joint media enterprises, and ensuring an economic recovery plan for Palestinian society.

STEP 2: FOLLOW THE WORLD BANK'S RECOMMENDATIONS. In its December 2004 report, the World Bank analyzed the Disengagement plan and issued several key recommendations. It pointed out that for a Palestinian economic recovery to be possible, the Israeli government will need to roll back the system of restrictions on the movement of people and goods imposed since the beginning of the Intifada, and allow a third-party deployment in security and customs arrangements. To effectively harmonize the Disengagement plan with the goals set forth in the Road Map, the World Bank recommended the following steps:

• Deploy a neutral international force to monitor the Gaza border crossings and also serve as a dispute resolution mechanism.

• Dismantle the system of over 700 checkpoints and barriers in the West Bank.

• Establish a secure, efficient and reliable Gaza-West Bank transport link.

• Permit the construction of a roll-on, roll-off cargo port in Gaza, and allow for a helicopter service between Gaza and the West Bank and Jordan.

• Israel must maintain, at a minimum, the current Palestinian labor levels within Israel at least until the end of the decade.

The Israelis and Palestinians should incorporate these recommendations into a formal binding agreement, as these recommendations are extremely important due to the dire state of the Palestinian economy. Given the depth of the economic crisis in Gaza and the West Bank, securing work and a future for one's family features very high on the agenda of the ordinary Palestinian and has a direct correlation to issues of security and stability. For example, instead of "washing off" Gaza's 1.3 million inhabitants, Israel should have a vested interest in offering them economic growth and prosperity. As the World Bank makes clear, this can happen only if the above-mentioned recommendations are implemented.

STEP 3: AGREE ON INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION. The most important component of the World Bank recommendations is the deployment of an international armed peacekeeping force. This is highly critical, because most likely it will be the only way to keep the peace and prevent the eruption of hostilities—which are still predicted due to the many years of occupation and the high levels of hate and desire for revenge that it has created in both Israeli and Palestinian societies.

In June 2003, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan publicly called for the deployment of an international UN buffer force in the West Bank and Gaza, emphasizing that this would be the only way to stabilize the region. Following his call, European Union foreign ministers agreed to consider having EU armed forces take part in a peacekeeping force to be deployed in the region. But Israel's objections scuttled the plan and the international community took no further action.

The Disengagement marks a perfect time to revive this idea and implement it. Under this model, deployment of international peacekeeping forces would be implemented through a Security Council resolution that would establish a UN-based "INTERFIP" (International Forces In Israel/Palestine). These forces would assume the task of a supervisory authority, be deployed in security and customs arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza, and monitor Gaza's seaport, airport, and border crossings. INTERFIP forces would be authorized to restore peace and security in the West Bank and Gaza, protect and guard Israel's borders against infiltrations, and facilitate humanitarian assistance operations to the Palestinian population. In addition, they would serve as liaison between Israeli security forces and the Palestinian security authorities.

Former NATO generals have suggested a different version of international intervention, publicly supporting the deployment of NATO forces in the West Bank and Gaza. NATO is perhaps better-suited to this task than the UN because both Israel and the Palestinian Authority would feel comfortable with NATO. Any NATO peacekeeping force in the region would report to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, who is always a U.S. officer, thereby allaying Israeli concerns, while European involvement should satisfy Palestinians.

Overcoming Israel's Longtime Objections

Since the first Intifada, Israel has refused to agree to the deployment of international forces in the Occupied Territories out of fear of relinquishing control over its security to a third party. Recently, when World Bank representatives brought up this possibility in their discussions with the Israeli government, the Israelis again fiercely resisted the idea. However, despite successive Israeli governments' sole reliance on their own security forces, the Israel Defence Forces have failed to bring security to the Israeli people. The closures, curfews, and checkpoints that Israel has imposed in the Occupied Territories have yielded dismal results. Through public pressure and diplomacy, the Israeli government must be persuaded to reconsider its position on this issue. The reasons for doing so couldn't be more obvious.

For the past five years, Israel has been afflicted by more terror and violence than any other country in the industrialized world. Despite Israel's huge investment of money, resources, and human effort in building and maintaining the most powerful army in the Middle East, Israel has become the place in the world where the chances of a Jew being killed just for being a Jew are the greatest. This fact, all too often ignored by the mainstream Israeli press, proves that Israel needs to rethink its overall security strategy far beyond withdrawing behind a Separation Wall and securing its perimeters with remote-controlled combat vehicles and high tech sensors. Israel must understand that a strong, well-armed international peacekeeping force is in its best interest.

A similar idea has worked between Israel and Egypt. In 1981, following the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) were deployed in the Sinai to maintain the peace between Israel and Egypt and prevent rearmament of the Egyptian Sinai. It has some 2,000 troops from eleven countries (including two U.S. battalions) operating under U.S. civilian and military leadership. The general calm on the Israeli-Egyptian border that has prevailed and the good relations between Israel and Egypt prove the MFO is an effective and successful model. The deployment of a similarly comprised international force to the West Bank and Gaza could be highly effective and meaningful.

Diplomacy, Lobbying, and Economic Pressure

Since the Palestinian Authority has officially welcomed international intervention, the international community must focus on pressuring Israel to agree to this idea. The international community can pressure the Israeli government by making economic aid dependent upon the acceptance of the deployment of an international peacekeeping force.

A key element in getting Israel's agreement would be the American Jewish community. This powerful and organized community should mobilize its institutions to apply pressure on Congress and the American ambassador to the UN to ensure that when the UN Security Council issues a resolution to deploy international peacekeeping forces to the West Bank and Gaza, the U.S. will not veto it. Moreover, American Jewish organizations can coordinate a lobbying campaign whereby they meet with Israeli politicians to persuade them of the great benefits that lie in international intervention—especially in the form of US-led NATO intervention.

Some Israeli politicians, such as former Israeli Minister of Internal Security Shlomo Ben Ami, have already expressed support for this idea. By sending experts to meet with Israeli politicians, and especially by linking economic aid and donations to the implementation of this idea, it is not improbable that Israel will eventually agree to the deployment of peacekeeping forces.

Learning from Past Mistakes

While raising illusory hopes, the Disengagement plan is really worsening the already dire economic situation in the Occupied Territories and likely to cause a return to the familiar cycle of violence. Though it was launched with much media attention and fanfare, it does not promise a brighter future for Israel and the Palestinians. Israelis, Palestinians, and the international community need only look back to the failed Oslo Accords to realize that declarations, unilateral steps, and interim agreements do not guarantee progress and peace.

Many experts have attributed the deterioration and eventual collapse of the Oslo Accords to the flawed idea of "interim agreements" and the absence of international peacekeeping forces to monitor and enforce those "interim agreements." The same mistakes should not be repeated. One of the most fundamental concepts in Judaism is teshuva (repentance). Even peacebuilders must do teshuva. If Israeli and Palestinian peacebuilders are to correct their past mistakes, they must immediately announce their willingness to transform the disastrous unilateral Disengagement plan into a Comprehensive Bilateral Peacebuilding Plan. The Israeli government must be pressured until it declares its acceptance of the Road Map, its willingness to comply with human rights treaties (including the prohibition on summary executions, house demolitions, and construction and expansion of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem), and its agreement—in the interim period—to the deployment of international peacekeeping forces.

At the same time, Palestinian leaders should condemn, more loudly and unequivocally than they are doing today, any form of terror. Furthermore, they should engage in a public relations campaign reaching out to Israelis, showing that a Palestinian state will be committed to democracy and civil liberties. A significant, albeit little-noticed, step in this direction is the final draft of the Palestinian constitution, which includes strong condemnation of terror ("Palestine is a peace loving state that condemns terror, occupation, and aggression") and a strong emphasis on civil liberties, gender equality, and accountability. Of key importance is Article 5, which states that "the constitution guarantees equality in rights and duties to all citizens irrespective of their religious creed."

By comparison, Israel has no such constitutional provision and, practically speaking, has implemented discriminatory laws and policies that deviate far and wide from this basic democratic principle. This demonstrates the need to focus on constitutional rights in both societies, nurturing a new generation that will be committed to core human rights.

This cannot be done with the presence of an oppressive occupying army. Consequently, deploying a strong, effective international peacekeeping force is essential for the success of the Comprehensive Peacebuilding Plan. It is the basic ingredient that will allow for the flourishing of people-to-people peacebuilding plans and programs. It is now the role of the international community, and especially American Jewry, to seize upon this window of opportunity, and, without any further delay, pressure Israel to allow the deployment of an international peacekeeping force. If the United States wants to act as a true friend and ally, it must join the World Bank, the UN, the EU and ex-NATO generals in demanding that the Israeli government agree to this key concept for the achievement of a secure and peaceful Middle East.

Shamai K. Leibowitz is an Israeli attorney who holds a Master of Laws in International Human Rights Law from American University's Washington College of Law. You can email him at legal@012.net.il.

 

Source Citation

Leibowitz, Shamai K. 2005. It takes two to tango: From unilateral to bilateral plans. Tikkun 20(6):59.